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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This thesis is intended as being a contribution to the debate on the loss of land, 
the causes, the characteristics of the problem and possible measures that can be 
enacted to deal with it, particularly in the case of pastoralists The research was 
conducted as part of the "Access to Land for Low Income Groups in the Third 
World" programme begun in the mid-1980s by the "Department for the Human 
Geography of Developing Regions" of the Faculty of Policy Sciences of the 
Catholic University of Nijmegen This survey later became part of the research 
programme of the "Nijmegen Institute for Comparative Studies in Development 
and Cultural Change' (NICCOS) of that same University 
Since the beginning of the 1980s the loss of land suffered by pastoralists 
became the focus of several studies (see Campbell 1979a, Weicker 1982, Little 
1987 and others) The afore-mentioned studies concentrated on the conflicts 
about and the competition for land between nomadic pastoralism and other 
types of land use such as cultivation and wildlife parks Other researchers have 
studied groups such as Indians, muit, aboriginals, landless agricultural 
labourers, small fanners or squatters in urban areas who are all fighting for 
their rights to land (eg Domer & Sahba 1981, Mbithi & Bames 1973, Sinha 
1984, Kleinpenning 1986, Maas 1986) The struggle for land has become a 
world-wide phenomenon, not restricted to a particular society, place or time 
Moreover, considering the doubling of the world's population within the next 
30 years and the limited area of land available an increase in the number of 
landless agricultura] workers and marginal farmers seems inevitable in the near 
future 
This concern was reflected in the deliberations of the World Conference 
on Agranan Reform and Rural Development of 1979 which stressed the 
importance of access to land and other productive resources as a key 
determinant for rural development and the improvement of rural incomes and 
living standards (see Moreno 1984 v) 
The research presented in this book began in January 1987 and was initially 
meant to be a continuation of fieldwork conducted among the Turkana 
pastoralists of north-westem Kenya Already having lost many of their cattle 
large numbers of these pastoralists had become destitute and dependent on the 
"Food-for-Work" programmes offered by several international organizations It 
was intended to follow-up the pastoralists who had been able to rebuild their 
herds and flocks once again New developments such as an increase in the 
areas cultivated alongside the seasonal nvers and because of tensions with 
neighbounng pastoral groups from Uganda and the Sudan in particular (eg 
Toposa) interfered with this 
However, reports from Turkana in mid-1987 indicated that conducting a 
survey in the border zone with Uganda and Sudan would have been too 
dangerous at that time because of political unrest and civil wars going on in 
both northern Uganda and southern Sudan As a result, and after much 
vi 
consideration, it was decided to chose another area in which to conduct the 
survey. 
In 1982, during my stay in Kikelelwa, a small village at the foot of Mt. 
Kilimanjaro in the Kenyan Kajiado District, I had personally witnessed the rise 
in the struggle for land between Kikuyu and Kamba immigrants and Maasai 
pastoralists who had been the original inhabitants of the area. This experience 
together with hearing many reports from Kajiado of the growing importance of 
the influx of non-Maasai in the district finally made this alternative study the 
most interesting. Moreover ал opportunity presented itself for assisting the 
University of Amsterdam in their supportive activities of a newly started 
integrated regional development project. The Arid and Semi-Arid Development 
Programme (ASAL) of Kajiado District, funded by the Netherlands Ministry of 
Development Co-operation (DGIS), requested assistance in the collection of 
Maasai literature and in the conducting of surveys. 
In the preparation, conduction and analysis of the research as in the final 
writing of this book I have been assisted by many people. In Kenya I owe a 
great debt to Mr. James Kipkan and Mr. Rinus van Klinken and all personnel 
of the ASAL programme for their useful co-operation and their logistic 
support. Thanks are also due to Emily Kimani for additional typing. Mr. A. 
Gutu, Mr. Gideon Kuluo and Mr. P. Ngari and all liaison officers of the 
ASAL-Programme, particularly those in the departments of Water, Livestock 
and Agriculture were of great help in the collection of background data and 
maps. My thanks also to staff members of SNV-Nairobi for logistic support, to 
Mike Mwangi who provided additional basic maps, to Agnes Kikaye for 
reviewing the livestock data, to Oliver Kantai for providing some literature and 
his co-operation in conducting additional fieldwork in Esokota and Nairobi, to 
Father Frans Mol of the Maasai Centre in Lemek for his hospitality, permission 
to copy meters of literature, his educating me in my understanding of some of 
the specific Maasai features and for commenting on earlier drafts of chapters S 
and 6, to Killian Holland of the McGill University of Montreal for interesting 
discussions, to Ruud van Dijck and Jaap van Woerden of the United Nations 
Environment Programme for providing literature and remote sensing data and 
to Peter de Leeuw of the International Livestock Centre for Africa for literature 
and discussion time. 
Much gratitude is due to Mr. J. ole Seitah for the hospitality I enjoyed at 
his home and for his tireless answering of all my questions on the facts and 
figures of Maasai society. He also made a most fruitful contribution to the 
training of the research-assistants. These young Maasai performed a tremendous 
and tiring job while walking or biking many kilometres day and night in 
Maasailand looking for willing respondents. I want to express my deepest 
respect and appreciation to Lemaron Kaanto, Bernard Katitia, Alfred Kesheko, 
William Kereto, Abraham Koshopa, Paul Kunoni, John Leboo, Amos 
Lemayian, Stephen Masenke, Jean Masinde, Joseph Muyaa, Joseph Nkasikasi, 
Daniel Nkobei, Julius Paita, Anthony Sarorit, Siaka Seita, Jonathan Simel, 
Vil 
Peter Shungeya and Thomas Tipanko I would also like to thank all those 543 
respondents who spent so much of their time in listening to and answering our 
questions Ashe Oleng 
Finally I would like to mention my gratitude to all those people who, 
over the years, opened their homes and gave me their friendship which made 
our stay in Kenya a most pleasant experience First and foremost I would like 
to mention Jos Miesen who, since my first arrival, has always been a great help 
and a fnend Thanks also to Niels de Vos, Theo Winder, Jos Verhaak and 
Martin van Leeuwen and to Leonie and Rinus van Klinken for their hospitality, 
to the Catholic Church of Kajiado (particularly to Father Alexander Gollaz) for 
accommodation and a most interesting Christmas Day among the Maasai 
herders of Lenkism, to Kennedy Dulo, Luis Muthana, John Kihiu Mwangi and 
Moses Mwangi for the best friday nights ever and to the families of Michael 
and Agnes Kikaye and Pauline Sairo for sharing their homes and meals with us 
while we were in Kajiado 
In the Netherlands a similar number of people deserve a word of thanks Prof 
Martin Doornbos, Prof Jan Hindennk and Prof Gemt Huizer for reading the 
manuscript, Mrs Angela Needham for helping with the correction of my 
Dutch-English, Ans Wilders for drawing the maps and figures, Huub Schlundt 
Bodien and Mane-José Rutten for additional figures and maps of Embohoi, 
Kitengela, Empuyiankat and Рока, Fred Muijrers for making the bar-diagrams, 
Monique Rutten for reviewing and cross checking literature references, Paul 
Hendriks for valuable hints on the data analysis and for allowing me the use of 
his computer from time to time, Hans Korfage for information on Sua Pan-
Botswana and Bert Toxopeus of the International Institute for Aerospace 
Survey and Earth Sciences (ITC/Enschede) for additional literature For 
supplementary agro-climatic information I am grateful to Mr R van de Weg 
and Mr L Touber of DLO Staring Centnim/Wageningen and Mr H Braun of 
ILRI/Wagemngen Thanks are also due to my previous colleagues of the 
Department of Human Geography of the Catholic University of Nijmegen and 
to Mrs Rietje van Dalen for logistic support I would like to express my 
particular thanks to my three supervisors. Prof Jan Kleinpenning, Dr Ton 
Dietz and Dr Bart Peperkamp They contributed much with their confidence 
and their careful reading of and valuable comments on the draft versions of the 
manuscript Also, I am very grateful to Ton Dietz for the opportunity offered 
by him to join the ASAL-Kajiado backstopping activities 
Finally, the support and interest shown by friends and relatives is highly 
appreciated Much gratitude to my mother and to my late father to whom this 
book is dedicated A special word of thankfulness to my wife Jacqueline who, 
besides experiencing some of the "good times" in Kajiado more than anyone 
was confronted with the "bad times' in the wnting of this book, and to our 
daughter Céline, who knows only the bad times They deserve an apology 
Marcel Rutten Hastière-Lavaux/Nijmegen, September 1992 
Vili 
CONTENTS 
Preface and Acknowledgements ν 
List of Tables xii 
List of Figures xv 
List of Appendices xv 
Introduction 1 
0.1 Nomadic Pastoralism Losing Ground 1 
0.2 Objectives and Methods of Survey 8 
0.3 Organization of the Book 12 
1 Concepts and Framework of the Analysis 13 
1.1 Concepts of Nomadic Pastoralism, Grazing Capacity, Land and 
Poverty 13 
1.11 The concepts of nomadic pastoralism and grazing capacity 13 
1.1.2 The concepts of land, land use rights and landlessness 18 
1.1.3 The concept of poverty 21 
1.2 Access to Land: A Framework for the Analysis 26 
1.2.1 Access to land world-wide 26 
1.2.2 The causes of landlessness and near-landlessness 30 
1.2 3 Government policies towards landlessness 33 
1.24 A framework for the analysis of landlessness 35 
1.3 Summary and Conclusion 40 
2 Kenya: Economy, Land and People 45 
2.1 Introduction 45 
2.2 The Kenyan Economy: Structure and Performance 47 
2.2 1 Introduction 47 
2.2.2 The Kenyan livestock sector 49 
2.3 (Un)employment and Economic Development Policy 65 
2.4 The Unequal Distribution of Land 69 
2 4.1 Introduction 69 
2.4 2 The distribution and availability of land 70 
2.4 3 Kenyan land (use) policy 79 
2.5 Summary and Conclusion 85 
3 The Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL) of Kenya 89 
3.1 Introduction 89 
3.2 The Location and Mam Characteristics of And and Semi-
And Kenya 89 
3.3 Cultivation in Kenya's Semi-And Lands 92 
3.4 Livestock Production in Kenya's And and Semi-And Lands 95 
3 5 Government Policy Towards the And and Semi-And Lands 103 
3.6 Summary and Conclusion 112 
4 Kajiado District: the Eastern Home of the Maasai 113 
4.1 The Physical Environment and Natural Resources 113 
4.11 Rainfall, evaporation and temperatures 115 
4.1.2 The vegetation of Kajiado Distnct 118 
IX 
4.1.3 Agro-climatic zones and carrying capacity 120 
4.2 Administrative and Political Units 
4.3 Kajiado District Human Population 128 
4.3.1 Maasai origin and socio-culture: myths and facts 128 
4.3.2 Population-numbers and structure 135 
4.3.3 Education 139 
4.3.4 Health sector 143 
4.4 Economy, Employment and Land Use Patterns 143 
4.4 1 The livestock sector 144 
4.4 2 The agricultural sector 150 
4.4 3 Other economic activities 158 
4.5 Infrastructure 161 
4.5.1 Urban areas and the transport network 161 
4.5 2 Water facilities 163 
4.5.3 Electricity and other sources of energy 164 
4.5.4 Social infrastructure 164 
Pre-Independence History of Land Use and Land Policy 
in Kajiado District 167 
5 1 Introduction 167 
5.2 Pre-Colomal - 1895· The Rise and Fall of Maasai Power 
and the Arrival of the Europeans 167 
5.3 1895-1919 The Early Colonial Penod, the Am val of the 
White Settlers and the Loss of Maasai Pastures 173 
5.3.1 Introduction 173 
5.3.2 The First Maasai Move 1904· creation of a Northern and 
Southern Maasai Reserve 173 
5.3.3 The Second Maasai Move 1911-12: creation of a single 
extended Southern Maasai Reserve 178 
5 4 1920 - 1945 Kenya Colony and the Maasai, Alien Influx 
and Land Grievances 184 
54 1 Introduction 184 
5 4 2 Kajiado District administrative changes 186 
5.4 3 Infiltration by other groups in the Maasai Reserve 187 
5.4 4 Evidence and memoranda presented to the 
Carter Land Commission 191 
5.4.5 Conclusions and recommendations of the Carter Land 
Commission 196 
5.5 1946 - 1963: Late Colonial Penod, Kajiado District 
Grazing Schemes, Infiltration, Emergency and Independence 197 
5.5.1 The African land crisis 197 
5.5 2 Administrative changes and boundary adjustments 201 
5.5.3 The introduction of grazing schemes and individual ranches 204 
5.5.4 Other land use developments in Kajiado District 212 
5.6 Summary and Conclusion 218 
Pre-Independence History of the Economy and of Development 
Policy in Kajiado District 221 
6.1 The Maasai Economy and Early Colonial Economic 
Development Policy in Kenya Maasailand: 1895 - 1919 221 
χ 
6 2 Economic Activities and Development Policy in Kajiado District: 
1920 - 1945 226 
6 2.1 Introduction 226 
6 2.2 Economic activities and development efforts in Kajiado 
District· 1920-1945 227 
6.3 Economic Activities and Economic Development Policy 
in Kajiado Distncf 1946 - 1963 243 
6.3.1 Introduction 243 
6.3.2 Late colonial economic development policy and 
activities in Kajiado Distncf 1946-1963 244 
6.4 Summary and Conclusion 259 
7 Kajiado Group Ranches: Creation, Performance and Subdivision 265 
7.1 Introduction 265 
7.2 The Creation of Group Ranches in Kajiado District 265 
7.2.1 Diminishing opportunities for nomadic pastorahsm 
around Independence 265 
7.2 2 The Group Ranch concept objectives and the search for 
traditional land units 269 
7.2.3 The process of adjudication and registration of Group 
Ranches 273 
7.2 4 The structure and administration of a Group Ranch 275 
7.2 5 Рока pilot Group Ranch 276 
7.2 6 Kajiado District Livestock Development Project Phase I, 
II and III 277 
7.3 Kajiado District Group Ranch Performance 284 
7.3.1 Achievements of the Kajiado District Group Ranch Project 284 
7 3.2 Problems and failures of the Kajiado District Group Ranch 
Project 286 
7 4 The Process of Subdivision of the Kajiado District Group Ranches 294 
7.4 1 Introduction 294 
7 4.2 The rationale for Group Ranch subdivision 295 
7.4 3 The procedure of Group Ranch subdivision 301 
7.4.4 The problematic process of Group Ranch subdivision 303 
7.5 Land Pressures Building Up in Kajiado District 1970 - 1990 308 
7.5 1 Infiltration and cultivation by non-Maasai groups 308 
7.5.2 Wildlife conservation and the creation of Amboseh 
National Park 318 
7.6 Summary and Conclusion 324 
8 The Impact of Subdivision of OIkinos and Embolioi Group Ranches 329 
8 1 Introduction 329 
8.1 1 The Characteristics of the sample population 329 
8.2 OIkinos and Embolioi the Earliest Subdivided Group Ranches 338 
8 2.1 The outcome of the group ranch subdivision process 338 
8 2 2 Changing residence patterns and social consequences 342 
8.3 The Economic Viability of Allocated Plots 345 
8.3 1 Introduction 345 
8 3.2 Selfsufficiency threshold levels 346 
8.3 3 Selfsufficiency versus size of allocated plots 347 
XI 
8.4 The Ecological Viability of the Allocated Plots 352 
8.4.1 Introduction 352 
8.4.2 Water and forage availability m the areas of survey 354 
8.4.3 Stocking densities 357 
8.5 Changes in Herd Mobility After Subdivision 359 
8.5.1 Grazing management 359 
8.5.2 Fencing characteristics in the subdivided areas 362 
8.6 Other Land Use Changes 364 
8.6.1 Reserved grazing pastures (Ol-oken) 364 
8 6.2 Cultivated plots (Shambas) 365 
8.6.3 Competition from wildlife 367 
8.7 Summary and Conclusion 369 
9 Partition, Transfer and Mortgage of Land in 
Subdivided Group Ranches in Kajiado District 383 
9.1 Introduction 383 
9.1 1 Land Control Board procedure 383 
9.2 Land Actions Performed by the New Kaputiei Land Owners 385 
9.2 1 Fragmentation of parcels by the new Kaputiei individual 
ranchers 385 
9.2.2 Transfer of land among the new Kaputiei individual ranchers 385 
9.2.3 Mortgage of land by the new Kaputiei individual ranchers 392 
9.3 Land Buyers Personal Characteristics and Land Actions 396 
9.4 Use of Loans and Money Obtained from the Sale of Land 400 
9.5 A Review of Experiences of Individualization of Afncan Pasture 
Land 408 
9.6 Land Tenure and Livestock Development A Review of 
Theoretical Considerations 411 
9.6 1 Land tenure and land degradation 411 
9 6 2 land tenure and commercialization 414 
9.7 Summary and Conclusion 416 
10 The Future of Maasai Pastoralism in Kajiado District 425 
10.1 Introduction 425 
10.2 The Personal Characteristics of the Sample Population 427 
10.3 The Diversification of the Maasai Economy 431 
10.4 The Intensification of the Maasai Economy 439 
10.4.1 The intensification of livestock production 439 
10.4.2 The intensification of cultivation 448 
10.5 The Commercialization of the Maasai Economy 449 
10.5.1 The selling of livestock 449 
10 5.2 Selling hides and skins 453 
10.5.3 The selling of milk 453 
10.5.4 The selling of crops 454 
10.6 Maasai Pastoralism in the 1990s 455 
10.7 Summary and Conclusion 459 
Summary and Conclusions 463 
Bibliography 485 
Curriculum Vitae 503 
xii 
List of Tables 
Table 1 1 Poverty in Kenya (1974) 
Table 1 2 Average Annual Cash Income of Maasai Households, 1976, 1981-83 
Table 1 3 Increase in (Agricultural) Population for Some Selected 
Developing Regions 1970-90 (in millions) 
Table 1 4 Change in Main Types of Land Use (in '000 ha). 1974-89 
Table 1 S Developing Countnes Estimated Landless and Near-Landless 
Population, 1980-85 
Table 1 6 Distribution of Land and Landlessness for Selected Countnes 
Table 2 1 Projected Population by Selected Groups in Kenya, 1989 
Table 2 2 Basic Indicators for Social and Economic Development 
Table 2 3 Structure and Growth of Production Kenya and the World. 1965-90 
Table 2 4 Gross Value of Marketed Output of Some Major Agricultural 
Commodities at Constant 1972 Pnces (K£ million) 
Table 2 5 Livestock Population by Zones and Production Systems ('000 head) 
Table 2 6 Total Number of Livestock Species in Kenya, 1960-90 
Table 2 7 Amount of Land Available for Grazing (Million Hectares) and 
Cairying Capacity (Million Livestock Units) per Zone, 1975-90 
Table 2 8 Projected and Actual (Officially) Slaughtered Meat of 
Bovines, Small Stock and Pigs and Potential Availability 
for Export in Kenya 1980-85 ('000 Tons) 
Table 2 9 Livestock Production in Kenya 1964-90 
Table 2 10 Producer and Retail Pnces of Selected Agricultural Products 
Table 2 11 Quantity of Domestic Exports from Kenya, 1973-89 
Table 2 12 Destination of Livestock Exports from Kenya, 1981-89 
(K£ 'OOO-current pnces) 
Table 2 13 Value of Import and Export of Livestock Products in Kenya, 1980-90 
(x US$ 1,000) 
Table 2 14 Agnculiural and Non-Agncultural Employment in Kenya, 1976-88 
Table 2 15 Classification of land Transferred to Afncans as at 1968 
Table 2 16 Distnbution of Agnculiural Holdings and Employment, 1977 
Table 2 17 Distnbution of Smallholdings by Size 
Table 2 18 Distnbution of Large Farms, 1966-89 
Table 2 19 Lifetime Migration by District and Province, 1979 
Table 2 20 Estimated Availability of Good Agnculiural Land per Person, 
per Distnct in 1969, 1979, 1989 (in Hectares of High-Potential 
Land Equivalents (hple)) 
Table 2 21 Land Ownership in Nakuru and Kiambu Distncts, 1979 
Table 3 1 Ecological, Demographic and Socio-Econormc Position of 
Kajiado Distnct and the Semi-And Distncts in Kenya as at 1979 
Table 3 2 Human Population Trends of Nine Major Nomadic Pastoral Groups 
in Kenya 1962-89 
Table 3 3 Livestock Numbers and Trends for Selected And and Serm-And 
Distncts 1969-88 
Table 3 4 Average Availability of Livestock per Capita for the Pastoral 
Population of Selected And and Semi-And Distncts 1966-88 
Table 3 5 Livestock and Wildlife TLU Densities for Selected And and 
Semi-And Distncts 1977-88 
Table 3 6 ASAL Programmes in Kenya, 1989 
Table 3 7 Approved Distnct Development Budget Allocations 1986-89 
22 
24 
26 
27 
28 
29 
47 
48 
48 
50 
51 
53 
54 
55 
56 
58 
61 
62 
64 
66 
71 
73 
73 
74 
76 
77 
83 
91 
97 
99 
100 
101 
108 
110 
xiii 
Table 4 1 
Table 4 2 
Table 4 3 
Table 4 4 
Table 4 5 
Table 4 6 
Table 4 7 
Table 4 8 
Table 4 9 
Table 4 10 
Table 4 11 
Table 4 12 
Table 4 13 
Table 4 14 
Table 4 15 
Table 4 16 
Table 4 17 
Table 4 18 
Table 4 19 
Table 4 20 
Table 4 21 
Table 4 22 
Table 4 23 
Table 4 24 
Table 4 25 
Table 4 26 
Mean Rainfall Recorded at Some Selected Meterological Stations. 
Kajiado District 
Kajiado Distnct Vegetation Types as Proportion of Each 
Physiographic Zone 
Distribution of Agro-climatic Zones over Kajiado Distnct 
Kajiado Distnct Potential Carrying Capacity 
Distnbution of Locations and Sublocations by Division, 1988 (1989) 
Maa-speaking Population in Kenya and Tanzania 
Maasai il-oshon 
Kajiado Distnct Population and Ethnic Composition 1927-2010 
Divisional Population Distnbution and Density, 1979-90 
Population Age-Groups and Sex Rano, 1979-89 
The Expansion of Pnmary Education m Kajiado Distnct, 1927-88 
Kajiado Distnct KCPE Score 1985-89 
Kajiado Distnct Secondary Schools, 1987 
Kajiado Distnct Labour Force 
Divisional Distribution for Different Kinds of Livestock, 1988 
Kajiado Distnct Livestock Units, 1988 
Composition of Cattle Herds by Division, 1988 
Production and Marketing Trends, Cattle and Shoats 1983-89 
Hides and Skin Production 1989 89 (nr) 
Kajiado Distnct Farmer' Household Si7e Related to Possessed, 
Arable and Cultivated Land, 1988 
Distnbution of Plot Size Categories over Possessed, Aiable 
and Cultivated Landholdings Among Kajiado Distnct Farmers 
by Agncultural Division, 1988 (%) 
EthniLity and Tenunal Status Kajiado District banners (% of all) 
Ethnicity and Objective of Cultivation, Kajiado Distnct 
Objective of Cultivation by Ethnicity and Division 
Production and Consumption of Some Major Crops by Settled 
Farmere in Kajiado District 1983 88 
Kajiado Distnct Irrigation Schemes, 1988 
116 
118 
121 
121 
126 
131 
133 
135 
138 
139 
140 
141 
142 
144 
145 
146 
146 
147 
149 
151 
152 
153 
154 
154 
155 
157 
Table 6 1 Kajiado Maasai Cattle Sales to the Meat Control Board 1941-45 237 
Table 6 2 Kajiado Distnct 1943 Census of Adult Cattle 239 
Table 6 3 Kajiado Distnct Cattle Sales and Aveiage Price 1947-60 248 
Table 7 1 Kajiado Distnct Phase I Group Ranches 280 
Table 7 2 Kajiado Distnct Phase II Group Ranches 281 
Table 7 3 Kajiado Distnct Phase III Group Ranches 282 
Table 7 4 Water and Vetennary Facilities in Kajiado Distnct, 1988 285 
Table 7 5 Loan Performance by Kajiado Group Ranches as at 1986 288 
Table 7 6 Kajiado Distnct Group Ranches and Subdivision Status, 1990 295 
Table 7 7 Potential Mean Plot Sizes for Subdivided Kajiado Group Ranches 297 
Table 7 8 Settlement of Farmers in the Loitokitok Area 309 
Table 7 9 Kajiado Distnct Annual Planted Acreage 1976-87 (ha) 313 
Table 7 10 Number, Ethnicity and Tenunal Situation of Kajiado Distnct 
Farming Households 314 
Table 7 11 Land Ownership and Ethnicity by Division, 1988 316 
Table 8 1 Sample Size of Survey Population 
Table 8 2 Population Charactenslics of Survey Population 
Table 8 3 Livestock Ownership Charactenslics of Survey Population 
Table 8 4 Landowncrship Charactenslics of Survey Population 
330 
333 
334 
336 
XIV 
Table 8 5 Wealth Strau of Sample Population Based on LE/AAME, 1990 337 
Table 8 6 Opinion on Subdivision Proposal and Allocated Plot 338 
Table 8 7 Mean Number of Households per Boma and Size of Boma, 1990 343 
Table 8 8 Residence Pattern of Sample Households by Wealth Strata (nr) 344 
Table 8 9 Percentage of Sample Households Living Below the Minimum 
Levels of Pure Pastoralism in 1990 347 
Table 8 10 Percentage of Sample Households Having an Inadequate Amount 
of Land Within a Selfsufficicncy Scenano, 1986 and 1990 349 
Table 8 11 Percentage of Selfsufficient Households Within Four Categones 
of Landownership, 1990 350 
Table 8 12 Opinion on Economic Viability of the Individual Ranch 351 
Table 8 13 Ecological Characteristics of the Study Areas 353 
Table 8 14 Availability and Condition of Water Sources, 1988 354 
Table 8 15 Water Sources Used (%) 355 
Table 8 16 Mean Distances to Watersources in Wei and Dry Season (Km) and 
Frequency of Watering Livestock 356 
Table 8 17 Presence of Dry Season Pastures 356 
Table 8 18 Stocking Densities of Individual Ranches 357 
Table 8 19 Herd Size Management Conducted After Obtaining an 
Individual Parcel 358 
Table 8 20 Rationale and Number of Livestock Located in Other Bomas 
at Time of Survey 360 
Table 8 21 Medium and Long Term MovemenU of Cattle and Small Slock, 1989 361 
Table 8 22 Fencing Characteristics in the Subdivided Areas (%) 362 
Table 8 23 Fencing Characteristics of Not Officially Subdivided Areas (%) 363 
Table 8 24 Increase in Number of 01 oken of Sample Households (%) 364 
Table 8 25 Increase in Number of Shambas of Sample Households (%) 366 
Table 8 26 The Extent of the Area Cultivated by 1990 367 
Table 8 27 Wildlife Development in the Subdivided and Established Individual 
Ranchers' Areas 1977-87 368 
Table 9 1 Kajiado District Lands Department Activities 1979 89 384 
Table 9 2 Applications for Partition of Original Parcels of New Kapuliei 
Individual Ranchers, February 1990 386 
Table 9 3 Applications for Transfer of Parcels of New Kapuliei 
Individual Ranchers to New Owners, February 1990 386 
Table 9 4 Authorised Primary Transfers of Parcels to New Owners as 
at February 1990 390 
Table 9 5 Pending Primary Transfers of Parcels to New Owners as 
at February 1990 390 
Table 9 6 Authorised Selling of Land by Olkmos and Embolioi Ranchers 
in a Time Perepeclive 391 
Table 9 7 Corrélations With Sale of Land (0 10 sign level) 391 
Table 9 8 Originai Plot Owners Mortgage of Land to Financial Institutions, 
February 1990 392 
Table 9 9 Past, Present and Future State of Loans Among Respondents 395 
Table 9 10 Characteristics of Olkmos Parcel Buyers 396 
Table 9 11 Authorised Partitioning, Transfer or Mongage of Land by Buyers, 
February 1990 399 
Table 9 12 Pending Partitioning, Transfer or Mongage of Land by Buyers, 
February 1990 399 
Table 9 13 Extent of Improvements Created by Individual Ranchers 401 
Table 9 14 Correlation of Infrastractural Improvements Made Before and 
After Subdivision with Sellers and Mortgagees Versus Non-Sellers 
XV 
Table 9 15 
Table 9 16 
Table 9 17 
Table 9 18 
Table 9 19 
Table 10 1 
Table 102 
Table 
Table 
Table 
Table 
Table 
Table 
Table 
Table 
Table 
Table 
10 3 
10 4 
10 5 
106 
10 7 
10 8 
10 9 
10 10 
10 11 
1012 
Table 10 13 
Table 10 14 
Table 10 15 
Table 10 16 
Table 10 17 
Table 10 18 
Table 10 19 
Table 10 20 
Table 10 21 
Table 10 22 
Table 1023 
Table 1024 
Table 1025 
Table 1026 
and Non-Mortgagees 402 
Source of Finance for Infrastractural Improvements (abs) 402 
Infrastructural Improvements Before and After Individualization 403 
Statistically Significant Correlations between Improvements Made and 
Household Characteristics, OUcinos (%) 404 
Ownership of Cars and Time of Purchase 406 
Ranch Improvements Initiated Before and After Subdivision 407 
Level of Education of Heads of Household by Wealth Stratum 
Heads of Household Additional Training and Knowledge of Kiswahili 
and English (%) 429 
Level of Education Household Members (above 5 years of age) 430 
Main Place of Residence (%) 431 
Mam Occupation of Head of Household 431 
Number of Other Activities of Heads of Households 432 
Main Activity of Other Household Members 433 
Cultivating Households by Wealth Strata 434 
Reasons For Not Cultivating 435 
Involvement of Household Members in Cultivation (%) 436 
Milking Practices Among Maasai Pastoralists 440 
Percentage of Pastoralists Having Improved Breeds and Percentage 
Distribution over Types of Improved Breeds Held 443 
Percentage of Ranchers with Diseased Livestock Among Their 
Herds and Hocks 443 
Reasons Given by Maasai Pastoralists for Having No Improved Breeds 445 
Main Sources of Improved Breeds 446 
Maasai Willingness to Increase the Number of Improved Breeds 
in Herds and Flocks 446 
Vetcnnary Care Practised by Maasai Pastoralists (%) 447 
Practises Applied to Increase Crop Production 448 
Livestock Transactions for December 1989 (abs) 450 
Livestock Transactions by Wealth Class in December 1989 
(as % animals owned) 450 
Relevance of Type of Livestock Transactions by Wealth Class in 
December 1989 451 
Selling of Hides & Shins (peiccntagc of households involved by 
wealth strata) 453 
Sample Population Sales of Milk 455 
Major Problems Experienced by the Respondents 456 
Livestock Transactions by Wealth Class in December 1989 
(as percentage of households involved) 461 
Types of Livestock Transactions by Wealth Class in December 1989 
(as percentage of total herd owned by wealth class) 462 
List of Figures 
Figure 0 1 Pastoral Peoples of Tropical Africa 
Figure 0 2 Location of Kajiado District in Kenya 
Figure 0 3 Cattle and Pastoral Human Populations Kajiado District 1948-84 
Figure 0 4 Maasailand around 1890 and in 1990 
Figure 1 1 Types of Livestock Keeping 
Figure 1 2 Framework for the Analysis of Access to Land 
2 
4 
5 
7 
14 
36 
Figure 2 1 Kenya's Ecological Zones and Population Distribution 46 
XVI 
Figure 2 2 Estimated Availability of Good Agricultural Land in Kenya 78 
Figure 3 1 Kenya Semi-And Zone and District Boundaries 90 
Figure 3 2 Cultivation in Kenya's Semi-Arid Zone, 1979/80 93 
Figure 3 3 Pastoral Groups of Kenya 96 
Figure 3 4 Types of Ranching in Kenya 106 
Figure 4 1 Kajiado District Physiographic Zones 113 
Figure 4 2 Kajiado District Mean Annual Rainfall and Evaporation 117 
Figure 4 3 Kajiado Distnct Vegetation 119 
Figure 4 4 Kajiado District Agro-Climatic Zones 120 
Figure 4 S Kajiado Distnct Administrative Boundaries 1989 127 
Figure 4 б Kajiado Maasai Il-oshon 132 
Figure 4 7 Kajiado Distnct Population Growth and Ethnic Composition 1927-79 136 
Figure 4 8 Distnbution of Slock Units by Division and Type of Animal 146 
Figure 4 9 Kajiado Distnct Land Use 160 
Figure 4 10 Kajiado District Topographic Map 162 
Figure 5 1 Map of East Afnca Protectorate 1895 172 
Figure 5 2 Map of the Northern and Southern Maasai Reserve by 1906 176 
Figure 5 3 Administrative Boundancs 1909 - 1961 186 
Figure 5 4 Maasai Land Claims and Areas of Exchange 192 
Figure 7 1 Kajiado Distnct Group Ranches 264 
Figure 7 2 Kajiado Distnct Gioup ranches and 1990 Subdivision Status 296 
Figure 8 1 Location of Survey Area in Kajiado Distnct 330 
Figure 8 2 Distnbution of Wealth Strata 337 
Figure 8 3 Olkinos Subdivided Group Ranch 339 
Figure 8 4 Embolioi Subdivided Group Ranch 340 
Figure 8 5 Olíanos Plot Sizes (ha) 341 
Figure 8 6 Land per Household Member/hhmb 341 
Figure 8 7 Kiboko Group Ranch 376 
Figure 8 8 Elang'ata Wuas Group Ranch 378 
Figure 8 9 Lomgosua Group Ranch 380 
Figure 8 10 Meto Group Ranch 382 
Figure 9 1 Olkinos Partitioned Parcels as at February 1990 387 
Figure 9 2 Olkinos Selling of Land as at February 1990 389 
Figure 9 3 Olkinos Mortgagees of Land as at February 1990 393 
Figure 9 4 Kitengela Subdivided Group Ranch 422 
Figure 9 5 Empuyiankat Subdivided Group Ranch 423 
Figure 9 6 Рока Subdivided Group Ranch 424 
APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 1 Assessment of Poverty Among Maasai Pastoralists 42 
Appendix 8 1 Group Ranch Profiles (Kiboko, Elang'ata Wuas, Loragosua, Meto) 375 
Appendix 9 1 Subdivided Group Ranches (Kitengela, Empuyiankat, Рока) 422 
Appendix 10 1 Livestock Transactions 461 
INTRODUCTION 
0.1 Nomadic Pastoralism Losing Ground 
More than 30 per cent of the earth's land surface is arid or semi-arid, and 
covers large areas of Australia, North and South America, Asia and Africa. 
They mainly comprise of grazing lands with an annual rainfall below 500-700 
mm and low canying capacity. Estimates indicate that not less than half of 
Africa's total land area, some 1,300 to 1,600 million ha, is devoted to animal 
husbandly and that some SO million Africans are either wholly or largely 
dependent upon it (see Bos & Peperkamp 1989:32). Some of these livestock 
keepers are nomadic pastoralists occupying tropical Africa's arid and semi-arid 
areas, totalling some 1,200 million hectares.' In Africa, approximately 120 
different pastoralist ethnic groups can be distinguished, numbering between a 
mere few thousand to several millions (see Jahnke 1982:68). As such the 
majority of the world's pastoralists are to be found in Africa which accounts 
for some 50-60 per cent, with Asia 25-30 per cent, America 15 per cent and 
Australia having 1 per cent. The most important single countries in terms of 
absolute numbers of pastoralists are Sudan, USA, Somalia, Chad, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, India and China (see Sandford 1983a°2). 
From the end of the second millennium B.C. African nomadic pastoralism 
has developed locally in an almost continuous band from the Atlantic to the 
Indian Oceans in African savanna and steppe zones (see Unesco/UNEP/FAO 
1979:265). Figure 0.1 shows the geographical position of the three main 
pastoral groups of tropical Africa: Nilo-Saharan; Afro-Asiatic and Congo-
Kordofanian. Each of these major groups is made up of some 12 subgroups 
composed of several clusters of related pastoral ethnic groups.2 
An estimation of the extent of the and and sem-and areas and the number of people 
engaged ш nomadic pastoralism depends, of course, on one's definition of these concepts For 
example, Jahnke using a dry region classificauon based on precipitation and evaporation more or 
less congruent with a 1,000 mm rainfall line and 0-180 growing days (a day during which 
precipitation exceeds potential evaporation), gives a figure of over 90 million out of a total of 238 
million agricultural people living m Afnca's tropical dry regions, excluding the Western Sahara, 
Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Egypt and South Afnca, by 1979 (see Jahnke 1982 17/235) Sandford 
(1983a 2 and 1983b 11) mentions a total of 30-40 million people living m the world's dry areas 
having 'animal-based' economies of which 13-25 million African pastoral people, representing Ο­
ΙΟ per cent of tropical Afnca's total rural populaüoa Dünung and Brough (1992 67) speak of 30-
43 million "pastoralists" scattered on the world's dry lanls by the early 1990s For 1990, the 
World Bank estimated for Sub-Saharan Afnca alone a number of 495 million people 71 per cent 
of whom were bving in the rural areas Using Sandford's 6-10 per cent figure, this would mean 
some 21-35 million pastoralists living m Sub-Saharan Afnca by 1990 (see World Bank 
1992.219/279). 
2
 For example, the Nilo-Saharan group Is subdivided into the Sabaran, Nubian, Beir, West 
Nilotic, East Nilotic and South Nilotic subgroups. The East Nilotic subgroup is composed of the 
Kanmojong and the Maasai cluster. The Maasai pastoral people, together with the Samburu, the 
agro-pastoral Njemps and the (now) agncultural Arusha people belong to the Maasai cluster. 
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1 Afro-Asiatic group 
A l Semitic (e g Maurs) 
A2 Berber (Tuareg) 
A3 North Cushitic (Beja) 
A4 East Cuehitic (e g Somali) 
2 Congo-Kordofanian group 
CI West Atlantic (e g Fulani Bororo) 
C2 Benue-Congo (e g Tswana) 
3 NSo-Saharan group 
N1 Saharan (e g Teda) 
N2 Nubian (Midob) 
N3 Beir (Didinga) 
N4 West Nilotic (e g Nuer) 
N5 East Nilotic 
a Maasai cluster 1 Samburu 
2 Maasai 
b Kanmojong cluster (e g Turkana) 
N6 South Nilotic (e g Pokot) 
Figure 0.1 Pastoral Peoples of Tropical Africa 
Source slinpbfied from Jabnke 1982 70 
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Nowadays, it appears that most of these pastoral societies are threatened in 
their very existence. Once called "the lords of the plains" roaming around with 
their large herds on extensive pastures the nomadic pastoral future now seems 
to have turned bleak. The processes of structural impoverishment and acute 
major crises of hunger and starvation of man and of animals, although not new 
phenomena, have seemed to become more frequent in recent times. The 1970s 
disaster in the Sahel is among the most well known examples of the 
breakdown of the pastoral way of life. 
According to Jahnke (1982:89) the 'notion of pastoralism under pressure is 
on the whole more valid than the notion of a free-ranging husbandry man with 
an abundance of livestock and land resources at his disposal'. Schwartz and 
Schwartz (1985:5) state that it becomes more and more evident that nomadic 
societies 'show a decreasing selfreliance in terms of food production'. 
According to Hjort (1982:24) 'growing scores of people [are] being pushed out 
of the pastoral economy'. Dietz (1987:13) wonders 'whether there is any 
chance of survival of a pastoral way of life'. His question is most 
pessimistically answered by Neville and Rada Dyson-Hudson stating that 'The 
collective future of traditional pastoralists is (...) at risk in East Africa. By the 
end of the century they may belong merely to memory, as traditional African 
hunter-gatherer populations already do' (Dyson-Hudson & Dyson-Hudson 
1982:213). 
Sometimes not just the mode of existence, even the people themselves are 
thought to be on the road to extinction. As early as 1910 H. and S. Hinde 
published their book "The Last of the Masai".3 In the early 1930s a medical 
survey among the Maasai of Kenya's Kajiado District revealed that the birth 
rate among the Maasai was not high enough to maintain the population as a 
result of gonorrhoea! infections (see KD AR 1931:4). In spite of this the Maasai 
nowadays number more than ever before. This is true of most pastoralist ethnic 
groups, making Sandford conclude that pastoralism is not dying out. He agrees 
that pastoral people are leaving pastoralism and that it is proportionally less 
important in the economy than 50 years ago. Nevertheless, he believes that 
'most of the areas which are pastoral at present will continue to be so in future 
and many millions of people will continue to be pastoralists' (Sandford 
1983a:2/3). 
To some researchers this growth of the human population is in fact the main 
cause of the economic problems of today's pastoralists. Droughts, rangeland 
degradation, reduced access to and control over land and an unfavourable if not 
hostile political and economic environment are also among the main causes 
mentioned. Opinions as to the relative importance of each of these causes 
differ between several schools of thought within and between disciplines, now 
and in the past Nevertheless, they all share the view that traditional nomadic 
Throughout dus book I will use the modem spelling of the group's name 0 e Maasai) 
Before the 1970s most authors used the na™ "Masai", "MasaT or "Massai". 
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pastoralism is losing ground.4 
Figure 0.2 Location of Kajiado District in Kenya 
Only a few cases were found m which traditional pastoralism gained in structural 
importance within a group's economy Holy (1987 210) reports of the increased impoitance of 
nomadic pastoralism within the mixed-agncultural economy of the Berti living m Northern Darftir 
Province, Sudan. A combination of climatic conditions, water improvements and political factors 
enabled the Berti to invest their wealth m livestock A similar description is given by Haaland 
(1972) for the neighbouring Fur Unesco/UNEP/FAO (1979 284) report of Fulam groups m Niger 
and Nigeria who, just before the 1970s drought, changed back from agncullure towards nomadic 
pastoralism. A less recent example concerns the Turkana pastoralisls of northwestern Kenya, after 
depaiung m the 18th century from Ihe Kanmojong cluster centred m northern Uganda, they 
concentrated on livestock herding as the ecological conditions m their new home area were not as 
favourable as m Uganda 
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By the early 1980s, the International Livestock Centre for Africa (ILCA) made 
a survey of the Maasai pastoralists of Kajiado District located at the southern 
tip of Kenya's Rift Valley province (see figure 0.2). Several sources 
concerning data for the human as well as the livestock population of the 
district between 1948 and 1984 were plotted against each other.5 
People ( '000 ) 
600-
600 
too 
200 \ 
Cattle/person 
% 
10 
Ж 6 1952 1954 1960 1964 1968 
YEAR 
1972 1976 19M 19U 
Figure OJ Cattle and Pastoral Human Populations Kajiado District 1948-84 
Source. Bekure et al. 1987-82 
Figure 0.3 shows the results of this analysis. A consistent rise in the number of 
Maasai pastoralists in combination with a fluctuating cattle population has led 
to a steady decline in the cattle/people ratio. As a rule of thumb it is estimated 
ILCA's estimations of livestock populations aie notoriously inaccurate, even human 
population figures for nomadic societies are problematic The livestock figures represent 
compromises among the often conflicting estimates onginaung largely from government records 
The human population figures are based on census as done m 1948, 1962, 1969, 1979 with an 
estimated correction factor for non-pastoralists (see Bekure et al 1987127) 
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that to subsist entirely on a diet of milk and meat, a minimum of about 10 
cattle/person is required.6 Thus, it can be concluded that since the early 1960s 
the Maasai of Kajiado District, on average, no longer accord with this basic 
condition. After the 1984 drought cattle wealth dropped to a low of less than 3 
cattle per person. 
Though aware of the questionable reliability of dated inforaiation a trend can 
be discerned in Maasai prosperity in this century. For instance, by the early 
1930s a report suggested that the 'average Maasai household of five persons 
has an allowance of over one and a half square mile of country to itself. The 
official number of cattle for 1930 is 720,000, but a more recent actual account 
made by the veterinary department in the Kajiado District indicates that the 
numbers are much in excess of that estimate and are probably more than a 
million' (KLC 1934:5). 
From these data, concerning the whole of Kenyan Maasailand (i.e. both 
Kajiado and the neighbouring Narok District), it can be calculated that some 
48,000 Maasai possessing approximately 720,000 to 1,000,000 cattle had on 
average 15-20 cattle per person in the early 1930s. Nowadays, according to a 
recent livestock census conducted in Kajiado District, some 120,000 Maasai 
pastoralists share approximately 633,000 head of cattle, a cattle/person ratio of 
5.3 (MoLD 1988:iii).7 
Besides an increasing Maasai population and virtually stable livestock numbers 
the land area available has been decreasing over the years. Population densities 
have been rising not only as a result of the growth of the Maasai population, 
other non-Maasai groups have migrated towards this area. Moreover, in an 
absolute sense, the Maasai territory has become much smaller, especially as the 
outcome of the process of colonization of East Africa by the end of the last 
century. In this study we will concentrate on the diminishing availability of the 
land resource for the Maasai pastoralists of Kajiado District Let us, by way of 
introduction, briefly examine the Maasai ownership of land over the last 
century. 
At the end of the nineteenth century and before the arrival of the British and 
Germans in East Africa, the Maasai pastoralists occupied an area located at a 
latitude of between 1° north of the Equate»' to about 6° south at some places 
over 200 km in width. Its surface area as presented by several authors ranged 
between 116,000 km2 (Jacobs 1963) and 207,000 km2 (Huntingford 1953). 
Approximately 44,000 km2 (Jacobs 1963) to 100,000 km2 (Voshaar 1979) was 
This Is based on a reference adult requirement of 2,300 Kcal per day, an output of 1 litre of 
milk per lactating cow (700 Kcal) and a fraction of some 20 per cent of the cows ш mik. Each 
head of caule is assumed to provide an additional 50 Kcal/day as meal (see Bekure et al. 
1987:127). 
After analyzing the crude 1988 Livestock Census data we estimate that approumalely 
26,000 cattle and 80,000 shoals belong to non-Maasai. Kikuyu and Sonjo were the mam owners. 
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located in present day Kenya.' The Maasai territory at the end of the 
nineteenth century and that of today is shown in figure 0.4. 
35° 36· 37° 38° 39· 
Figure 0.4 Maasailand around 1890 and in 1990 
After the arrival of the British the Maasai were removed from their best 
grazing areas and restricted into two separated Maasai reserves totalling some 
23,620 km2 by a treaty in 1904. In 1912/13 the majority of the northern Maasai 
For an assessment of Ihe 19th century Maasai area, maps provided by several authors were 
analyzed and our measurement provided the following ñgures for the extent of pie-colonial 
Maasailand: Jacobs (1963) 116,000 km1; Ochieng' (198S) 123.000 kni; Hollis (190Í) 126,000 
km"; Векше et al. (1987) 155,000 km1, Voshaar (1979) 160,000 km1; Leys (1924 tept. 1973) 
some 200,000 km2; Huntlngford (1953) 120,000 km'. Figures for Kenya Maasailaul ranged as 
foUows: Jacobs (1963) 44,000 km1; Hollis (1905) 55,000 km1. Leys (1924 repr. 1973) 64,000 W ; 
Ochieng' (1985) 69,000 km2; Huntingford (1953) 70,000 km1 and Voshaar (1979) 100,000 km*. 
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were regrouped in an enlarged southern reserve comprising an area of 
approximately 37,800 km2 (see Sandford 1919:3). Moreover, in terms of 
quality the loss was even more severe as green pastures located in ecologically 
favourable areas had to be abandoned and were replaced with a less 
comfortable habitat, heavily infested by tsetse fly and mostly lacking sufficient 
water and all year round grazing. According to Morgan (1972:215) of the 
31,000 km2 (excluding forest reserves) of European settled lands, 18,000 km2 
consisted of old Maasai grazing grounds, evacuated under the agreements of 
1904 and 1913. Minor adjustments in later years resulted in a Maasai territory 
of 39,300 km2 by 1934 (see Hailcy 1950 repr. 1957:167). 
The 1979 Kenya population census gives a figure of 211,651 Kenya Maasai 
living in Kajiado and Narok districts totalling 39,618 km2. This area, however, 
had to be shared with 147,655 non-Maasai inhabiting the towns and better-
watered areas, as well as with a few of the most popular Kenyan game parks. 
Leaving these reductions aside for the moment, it can be calculated that during 
this century the Kenya Maasai area was reduced to almost half of its former 
territory. At the same time the population occupying it, Maasai and non-
Maasai, has increased almost fifteenfold from 43,000 in 1915 to probably over 
630,000 nowadays (see Sindiga 1986:163). 
0.2 Objectives and Methods of Survey 
The object of this study "nomadic pastoralism" can also be seen as two 
separate issues, the "nomadic" referring to access to and mobile movements 
over land, the "pastoralism" to the ownership and production of livestock and 
the use of pastures. As Galaty (1978:1) points out the first is mainly a political 
and the second largely an economically governed phenomenon. As we will see 
in the Maasai context the two spheres are inter-related and our study of Maasai 
society should also operate from both perspectives. 
The main theme of this book, however, is foremost to study one specific 
phenomenon; the loss, privatization of and competition for land within the 
Maasai pastoral way of life. 
The loss of grazing pastures due to increased cultivation, the establishment 
of Game Parks and mineral exploitation is said to undermine the livestock 
economy of Maasai pastoralists in Kajiado District. Furthermore, the recent 
subdivision of group ranches into too small individual holdings is feared will 
result in the selling of land to outsiders. This research examines the outcome of 
this process as well as the Maasai response of economic intensification and 
diversification, including increasing the productivity of the herd, cultivation, 
wage-employment, out-migration and so on. 
Taking into account the geographical context this main objective has been 
operationalized through the following research questions: 
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- international level: what is the world-wide trend concerning the availability 
of land for nomadic pastoralism? Have international political and economic 
forces directly or indirectly affected the man-land relationship in Kajiado 
District? 
- national level: which particular physical, economic, demographic and other 
features of Kenya are operative in the context of the availability of land? 
What is the central government's policy towards the Kenyan land issue and 
livestock development? 
- regional level: what is the structure and dynamic of the Kenyan dry regions? 
Which is the regional development policy applied in these regions? 
- local level: what are the economic, political, socio-cultural features of 
Kajiado District as of today? How did these develop since the arrival of the 
British colonizers by the late 1880s? What happened to Maasai access to 
land during the last century? What is the balance between demand and 
availability of land then and now? Which factors are responsible for the 
decreasing availability of land? What is the outcome of the process of 
individualization of communally owned land? Will it increase the marketing 
of livestock and bring about improvements in the sphere of water 
development and grazing management? To what extent is the reported selling 
of individualized plots taking place? Who are these sellers and buyers? For 
what purpose do buyers use the newly acquired parcels? Are the Maasai 
selling land to buy poverty? 
The methods of research applied in the preparation of this book included an in-
depth analysis of the relevant literature covering nomadic pastoralism. Part of 
this exercise had been carried out in the context of another study undertaken 
by the author in 1984 among the Turkana nomadic pastoralists of north-west 
Kenya. Specific literature concerning Maasai pastoralists was collected at 
several universities in the Netherlands, the University of Cambridge and the 
University of London in Great Britain. In Kenya, the bulk of information 
available in the form of books, research papers, annual reports, policy papers, 
mímeos, maps, remote sensing data, closed and open files and newspapers was 
obtained from the University of Nairobi, the National Archives, the Kajiado 
District Information and Documentation Centre, the International Livestock 
Centre for Africa (ILCA), the Kajiado Arid and Semi-Arid Lands Programme 
(ASAL), the Ministries of Livestock Development, Agriculture and Education, 
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and private collections. 
Father Frans Mol's private collection of literature on Maasai turned out to be 
particularly helpful. However, entering his library makes one feel as if hit by a 
sledge-hammer as it is a visual expression of the enormous amount of ink and 
paper used by early travellers, colonial politicians, missionaries, 
anthropologists, geographers, historians, biologists, ecologists and even fiction 
writers on the pastoral Maasai. 
Among the most informative, at least for this study, have been the works of 
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Jacobs (1963), Leys (1924), Merker (1904), Mol (1978), Sandford (1919), 
Soirenson (1968), Waller (1976), mainly dealing with the history and 
anthropology of the Maasai, Bekure et al. (1987), Campbell (1978), Evangelou 
(1984), Galaty (1980), Grandin (1981), Halderman (1972), Holland (1986), 
Metson (1974), White and Meadows (1981), Njoka (1979), Sindiga (1986) and 
Tobiko (1989a) chiefly concerned with the Maasai economy and habitat 
In addition to the literature survey I attended a fulltime five month course on 
"Land Ecology and Rural Survey" at the International Institute for Aerospace 
and Earth Sciences (ITC) at Enschede in the Netherlands. It enlarged my 
knowledge of the ecological peculiarities of the tropical rangelands. 
In Kenya, co-operation was sought with the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands 
(ASAL) Programme of Kajiado District. Backstopping of this Netherlands 
sponsored programme was entrusted in the hands of the University of 
Amsterdam. As an assistant backstopper I supported the programme with the 
statistical handling and analysis of a district-wide survey conducted in co­
operation with the Ministry of Agriculture. Other, small scale surveys 
concerning livestock marketing, agricultural diversification and women group 
activities were also dealt with. 
Furthermore, a conference entitled "the Future of Maasai Pastoralists in 
Kajiado District" held in Limimi, Kenya, was attended in May 1989. Besides 
being a conference visitor, I was lucky enough to be able to participate in the 
organization of note-taking and the production of the conference proceedings. 
This job helped me to become acquainted with up-to-date information from a 
variety of sources, including Maasai pastoralists, government officials, 
missionaries, politicians and fellow researchers. Another forum, the 01 Maa 
meetings in Nairobi, also acted as a catalyst in my understanding of the present 
problems facing Maasai pastoralists. Other key-informants had already been 
interviewed during my stay in Kajiado from October 1988 until March 1989. 
The actual field work was conducted from September 1989 until April 1990. 
Criteria for the selection of our research locations were formulated and 
discussed with key informants. Seven group ranches were finally chosen in 
which the survey would be conducted: Olkinos, Embolioi, Elang'ata Wuas, 
Lomgosua, Kiboko, Meto and Рока. In addition we did two more specific 
surveys concerning employment among (young) Maasai in Esokota group 
ranch and Nairobi and another one about agricultural Maasai in Bartimaro 
group ranch (these case studies will be published at a later date). 
In total 26 Maasai secondary school leavers were tested for conducting the 
interviews of which 20 were finally selected.9 An important prerequisite was 
that they should originate from the locations being researched. Experience 
during the testing of the questionnaire had made clear that the openness of the 
Unfortunately, we had to drop Рока from our sample because the enumerator left his job 
after linding another one in Nairobi and no tune was left to appomt and tram another assistant 
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respondents and the validity of their answers greatly increased when the 
interviewer belonged to the same Maasai section. His familiarity with the area 
allowed the checking of information provided. Furthermore, parallel carrying 
forward of the survey in every location at the same time overcame the problem 
of comparability of data which would have resulted from a sequential 
collection. 
Groups of 2 to 4 students were stationed in their "home" group ranches. This 
also helped to solve the immense logistic problems of accommodation and 
transport As most respondents could only be interviewed during evening time, 
it was necessary to spend the night at the household's residence. Non-Maasai 
or Maasai from other locations would have had severe problems in arranging 
for this, especially in the Kaputiei group ranches (i.e. Olkinos, Embolioi, Рока 
and Kiboko). Every group was provided with at least one bicycle and a letter 
of introduction. As far as possible we had informed local chiefs of the start of 
the survey. In general every interviewer operated on his own except where, for 
reasons of wildlife danger, it was better to move in teams of two persons. 
We have tried to reach to a uniform distribution of respondents taking into 
account the human population densities within the ranch. The selection of the 
households was random. The location of every respondent's home was marked 
on a map. A Kajiado District General Event Calendar and a group ranch 
specific time table were produced to assist the respondents and interviewers in 
locating historical happenings. These calendars combined dates and specific 
events such as the construction of a road, the drilling of a borehole, a period of 
severe drought, the conducting of special ceremonies and the opening of a 
school, dispensary or training centre. 
Before the actual fieldwork went ahead the group of interviewers had a two-
week fulltime training course in Kajiado. The concepts, objectives and methods 
of survey were discussed in full detail in order to come to as uniform an 
understanding of the purpose and execution of the research as possible. 
Research questions were formulated, field-tested and reformulated. In order to 
be able to make trend deductions we attempted to stay as close as possible to 
other survey formats used by Metson (1974), White and Meadows (1981) and 
ILCA (1981) during the late 1970s and early 1980s period. 
In the first week of the survey we visited all groups to discuss problems that 
had possibly arisen. Revisits were carried out at a later stage. In addition, all 
the interviewers reported at a three week interval at Kajiado to recover 
somewhat and to refresh mind and body. Experiences were shared and 
discussed. Papers providing specific information about selected aspects were 
produced by every research team. Their interest in the topic became most 
obvious in discussions between themselves and with civil servants and policy 
makers. The enthusiasm and input showed by these young Maasai was very 
stimulating for us. Their work has contributed enormously to the writing of this 
book. 
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03 Organization of the book 
Chapter 1 introduces some of the main concepts used in this book such as 
nomadic pastoralism, land, land use rights, landlessness and poverty. Reference 
will be made to the Maasai situation. In addition, trends in the use of land 
world-wide as well as in Kenya will be shown. Finally, a framework used for 
the analysis of the access to land will be discussed. 
Chapter 2 highlights the Kenyan economy. Special attention is paid to the 
livestock sector in a regional, national and international context. Next, the 
national development policy is discussed before turning to one of the country's 
most burning issues, the unequal distribution and availability of land. 
Chapter 3 concentrates on a sketch of the semi-arid and arid lands of Kenya. 
This acts as a frame of reference for the Maasai pastoralists of Kajiado District 
in respect of land potential, livestock and wildlife density and demographic 
characteristics. 
Chapter 4 provides more detailed information about Kajiado District 
concerning its people, economy, ecology and physical infrastructure as of 
today. A brief outline of some aspects of Maasai society will also be discussed. 
Chapter S outlines the history of land use and land policy in Kajiado District 
as it developed since the late 1880s until 1963, the time of Kenya's 
independence from Great Britain. 
Chapter 6 follows a similar approach though here we concentrate on the 
Maasai economy and development policy in Kajiado District during this 
period. Reference to the overall performance of the Kenyan economy and 
Colonial development policy will often be made. 
Chapter 7 discusses post-Colonial land policy and the state of affairs in 
Kajiado District. Attention is paid mainly to the creation, performance and 
subdivision of group ranches. The growing importance of wildlife conservation 
and cultivation since the mid-1960s will also be dealt with. 
Chapter 8 presents the results of this survey obtained among the Maasai of 
Kajiado District concerning the effects of group ranch subdivision. The 
ecological and economic viability of individualized plots, the processes of 
fencing and reduced mobility. 
Chapter 9 deals with the further fragmentation, transfer and mortgage of the 
newly created plots. The kind of investments and improvements made by this 
new group of individual ranchers are presented. 
Chapter 10 provides information concerning the personal characteristics of 
the Maasai pastoralists and the intensification, diversification and 
commercialization of their (livestock) household economies. Notice is given of 
the major problems as mentioned by the Maasai pastoralists of today. This 
should provide an answer to the future of the Maasai of Kajiado District 
considering the steadily growing number of Maasai people with a diminishing 
area of land available. 
CHAPTER 1 
CONCEPTS AND FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
1.1 Concepts of Nomadic Pastoralism, Grazing Capacity, 
Land and Poverty 
1.1.1 The Concepts of Nomadic Pastoralism and Grazing Capacity 
Pastoralists are people who make a living by keeping livestock that act as a 
direct intermediate between man and his natural environment, the pastures. 
Indigestible plants are converted into milk, meat, fat and blood for human 
consumption and/or provide an indirect source of income through the sale or 
barter of animals and their produce, including wool, hides and skins, manure 
and homs. 
Like hunting and ranching, pastoralism, belongs to the main categories of 
rangeland utilization. It is a form of "extensive grazing", meaning that use is 
made of the land by grazing animals without an overall improvement of the 
vegetation being undertaken by (re)seeding or fertilizing or allowing for 
improvements like local feedlots or water supplies. 
Zonneveld (1984:94) has subdivided pastoralism according to various "key 
attributes", such as produce, stock type, objectives and mobility: 
Produce: - meat pastoralism, milk pastoralism, wool (by-product mainly); 
Stock type: - small stock pastoralism, cattle pastoralism, reindeer pastoralism 
(see Ingold 1980:202), llama and alpaca pastoralism; 
Objectives: - subsistence pastoralism, commercial pastoralism; 
Mobility: - village communal grazing, transhumance, nomadism, ranching. 
Let us consider some of these sub-classifications in detail. The distinction 
made concerning "produce" is a relative one. Milk pastoralists will also eat 
meat and vice versa. Milk pastoralism is the most common. The division made 
along the line of stock type is a relative one, especially as far as cattle and 
small stock are concerned. For example, in Kenya most pastoral households 
have both cattle and small stock. We would like to add "camel pastoralism", 
which in most north-African countries especially is of major, if not sole, 
importance. 
Using the "produce" criterium a division can also be made concerning the 
relative importance of pastoralism within the households' overall economy (see 
Dietz 1987:15). When at least 50 per cent of the pastoralists' income is based 
on the livestock enterprise the term "pure pastoralism" is often applied. Others, 
however, prefer to reserve this terni for those pastoralists who live solely from 
the produce of their herds. Besides livestock, pastoralists may satisfy their 
needs through cultivation. If they obtain between 10 and 50 per cent of their 
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income from animals they arc classified as "agro-pastoral". When non-
agricultural income covers more than half of the food needs one speaks of a 
"mixed economy". 
Starting from the production "objective" point of view it is possible to 
differentiate between subsistence and commercial pastoralism; the former 
inmlies that üvestock products directly provide more than half of the food 
needs, while in the latter case food is bought with the proceeds of the selling 
or bartering of animals and their produce. 
The last key for sub-classifying pastoralism is that of "mobility". As with the 
degree of pastoralism, it is possible to distinguish a kind of gradation in the 
mobility aspect, ranging from hyper mobile, having no fixed home and putting 
up a tent or hut wherever grass and water is available to being completely 
sedentary. и г л 
It should be stressed that the nomadic movements are not the result ot the 
pastoralist's wish to travel. These are foremost determined by the low 
ecological potential of the grazing areas; minimal and/or unreliable rams, 
sometimes failing altogether, and the high évapotranspiration or extreme cold 
resulting in low and seasonal and geographically variable herbaceous biomass 
availability. In other words, the pastoralists are forced to move their animals in 
search for grazing. Other factors affecting mobility are the need to avoid 
disease-affected and insecure areas. Actual migration patterns are also 
influenced by the location of trading centres, agricultural areas and quarantine 
regulations imposed by the Government. In other words, mobility is necessary 
in order to survive. 
(open) 
limited disiane« 
солЬ. agrioütun 
<F5& 
Communal grazing Ranch 
(fenced) 
pure UvesRxi 
abowUdlUe 
«by 
-/¿2 '^СГ^?-(open) 
Figure 1.1 Types of Livestock Keeping 
Source: Zonneveld 1984:94 
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One speaks of village communal grazing if herding is centred around a village 
and the walking distance does not exceed 20 km (see figure 1.1). 
A specific intermediate form of mobility is transhumance: the seasonal 
movement of herds and flocks accompanied by herdsmen only, along moie or 
less fíxed trekking-routes to wet-season grazing grounds returning to their 
sedentary base where the rest of the families live permanently in the dry 
season. For example, the Bororo of Niger and the Tuareg of Mali make long 
treks of over 100 km every year. Where ecological conditions become better, 
i.e. the intermediate zone between semi-arid and sub-humid allowing for 
agriculture, the nomadic movements are short or rather infrequent; e.g. the 
Nandi of Kenya. 
Nomadism refers to those cases in which all household members are 
constantly on the move during the dry season either together or, as in the case 
of the Turkana of Kenya, split up from each other taking care of a specific part 
of the total herd.' During the wet season the members and their livestock 
regroup on the wet season pastures whenever there is an abundance of grazing 
for all of the household's animals. This is a constant process of dispersion and 
concentration in order to use the scarce available resources optimally. 
Ranching refers to a situation whereby 'the herds are kept for sale on a 
specific, sometimes fenced, area, in which water resources are controlled, herds 
are divided into different age and sex groups, parasites and predators are 
controlled, the range is managed and use of fire is regulated' 
(Unesco/UNEP/FAO 1979:265) Wild animals may also be kept and managed 
as well as domesticated. According to Zonneveld (1984:96) ranching was 
introduced in the last century. Ranches can only exist where dry season grazing 
areas are available. For arid and semi-arid areas this means that a ranch has to 
extend over many thousands of hectares. Improved ranch systems which make 
use of reseeding and fertilizing as in the United States, can be much smaller. 
A specific ranching system, which will be the focus of this study, is the 
"group-ranch" in which the exclusive grazing rights of a large tract of 
(unfenced) land are given to a specific group of families. Its objective lies 
somewhere in-between that of regular ranching (one of the most 
commercialized forms of livestock keeping oriented at an outside market), and 
that of subsistence pastoralism (foremost geared to maximize (milk) output in 
order to support the human population and the reproduction of the herd). 
Traditional Maasai pastoralism was (moderately) nomadic, cattle-, milk- and 
Unfortunately, several authors while referring to pastorahsts speak of "nomads" (see eg. 
Unesco/UNEP/FAO 1979 465). There is also the confusing concept of "semi-pastorahsm" Some 
authors use it m the context of agro-pastoralism or a mixed economy Others stress the nomadic 
aspea and seem to speak of semi-sedentaiy pastorahsts when refcmng to pastorahsts following 
transhumance or a kind of reduced mobility, either m time or space, as compared to "fully-
nomadic" people. When sem-pastoralism exists together with sem-nomadism as is not seldom the 
case, there is no problem. It would be better to avoid this terminology 
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subsistence-oriented. Nowadays, the Maasai human population has become 
more sedentary and organized along the lines of "group-ranches". These are, 
however, in a process of dissolution resulting in the individualization of 
landownership. Cattle are still the most important kind of stock within the 
Maasai herds, though sheep and goats have grown in importance. Recently, 
some camels have been introduced. In addition, the diversification of and 
commercialization of processes of the Maasai household economy as well as 
changing food habits are increasingly visible. 
The extent of mobility is foremost related to the quality of the rangeland; 
forage quantity and quality, availability of water, presence of pests and 
diseases, erosion hazard, climatic hardship and the like. The number of animals 
that can be maintained per area unit as determined by all site factors, without 
reducing the quality of the land is called the carrying capacity of the land. The 
term grazing capacity can be defined as the number of animals that can graze 
on a certain area without doing damage, based on the amount of forage 
available, presuming all other factors are favourable (see Zonneveld 1984:107). 
Grazing capacity therefore refers to a potential situation. An approximation of 
the grazing capacity is obtained by dividing the rangeland forage growth by the 
herbivore requirements2: 
G = - i P 
R 
G = grazing capacity in animal units/area unit (eg. AU/ha); 
F s forage production in wcighl/area unit/unit of lime (e.g. kg/ha/year). The yearly Consumable 
Dry Mailer (CDM) production (y) is deiermined by the annual rainfall (x) in mm per year 
multiplied by a certain constant (b: 1-10) depending on soil, rainfall seasonality, altitude and 
the like. The outcome has to be added to another fixed constant (a: -400 to 100, depending 
on the area). For semi-arid Kenya these constants are set at -100 to -240 and 3.8 to 6.0 for a 
and b respectively); 
R = herbivore requirement of dry matter (DM) in weight/animal unit/unit of time (e.g. 
kg/AU/year). The daily DM forage requirements of large herbivores vanes from 2 to 4 per 
ceni of the body weight. Also the quality of DM, expressed in terms of crude protein contents 
(CP) is of importance in this respect In general CP requirements are set at 7% of consumable 
dry mauer, whereas 10% is preferable. Multiplying the N(itrogen) content by 6.2S gives the 
CP percentage; 
Ρ = proper-use factor (PUF) in decimal (0-1); maximum proportion of forage growth that can be 
grazed each year from a given type of forage without inducing a downward trend in forage 
production. For arid and semi-and rangelands a rule of thumb is that the potential forage 
consumption is half the forage growth (PUF = 0.5). 
The following is based on lecture notes of the International Institute for Aerospace Survey 
and Earth Sciences (ITC) wriuen by van Gils, van Wijngaarden and Zonneveld (see Gils van et al. 
1985a and Gils van et al. 1985b). 
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Comparing the actual grazing capacity (i.e. taking into account other land 
qualities like water availability and so on) with the stocking rate (i.e. the 
number of animals per surface area present over a certain period (e.g. 
AU/ha/year)) an idea may be formed about the grazing intensity. If the 
stocking rate is lower then the range is understocked, if higher then it is 
overstocked. In both cases there is a danger of deterioration of the rangeland 
(see Gils van et al. 1985a: 19). 
Finally, we should consider the application of a uniform animal or 'stock unit' 
to convert different types of animals (i.e. cattle, camels, goats and sheep) into a 
single figure enabling us to make an overall estimation of the total feed 
requirement and/or production potential for a certain area or group of people. 
In general animals are compared on the basis of liveweight only. Others go 
further by applying metabolic weight, by including age or by referring to the 
food producing capacity. 
Unfortunately, as a result of these different approaches, a world-wide 
accepted definition of the stock unit is not yet available. Several units can be 
traced in the literature. Dahl and Hjort (1976) use a 'Standard Stock Unit' 
(SSU) of 215 kg, which places goats at 0.33 SSU and sheep at 0.20 SSU. Pratt 
and Gwynne (1977/8) also speak of SSU, though they refer to a steer with a 
liveweight of 450 kg or to a Zebu cow with calf of 300 kg ('Zebu Unit'). For 
goats and sheep they use equivalents of 0.14 - 0.20 SSU, depending on actual 
liveweights. The UNDP/FAO Kenya Range Management Project Preliminary 
Survey conducted in the late 1960s grounded their 12 year span livestock 
development projections on 'Kenya Stock Units' (KSU) of an average of 0.55 
for cattle and 0.07 for small stock (see section 7.2.5). Some years later the 
Kenyan Range Management Division (RMD) used a 'Stock Unit' of 1.25 for a 
mature bull, 1.0 for cow with calf, 1 year old steers and heifers 0.5, 2 year old 
cattle 0.75, 3 year and over 1.0 SU (see section 7.2.6). The Kenyan Rangeland 
Ecological Monitoring Unit (KREMU) speaks of 'Tropical Animal Units' 
(TLU) as equivalent to a 250 kg animal and uses conversion factors of 1.2, 
0.72 and 0.072 for camels, cattle and small stock, respectively (see Mbugua 
1986:419 and section 3.4). By contrast Jahnke (1982) speaking of 'Tropical 
Livestock Units' (TLU) uses conversion factors of 1.0, 0.7 and 0.1 for camels, 
cattle and shoats. 
For their Kajiado District survey executed during the early 1980s the 
International Livestock Centre for Africa (ILCA) used 'Livestock Equivalents' 
(LE) for livestock species conversion towards a standard 250 kg liveweight 
animal. The LE approach is based on metabolic weight as it gives a more 
precise indication of the feed requirements of the herd. The average conversion 
factors used are 0.71 for cattle and 0.17 for small stock. The Ministry of 
Livestock Development in Kajiado used for their 'Stock Unit' (SU) a mean 
figure of 0.6 for cattle and 0.125 for small stock (see section 8.3.2). 
In other words, one should be very careful about estimates and especially 
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about strong statements concerning situations of 'overgrazing' or 'livestock 
deficits for human consumption'. Application of different livestock units will 
result in different outcomes which could be in conflict In chapter 8 we will 
deal further with this confusing concept 
1.1.2 The Concepts of Land, Land Use Rights and Landlessness 
Besides livestock the pastoral way of production needs land. Land has been 
defined by the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations as an 
area on the earth's surface, the characteristics of which embrace all reasonably 
stable, or predictable cyclic attributes of the biosphere vertically above and 
below this area, including those of the atmosphere, the soil and the underlying 
rock (geology), the water regime (hydrology), the plant and animal populations 
and the results of past present and future uses of the land by man (see 
Zonneveld 1984:111). 
Let us consider some juridical issues in relation to land. Simply put, land 
tenure concepts define how individuals gain access to and acquire use rights 
over land, either temporarily or permanently (see Ezemoah 1987:36). There are 
many ways in which rights of land are laid down. It is possible that title deeds 
have been given out (statutory law) or that land is transferred by a traditional 
law of succession (customary law). 
Hellen (1977:34-74) makes a twofold division within the category of land 
which falls under the regulations of the statutory law: 
1. private land - all land which is owned, held or occupied under a freehold 
title, or a leasehold title, or a certificate or claim, or which is 
registered as private land under a Registered Land Act. 
2. public land - all land which is occupied, used or acquired by the 
Government and any other land not being customary or 
private land. 
Land underlying customary law can be distinguished as: 
1. communally used 
2. individually used 
3. reserve land - not yet allotted 
Nowadays, in many countries of Africa, the customary laws of succession are 
under pressure as a result of a process towards individualization and 
exclusivity of tenure. By implementing a programme of land consolidation, 
adjudication and registration, often part of a large-scale land-reform policy 
and/or new land legislation, the change from customary to statutory land law 
and from communal to individual ownership is being brought about 
In Kenya too, traditional systems of land tenure and land use are vanishing 
slowly but surely. It should be realized that there was no such thing as a 
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uniform traditional land tenure system for all ethnic groups in Kenya. Each 
group had its own system with ceitain peculiarities that others lacked in their 
land tenure arrangements. For instance, the githaka system of the Kikuyu 
agriculturalists differs in many respects from the land regulations among the 
Maasai pastoralists (see e.g. Sonius n.d.). Still, for all groups there was no such 
thing as land being a marketable commodity as land came under Bntish rule 
by the end of the 1890s (see chapter 5). In 1902 an Ordinance was passed by 
the new rulers proclaiming that all public land (i.e. unoccupied land) was 
Crown land which, for the time being, was subject to the control of His 
Majesty. In practice this meant that land under customary law, which seemed 
to be unoccupied but was, in many cases, only temporarily abandoned or 
sometimes stiU in use, was alienated and given in leasehold or even granted in 
freehold to the newcomers. When the Kikuyu returned to find the lands of their 
people occupied by settlers it had been, from their point of view, stolen (see 
Best & de Blij 1977:440). 
Reserves allocated to the principal ethnic groups in the first quarter of this 
century, created another category of land ownership; Native land. In fact this 
was reserve land all held under traditional tribal systems of allocation and 
rights. In later years this division in land tenure categories in Kenya was 
regrouped into: 
- Government land: land, directly administered by the Commissioner of Lands, 
held on behalf of the Government; forest reserves and national parks. Leases 
of 33 or 99 years are sometimes offered to interested parties; 
- Trust land: land not gazetted or allocated on title but held in trust under 
customary law by the county council, a "native" administrative body, for the 
ethnic group occupying that particular territory, and 
- Private land: registered land in private ownership or held on lease from the 
Government (see World Bank 1975:455). 
Landlessness or near-landlessness seems to be on the rise all over the world in 
the urban as well as in the rural areas. Landless agricultural workers do not 
have access to this productive resource necessary for making a living. Near-
landlessness has been defined by Leonard (1989:13) as 'access to plots of land 
too small to provide a minimal livelihood under existing land use patterns and 
technical capabilities'. Recent estimates place some 13 per cent of all rural 
households in developing countries as landless and almost 60 per cent have too 
little land to subsist on (see section 1.2.1). 
How do the Maasai traditionally view land-related issues such as ownership, 
rights of use and inheritance? 
Tobiko (1989a:25) states that, to a Maasai, land (en-kop) includes 'both the 
solum and anything growing or otherwise naturally implanted in the soil -
vegetation, trees, grass, etc.'. Maasai customary land law regulates the access 
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to and use of pastures and water. The most important sociological entity along 
which the application of the Maasai customary land law proceeds is the 'ol-
osho' or section. In total among the Kenyan Maasai there are 12 distinct 
sections each having their own name (Kaputiei, Matapalo, Purko, Kisonko, 
Ddamat, Dalalekutuk, Keekonyokie, Loodokilani, Loita, Siria, Uasinkishu and 
Moitanik) and together they comprise the Maasai pastoral group.3 
Every section has its own specific geographic location in Maasailand and 
forms the basic, as well as the ultimate unit of land ownership and resource 
utilization. The senior elders in any section form the governing body. Land at 
sectional level is communally owned. Members of each section, enjoy equal 
rights of access to all natural resources (grass, water, salt licks) of their section. 
However, the use of land also has some restrictions. For instance, dry season 
pastures are not entered by any person of the community until the time comes 
to retreat to these mostly swampy or upland places. Additionally, a family is 
allowed to mark a small 'traditional private pasture' (ol-okeri), tracts of land 
located immediately opposite the family gates to a kraal camp (homestead), 
reserved for the grazing of a family's calves, sick, aged and weak animals. 
Grazing on another's ol-okeri without permission is a serious social wrong. 
But, as Tobiko explains 'in spite of its private nature, olokeri did not confer 
upon the "owner" any semblance of private ownership; it is merely a socially 
recognized "private-reserve" that confers no title whatsoever; it is neither 
inheritable nor disposable by whatever means. Moreover, it only belongs to the 
"owner" so long as he is in occupation of it; so that if he migrates to another 
place, his olokeri ceased, whereon, another person may subsequently carve his 
on the same site' (Tobiko 1989a:35). 
Another restriction concerning the free use of land among the Maasai is 
operative on the wet season pasture {empamat) of a certain section. Most 
people have their own locality of residence in the lower plains which they 
prefer and return to whenever possible during the wet season. Where a person 
erects his homestead he acquires exclusive rights over it. These rights will 
retain some sort of "reversionary" rights over both the settlement itself and the 
spot on which it is erected. No outsider can lay claims to the site and, even if 
the owners abandon it, it remains unoccupied and undistributed unless a 
relative or friend is allowed to live there. No one may occupy it without the 
owners' permission and they can return there at any time to live in it again. 
Settlements in the dry-season higher lands are temporary in nature. Also "man-
made" water sources are more or less privately "owned". Land around such a 
well also falls under the control of the well-digger. This person, however, has 
no exclusive say in the use of it 
Finally, Maasai of a different section in search of water and green pastures 
are not allowed to trespass onto another section's area without permission 
being granted by this section. In principle, however, permission is always 
Ια Tanzania we find (he Sikiran, Lailayiok and the main body of Kisonko Maasai 
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granted. The Maasai recognise the fact that by allowing others to enter their 
area they create a reciprocal right which, as history has repeatedly 
demonstrated, will most likely be needed at one time in the years to come. 
1.13 The Concept of Poverty 
Another concept which needs some clarification is poverty. Several definitions 
have been used in the past each having its own merits and difficulties/ 
Nonetheless, all approaches should be handled with caution. According to a 
World Bank Report (1990) poverty is the inability to attain a minimal standard 
of living. This seems to be a simple definition but its operationalization still 
causes great difficulties. The World Bank Report uses a measure of 
consumption below US$ 370 per person per year as the poverty line. On a 
regional level social indicators like life expectancy, child mortality and school 
enrolment are also included. Undernutrition is a well known symptom of 
poverty - largely concentrated among the landless, sharecroppers, small fanners 
and small-scale fishermen. The close relationship between illiteracy and 
poverty is also confirmed in country surveys (see WCARRD 1988:103). 
According to the World Bank's US$ 370 consumption poverty line 
approximately 1,115 million people in the developing world, that is some 33 
per cent, were living in absolute poverty by 1985 (see World Bank 1990:28).' 
South Asia (525 million poor). East Asia (280 million poor) and Sub-Saharan 
Africa (180 million poor) are the regions inhabiting most of the poor with only 
the latter expected to increase their absolute number of poor people by the end 
of the century to some 265 million people living below a minimal standard. 
This would mean a continuation of the trend for this region in the 1965-1985 
period when poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa was severe and especially since the 
beginning of the 1980s, even increased sharply.6 
Consumption per capita stagnated and primary enrolment rates 
(approximately 60 per cent by 1980) decreased by almost 7 per cent between 
1980 and 1985. Child mortality by 1980 was almost 200 deaths per thousand 
children under 5 years of age and has been reduced by only a meagre 5 per 
cent since then. Life expectancy has increased from 42 years in 1965 to 50 
4
 For example, Greer and Thorbecke (1986) use a nutritional approach for Kenya by denning 
'food poverty' as an attempt to measure whether individuals consume enough food - or have the 
means to do so - to enjoy a minimum desirable level of physical health 
The Food and Agricultural Organizaban of the United Nations (FAO) gives an estimate of 
789 million poor people for 1980 (excluding China and Asian centrally planned economies), half 
of whom were living m South Asia (see WCARRD 1988 7) 
6
 Newest figures indicale that the 1990 Report projection for the year 2000 (decline to some 
82S million poor world-wide) has been to optimistic Latest estimates foresee a total of 1,107 
million poor people of which 304 million will reside m Sub-Saharan Africa. This is 49 7 percem 
of the lauer's total expected population for the year 2000 (see World Bank 1992 30) 
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years by 1985 but is still the world's lowest Malnutrition is on the rise, and 
the number of underweight children has grown substantially. All other regions 
in the world score much better in comparison. 
Kenya, in terms of GNP per capita ranking 25th on the scale of poorest 
countries by 1992, seems to reflect the overall trend for the whole of Sub-
Saharan Africa sketched above.7 'Estimates of the proportion of the total 
population living in poverty in Kenya in the mid-1970s range from 30 (Collier 
and Lai) to 45 per cent (Crawford and Thorbecke)' (Hunt 1985:33). As Hunt 
points out both studies were based on a considerable amount of guesswork. 
Still, both surveys show that poverty in Kenya is a widespread phenomenon 
and that the majority of the poor are living in the rural areas. 
The rural poor are a heterogeneous group, comprising of smallholders, large-
farm squatters and pastoralists, but who share common disadvantages. These 
include limited assets, environmental vulnerability, lack of access to public 
services and amenities, specifically education and medical facilities. The 
(nearHandless constitute the largest single poverty group in the developing 
regions. Pastoralists are also among the poor, though their situation seems to 
be less structural as severe periods of stress are followed by times of recovery. 
Table 1.1 Poverty in Kenya (1974) 
URBAN 
Nairobi 
Other 
RURAL 
Pure pastoralists 
Pastoralists who fami 
Migrant f i n n e n 
Landless/poor occupatioo 
Leodless/cood occupation 
Smallholdcn 
Large farai squatters 
Large faimen 
TOTAL 
Total 
number 
COOO) 
1,400 
700 
700 
12,895 
725 
75 
200 
420 
245 
10340 
600 
290 
¡4,295 
Below 
poverty 
COOO) 
60 
20 
40 
4,i50 
615 
25 
110 
210 
-
2,990 
200 
-
4,210 
Below 
poverty 
(*) 
43 
29 
47 
52 2 
848 
33 3 
55 0 
500 
00 
289 
33 3 
00 
295 
Total 
poor 
(%) 
Л 
05 
09 
986 
146 
06 
26 
50 
00 
710 
48 
00 
1000 
Total 
population 
(*) 
9S 
49 
49 
902 
51 
05 
14 
29 
17 
723 
42 
20 
1000 
Poverty L 
Ksh./yril 
2,150 
2,150 
4,285 
2,700 
2,000 
1.900 
2,000 
2,000 
Source author's compUation Irom World Bank 1 Ш 4Ь-\Ш о\1іеі and Lai im 
Collier and Lai (1980 and 1986) took 2,000 Kenyan Shillings a year (at 1974 
prices) as the rural poverty income line for a smallholder household in Kenya. 
The line is mainly chosen to be able to compare one rural group with the other 
7
 The World Bank includes 43 low-income economies with GNP per capita between 80 US$ 
(Mozambique) and sona: 600 US$ (Viet Nam) Kenya scores a 370 US$ per capita GNP Of tins 
group 28 are African countries (see World Bank 1992.218) 
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instead of measuring the total number of poor people. Table 1.1 shows the 
spread of poverty in Kenya by 1974 according to Collier and Lai (1980). 
Crawford and Thorbecke give a figure of 89 per cent of the poor living in the 
rural sector, while Collier and Lai's estimate is even as high as 98.6 per cent 
composed of smallholders (71.0 per cent), pure pastoralists (14.6 per cent), 
pastoralists who farm (0.6 per cent), migrant farmers (2.6 per cent), landless 
with poor occupations (5.0 per cent) and large-farm squatters (4.8 per cent).* 
In absolute terms Collier and Lai estimated pure pastoralists at 725,000 
people of whom almost 85 per cent were living below the poverty line set for 
this group at Ksh. 4,285/- per year per household. This information caused the 
World Bank to conclude that 'pastoralists are possibly the poorest group in 
Kenya' (World Bank 1983:300). For pastoralists who practise some additional 
fanning (75,000 people), Collier and Lai predicted a relatively well-off 
situation with only 33 per cent living in absolute poverty. 
Let us examine the extreme figures provided by Collier and Lai in more detail. 
To determine poverty among Kenyan pastoralists they used a survey done by 
Campbell in 1977 among the Loitokitok section of the Maasai living in the 
south-eastern comer of Kajiado District As their source of information 
Campbell estimated the household's average income to be Ksh. 3,270/- for 
1976. 
Table 1.2 shows data from Campbell's survey as well as the results of a 
research conducted by the International Livestock Centre for Africa (ILCA) 
between 1981 and 1983 among Kajiado Maasai pastoralists. The ILCA survey 
estimated an annual household cash income of Ksh. 13,010/- obtained mainly 
through the sale of livestock and its produce (83 per cent). Other sources of 
income such as wages, beer brewing, money transactions, accounted for the 
remaining 17 per cent. Borrowing and loan collections (Ksh. 1,110/-) provided 
a total annual cash inflow of Ksh. 14,140/-.' For a valid comparison with 
Campbell's 1976 cash income, however, these figures should be corrected for 
inflation which amounts to some 15 per cent per year. At 1976 prices ILCA's 
Maasai pastoralist household's mean annual cash income would be in the order 
of Ksh. 5,782/- per year.10 This is some 77 per cent higher than Campbell's 
mean annual cash income, and would, on average, exclude Maasai pastoralists 
Because the 1990 urban population has increased to some 4-5 aillioa or 22-24 per cent of 
the Kenyan human population as compared to the 1.4 million or 9.8 per cent by 1974, it is 
expected that since 1974 the importance of the urban poor has grown likewise. 
9
 This is in the range of Campbell's figure of 93.43 per cent livestock related income. One 
should take into account that this figure applies to pure pastoralists. For Maasai pastoralists who 
also farm the livestock related Income drops to some 35 per cent only, lite ILCA survey does not 
disoimmalfi between so called Maasai pure pastoralists and Maasai farmers. 
10
 Using the ILCA defined Maasai consumer price index of 112 for 1976 as compared to 2S2 
for 1982 (1975=100) (see Bekure et al. 1987:372). 
24 
from being among the poor!" 
Selling Wealth to Buy Poverty 
Table 1.2 Average Annual Cash Income of Maasai Households, 
Income 1976 
Source 
CatUe 
Sheep 
Goals 
Milk 
Hides 
Su¿> Imauxk 
Relatives 
Business 
Labour 
Otber 
TOTAL 
Ksh. 
2,167 
347 
462 
34 
45 
3,055 
42 
78 
47 
48 
3.270 
Source Campbell 1978 48 & Hekure et 
% 
663 
106 
141 
10 
14 
93 4 
13 
24 
14 
15 
1000 
al ІУИ І' 
1976, 1981-83 
Income 1981/3 
Source 
Livestock sales 
Milk 
Hides 
Skins 
Sublivesiock 
Money transactions 
Beer brewing 
Wages 
Other 
TOTAL CASH-INCOME 
Loan collections 
Borrowing 
TOTAL CASH-INFLOW 
¿У 
Ksh. 
10,365 
210 
5 
110 
10,690 
815 
75 
изо 100 
13.010 
970 
270 
14,140 
% 
80 
2 
0 
1 
83 
6 
0 
10 
1 
100 
In addition, as highlighted in appendix 1.1, Collier and Lai's estimate is based 
on a survey conducted among one group of nomadic pastoralists at a specific 
time and place, the group being under severe stress.12 Their assessment also 
overrates the pastoralists' poverty line due to the omission of the valuation of 
subsistence production and the use of a questionably large household size. In 
other words, Collier and Lai's calculation has resulted in an inflated number of 
poor pastoral people for the whole of Kenya. 
This statement is confirmed by other surveys showing a less dramatic 
situation for Maasai pastoralists. For instance, according to a survey conducted 
in 1981/2 by the Kenyan Central Bureau of Statistics, Kajiado and Narok 
households, most of them pastoralists, had the highest average net monthly 
income (Ksh. 1,674/-) as compared to other districts of the country (Ksh. 829/-
mean) (see RoK/CBS 1988:33-35). This survey included income in kind 
derived from farm enterprises in determining total income. In Narok/Kajiado, 
the proportion of income in kind was an estimated 63 per cent of the total 
average monthly household income, while the national average figure 
amounted to 48 per cent. This underscores our statement that among 
pastoralists subsistence is of more importance than among smallholders. 
Adjustment of the minimim income of Ksh. 4,285/- for 1974 would result m a poverty 
line of approximately Ksh 5,635/- per household for 1976 
Campbell gives a figure of 60 per cent of his sample of pastoralist households being 
unable to meet subsistence needs from Uieir herds at the lime of the survey de ш the post 
drought situation) as compared to 25 per cent in the pre-drought situation' (see Campbell 
1978 23) 
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Likewise, the per capita cash income poverty line for pastoralists will be lower 
than for agriculturalists. 
Does this mean that we should reject the idea of widespread poverty among 
Maasai and other pastoralists in Kenya altogether? 
Not completely; we agree with Collier and Lai that the poverty concept 
should mainly be used to estimate the relative number of poor people 
especially in relation to other groups in Kenyan society. Nevertheless, a more 
accurate figure than that provided by Collier and Lai would be welcomed. 
Crawford and Thorbecke presumed a still high but considerably lower 
percentage of impoverished people of 60 per cent of all Kenyan pastoralists 
(totalling 1,365,000 people according to these authors - see Hunt 1985:40-54). 
Available information provided by other researchers suggests that among the 
Maasai in 'normal' times the number of poor households, which in most cases 
is based on a ranking according to wealth expressed in number of animals in 
relation to household size, ranges in the order of 25 to 35 per cent (see 
Campbell 1978:23 and King et al. 1982:5). Estimates for the other pastoral 
peoples of Kenya vary with the Pokot and Turkana characterized as being less 
well off and the Orma and Borana among the relatively more affluent 
pastoralists (see section 3.4). 
As late as the early 1930s the Maasai were characterized by the Kenyan 
Land Commission as being probably the most wealthy tribe in East Africa, 
both in land and the stock they were able to sustain. 
This kind of wealth (land and stock) has not been included (directly) in 
Collier and Lai's poverty definition. As Leonard (1989:13) has said the degree 
to which landlessness or near-landlessness coincides with poverty is a source 
of debate among experts. Unesco sees a strong relationship between 
landlessness and poverty at least for certain areas of the world. 'Poverty is 
highly correlated with landlessness in South Asia, southern Africa and much of 
Latin America. When the poor do own land it is often unproductive [and] 
many of the poor have access to land without having ownership rights. In other 
cases the poor have access to land that is owned by the community or is 
common property. Such arrangements are increasingly jeopardized by 
population pressure, privatization, overexploitation of resources, and 
deterioration of the environment' (Unesco/UNEP/FAO 1979:31-2). 
Comparison over time of resources, including assets like livestock and land, 
should bring forward really essential information concerning the level of 
poverty. It is the overall trend of prosperity over a long span of time, 
excluding short term fluctuations, that should be sought. In the following 
chapters we will present this trend for Kenyan pastoralists and Maasai 
livestock keepers in particularly. To enable us analyzing the access to land for 
Maasai pastoralists we used a framework which we will present in the next 
section. Before that we will discuss the world trend in the availability of land 
for the agricultural population in the last decades. 
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1.2 Access to Land: a Framework For the Analysis 
1.2.1 Access to Land World-wide 
World-wide during 1980-1990 there was an increase in the agricultural 
population of some 193 million, whilst the arable area under production 
expanded with only 23.4 million ha as against an increase of 62 million 
agricultural people and 38.8 million ha in the period 1970-1980." Table 1.3 
shows the (agricultural) population figures for some selected regions in the 
1970-90 period. From this table it can be concluded that, as far as all 
developing regions are concerned, the agricultural population increased with 
some 235 million people over the 1980-1990 period. 
Table 1.3 also shows the high percentage of the agricultural population in 
Kenya (77 per cent), Africa (66 per cent) and the Far East (61 per cent) as 
compared to the Near East (38 per cent) and Latin America (26 per cent). The 
1970 percentages for these regions were 82, 74, 68, 59 and 41 per cent, 
respectively. This means that the Near East and Latin America regions in 
particular have been able to reduce the relative importance of their agricultural 
population, whereas the reductions in other regions were only modest. 
Table U Increase in (Agricultural) Population for Some Selected Developing 
Regions 1970-90 (in millions) 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 
Region 
Kenya 
Africa 
L. Amenca 
Near East 
FarEasl 
Alldev 
regions 
Tot 
Pop 
11 
2*4 
2*3 
160 
1.892 
2.623 
Agr 
Pop 
9 
209 
117 
95 
1.286 
1.710 
Tot 
Pop 
14 
333 
323 
185 
2.109 
2.955 
Agr 
Pop 
11 
246 
118 
95 
1.470 
1.932 
Tot 
Pop 
17 
386 
363 
212 
2,313 
3.280 
ART 
Pop 
13 
275 
117 
99 
1.559 
2.052 
To« 
Pop 
20 
449 
404 
247 
2,538 
3.641 
Agr 
Pop 
16 
308 
118 
102 
1,636 
2,167 
Tot 
Pop 
24 
525 
448 
280 
2.786 
4,046 
Agr 
Pop 
18 
347 
118 
106 
1.713 
2.287 
Source: h'AU/HY WSZ and ІУУО 
Note: the regions mentioned refer to the developing countries only. The Far East figure also 
includes centrally planned Asian nations. 
Agricultural population is denned as all persons who depend for their livelihood on 
agriculture. This comprises all persons actively engaged in agriculture and their non-working 
dependents. For a definition of types of land use see notes table 1.4. 
Table 1.4 Change in Main Types of Land Use (in '000 ha), 1974-89 
Kenya 
1974 
1979 
1984 
1989 
(1) 
2¿10f 
2,270f 
2335f 
2,428f 
(2) 
38,100f 
38,100f 
38,100f 
38,100f 
(3) 
2.660f 
2¿60f 
2,460f 
2,360f 
(4) 
13,999 
14,039 
14,074 
14,081 
Near East 
1974 
1979 
1984 
1989 
(1) 
84,651 
84.258 
81,991 
82,582 
(2) 
309,948 
310,132 
309,878 
309.148 
(3) 
98,610 
96,185 
95.365 
94,122 
(4) 
699,027 
701,012 
704,980 
706,362 
Africa 
0) 
143,634 
149,357 
153,051 
156.576 
(2) 
703.999 
703,317 
699,346 
698,164 
(3) 
668,285 
656,700 
644,967 
633.203 
(4) 
813.057 
819,561 
831,571 
840,997 
Far East 
(1) 
374,995 
378.250 
380,677 
382,227 
(2) 
495,788 
478.850 
478,684 
461,917 
(3) 
503,398 
489.260 
470.600 
461.917 
(4) 
585,498 
613.292 
629.653 
635,692 
Latin America 
(1) 
153,895 
167,281 
175,603 
180,090 
(2) 
542,225 
553.489 
563,544 
573.843 
(3) 
1,032,917 
1.008.249 
982,647 
955,601 
(4) 
288,633 
288,652 
295,877 
308,137 
M Developing Countries 
0) 
758,238 
780.261 
792,485 
802.654 
(2) 
2,052,735 
2,046,562 
2.052.232 
2,061.734 
(3) 
2347,432 
2,295,142 
2,237.596 
2,188,780 
(4) 
2.428,457 
2,464.812 
2^04.423 
2^33.590 
Source. ЬАи/п ічьм 
(1)° Arable Land and Land under permanent Crops 
(2): Permanent Meadows and Pastures 
(3): Forests and Woodland 
(4): Other land 
f : FAO esumale 
Arable land refers to land under temporary crops, temporary meadows for mowing or pastures, land under market and kitchen gardens, and land lemporanly 
fallow or lying idle; 
Land under permanent crops refers to land cultivated with oops that occupy the land for long penods and need not be replanted after each harvest, such as 
cocoa, coffee and robber, 
Permanent Meadows and Pastures refers to land used permanently (five years or more) for herbaceous forage crops, either cultivated or growing wild. The 
dividing line between this and "Forests and Woodland" can be somewhat unclear especially in the case of shrubs, savannah, etc; 
Forests and Woodland refers to land under natural or planted trees, 
Other Land refers to any other land not nrationed in category 1, 2, 3. It includes built-up areas, roads, barren land etc (see FAO/PY 1990). 
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The change in land available for cultivation is shown in table 1.4. It should be 
noted that, in the latter half of the 1980s, the expansion of land for agriculture 
worldwide was only half that of the first period of the decade, whereas the 
growth of the agricultural population was slightly higher. This trend, though 
less pronounced, can also be deduced for the African Region. From 1979-84 
the land available for agriculture in Africa increased by 3.7 million ha as 
compared to a 3.S million ha increase in the 1984-89 period. The African 
agricultural population increased by 33.S and 38.5 million people, respectively. 
In Kenya, the situation is less clear. The growth of the agricultural 
population is on the increase. From 1980 to 1990 the number of agricultural 
people was estimated to have increased by some S.O million (2.4 million and 
2.6 million for the first and last half, respectively). The FAO, however, 
estimated a larger increase in the amount of arable land in this period (65,000 
ha for 1979-84 and 93,000 ha for 1984-1989). 
Still, the percentage increase in arable land (4.0 per cent) is very much less 
than the growth of the agricultural population (164 per cent) in the 1985-90 
period. The effect of this imbalance in growth has been increased pressure on 
land. 
Access to land has become an issue for a growing number of people. In 
extreme cases people become landless or near-landless. The FAO estimated 
total of landless and near-landless people is 180 million and 817 million, 
respectively for 1985 as against 171 and 763 million for 1980. This is an 
overall increase of 63 million people classified as landless or near-landless 
over the 1980-85 period. 
Table U Developing Countries Estimated Landless and Near-Landless 
Population, 1980-85 
Region 
Africa 
L Amenai 
Near East 
Asia 
Total 
Near-landless population 
1980 
172 
63 
47 
481 
763 
% 
225 
83 
62 
63 0 
1000 
1985 
190 
63 
48 
516 
817 
% 
233 
77 
59 
63 1 
100 0 
80-85 * 
80/85 
18 +105 
nil 00 
1 + 21 
3 5 + 7 3 
5 4 + 7 1 
Source authors derivaüon based on WCARRD ШН 35 
Landless population 
1980 
17 
18 
15 
121 
171 
table 4 
% 
99 
105 
8 8 
70 8 
1000 
1985 
19 
18 
14 
129 
180 
% 
105 
100 
78 
717 
1000 
80-85 
2 
nil 
-1 
8 
9 
% 
80/85 
+ 118 
+ 0 0 
- 67 
+ 66 
+ 53 
Note the estimates do not include centrally planned economies 
Table 1.5 presents the estimated spread of landless and near-landless people 
living in the less developed regions of Africa, Latin America, Near East and 
Asia as at 1980 and 1985. It shows that landlessness is foremost a phenomenon 
of the Asian countries. Over the continents, nearly two-thirds of landless and 
near-landless people live in Asia as against one-fifth in Africa and one-tenth in 
Latin America. In terms of percentage of agricultural people being landless or 
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near-landless Africa remains less affected though it is estimated that the 
increase in landlessness is highest in this continent 
Table 1.6 Distribution of Land and Landlessness for Selected Countries 
Countiy 1970s 1980s 
(gini coefficients) 
Africa 
Cameroon 
Congo 
Ethiopia 
Gabon 
Kenya 
Lesotho 
Libena 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Reunion 
Siena Leone 
Togo 
Far East 
Bangladesh 
India 
Rep of Korea 
Nepal 
Philippines 
Sn Lanka 
Near East 
Saudi Arabia 
Latin America 
Brazil 
Dominican Rep 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Jamaica 
Paraguay 
Venezuela 
044 
029 
043 
047 
-
0 39 
073 
-
-
070 
044 
-
042 
064 
037 
069 
051 
0 51 
079 
084 
079 
0 81 
0 85 
0 82 
-
092 
. 
-
-
. 
077 
. 
. 
080 
036 
065 
. 
045 
-
0 62 
030 
060 
0 53 
062 
0 83 
086 
-
. 
. 
-
094 
-
Pure Landless Near Landless 
(as % of all rural households) 
-
11 
29 
30 
-
-
37 
19 
39 
77 
41 
318 
283 
78 0 
55 0 
38 0 
-
43 0 
600(<20ha) 
410 
760(<20ha) 
Source WCAKKD 1У8В (able 3 & Ь 
Note the gini-coefficienl is a measure of inequality m distribution increasing from 0 to 1 Thus a 
reduction In the gml-coefficient does not exclude an absolute increase m the number of near-
landless and landless (e g India) The high rates of Madagaskar and Reunion are mainly due to 
foreign owned plantations 
Table 1.6 shows the inequality in the distribution of land holdings and 
percentages of (near-) landlessness in some selected countries. Inequality is at 
its most profound in Latin America. Africa shows the least unequal distribution 
of land holdings, whilst Asia takes an intermediate position. Among African 
countries, Madagascar, Kenya and Reunion show the most distorted land 
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distribution pattern. For Kenya this is expressed in a gini-coefficient of 0.77 
(1981) and in the percentage of almost 32 per cent of all rural households 
estimated as having holdings of less than 1.0 ha.14 
1.2.2 The Causes of Landlessness and Near-landlessness 
The issue of landlessness has been stipulated by the World Conference on 
Agricultura] Reform and Rural Development (WCARRD) organized in 1979 as 
one of the major obstacles for establishing a "growth with equity" policy.13 
The FAO undertook follow-up conferences in 1983 and 1987 which 
recommended anew a broadening of the social base of land-ownership by 
introducing policy changes relating, among others, to land tenure (see 
WCARRD 1988:i). 
A review of causes of landlessness and near-landlessness was provided by 
Sinha in 1984."' He concluded that landlessness and near-landlessness were 
the result of a complex interaction of topographical, socio-economic and 
political forces operating over centuries which made it difficult to disentangle 
these causes from one another or to indicate their relative importance (see 
Sinha 1984:18). 
Still, for most cases of landlessness, Sinha (1984:18-32) after reviewing 
several case studies from all over the world, holds one or more of the 
following causes to be responsible: land scarcity; low productivity of 
agriculture and underdevelopment; colonial legacy; maldistribution of land; 
economic incorporation into the world economy and indebtedness. Let us 
briefly discuss each of these factors: 
First, densely populated areas that suffer from a shortage of land will, over 
time, confront a growing number of landless people. We have seen that 
countries in Asia in particular have to deal with the problem of densely 
populated areas and land scarcity. Land scarcity also exists in parts of the 
developed world (e.g. the Netherlands). For example, in 1988 the potential per 
capita availability of arable land in the Netherlands was only 0.06 ha, whereas 
Dismbuuon of land in Nandl District, ranking 16th (out of 42) of the most densely 
populated districts of Kenya, showed a gim-coefficient of 0 56 for 1987 (see Hebinck 1990 173). 
The conference was attended by 145 countnes and effected the adoption of a Declaration 
of Principles and the Implementation of a Programme of Action which asked the developed and 
developing countnes to intensify their efforts for alleviating rural poverty. 
His book was written under the auspices of the FAO in order to challenge the lack of 
weU-documented information about the many inter-related factors causing landlessness It was felt 
that without a thorough understanding of the causes and effects of landlessness, it would be 
extremely difficult to advise governments on policy alternatives to reverse the present situation and 
the trend of the growing significance of landlessness 
Chapter 1: Concepts and Framework for Analysis 31 
it is 0.08 ha in Bangladesh. 
However, the potentially inadequate size of a holding does not matter so 
much in countries where the scope for non-agricultural employment is very 
wide. In 1990 only 3.7 per cent of the economically active population in the 
Netherlands was operative in the agricultural sector, while in Bangladesh this 
figure was 68.5 per cent As a result the average actual arable land holding 
size per caput of the agricultural population was 1.64 and 0.12 ha for the 
Netherlands and Bangladesh, respectively. The trend of absolute numbers of 
people engaged in agriculture is a decrease in the rich countries whereas in the 
poor countries it is an increasing trend. 
Among the group of developing countries strong differences exist as well in 
the importance of the agricultural sector for employment opportunities. The 
South American countries, for example, have more opportunities outside 
agriculture than do most Asian and African nations. In 1990, 26.1 per cent of 
the economically active Latin American population was working in the 
agricultural sector whereas this figure for Africa (68.3 pier cent) and the Far 
East (63.6 per cent) was significantly higher (see FAO/PY 1990). 
Secondly, it should be realized that in the world's richest countries the 
productivity of agriculture, as well as manufacturing, is much higher. In the 
Netherlands the 1988 agricultural output per ha was US$ 12,220. By contrast, 
Bangladesh had an output of only US$ 956 per ha. Low productivity in both 
agriculture and manufacturing prevents the rapid acceleration of economic 
development and, as a result, the pressure of population on land continues to 
increase, especially in combination with rapid population growth. 
A third cause of landlessness is stated to be colonial rule. Sinha reports the 
consequences of the Spanish conquest and the introduction of Spanish land 
tenurial arrangements for the Aztecs in Mexico. Land was confiscated and this 
legacy simply continued after the time of independence. In the early years of 
the 20th century nearly 96 per cent of rural families possessed no land while 
over 8,000 haciendas controlled 40 per cent of Mexico's total area. 
Comparable situations developed in Brazil where the Portuguese started their 
plantations and large estates at the cost of Indian land and lives. The plantation 
system was also introduced in Africa, leaving the "native" population to subsist 
on poorer lands (e.g. in Zimbabwe, Kenya, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco). Myrdal 
reported for South Asia on the European policy of encouraging private 
property to be superimposed on South Asian traditional tenurial rules, resulting 
in the destruction of the latter (see Sinha 1984:24). 
A fourth factor causing landlessness is the concentration of landownership in 
the hands of a minority. In Latin America in particular this factor is held 
responsible for a great deal of poverty and landlessness. According to the 
WCARRD data base comprising 33 selected developing countries, the average 
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concentration ratio during the 1970s for a group of 12 Latin American 
countries was 0.80. For Asia this was 0.52 (from 9 countries) and for Africa 
0.45 (from 12). In most cases, the colonial legacy must have been responsible 
for the maldistribution of land. Land reform programmes after Independence 
must have assisted the landless somehow. Nevertheless it has often been the 
case that the post-Independence period saw a continuation or even a worsening 
of biased landownership relations. 
For example, Paraguay, which had only a peripheral position in the era of a 
"Spanish" Latin America, did not suffer from landlessness at the time of 
Independence in 1811. It was only after the Government started to sell 
stateland to willing buyers that a process was started which ultimately resulted 
in the most distorted pattern of landownership in the world. Wealthy people as 
well as (foreign) companies were offered an opportunity to acquire large areas 
of land at relatively low prices, leaving the have-nots behind (see Kleinpenning 
1987:90). 
As a fifth factor, world-wide economic integration has been mentioned. The 
assimilation of the colonies into the world economy has led to the 
commercialization of agriculture. The surplus earned from exports was 
deposited in the capitals of the colonial powers instead of in those of the 
colonized, and provided the wealth for the industrialization and diversification 
of their economies. 
With the political independence of the colonial territories, a direct take-over 
of land by foreigners was stopped, but dispossession of the peasants still 
continued. In Latin America this was reinforced by the introduction of new 
technology (large scale mechanization) causing these large estates to lay off 
workers (see WCARRD 1988:46). Multinational corporations and the local 
elite were responsible for this practice. For example, between 22 and 39 per 
cent of cultivatable land in the Dominican Republic was controlled by one 
foreign company alone (see Sinha 1984:29). More subtle claims on land in the 
Third World operate by way of setting aside large parts of agricultural land for 
the production of animal feed for western cattle (e.g. tapioca fields in 
Thailand). 
Incorporation into the world economy has also brought advantages like 
sanitation, health and medicine, which, however, have had serious 
consequences for the pressure of population on land. 
Finally, landlessness results from indebtedness. Under communal tenure land is 
not a commodity. The adoption of Western concepts of private property, 
however, have made land a transferable resource. Farmers who fall into debt as 
a result of harvest failures, either have to mortgage their land or to sell it 
straight away. It should be realized that with large numbers of poor households 
driven onto marginal lands on steep slopes or semi-arid areas the risk of crop 
failure has increased. The final result is that large numbers of former land-
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owners either become tenants or share-croppers on the mortgaged lands or they 
become landless. In the latter case they engage in rural wage-labour, become 
illegal squatters, move to newly opened colonization areas or leave the rural 
area in a search for urban employment 
The emerging problem of landlessness in Africa is related to a combination of 
several factors. The World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural 
Development (WCARRD) mentions two main factors which have affected 
access to land in Africa (see WCARRD 1988:41). 
First, it stresses the high rates of growth of the agricultural population in 
Africa, exceeding 2.0 per cent in more than half the countries and at around 
3.0 per cent in Kenya, Rwanda, Nigeria and Tanzania in relation to an 
inadequate compensating expansion of arable area. All except four African 
countries (Cameroon, Gabon, Reunion and Sierra Leone) have recorded 
declines in arable land per capita of agricultural population in the period 1980-
1985, as compared with 1975-80. 
Secondly, the tenurial situation in most African countries is responsible for 
the inequality in the distribution of land resulting in an artificial shortage. It is 
stated that, apart from landlessness caused by shortage of land in certain 
countries (such as Lesotho and Rwanda), the major factor affecting 
landlessness in Africa is the growing tendency towards the privatization of land 
rights, leading to the dispossession of the poorest in the process of adjudication 
or through forced sales due to debt (see WCARRD 1988:41). 
However, improvements have been made in some countries. For example, 
Reunion, India, Nepal and Korea are among the countries mentioned by the 
WCARRD-report that succeeded in bringing about a more equal distribution of 
land. In the next section we will analyze Government policies towards land 
tenure as practised by different groups of countries. 
1.23 Government Policies Towards Landlessness 
Basically, national land development policies are of two sorts: those designed 
to increase economic growth and those intended to increase equity (see 
Davison 1987:30). In the latter approach three types of measures to tackle 
landlessness and increase equity can be distinguished: curative, ameliorative 
and participatory measures. It should be noted that these measures are not 
restricted to the national Government but, at different levels of intensity they 
are also part of policies practised by other countries, international donors and 
Non-Governmental Organizations. 
In the group of curative measures we include land reforms, land settlement, 
intensification of agriculture, diversification of the economy and reducing 
population growth. Ameliorative measures are those such as securing tenancy 
and (reasonable) minimum wages or relief of debts. Other ameliorative 
measures are those developed within as a result of an increase in interest in the 
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rural sector like basic needs programmes (e.g. integrated rural development 
programmes) or rural works programmes (e.g. land reclamation, afforestation). 
Finally, participatory measures are those activities which help the landless and 
the rural poor to organize themselves. This includes programmes of 
consciousness-raising, assisting self-help activities, promotion and improvement 
of agricultural co-operatives and the like. 
In spite of this broad range of possible measures to improve the access to 
land for a large number of the (near-)landless the WCARRD-propagated 
strategy of "growth with equity" via a more equitable distribution of assets, has 
been followed by virtually no country during the 1980s. In this period attention 
for land reform programmes as in the 1970s seems to have declined in most 
countries. In fact a continuation -even increase in many countries- of 
inequalities occurred in the distribution of land and increasingly large numbers 
of marginalized smallholders became dependent upon wage-labour. It seems 
that the type of land policy geared at promoting economic growth, either with 
or without the implementation of a set of ameliorative measures, has been the 
most favoured. 
In Africa, three broad trends of policy governing access to land during the 
early 1980s have prevailed. First, in some countries there have been shifts 
towards a socialization of land through co-operatives, collectives and state 
farms, sometimes coupled with villagization programmes (as in Ethiopia, 
Mozambique, the Congo). Secondly, in other countries, there have been shifts 
towards or a continuation of the privatization of land, as in Malawi, Kenya, 
Liberia, Uganda, Reunion and Botswana. Thirdly, there have been adaptations 
of existing tenures to modify the relations between the tribal chiefs and the 
state, as in the Gambia and Lesotho (see WCARRD 1988:38). 
Within the first group of countries, the need has been recognized for greater 
allocation of resources towards the peasant sector and a further strengthening 
of the peasant co-operative sector, as state farms are not achieving their 
intended results. Here ameliorative and participatory measures should help to 
increase economic development 
In the second group of countries, Kenya and Malawi have continued their 
programmes of accelerated adjudication and registration of individual titles. 
Both countries are reported to face an increasing number of landless people, 
rural-urban migration and settlement in marginal areas. In Uganda, the granting 
of public lands to large entrepreneurs has led to the emergence of tenancy 
problems. In Botswana, the land tenure changes are partly the result of 
increased population and partly the result of Government programmes aimed at 
increasing employment and income in rural areas (see Milazi 1988:51). 
In the third group of countries, the adaptation of customary tenure to new 
needs has taken various forms such as the establishment of land allocation 
committees chaired by the chiefs with regulations and leaseholds (Lesotho), or 
defining the rights of the state in relation to the chiefs in the allocation of 
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unused land, as in the Gambia. These latter arrangement represent a steady 
expansion of state power in the regulation of customary tenure. In the Gambia, 
it has been recognized that fallow periods have either diminished or have 
disappeared as a result of population pressure, while the renting of land has 
become common. 
In general a switch to the adoption of the second type of land policy can be 
recorded among a growing number of African countries. 'The last five years 
have seen the wholesale abandonment of economic planning based on social 
property concepts to a planning pattern emphasizing some form of private 
property rights' (Riddell 1988:39). This will probably sharpen the inequality in 
the land distribution which, though less pronounced as in Latin America or 
Asia, does exist in Africa. The WCARRD report (1988:38) stated that 'some of 
the factors contributing to this inequality seem to have originated from state-
created dualism or the privatization of lands held under customary tenure'. 
Indeed, as shown by table 1.6 the highest inequality in land distribution in 
Africa is found among the group of countries propagating the privatization of 
land (e.g. Liberia, Kenya, Reunion). 
Overall, it can be concluded that the trend in most countries of the developing 
world is one of a further deterioration in regard to access to land for a majority 
of farmers. Groups such as pastoralists, hunter-gatherers, the illiterate and 
female agriculturalists are particular victims of the capitalization of land. These 
groups cannot compete with the vested interests of powerful groups of rich 
farmers, ranchers or multinationals. Competition, sometimes evolving into open 
conflict manifests itself between these groups. Sometimes the dispossessed 
compete over the same lands as for example when marginalized farmers 
compete with pastoralists. Finally, this struggle for land can also be recorded 
among members belonging to the same group. Let us now tum to the next 
section in order to discuss a global framework to help us analyze the factors 
causing landlessness and the competition and conflict arising over land. 
1.2.4 A Framework for (he Analysis of Landlessness 
The scheme presented in figure 1.2 is the result of work done by Kleinpenning 
(1986 and 1987), Weicker (1982), Little (1987) and Rutten (1985) 
incorporating information provided in sections 1.2.2 and 1.2.З.17 The starting 
point for the creation of this framework was a need to disentangle some of the 
complexity and interrelated causes and effects operating in the field of 
landlessness and the rise of the struggle for land. The scheme is intended to 
help us describe and analyze the process of land alienation and conflicts over 
land in Kajiado District of today as well as in the past. -
The scheme presented in (be latter repon was developed by Korfage and Rutten. 
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Figure 1.2 Framework for the Analysis of Access to Land 
Source Kleinpenmng 1986, Ruiten 1983 
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Land as a resource for man has been placed in the centre of the scheme. Land, 
however, is as we have seen, a scarce resource. The extent of this scarcity will 
vary over the globe's surface depending on the absolute quantity available 
(supply) in relation to the demand for it. It should be realized that both 
variables (i.e. supply and demand) should be defined in a relational way (see 
Hendriks 1986:149). 
The physical quality, relative location, accessibility and form of ownership 
(e.g. communal or individual) of a certain piece of land will make it more or 
less suited for certain activities. The demand is also determined by the specific 
quantitative and qualitative needs of the users. In other words, supply as well 
as demand both have a qualitative dimension. Moreover, these dimensions will 
vary over time. As a result the scarcity of land may be permanent or 
temporary. 
The quantitative and qualitative dimension of supply can be defined as "arcai 
extent" and "use potential", respectively. For demand these characteristics 
could be renamed as "number of land users" and "user and production-specific 
characteristics". For example, the demand made for land by a group of farmers 
engaged in irrigated agriculture will differ from that made by pastoralists, 
ranchers, enterprises, institutions or the Government itself. The potential 
productivity of the land in relation to a (minimal) standard of living 
requirements, the ability to purchase and use the land as well as possible 
motives for speculation all play a part in determining the final volume of 
demand for land. If a free land market exists supply and demand will express 
themselves in a particular use value (rent) and exchange value (sale price). 
All of this interplay evolves not in a vacuum, but within a local, regional, 
national and international context, which can be further sub-divided into an 
economic, social, political, demographic and ecological scene, imbedded in a 
dynamic process of change and development. 
The local and regional level is the setting where the land use activities are 
performed and where the analysis starts. Kleinpenning (1987:44) mentions that 
we should at least differentiate between colonization zones and old agricultural 
regions because of the striking differences between them. In addition the local 
and regional (land use) development policy exercised by the Government 
should be considered as well as the existing land tenure situation. 
It will be clear that, in most cases, Government policy at local and regional 
level is interlinked with national development policy. Nevertheless, differences 
do exist between countries themselves as well as in time concerning the 
specific prescribing and regulating power of the national policy for the local 
context Moreover, it is difficult to speak of one uniform Government as 
several departments each have their specific policies that sometimes conflict 
(e.g. Ministry of Wildlife & Tourism versus that of Agriculture or Livestock 
Development). Moreover, within a single ministry those responsible at local-
regional level may have different opinions than their superiors have at national 
headquarters. 
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Notwithstanding these remarks it should be realized that central government 
is a very important conditioning force. We have already indicated the choices 
the state may make between its economic development policy which is either 
geared to economic growth sec or to a policy that also takes account of the 
equity issue. These policy objectives determine which forms of rural land use 
are encouraged, e.g. large-scale capitalist forms of production or peasant types 
of land use. We also mentioned the curative, ameliorative and participatory 
measures that can be implemented to assist certain, land seeking groups (see 
section 1.2.3) 
Nongovernmental institutions such as churches, trade unions, political parties 
and pressure groups also play a role in this respect. They are often directly or 
indirectly involved in assisting the land seeking groups to a greater or lesser 
degree. 
Processes appear at international level that have effects on the national and 
even the local level. Foremost, the international economic order is 
charactenzed by a differentiated production of goods and a huge flow of 
products between countries. The developing countries play a specific role in 
this respect; roughly speaking they supply the energy and raw materials for the 
production of a large number of industrial goods. Most of this production 
occurs in the rich countries although, increasingly, multinational firms are 
transplanting some of these activities to less wealthy countries. 
Except for some Asian countries, agricultural products still make up the bulk 
of exports transported from the poor to the rich countries. Changes in the 
demand and/or price for these products will, in return, affect the agricultural 
sector in the developing world, including the way and extent to which land is 
used. 
Furthermore, supra-national institutions like the World Bank or the 
International Monetary Fund play a role in land (tenure) policy or in the actual 
use of land in the poor countries either directly or indirectly. International 
solidarity and support, for example from trade unions and churches, should 
also be recognized in this respect 
International organizations active in the field of nature conservation (e.g. the 
preservation of the rainforests, the protection of biological diversity and rare 
wildlife species and so on) see their efforts ultimately translated into questions 
to do with land, unfortunately not infrequently at the cost of access to land for 
the marginalized of the human population in the developing countries. 
Finally, access to land is bound to change. This means that, besides the 
location-specific dimension, we should undertake a historical analysis to clarify 
how a particular situation of land use developed. 
The problem of land scarcity is expressed in a growing number of landless 
people but also in the manifestation of competition and conflicts concerning 
access to land. Competition for land could be defined as a situation by which 
one or more parties involved are being hindered in converting the necessary 
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production needs by the other party without the will to take action against it. 
This could develop into a situation of conflict in the case when one or all 
parties want to take action at the cost of the others). 
Competition and conflicts could take place over use rights to or ownership of 
land. Competition could take place either directly (taking land from the other 
party) or indirectly (taking virgin land). Conflicts can be latent (wanting to 
counteract) or manifest (actually taking action against the other party). Another 
distinction could be made concerning the activities involved. Competition and 
conflicts occurring between actors performing the same activity could be called 
internal or inter-group conflicts, whereas those between actors of different 
activities are classified as external or intra-group (see Rutten 1985:32-33, 
Little 1987:195). 
Where early studies of land use and interactions between pastoral and 
agricultural groups emphasized the symbiotic co-operative aspects, nowadays 
examples of competition and conflicts over land are manifold. Restricting 
ourselves to Africa the following are but a few examples. The Basarwa in 
Botswana, a group of hunter-gatherers, are in process of losing their hunting 
areas at the cost of large farm ranching. Maasai pastoralists have seen large 
tracts of their grazing land carved out for the exclusive use of wildlife in 
National Parks. Tuareg pastoralists in the Niger are faced with increasing 
numbers of small-scale farmers disrupting their migration patterns, frequently 
leading to open conflicts which can include murder. Similar difficulties exist 
between Hausa farmers versus Fulbe herders in West Africa and Tugen 
cultivators vis-à-vis Π Charnus pastoralists in Kenya. 
Little has made a classification of three origins of land use conflicts in pastoral 
areas; the encroaching fanner, the cultivating herder, and the absentee herd 
owner. These last two are 'symptoms of social differentiation at the community 
level, in which rich and poor producers pursue different land use strategies that 
are potentially competitive' (Little 1987:207). The "Cultivating Herder Model" 
refers to pastoralists who in recent years are turning to fanning as part of a 
diversification strategy. This involves either rich pastoralists farming to support 
their livestock herding or poor herders virtually forced to cultivate in order to 
survive. 
The "Absentee Herd Ownership Model" manifests itself in two ways; private 
landowners living off the ranch who employ someone to look after the animals 
or livestock traders and other businessmen who buy cattle locally, hire herders 
to look after the animals and organize stock movements to the urban markets. 
By using local grazing areas these traders are able to fatten the animals at 
minimal cost According to Little (1987:206) this development is growing in 
significance in Kenya and elsewhere in Africa. Since this group of "part-time" 
pastoralists mostly operate outside the indigenous management system it is 
likely to be less concerned with long-term conservation practices. This could, 
in the long run, give rise to growing competition and conflicts. 
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13 Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter we discussed the concepts and framework for analysis which will 
be used in outlining the process of access to land among the Maasai pastoralists 
of Kajiado District, Kenya. In the world's rangeland areas different types of 
livestock-keeping such as subsistence nomadic pastoralism or commercial 
ranching exist. Divisions can be made along the lines of produce (meat, milk, 
wool), stock type (e.g. cattle, camel, reindeer), objective (subsistence or 
commercial) and mobility patterns (e.g. transhumance, nomadism, ranching). 
The Maasai pastoralism of today has evolved from nomadic subsistence milk-
oriented cattle keeping towards a mixed situation of group ranching, individual 
landownership and commercialized and diversified household economies. Cattle 
are still the mainstay of the Maasai herds but small stock is on the increase. 
Several methods for recalculating these different types of animals into uniform 
stock units have been highlighted. The enormous diversity of these equivalents 
stresses the difficulties and care needed in judging the grazing capacity of a 
certain area. Besides, uncertainties and the variability in forage production, 
herbivore requirements and a proper use factor make any absolute statement 
concerning the potential carrying capacity of an area questionable. 
Land can also be dealt with in juridical terms. For Africa as a whole and 
Kenya in particular we concluded that customary law has, in the last century, 
increasingly been replaced by statutory law and communal by individual 
landownership. This statement needs some clarification as we showed for (he 
Kikuyu and Maasai traditional society that land use was not free for all. For 
instance, every Maasai family was allowed exclusive user rights over certain 
pieces of land either reserved for their young, sick or weak animals (ol-okeri). 
Also, control over a specific territory was exercised by each Maasai section. 
Access to another section's territory had to be requested. 
Another vested idea, reaffirmed by Collier and Lai, concerning severe poverty 
among nomadic pastoralists was criticised by showing that this assessment 
suffered from the use of questionable assumptions, overestimations and 
omissions (see also appendix 1.1). Instead of some 85 per cent of Kenyan 
pastoralists considered to be living below the poverty level we assumed a figure 
of approximately 25-35 per cent. 
Attention was paid to the concepts of access to land and landlessness. 
Reference was made to a clear trend of a decreasing availability of land for 
low-income groups resulting in a growing number of landless. The highest 
percentages of (near) landless households can be found in the Far East and in 
Latin America. In Bangladesh, for instance, 78.0 per cent of all rural households 
are within the group of pure or near landless. In the Dominican Republic the 
figure of pure landless alone was estimated at 77.0 per cent. For Africa the 
highest figure known is for Kenya (31.8 per cent). 
In addition to these high percentages of landlessness, the distribution among 
the group of owners is highly distorted, meaning that land scarcity is frequently 
artificially created. For example, gini-coefficients for Latin America (a measure 
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of inequality in distribution increasing on a scale from 0 to 1) are often above 
0.80, with Paraguay at the world's top position with 0.94! In Africa and Asia 
these figures are in the range of 0.45 to 0.65. Only in Madagascar (0.80 due to 
plantations mostly) and Kenya (0.77) is the distribution of land rather distorted. 
In Africa the percentage of landless and near-landless is, in general, still on 
the low side but it is growing rapidly. Over the 1980-1985 period it was 
estimated to have witnessed an increase of 11.8 per cent of pure landless and 
10.5 per cent for near landless. The mean figures in the developing regions of 
the world stood at 5.3 per cent and 7.1 per cent, respectively. Several causes for 
landlessness were reviewed: densely populated areas, low economic 
productivity, colonial legacy, maldistribution of land, world-wide economic 
integration and indebtedness (i.e. poverty). For Africa the major factor affecting 
landlessness was stated to be the growing tendency towards the privatization of 
land rights. 
In some countries (e.g. India, Nepal and Korea) a more equal distribution of 
land has evolved. Korea, especially (north as well as south) played an active 
role in achieving this improved situation. Three types of strategies can be 
distinguished in order to tackle landlessness: curative (e.g. land reforms), 
ameliorative (e.g. securing tenancy) and participatory (e.g. assisting self-help 
activities) measures. However, interest in land reform programmes under the 
heading of "growth with equity" did not materialize in the last decades. Instead 
inequality continued or became even more severe. 
In Africa, three major lines of policy towards access to land during the early 
1980s prevailed. In some countries there was a shift towards the socialization of 
land by way of co-operatives and state farms (e.g. Mozambique). In others the 
privatization of land was either continued or begun (e.g. Malawi, Kenya). One 
of the latest approaches to modernizing traditional tenures in favour of state 
control, is taking place in Lesotho. 
In general, the switch towards the second type of land policy is what seems to 
be prevailing in Africa at the present time. From this an increase in the 
maldistribution of landownership in Africa is expected. Groups like pastoralists, 
hunter-gatherers, illiterate and female agriculturalists will be the victims of the 
capitalization of land. These groups are doomed to lose their struggle for land 
with the vested powerful groups of rich farmers, ranchers or (inter)national 
corporations. Increased conflicts and competition about land between both types 
of groups mentioned above and among the have-nots themselves can be 
predicted. 
In order to systematically disentangle the complexity of land conflicts and the 
competition a framework for analysis was presented. Supply and demand for the 
land resource is the starting point for a scheme which involves aspects and 
dimensions such as physical quality, relative location, form of ownership, 
number and specific needs of (potential) users and historic developments. This 
interplay occurs within a local, regional, national and international context. In 
the following chapter a start will be made with presenting all of these spheres. 
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APPENDIX 1.1 Assessment of Poverty Among Maasai Pastorahsts 
For a real assessment of poverty among Maasai pastorahsts the following considerations aie 
also of importance 
1 First, the pastoral annual income as defined by Collier and Lai excludes a valuation of the 
home consumption of milk and meat from the household's livestock The formation of capital 
through the herd's natural growth of animals Is also not Included Exclusion of these means 
of livelihood are considered to be too important an omission to allow for, as most Maasai 
pastorallsts are still mostly subsistence oriented 
By examining two groups of Maasai In detail ILCA found that, besides the commercial 
value of livestock (Ksh 9,375/-), the herd's output used for direct home consumption (valued 
at Ksh 9,145/-), as well as the "stock Inventory change" ( l e the net growth of the herd and 
flock amounting to Ksh 14,975/-) would raise the mean annual Income from livestock alone 
to Ksh 33,495/- per household. In a relative sense this means that some 28 per cent of the 
gross output of the household's herd can be considered as being commercial while 27 per 
cent is used for direct subsistence " The remaining 45 per cent is saved in the form of herd 
and flock accumulation (see Bekure et al 1987 346/7) Including non-pastoral Income total 
gross annual income was Ksh 38,260/- on average for Maasai pastoral households of the 
eastern part of Kajlado District during 1981-83 This means that, at 1976 prices, ILCA's 
Maasai pastoralist average total household annual income would be In the order of Ksh. 
17,000/-
A comparison between Collier's smallholders and ILCA's pastorahsts shows that the 
former are able to provide approximately 35 per cent and the latter some 50 per cent for 
home consumption. Moreover, pastorahsts spend a relatively small amount of cash on their 
livestock production since they do not pay directly for the major inputs of the system, i e 
family labour, livestock and land (see Bekure et al 1987 350) Also, expenditure for 
schooling and travelling fall far below those made by cultivators The effect of this ability of 
Maasai pastorahsts to rely on their own food production for a major part and to have 
minimal expenditure for several Inputs and services is shown by Campbell for the year 1976, 
while Maasai pastorallsts and farmers had expenditure ratios as a percentage of income of 81 
and 79 per cent respectively, non-Maasai farmers had expenditures of 174 per cent (Kikuyu 
farmers) and as high as 286 per cent (other non-Maasai farmers), as a result of being forced 
to use cash savings and stored food above the regular annual income for 1976 
Thus Maasai pastorallsts use some 50 percent of their production for their own 
consumption By comparison, smallholders m Nyanza, Western and Central keep approximately 35 
per cent of their production for subsistence According to the ILCA survey more than 80 per cent 
of the total home consumption is accounted for by milk It seems valid to conclude that this fact 
severely reduces the need for a cash inflow allowing a lower poverty-line as, for example, 
compared to the agricultural smallholders, the landless or the urban poor Campbell's survey 
shows that Maasai fanners and non-Maasai farmers obtained over two-thirds of their subsistence 
needs from cultivation Maize and beans alone were able to produce 64 and 5 4 per cent for 
Maasai and 55 and 15 per cent for non-Maasai' subsistence needs, respectively In addition, 
Maasai fanners could rely on their cattle This made Campbell (1978 36) conclude that 'In terms 
of provision of subsistence the non-Maasai farmers faced a more difficult situation than either the 
Maasai farmers or many Maasai pastorallsts' 
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2. A second remarle towards Collier and Lai's use of Campbell's data concerns their 
statement that '1976 was a post-drought year' and 'income was evidently not regarded as 
being temporarily low, for mean expenditure was only Ksh. 2,641/yr' (World Bank 
1983:300)." 
These are disputable accounts. According to Campbell, and many other authors, 1976 was 
one of the worst years since the early 1960s drought. Rainfall amounted to an extreme 
minimum of 230 mm on average for Kajiado Districi. It ended a period of almost continuous 
below average rainfall In the drought-stricken Loitokltok area since 1973. Campbell's survey 
was conducted at the end of the drought, prior to the heavy rains of March-April 1977. The 
data concerning income and expenditure refer to the year 1976 and cannot be considered to 
reflect a post-drought situation. As Campbell states 'At the time of the survey (at the end of 
the drought) over 60 % of Maasai pastorallsts were unable to meet their subsistence needs 
from their herds (...) the situation was very serious' (see Campbell 1978:10/23). Assistance 
was also provided by relatives and non-relatives, the Government and missions. In spite of 
this, returns of livestock related sales were sufficient to buy substantial amounts of grain (see 
Campbell 1978:8). An average of S3 per cent of total expenditure was used to buy food 
crops. 
Taking all these factors together It will be clear that at least the variables affecting Maasai 
Income and expenditure in 1976 are heavily biased; more animals were sold because of the 
drought On the other hand, prices had dropped considerably, while those for grains had 
increased. It is hard to know the net result of these variables for the total cash Income earned 
by Maasai pastorallsts in 1976. Still, it seems rather questionable to use the annual income of 
this year as a firm basis for an estimation of the Maasai household income let alone other 
Kenyan pastoralists. 
3. A third comment concerns Collier and Lai's guesswork as applied to their handling of the 
household size of pure pastoralists. Campbell's survey gives a figure of 13.4 persons or 10.5 
adult equivalents for an average Maasai household. Collier and Lai rounded this figure up to 
15. By adjusting the Ksh. 2,000/- annual income poverty line for smallholder agriculturalist 
households of 7 members, they estimated the pastoralists poverty boundary to be 15/7 χ 
2,000 = Ksh. 4,285/- a year per household (see table 1.1). 
Data from other researchers depart in some cases significantly from this 15 persons 
household size estimate used by Collier and Lai. For example Sindiga (1986:109/217), who 
studied Maasai population pressure and related aspects for the Kajiado Maasai, used an 
overall 6 persons household size as confirmed by the 1979 population census (6.23 persons 
per household). Studies by other scholars in the Maasai area provide average household size 
figures in the range of 9.4 persons (Bille & Anderson 1980:23), 12.0 persons (Bekure et al. 
1987:172-181) and 13.8 persons (White & Meadows 1981:16). Differences in household 
definition, variations in time, place and conductors of survey, will be responsible for (part of) 
this fluctuation.30 
Many households are expanded by die Incorporation of an individual from another 
1 9
 By contrast, ILCA calculated a mean annual expenditure of Ksh. 9,393/- for 1981-83 and 
only 32 per cent of this amount was spent on food (see Bekure et al. 1987:332). 
2 0
 A household according to official Kenyan sources comprises a person or a group of 
persons generally of the same kinship who normally reside together in the same house or in 
several houses within the same compound and share a common source of food and are answerable 
to the same bead. It is probable that (he inclusion or exclusion of dependents and/or household 
members who have temporarily migrated is responsible for the large variation between the various 
estimates. 
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household or even a whole sub-household (resident mothers, step-mothers and/or siblings). 
The ILCA survey (Bekure et al 1987.172-3) found a share of 17 per cent of all households 
having unseparated mamed sons with their wives and children. Dependents are incorporated 
into other households because they have Insufficient resources to be self-supporting 
Additionally, to offset a labour shortage for herding or domestic tasks 40 per cent of all 
households borrow children from other households Poor households and neh are involved in 
this practice with the former lending out higher numbers. ILCA points to the coirelation 
between wealth and household size and composition Rich households are 80-100 per cent 
larger than poor ones and have a smaller percentage of their members coming from the 
nuclear family (man, his wives and children). In fact, it is a social mechanism relieving 
shortages of labour for the neh and helping the poor to overcome insufficient resources. 
If one accepts a pastoral household size of less than 15 people, the poverty line for pure 
pastoralists should be lowered significantly. Applying Campbell's household size of 13 4 
leads to a reduction of Colber and Lai's poverty line (i e Ksh 4,258/-) to Ksh. 3,829/-
(13 4/7 χ 2,000 = Ksh. 3,828/60), while Sindiga's household esumate places it at Ksh 
1,714/- only. 
4. Fourthly, different methods of data collection will have influenced the validity of the 
information gathered While the ILCA team interviewed all adult members of households 
(D=282) once a month over a two-year penod concerning their income and expenditure, 
Campbell's data were obtained from the head of the household (n=166) during one visit It is 
well known that in the latter case an underestimation of real expenditure and income is 
inevitable 
CHAPTER! 
KENYA: ECONOMY, LAND AND PEOPLE 
2.1 Introduction 
Kenya covers an area of 582,646 km2 of which about four-fifths is and and 
semi-arid, receiving less than 700 nun of rainfall per year (eco-zones V-VII). 
Only a mere 18 per cent (104,844 km2) constitutes the medium and high-
potential areas (eco-zones І-Г receiving between 700 and 1,600 mm of rainfall 
annually). In total approximately 23.5 million people (1989 estimate) share this 
area. However, their distribution is highly concentrated in the high-potential 
regions where some 80 per cent of Kenya's population lives. Figure 2.1 shows 
the ecological zones and population distribution for Kenya. 
Kenya's demographic situation has been characterized as 'among the most 
alarming in Africa' (see Bernard 1982:151). A population increase of 3.8 per 
cent per year as compared to a world average of some 1.8 ranks Kenya among 
the fastest growing countries in the world.' This fast population growth in 
Kenya is the result of a sharp decline in mortality (from 20 to 11 per 1,000 
persons between 1965 and 1988), a still high crude birth rate (from 52 to 47 
live births per 1,000 persons) and a continuing high total fertility rate (from 8.0 
in 1965 to 6.9 in 1988) Although the average annual population growth figure 
is expected to decline to some 3.4 per cent, the total Kenyan population will 
rise to an estimated total of 34 million people by 2000 and by the year 2025 
will amount to some 62 million people (see World Bank 1990 228).2 This 
rapid growth is reflected in the population age structure of Kenya; 50 9 percent 
of its population is between 0-14 years of age! No other country in the world 
has more than half of its population in this cohort (see World Bank 1990 228). 
Table 2.1 shows the Kenyan age cohorts. The combination of rapid 
population growth in the face of a limited supply of good agricultural land is 
the central problem of Kenyan development. It affects all elements of Kenya's 
development strategy. Given the nature of the age structure of the population, 
there will be short-run implications on the Government's ability to provide 
basic needs. 
Leaving aside the oil producing counmes of the Middle eastern region experiencing high 
growth rates due to Immigration, only the Ivory Coast and Gabon reached higher than average 
annual growth rates of 40 and 3 9 respectively for the 1980-1988 penod (see World Bank 
1990 22ДО) The latest figures of the United Nauons estimate the Kenyan mid-1989 population to 
number 24,872 people The 1985-1989 growth was placed as high as 5 0 per cent annually (see 
United Nations 1991) 
2
 The World Bank figures do not take into account the effect of AIDS Alarming reports 
from several pans of Africa, including Kenya, suggest a slowing down In the growth of the 
population Nevertheless, the latest World Bank Report (1992 268) expects a total of 64 million 
Kenyans by 2025. 
. - ; Л KENYA 
DISTRIBUTION OF POPULAfìON 
A hUrch S^Mntwr/Odobar or hUfcrt-Uay 
vMay 
С no ( M n u ruty 
D rwo mny малшт Manh-ti*/ and Octotw-
E απ· mrrj аяаіжі Aprii lo JWM 
Figure 2.1 Kenya's Ecological Zones and Population Distribution 
Source Dietz 1987 and Population Census 1979 
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Table 2.1 Projected Population by Selected Groups in 
Kenya, 1989 
Functional Age Groups 1989 
('000) 
Toul Population 23313 
Children (0-14 yr) 11,832 
- Prc-School Age (0-5 yr) 5,523 
- Primary School Age (6-13 yr) 5,707 
- Secondaiy School Age (14-17 yr) 2,251 
Female Reproductive Age (15-49 yr) 5,018 
Productive Age (15-64 yr) 11,190 
Old Age (65+ yr) 491 
Potential Labour Force 9,139 
Source: RoK UMUa.'iUK (able U.'J 
In the long term heavy pressure will be placed on the economy which is likely 
to induce the major structural and social changes necessary to absorb the 
greater labour force. In other words, the generation of today has to be absorbed 
into productive employment in the years to come in order to prevent 
widespread human misery. According to Hunt (1985:1) 'Kenya is on the brink 
of a major human crisis. Between 1976 and the year 2000 8 million people are 
expected to enter the labour force. This in an economy in which in 1982 the 
total labour force was 7.6 million (in 1976 6.2 million). These labour force 
entrants are already bom'. 
Before considering the implications of the new jobseekers for the Kenyan 
economy, let us first examine the structure of this economy; its sectors and 
their contribution to the national economy as well as its growth. 
22 The Kenyan Economy: Structure and Perfonnance 
2.2.1 Introduction 
The Kenyan economy belongs to the low-income economies of the world. It 
ranks 25th having an average per capita GNP of 370 US$ in 1990. Table 2.2 
shows some of the basic indicators for social and economic development for 
Kenya in comparison to the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa, the low-, middle-
and high-income economies and the world. The relatively good perfonnance of 
the Kenyan economy, as illustrated by the average annual GNP per capita and 
inflation figures, in comparison to the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa is also 
demonstrated by table 2.2. Furthermore, life expectancy and literacy confirm 
Kenya's favourite position among this group of African countries. A striking 
feature of the Kenyan population is its high percentage of those living in the 
rural areas as compared to other countries. Besides the capital city of Nairobi, 
populated by some 1.5 million people, six more cities, Mombasa, Kisumu, 
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Nakum, Machakos, Meni and Eldoret, fall in the range of above 100,000 
inhabitants. In 1989, a total of 4.3 million people was estimated to live in 172 
urban centres (having at least 2,000 inhabitants) (see RoK 1988a:74). 
Table 2.2 Basic Indicators for Social and Economic Development 
Kenya 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Low income economies 
Middle income economies 
High income economies 
World 
GNP/Cap 
US$ 
1990 
370 
340 
350 
2,220 
19,590 
4,200 
av. an. 
growth 
65-90 
1.9 
0.2 
2.9 
2.2 
2.4 
1.5 
Average 
annual 
inflation 
65-80 
7.2 
11.4 
8.0 
21.1 
7.7 
9.2 
80-90 
9.2 
20.0 
9.6 
85.6 
4.5 
14.7 
Life 
expectancy 
(years) 
1990 
59 
51 
62 
66 
77 
66 
Adult 
illiteracy 
m 
1990 
31 
50 
40 
22 
4 
35 
Rural 
population 
(%) 
1965 1990 
91 76 
86 71 
83 62 
58 40 
29 23 
66 50 
Table 2,3 displays Kenya's structure and growth of production. It demonstrates 
that the Kenyan economy, after Independence and up to the 1980s, performed 
very well and grew at an annual rate of 6.8 percent This growth was based 
largely on the transfer of land from large to small fann use, extension of the 
area under cultivation of high value crops and industrialization based on a 
strategy of import substitution (see RoK 1988a:4). Economic growth slowed 
down to 4.2 percent for the 1980-90 period. This setback had already started 
by the mid-1970s, resulting in an average growth of 4.1 per cent per year 
during 1972-1980 only (see World Bank 1983:«), not much above the 
population growth. 
Table 23 Structure and Growth of Production Kenya and the World, 1965-90 
Kenya 
Sub-Sah. Afnca 
Low inc. ec. 
Middle inc. ec. 
High юс. ec 
World 
source: compii 
GDP (USS шШюо) 
1965 1990 
920 7,540 
27,020 162,940 
168,700 915,520 
209,520 2,437,660 
1.413.490 16,316,290 
2,039,890 22,298,850 
îd from World Uank 
dmr. 
agncul. 
65 90 
35 28 
40 32 
41 31 
19 12 
5 .. 
10 .. 
of 
lodastiy 
65 90 
18 21 
20 30 
26 36 
34 37 
43 .. 
41 .. 
W2:22U-Îi 
GDP 
services 
65 90 
47 51 
39 40 
32 35 
46 50 
54 .. 
51 .. 
av. 
65-80 
GDP 
65 80 
80 90 
6.8 42 
42 2.1 
4.9 6.1 
6 3 25 
3.7 3.1 
4.0 3.2 
annual 
and 
agncul. 
65 80 
80 90 
5 0 3.3 
2 0 2.1 
2 6 3.9 
3.4 2.4 
.. 1.7 
1.7 2.7 
growth 
80-90 
industiy 
65 80 
80 90 
9 7 3.9 
7.2 2.0 
7.3 8.2 
6.7 2.3 
2.7 .. 
.. .. 
rate 
(*) 
lemcca 
65 80 
80 90 
12 4.9 
4.7 25 
62 65 
7.4 2.6 
45 .. 
.. .. 
International and national problems were among the causes for this reduced 
economic growth rate; the energy crises of the 1970s, international recession, 
high interest rates, dramatic swings in the prices of Kenya's key exports coffee 
and tea, the collapse of the East African Community, narrowing scope for 
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efficient import substitution, slow agricultural growth due to unfavourable 
climatic conditions, diminished scope for the expansion of production on un or 
undercultivated high-potential land and a switch to industrialization to the 
detriment of agriculture. The manufacturing sector has been increasingly 
oriented to the processing of intermediates for the domestic market, making it 
more dependent on imported inputs and less capable of generating the exports 
required to pay for these imports. 
Although the contribution of the services sector is responsible for 49 percent 
of the national GDP it is still agriculture which is considered to be the 
mainstay of Kenya's economy as it provides the basis for the development of 
other sectors of the economy. Coffee and tea are by far the most important 
cash crops, accounting for some 64 percent of the agricultural export total. In 
fact, besides petroleum products (12.0 percent), coffee, tea, and horticultural 
products are the most important export commodities comprising 26.6, 20.2 and 
12.5 per cent for 1988, respectively (see Statistical Abstract 1990:58). 
However, exports have grown very slowly, if at all, and have become 
concentrated in the above mentioned commodities. The tourism sector has 
grown in importance over the last decade, and has even overtaken coffee and 
tea as a major source of foreign exchange earnings, but it is also a very 
uncertain branch of the economy (see section 7.5). 
From table 2.3 we also leam that the growth of the industrial sector was 
much higher until the 1980s, as compared to this last decade, when it 
experienced a very modest rate of growth despite an official Government 
policy geared at promoting industrial production. Again, in respect to other 
Sub-Saharan countries Kenya's industrial performance was much better, but in 
comparison with the industrial growth of other low-income economies outside 
Africa, Kenya lagged behind. On the whole the country's terms of trade have 
deteriorated and outstanding external debt has risen from 12.4 per cent in 1978 
to 35.8 percent of GNP in 1987 (see RoK 1988a:15). This adds to another 
burden; the lack of employment opportunities for a fast growing number of 
people. In section 2.3 we will examine this issue in more detail. Before turning 
there we should briefly present information concerning the position of the 
livestock venture within the agricultural sector of the Kenyan economy. 
2.2.3 The Kenyan Livestock Sector 
According to the 1989-1993 Development Plan the Kenyan Government aims 
at a diversification of agricultural production, while at the same time 
specifically promoting seven major commodities; coffee, tea, maize, wheat, 
milk, meat and horticultural crops. Coffee and tea should provide agricultural 
incomes and exports. Maize, wheat and meat should secure the domestic food 
supply, while milk and horticultural products aim at both (see RoK 1988a: 106). 
From table 2.4 we leam that the growth in the marketed output in monetary 
terms has especially occurred in coffee and tea which have overtaken the initial 
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leading position of beef and dairy products. The last column shows the 
importance of each of the officially marketed products with respect to the 
domestic export of Kenya for 1988. Horticulture (12.S percent), petroleum 
products (12.0 percent), hides and skins (2.8 percent) and sodium carbonate 
(2.0 percent) are among the other main export commodities. 
Table 2.4 Gross Value of Marketed Output of Some Major Agricultural 
Commodities at Constant 1972 Prices (K£ million) 
1955 1964 1972 1980 1982 1988 As % of export 
value in 1988 
Coffee 
Tea 
Maize 
Wheat 
Sisal 
Sugarcane 
Beef 
Dairy 
Sub-total 
50 
26 
41 
34 
18 
09 
74 
5 0 
302 
16 2 
61 
27 
34 
31 
18 
13 4 
66 
53 3 
242 
160 
73 
42 
19 
31 
16.5 
109 
841 
35 6 
26 9 
4 2 
55 
22 
112 
14 0 
100 
109 6 
340 
287 
11 1 
59 
23 
87 
19 6 
13 4 
123 7 
47 9 
49 0 
207 
55 
17 
98 
219 
18 1 
174 6 
Source author's compilaüon ot World Hank ITO '№ Statistical Abstract 1№. 1УВ5, ІУНН, IWU 
Livestock production in Kenya is a very diverse activity in terms of all aspects 
such as production goals and applied technology as well as producer, pasture 
and livestock characteristics.3 Beef and dairy animals of different quality are 
kept, mainly by distinct groups of producers in separate regions of the country 
geared on the one side at full (milk) subsistence and on the other to intensified 
commercialized production of high grade meat for export to Europe. 
Table 2.5 shows these different livestock production systems over the 
different ecological zones. The data presented are based on the 1983 livestock 
census performed by the Ministry of Agriculture and corrected by Sloan. It was 
estimated that a total of 10,930,000 cattle, 6,630,000 sheep and 7,730,000 goats 
made up the Kenyan livestock herds and flocks. Out of these 32.2, 55.1 and 
54.1 per cent respectively belonged to the pastoralists, mostly for subsistence 
reasons. Camels and donkeys are not included in this overview but are 
estimated to total some 800,000 and 250,000, respectively, almost all restricted 
to the low-potential rangeland zone. 
The commercial livestock sector comprises large ranches in the disease free 
higher rainfall zone (i.e. zones Ι, Π and Ш). This is the zone that was occupied 
gradually by the Europeans when they arrived at the end of the 19th century, 
pushing the African pastoralists towards the arid and semi-arid regions. 
Nowadays, the ranches are in the hands of companies or rich individuals either 
For an mdepth analysis of the Kenyan livestock sector we would like to refer to studies 
don: by UNDP/FAO (1967), Raikes (1981), Evangelou (1984) and FAO (1984) 
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held under freehold arrangements or leased from the government Improved 
beef and high grade dairy cattle stay on these large farms using high inputs of 
capital for extra feed and disease-omitting measures. 
Table 2J Livestock Population by Zones and Production Systems ('000 head) 
Hlgh-poteDtia] arc» 
(zones I, II and ΠΙ) 
Smallholders 
Commercial enterprises 
Total 
Cattle 
4.830 
390 
5.220 
Sheep 
1,440 
240 
7.680 
Goats 
1,380 
1,380 
Medlom-poteDtJal rangeUnds 
(zones IV and V, pan of zone VI) 
Smallholder mixed farming 
Commercial ranching 
Pastoralists (including group noches) 
Total 
Low-potential nngelands 
(zone П, part of zone VI) 
Pastoralists 
Grand Total 
Source: Uekure et al. ІУ87:24 
1.840 
10,930 
2,020 
6.630 
2,470 
7.730 
Most improved dairy animals, however, are owned by smallholder farmers in 
the better watered parts of Kenya. These smallholders also keep a major share 
of all indigenous cattle and small stock of Kenya (some 47.8 and 21.3 per cent, 
respectively). So, by far the densest concentrations of cattle are found in 
western Kenya, Nyanza and Western Provinces and are kept by peasant 
cultivators. Cattle, sheep and goats are often grazed on crop residues and on 
any public land available such as roadsides. The animals provide an additional 
source of food next to the crops cultivated on the small parcels. Milk and 
animals are also marketed. 
The medium and low-potential zones (i.e. the semi-arid and arid zones Г , 
V, VI and П) are inhabited by 4 to S million people. Some three quarters of 
this human population possess about one third of the total livestock units under 
smallholder mixed farming conditions comprising approximately one quarter of 
the rangeland zone. The medium-potential rangeland zones are also inhabited 
by commercial ranches including individual ranches, company ranches and co­
operative ranches (see section 3.5 and figure 3.4). The remaining quarter of the 
human population in the rangelands is made up of (semi)-noinadic pastoralists. 
They either stay within group ranches or roam freely around with their animals 
in the traditional grazing areas. They keep relatively large herds of mostly 
indigenous cattle, small stock, camels and donkeys (almost 70 per cent of all 
960 
1,230 
1,680 
3.870 
1,000 
300 
1,630 
2,930 
2,170 
1,710 
3.880 
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livestock units or 61.6, 73.7 and 6S.8 per cent of all cattle, sheep and goats in 
the Kenyan rangelands, respectively). 
Each of these species have their specific food requirements and production 
characteristics which allow the pastoralists to optimize the use of the natural 
habitat and diminish the risks involved in livestock keeping as set by harsh 
environmental conditions. For example, camels and goats are browsers as 
opposed to cattle and sheep who are grazers. In addition, each of these species 
have different water requirements and rates of survival and reproduction. In 
general some 60-70 per cent of the pastoralists' cattle are cows as the owners' 
main goal is production of milk for subsistence. Increasingly crossbreeds are 
brought within these herds to optimize output. Small stock is the main supplier 
of meat and often bartered or sold m exchange for other foodstuffs or cash. 
Cattle sold by pastoralists is either unproductive, old, sick or weak or very 
young steers. This last category is not seldom transported from the very dry 
regions in the north of the country for fattening in the southern semi-dry areas 
and on the commercial ranches. So, in spite of different fanners' production 
goals and regional characteristics, the distinct livestock enterprises in Kenya 
are interlinked to form a stratified, integrated and specialized livestock 
production system.4 
As stated by several authors and the Ministry of Livestock Development 
itself we should be very careful about livestock (offtake) figures as up dated 
basic data is missing.5 Still, to assess the (potential) capacity of the livestock 
sector let us look at some of the production factors involved (i.e. livestock 
numbers, breed type of animals and the quantity and quality of land available). 
Firstly, the livestock population of Kenya immediately prior to the 1984 
drought was estimated to be 11.5 million head of cattle (see Evangelou 
1984:7). If this figure is correct, we estimate that by the late 1980s the Kenyan 
stock will have recovered to this same number of cattle or slightly above. 
Table 2.6 gives an overview of predictions about livestock numbers made by 
the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 
Still, according to Evangelou, increased stratiftcauon of Kenya's livestock industry is 
thought to have been impeded by the lack of sufficiënt finishing facilities for absorbing rangeland 
immatures For example, the World Bank calculated that if Kajiado and Narok were stocked with 
1 0 million head (compared to 1 5 million now), m order to stabilize the population, fattening 
arrangements would have to be made for 180,000 young steers and heifers annually, and this 
number alone would nearly fill the present areas of commercial ranches (see Evangelou 1984.72). 
Feedkxs for fattening were given high pnonty by the government m the late 1960s Test trials of 
70 day penods in feedlot conditions raised the edible meat contení of a low quality carcass by 50 
percent, and did so profitably (FAO/World Bank 1977a 73) 
For example, Raikes (1981192) states that the slaughtering of cattle and other stock in 
rural areas is very much less controlled and a number of major towns are ringed by "miai" 
buichenes, which sell meat to the towns In addition, there is a substantial illegal urban trade, 
which is steadily growing 
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Table 2.6 Total Number of Livestock Species in Kenya, 1960-90 
Year 
1960Λ>1 
1961/62 
1962/63 
1963/64 
1964/65 
1965/66 
1966/67 
1967/68 
1968/69 
1969/70 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
Cattle (-000) 
7,442 
7,386 
7^13 
7,236 
7,206 
7,740 
7.730» 
7,750f 
7,800f 
7,850f 
8,170f 
7.760f 
7,370f 
7,4O0f 
7.600f 
7300f 
9.400* 
9,960· 
10,470* 
11,000 
11300 
12,000 
12,500f 
13,082 
12
r
000f 
9,000f 
9.500f-12,645 
9.800f-13,050 
13.457 
13.793 
Sheep ('000) 
6.742* 
5,0O4f 
4.997f 
4.928f 
5,027f 
5,375f-7,000f 
7,200f 
7,3O0f 
7,450f 
ΊύΟΟί 
3315f 
3,339f 
3.172f 
3400f 
3,600f 
3,61 If 
3300 
3.980 
4,000f 
4,700f 
5.100f 
5300f 
6.400 
6388 
7,000* 
7.100f 
7,200f 
6,317* 
6.325» 
6316* 
Goals COOO) 
afa 
6.400f 
6,600f 
6,200f 
6.300f 
6.400f 
6300f 
6.600f 
6,700f 
6,800f 
4,000f 
3,8O0f 
3,60Of 
3.800f 
4,100f 
4.100f 
4,390 
4,415 
4300f 
5,CI00f 
5,300f 
5300f 
7,500f 
7,775 
8,200f 
8.000f 
8,300f 
7.000* 
7300* 
8,000* 
Camels ('000) 
n.f.a 
171f 
173f 
175f 
177f 
178f 
179f 
180f 
182f 
184f 
320f 
322f 
325f-520 
530f 
530f 
564f 
540f 
550f 
550f 
608 
609 
610Í 
620f 
774 
600f 
790f 
780f 
790f 
800f 
810f 
Source. FAU/HY 1%1-Уи 
Note: f=FAO estimate; *= unofficial reliable source. FAO livestock figures for a particular year 
are often altered in more recent FAO publications. As a result we should be very careful in 
inierpreting this data. For example, the increase in cattle numbers from 1976 lo 1977 is simply due 
to new information. For the years 1987 and 1988 double figures are presented as the FAO 
adjusted its initial estimate. Moreover, for some years the figures exclude livestock available on 
smallholdings of less than 2 ha and/or in the hands of pasloralists. The drop m small slock 
numbers aller 1970 is due to the exclusion of the pastoral areas, whereas the rise in the number of 
sheep in 1965/66 results from inclusion of animus on holdings of less than 2 ha Figures for 
camels were initially based on village countings only. 
The FAO made an estimate for 1988 of 9.8 million cattle and 15.8 million 
shoats (see FAO/PY 1988). In its 1989 production yearbook, however, this 
1988 figure was changed to 13.1 million cattle and 13.3 million shoats (see 
FAO/PY 1989). This again stresses the lack of reliable data concerning 
livestock numbers in Kenya. 
Secondly, besides the number of cattle and small stock we are interested in the 
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type of breed of these animals. Raikes estimated that for 1970 there was a total 
of 702,000 grade dairy cattle and 422,000 improved beef animals in addition to 
some 8,807,000 indigenous Zebu. 
As compared to the early 1970s, the number of improved animals is on the 
increase. For 1978 the Ministry of Livestock Development assessed a total 
cattle population of 10.2 million of which 1,127,000 were improved dairy, 
660,000 improved beef and 8,460,000 unimproved animals (see RoK/MLD 
1980:10). For 1983 an estimate was made of some 2 million grade dairy 
animals mainly in the hands of smallholders from the high-potential zones (see 
Bekure et al. 1987:20). Unfortunately we have no figures for the number of 
improved beef animals, most of them staying on the large farm commercial 
ranches of the medium-potential zone. 
Thirdly, the quantity and quality of land available for livestock production in 
Kenya should be assessed. The Ministry of Livestock Development estimated 
that in 1975 some 50.31 million hectares were available for grazing. This area 
was thought to be able to support a total of 12 million livestock units, while 
only 6 million were available at that time. The amount of land available was 
expected to decline to about 48.7 million hectares by 1990 due to increasing 
cultivation and other land uses. As a result the supportable number of livestock 
units was expected to drop to 10 million livestock units. 
Table 2.7 Amount of Land Available for Grazing (Million Hectares) and 
Carrying Capacity (Million Livestock Units) per Zone, 1975-90. 
1975 1990 
Zones Million ha Million LU. Million ba Million L.U. 
II ffigh-
Ш Potential 
IV Seni-
V Arid 
2.0 
4.0 
5.4 
26.0 
13.0 
3.8 
4.0 
1.4 
2.2 
0.4 
1.6 
3.0 
5.2 
26.0 
13.0 
3.0 
3.0 
1.4 
2.2 
0.4 VI Arid 
Total 
Source: KoK/MLU 1УИ1Ш 
50.4 11.8 48.8 10.0 
Table 2.7 shows that the decrease in land available for grazing is expected to 
occur in the high-potential zones (II and ΠΙ), including patches of these inside 
low-potential areas, mainly. Besides a decreasing availability of land for 
livestock production the major constraints to livestock development in Kenya 
include livestock diseases, poor marketing facilities, low prices, harsh climatic 
conditions including periods of severe droughts, lack of improved breeds and 
competition from wildlife (disease transmission, prédation). As a result it is 
feared that Kenya's production of meat will, in the future, possibly not be able 
to keep pace with the growth of the human population. 
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The 1977 FAO/World Bank report on meat production and trade in the Near 
East and East Africa projected a deficit in domestically produced sheep and 
goat meat of some 15,000 tons for Kenya as early as 1980, increasing towards 
25,000 tons for 1985. For 1985 a shortage of beef and veal of approximately 
10,000 tons was foreseen. In reality domestic livestock production (i.e. 
officially slaughtered animals including meat exported, excluding imported 
animals) lagged behind these projections in the case of beef and pork, while 
the small stock meat production was more than threefold the 1985 projection 
(see table 2.8). 
Table 2.8 Projected and Actual (Officially) Slaughtered Meat of Bovines, 
Small Stock and Pigs and Potential Availability for Export in 
Kenya 1980-85 ('000 Tons) 
Beef & buffalo 
Small stock 
P>g 
1980 projected 
187 
17 
8 
1980 actual 
193 
39 
4 
1985 projected 
229 
15 
10 
1985 actual 
189 
45 
4 
Expon availability (+) 
Import requirement (-) 
Beef & buffalo 
Small slork 
P>g 
+9 
-15 
+1 
+15 
+7 
-3 
Source hAU/World Hank І ІІЛ 11Н/Г34,1-AU/HY 1У82, 1У« 
-10 
-25 
+2 
¡S 
-50 
+5 
-4 
In 1980 the Ministry of Livestock Development published its National 
Livestock Development Policy document It stated that the main objective of 
future livestock development policy was to help the nation avoid any shortfalls 
in livestock production (see RoK/MLD 1980:1). These strategies and objectives 
were recently restated in the Sixth National Development Plan (see RoK 
1988a: 121). 
In the Policy document the 1980 demand for beef was estimated at 135,000 
tons and was projected to increase to well over 200,000 tons by 1990. The 
1980 supply was stated to be 140,000 tons of beef. According to the Sixth 
Development Plan the supply for 1987 was 171,000 tons, while the 1993 
production target was set at 181,000 tons (see RoK 1988a: 107/110). This 
would mean a projected deficit of 42,000 tons of beef for this last year as the 
1993 demand was calculated to be 223,000 tons. FAO production estimates are 
higher for production as well as demand. For 1980 the FAO gives an estimate 
of 193,000 tons of locally produced beef rising to 228,000 tons for 1989 and 
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even 330,000 tons for 1990 (see FAO/PY 1983, 1990, 1991 and table 2.9).6 
Table 2.9 Livestock Production in Kenya 1964-90 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
Bovine 
Com & 
Sub 
Slaughter 
Bovine 
Com 
Purchase 
(Parasi) 
Shoals 
Com & 
Sub 
Slaughter 
Shears 
Com 
Purchase 
(parasi) 
1,000 b) (1,000 h) (1,000 h) (1,000 b) 
nfa. 
η f a. 
n f a 
nfa. 
n f a 
n f a 
905f 
859f 
801f 
759f 
780f 
830f 
920f 
1350f 
1245f 
1400f 
1540 
1610 
1680f 
1640 
1650 
1560f 
1170f 
1684 
1737 
1789 
1878 
156 
185 
188 
216 
184 
185 
196 
210 
199 
155 
159 
134 
229 
158 
68 
68 
56 
61 
75-310 
84-384 
223-614 
1 -524 
? 427 
? -524 
·> -701 
? -752 
n f a 
n f a 
n f a 
n f a 
n f a 
n f a 
n f a 
2250f 
2196f 
2080f 
2060f 
2150f 
2500f 
2600f 
2920f 
2960f 
3130f 
3380f 
3642f 
3850f 
3420f 
2888 
3900f 
3730f 
4013 
3406 
4700 
4936 
115 
liO 
63 
67 
53 
99 
112 
100 
101 
36 
18 
33 
17 
17 
22 
12 
9 
9 
15-108 
6-293 
15-714 
7-764 
7-818 
?-875 
?-942 
t-m 
n f a 
Bovine 
Com & 
Sub 
Slaughter 
(1,000 t) 
n f a 
n f a 
n f a 
n f a 
n f a 
n f a 
131f 
132f 
137f 
141f 
143Г 
131f 
145f 
189f 
192f 
192f 
193f 
209f 
219f 
198f 
204f 
189f 
145f 
164-212f 
173-239f 
228f 
330f 
Bovine 
Com 
Purchase 
(Parasi) 
(1,000 ι) 
25 3 
25 1 
27 9 
314 
304 
263 
280 
261 
269 
22 7 
19 8 
166 
269 
206 
8 9 
8 9 
7 3 
8 4 
9 8 
107 
384 
25 5 
n f a 
n f a 
n f a 
n f a 
n f a 
Shoals 
Cran & 
Sub 
Slaughter 
(1,000 t) 
32f 
32f 
31f 
32f 
31f 
28f 
26f 
26f 
25f 
24f 
25f 
29f 
32f 
37f 
43f 
43f 
36f 
37f 
38f 
40f 
33f 
45f 
43f 
45-Ш 
45-51f 
54f 
56f 
Shoats 
Com 
Purchase 
(Parasi) 
(1.000 t) 
132 
127 
072 
077 
0 61 
1 14 
129 
1 15 
1 16 
041 
0 21 
0 38 
020 
020 
025 
0 14 
0 10 
0 10 
0 17-1 24 
007-3 37 
017-8 21 
7-8 79 
7-941 
7-1006 
7-10 83 
7-1148 
n f a 
Total 
Meal 
Slaughter 
(1,000 l) 
162 
171 
167 
174 
185 
189 
196 
201 
208 
213 
217 
212f 
228f 
278f 
290 
293 
286 
?*,?( 
289f 
304f 
303f 
300f 
261f 
280f-340 
295f-362 
357 
466 
source t-AU/PY 1УЙ7-ІУУІ, Kaikes 1У81, Stá'lisucal Abstract ІУКТ, 1УНЙ, ІУНУ 
Note Com.= commercial, Sub= subsistence, Parasi = parastatal, f= FAO esumate, n fa . = no 
figures available For 1982-1990 m the commercial purchase by parastatals columns two figures 
have been included to illustrate the change in recording by the statisucal depanmenL Also for 
1987 and 1988 we included two sets of data, both FAO estimates made m following yearbooks. 
Whatever the exact figures will be, it is felt that Kenya will probably not be 
able to become a major exporter of meat as foreseen by the FAO in the mid-
1980s (see FAO 198Sc:84). There is in fact a risk that Kenya will be forced to 
import meat in the near future. By early 1990 the Minister for Livestock 
Development called upon local researchers to find ways to curb the predicted 
6
 It should be noted that the FAO 1987 esumale of 212,000 tons of beef published m 1990 
differed significantly from the FAO 1987 production figure published one year earlier which stood 
al 164,000 tons of beef only (see FAO/PY 1989, 1990) 
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shortfall in the production of livestock in the country by the tum of the century 
(see KT 18/01/90). 
The crux of the matter in this selfsufficiency aspect will be whether the 
growth in livestock production will be able to offset the growth in the Kenyan 
human population, which happens to be among the highest in the world. 
Unfortunately, per caput livestock production figures for Kenya are even more 
prone to "guestímates" due to the fact that exact and reliable figures for both 
human and livestock population totals are not known. As a result FAO 
livestock production per caput index figures for 1988 as published in 1989 
differ significantly from the 1988 estimate published in 1990 or again in 1991. 
The latter estimate for the year 1988 of 123.66 suggests a growth in per caput 
production as compared to 1979-81 average production level (=100), whereas 
the former figure of 82.04 would imply the opposite situation (see FAO/PY 
1989, 1990, 1991). 
The Ministry of Livestock Development foresaw the same bleak future for 
milk. In 1987 1,503,000 tons of milk were produced, mainly by improved 
dairy animals from the high-potential areas. For 1993 this figure is estimated to 
rise to 1,693,000 tons, while the demand will be for 2,500,000 tons. The rising 
shortages are reflected in the decline in the export volume of livestock related 
products. FAO milk production estimates for 1987 have recently been changed 
from 1,001,000 tons to 2,055,000 tons. This again illustrates the care that 
should be taken in drawing too strong conclusions based on this data. The 
FAO estimate for the production of milk in 1990 is 2,340,000 tons. If correct, 
this comes close to the expected 1993 demand. 
To secure food supplies the Ministry of Livestock Development, in co-
operation with other ministries and institutions, has several instruments at 
national, regional and district level by which it is able to influence production 
Marketing of agricultural products in Kenya is dominated by state-controlled 
institutions at almost every level. For example, the Minister of Finance sets the 
prices for most products at producer and consumer levels, as empowered by 
the Price Control Act For livestock products this practice has continued until 
recently when the Government decontrolled (bovine) meat prices at the 
producer, wholesale and retail levels. During the 1970s real prices paid to 
producers by the state owned meat processing Kenya Meat Commission 
(KMC) remained more or less unchanged, whereas for small stock they 
declined dramatically (see box 2.1). 
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Box 2.1 Change in Livestock Prices for Consumers and Producers 
Pnces paid to producers and consumers of meat, milk and maize over the years are presented 
below (see table 2 10) It should be noted that these are official pnces In other words, overall 
producer livestock pnces will have been above this estimate Still, the real pnces received by 
the primary producers will have been less than these figures, as the animal changes hands 
several times between the producing household and the wholesale producer (KMC, private 
abattoir or local butcher) before reaching the slaughterhouse 
Retail pnces paid outside Nairobi will be slightly higher for processed and packed products 
due mainly to transport costs, while ready-made fresh products like meat and milk are often 
cheaper than in the Nairobi area. 
Table 2.10 Producer and Retail Prices of Selected Agricultural Products 
Official Producer Prices 
Beef high grade (CAQ) 
Beef low grade (3rd) 
Mutton 
Milk 
Maize 
Average Retail Prices 
Nairobi 
Beef high grade (CAQ) 
Beef low grade (3rd) 
Mutton 
Milk 
Maize flour 
Maize gram 
1970 
Ksh 
3 49 
2 73 
419 
0 53 
028 
Ksh 
1176 
534 
9 98 
150 
055 
0 55 
1975 
Ksh 
5 98 
4 74 
700 
0 85 
0 70 
Ksh 
13 33 
740 
16.50 
190 
119 
100 
+% 
71 
74 
67 
60 
154 
+% 
13 
39 
65 
27 
116 
82 
1980 
Ksh 
1043 
960 
9 48 
146 
095 
Ksh 
25 46 
13 00 
23 74 
2 76 
165 
269 
+% 
199 
252 
126 
175 
247 
+% 
116 
143 
138 
84 
200 
389 
985 
Ksh 
2161 
14 92 
2198 
2 85 
187 
Ksh 
4641 
2100 
49 42 
550 
411 
+% 
1987 
Ksh 
519 21.52 
447 
425 
438 
580 
+% 
295 
293 
395 
267 
647 
6 21 1029 
16 69 
2148 
325 
209 
Ksh 
53 37 
2513 
5245 
600 
4 65 
1989 
+ * Ksh +% 
517 2400 588 
511 1900 596 
413 nfa 
513 3 75 608 
660 2 23 696 
+% Ksh +% 
354 6401 444 
3713017 465 
426 6006 502 
300 718 379 
745 5 00 809 
6 501082 6 501082 
Producer pnces set for beef are by grade Sheep and goat meat are not graded The Pnce 
Control Act also fixed maximim retail pnces for beef with bone, beef without bone, 
mutton/goat meat, liver, heart, tongue and kidney, and tnpe The pnces vary by locality but do 
not take mio account different grades According to Evangelou (1984 58) this has resulted in 
butchers mostly willing to purchase lower-grade carcasses as this brings them a higher net 
return per kg They also offer higher grade meat to restaurants at above aulhonzed pnces 
The Kenyan Government deregulated the fixed floor pnces for producers and consumers of 
bovine meat m February 1987 The effect of this measure on the total level of marketed 
animals is hard to determine as many other factors, like the closmg of the KMC and penods of 
drought and disease, influence take off figures from the and and semi-and areas In terms of 
profitability a figure of approximately 30 per cent nse m livestock farmers' incomes has been 
mentioned over a period of two years since the decontrol of livestock pnces (see DN 13Л31/90) 
Evangelou studied livestock marketing in Maasailand in the early 1980s and also concluded 
that 'expansion of livestock production in Kenya's Maasailand foremost requires unbiased 
pricing policies ( ) A pnce structure for Kenya's livestock industry which Is not biased against 
producers stands first among needed institutional reforms' (Evangelou 1984 252) 
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World-wide, governments have kept down the cost of living in the cities. Their 
policy in fact meant subsidizing food for the urban population at the cost of 
rural producers. As stated by the FAO/World Bank 1977 report this so-called 
"cheap meat" policy has 'led in srane countries to a distorted relationship 
between retail prices and domestic producer prices, maintaining the latter at 
unprofitable levels' (FAO/World Bank 1977a:45). 
In addition to price setting, a large body of legislation regulates how, where 
and when stock and produce may be moved (see Raikes 1981:189-91). The 
regulations for the marketing of meat in Kenya are controlled by the KMC and 
the Livestock Marketing Division (LMD). The KMC runs two factories: one in 
Athi River (near Nairobi) and another in Mbirikani (near Mombasa), while the 
LMD is responsible for livestock purchases. Both parastatal bodies have their 
roots in the colonial period. In the past the "quarantine policy" has often been 
misused in favour of the "modem" sector and at the cost of the "traditional" 
livestock sector. It blocked fair competition to keep producer prices of meat 
artificially (too) high. Nowadays, quarantine regulations are still in force 
permanently or temporarily especially for the northern rangelands. Traders, 
however, do violate these rules, resulting in the transportation of animals 
between districts as well as countries 
Thus, KMC/LMD face stiff competition on the local market as producers 
prefer to deliver their animals to private abattoirs. At least nine are operative 
around Nairobi. Their popularity stems from higher and immediate payments, 
whereas it takes two weeks to two months for KMC to pay the livestock 
keepers while offering less favourable prices. Moreover, producers are not 
allowed to have the offal and skins free as the private abattoirs do (see DN 
12/10/86). 
With a rapidly growing local demand for meat this means that growing 
proportions of total supply are diverted away from exports, KMC's main 
outlet, to these more lucrative non-official markets (see Raikes 1981:127 and 
below). As a result KMC has not been used to full capacity (1,250 cattle and 
700 shoats per day) in the last IS years. By the middle of the 1980s the KMC 
ran into severe problems as it lost some Ksh. 190 million over the years 1983-
85 (see DN 12/10/86). Recently the KMC underwent a major revitalization 
after it had been forced to close down by the late 1980s (see box 2.2).7 
Moreover, as mentioned by FAO (1985c:84) 'in recent years, disasters of 
climate, particularly prolonged drought, and other external circumstances have 
considerably limited exports'. 
7
 Tbe failure of KMC does not stand alone The Government of Kenya concluded ш lts Sixth 
Development Пап that parastatali and nationwide monopolies bad performed poorly due to lack of 
competition and weak management Most parastatals m Kenya are not cost-effective (see RoK 
1989 114) After analyzing the performance of 17 agricultural parastatals bom Independence to 
1984 Barbara Grosh concluded that since 1976 several firms had developed financial problems 
KMC was classified as a firm having chrome deficits since 1974 The current strategy of 
increasing Government control was predicted to fail (see Grosh 1986 41). 
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Box 2.2 Decline and Revival of the Kenya Meat Commission (KMC) 
In the early 1970s KMC's legal monopoly over commercial slaughter was relaxed and private 
slaughterhouses were officially permitted to operate for the fust time (see Evangelou 1984 66-
68) According to FAO/World Bank figures some 16 small abattons with a daily total capacity 
of 300 cattle and 300 sheep slaughterings were licensed by the KMC (see FAO/World Bank 
1977a 41) It was intended that KMC concentrated on Kenya's export market, while local urban 
markets would be supplied by privale firms Before the collapse of the KMC Kenya was the 
thud largest supplier of corned beef m Europe (mainly to the U K.) 
The performance of the Kenya Meat Commission started declining m 197S By late 1980 it 
was operating at only two-fifths of us weekly production capacity of 750 tons KMC's problem 
of securing sufficient throughput for profitable operation can be largely attributed to increased 
competition from private abattoirs, especially those in the Nairobi outskirts The Government 
directive to intervene during the drought of 1984 by way of buying large numbers of cattle 
irrespective of their condition (at too high pnces) is said to have hastened this process of 
decime This operation caused the paraslatal to incur losses estimated at Ksh 36 75 million. 
The ill-fated Government abattoir ground to a halt at the height of crippling financial 
problems m November 1987 KMC owned farmers some Ksh 4 million. KMC was revived on 
July 24th 1989 It's name was changed to the Kenya National Meat Coiporation 60 per cent 
being m privale hands (shareholders) and the remaining 40 per cent owned by the ADC (see 
Standard 23/08/89) Under this new management plans have been made to open branches m 
Ganssa and Nakuru, but most importantly to improve its operations by timely (next day) 
payments to producers, fair payments and the like 
The Livestock Marketing Division (LMD) 
Whereas the processing and sale of meat was m the hands of the KMC, the Livestock 
Marketing Division's responsibility was primarily the purchase of stock m the pastoralisl's 
areas For this purpose stock routes and bolding grounds for quarantine (of up to 6 month 
periods) to prevent the transmission of diseases (esp CBPP) were created LMD was created m 
1970 replacing the African Livestock Marketing Organization (ALMO) The LMD, though 
successful m creating the marketing infrastructure, was not able to compete with the private 
traders For example, Njiru reports for the Rendille pastorahsts m Northern Kenya that only 
26 1 percent of all cattle sales m 1980 were sold to LMD, while local shopowners (37 1), local 
slaughter (18 8) and itinerant traden (179) were the other offtake destinations (see Njiru 
1986 337) 
Private traders offered higher pnces, direct payment and (illegally) exported animals towards 
the butcheries m the mam urban centres, whereas the LMD concentrated on feeder cattle for 
fattening on commercial ranches and slaughter cattle for the KMC Since 1983/4, however, the 
Treasury did not provide the LMD with funds for the purchase of cattle Its task was taken over 
by the KMC and local traders (see Mweya 1986 327) 
Livestock Weights and Ofltake Rates 
Average carcass weights for (officially marketed) cattle m Kenya have been said to have 
declined from 145 kg m the early 1970s to 125 kg by 1988 (see FAO 1989) Sheep ani goat 
carcass weights were 12 and 8 kg, respectively These are somewhat constant weights By 
comparison, average carcass weights for all African countnes stand at 146, 13 and 12 kg for 
cattle, sheep and goats respectively Worldwide these figures stand at 207, 15 and 12 kg, 
respectively 
Average annual official offtake rales for bovine animals and sheep m Kenya are estimated to 
be 13 1 and 36 1 per cent for 1982, while a decade before this they stood at 101 and 28 3 per 
cenL In Africa, 1982 offtake rates for cattle and sheep were 11 5 and 30 1 per cent For the 
countnes within the European Countnes average offtake figures were 33 9 and 57 9 per cent 
while worldwide these figures were 17 1 and 35 3 per cent (see FAO 1985a) 
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So, although the number of cattle sold by producers will have increased due to 
the droughts of 1980 and 1984 the average carcass weight will have been 
rather low. In the post-drought years producers, in spite of the higher prices 
offered, will not have been very willing to sell their animals as their main 
concern was rebuilding their herds and fattening their animals.8 
Kenya is also facing marketing problems for exporting livestock (products) 
on the demand side, either in a quantitative (low demand due to worldwide 
overproduction) or qualitative way (non-tariff barriers like hygiene and disease-
free requirements). Table 2.11 highlights the decrease of (official) exports of 
most livestock products during the 1980s from Kenya, while a slight recovery 
occurred at the end of this period. The problems and revival of KMC will have 
certainly influenced Kenya's ability to export livestock products. Increased 
local demands, periods of drought and international competition have attributed 
to structural or temporary variations in livestock export figures. 
Table 2.11 Quantity of Domestic Exports from Kenya, 1973-89 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
Live 
Animals 
No. 
1.018.051 
1,376,920 
1,355,728 
2,056,755 
758,216 
227,489 
139,964 
224,269 
44317 
32365 
32,104 
41,434 
62.060 
162,333 
74,048 
143,456 
366,663 
Meat& 
Products 
Tons 
6.664 
6,780 
8.280 
9,775 
9,344 
3,033 
2,643 
1.253 
1.890 
2.916 
2.367 
4,294 
3,669 
763 
87 
71 
403 
Hides & 
Skins 
Tons 
8.226 
9,082 
11,940 
14,158 
11,374 
10,893 
13,081 
8,485 
12564 
11,136 
9,158 
9,055 
10,451 
13.965 
16,052 
17.580 
10.153 
Butler & 
Ghee 
Tons 
2,774 
2,028 
1,112 
1,183 
1,063 
1.581 
1,206 
230 
565 
878 
1,179 
438 
275 
423 
315 
225 
262 
Wool 
Tons 
1303 
1.348 
1,231 
1,288 
1,361 
1,165 
1,080 
1,706 
1,113 
1.453 
1.182 
1.701 
689 
1.109 
1.024 
795 
445 
(Dried) Milk 
& Cream 
Tons 
4.118 
1,460 
1301 
648 
257 
1,738 
1.913 
83 
31 
20 
30 
16 
95 
208 
655 
1,923 
1,144 
Eggs 
COOO) 
2339 
1,966 
1,668 
2,080 
3,342 
2,168 
1,248 
1399 
2,204 
1,422 
929 
825 
699 
606 
575 
484 
220 
Source: Staùstical Abstract 1У82. 199U 
KMC has been exporting much beef in the form of processed meat, corned 
beef as well as frozen and chilled meat, most of which goes to the Middle East 
and the United Kingdom. There is, however stiff competition from other 
countries due to a worldwide overproduction of beef, especially in Europe, 
South America and Australia. 
For example, average bovine carcass weights in 1980 dropped from 130 kg to 125 kg and 
recovered to 130 in 1981 (see FAO/PY 1983). 
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Table 2.12 Destination of Livestock Exports from Kenya, 1981-89 
(K£ '000 - current prices) 
Live ammali 
Meat and meat 
ptepantioiu 
Hide «Dd Am· 
(including Air) 
Balte and ghee 
Wool (mw) 
year 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
Weal- Uniled 
Gennaoy Kingdom 
95 
93 
225 
756 
222 
95 
4 
-
-
22 
21 
20 
-
. 24 
6 
-5 
_ 
• 
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209 3,997 
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183 1,272 
- 9,206 
- 7,902 
- 6,331 
- 7,122 
- 9,989 
-12,611 
-16,874 
-26,102 
-13483 
10 583 
14 1,020 
14 1,486 
18 648 
11 458 
14 627 
14 518 
12 337 
11 1,764 
- 975 
- 1,219 
- 942 
- 1,402 
- 738 
- 1.234 
- 1,472 
- 1,938 
- 1,276 
Noie: ibe detailed destination of live animals is not known. Most animals, however, aie transferred 
to neighbouring countries and Ibe Near East. 
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Demand for imports is restricted to a very small number of markets: USA, 
Japan, Canada, CIS. Still, the EC is the most impoitant export market for 
Kenya's agricultural produce. In total the EC imported 75.2 per cent of 
Kenya's agricultural exports, which is equivalent to a share of 2.0 per cent or 
the twelfth place in the EC's agricultural imports from the group of developing 
countries (see Eurostat 1989:67).9 
Table 2.12 gives a detailed picture of Kenya's export of livestock 
(products). Among the group of developing countries the most important 
suppliers of meat to the EC are Brazil (42.0 per cent), Argentina (27.7 per 
cent), former Yugoslavia (11.4 per cent) and Uruguay (7.1 per cent). Kenya 
(0.7 per cent) ranked thirteenth in 1986 as it did in 1981, while in 1984 and 
1985 it stood at the eighth place.10 In 1985/86 the Common Market was 
buying 93.7 per cent of all Kenyan meat exports. Zimbabwe (2.6 per cent) now 
ranks above Kenya in fifth place. Nevertheless, in spite of Kenya enjoying a 
special agreement with the EC as part of the Convention of Lomé (giving 
access to that Community's market for the export of fresh, chilled or frozen 
meat) absolute exports to this market have virtually been non-existent." 
Kenya was among the top ten suppliers for the following products for each of the 
commodities mentioned Percentages refer to Kenya's EC market share as compared to the group 
of all developing countries Specifically tea (28 3%), fresh vegetables (17 8%), flowers (130%) 
and coffee (5 0%) are supplied to the EC from Kenya Other primary products for which Kenya is 
among the mam suppliers are fhut and vegetable juices (2 1%), fresh tropical fruits (excl bananas) 
(2 1%), preserved vegetables (1 8%), vegetable saps and extracts (4 6%), nuts (2 8%), plants, seeds 
for pharmacy and perfumery (2 6%) and sheep's and lamb' wool (2 7%) 
For imports from developing countries. Uve animoL· are of minimal importance, the only 
supplier worthy of mention being Yugoslavia (95 2%) If we consider meat of bovine animals 
(fresh, chilled or frozen) Argentina takes the lead being responsible for 40 0% of the value of (his 
import item, followed by Brazil (23 8%) Brazil is by far the largest supplier of other prepared or 
preserved meat (70%). In the category other meal (sheep, goats, offal, pigs, poultry etc) it is 
Argentina (33%) before Indonesia (23%) and China (24%) Sheepskins are provided by Iran 
(65 0%), Lebanon (11 8) and Ethiopia (6 3%) Goatskins are supplied by China (47 6%), Ethiopia 
(8 5%) and Nigeria (7 6%) mainly (see Eurostat 1989 34/44-45) 
This special agreement allows an exemption of duty, subject to only 10 per cent of the 
variable charge on imports from third-party countries Botswana, Madagascar and Swaziland also 
have access to the Common Market under this special arrangement The quota for preferential 
access was set at 27,532 tons per annum in 1975 and increased, m 1980, to 30,000 As a result of 
outbreaks of diseases, especially Foot & Mouth, as well as due to inadequate availability and 
substandard trade services these four countries actually sent much less beef and veal to the EC ш 
the decade bom 1970 to 1980 than had been agreed upon For example, m 1983 shipments 
amounted to 16,300 tons only, practically all from Botswana (see FAO 1985c 55/84) 
Overall imports of meat and meal preparations as a share of the EC's agricultural imports 
from all developing counmes decreased from 12 per cent m 1970 to about only 5 per cent m 
1985/86 (see Eurostat 1989 20) Competition to enter the EC-meat market mainly comes from 
Brazil and Argentina Moreover, the EC increased its meat exports (8% m 1970, 12% m 1985/86), 
especially towards the Near East (Egypt (16%), Saudi Arabia (13%)) a second most important 
market for Kenyan livestock (products) In 1986 the third most important EC agricultural export 
was beef. 
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Authorization for imports of beef and veal under this agreement have been 
conditional on the existence of satisfactory animal health standards in the 
supplier countries. Foot & Mouth disease especially hinders the export of 
Kenyan livestock to the EC. In 1989, the Minister of Livestock Development 
declared that his Ministry would take bold steps to make Kenya free of Foot & 
Mouth disease before 1992 to enable the country's export of beef to the EC 
(see DN 02/08/89). Even if this major task were to be realized, Kenya faces a 
rising internal demand for meat and meat products that will have to be met 
Table 2.13 shows an overall increasing trend (in monetary terms) of imports of 
live animals and meat products, with decreasing exports throughout the 1980s. 
An exception is the value of the trade in dairy products and eggs. 
Table 2.13 Value of Import and Export of Livestock Products in Kenya, 
1980-90 (xUS$ 1,000) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1983 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Live import 1,334 851 244 640 330 296 325 538 589 2,154 987 
animals expon 1,554 3.822 3,151 6,094 7,203 1,699 3,217 2,205 1,707 1.751 1,751 
Meat and import 77 63 28 11 22 10 1 14 89 60 60 
meat prep export 4,334 5,844 8,344 5,996 10371 8,354 1,969 267 207 170 3,800 
Dairy prod import 15,068 15,812 4,221 4,721 12,817 4.940 1,868 967 130 1,360 190 
and eggs export 947 1,709 2,121 2,431 1,062 842 1,417 2,700 2,659 2,550 2,120 
Source: ЬАІУІY 1У86, IWl 
Processing and marketing of milk (products) in Kenya is in the hands of the 
Kenya Co-operative Creameries (KCC). This is not a parastatal but a private 
body which operates with a state granted monopoly and under some form of 
state control.12 It controls almost all modem dairy sector sales of dairy 
produce on official markets. Still, Raikes estimated that only 12 to 20 per cent 
of total milk production were official deliveries. It is mainly the small farm 
sector which is responsible for some 65 percent of total milk production (see 
Raikes 1981:129). 
By the end of 1990 the KCC ran into problems and was placed under 
interim management in order to end corrupt practices. The Government also 
repeated its intention to ban the KCC monopoly in milk processing to enable 
co-operatives to enter this activity (see KT 04/12/90). Over the years the 
company sold as a result of poor milk prices fixed by the Government, some 
70 per cent of its products below production costs (see Weekly Review 
08/05/92). 
Recently, it has been suggested to break away from this monopoly for the KCC by 
licensing smaller district-based dairy units (see RoK 1988a:115). 
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Let us tum to section 2.3 for a more indepth analysis of the Government's 
economic development policy as it has emerged over the years since 
Independence. Special attention will be paid to the lack of employment for the 
fast growing Kenyan population. 
23 (Unemployment and Economic Development Policy 
The total Kenyan labour force is expected to rise to 14 million people for the 
year 2000, as compared to an estimate of slightly over 9 million for 1989. At 
the same time it is expected that the total number of people living in poverty is 
at least likely to double by the year 2000 to about 12 million out of a total 
population which is expected to rise to over 30 million (see Hunt 1985:101 and 
table 1.1). In order to combat poverty, Kenya is in high need of new jobs. 
Several authors have dealt with the problem of how to solve the employment 
and poverty issue (e.g. ILO 1972, World Bank 1983, Hunt 1985 and 
Livingstone 1986). Most of them conclude that it will be virtually impossible 
to solve the employment problem unless population growth slows down. These 
writers, and the Kenyan Government recognise that this can only be a long 
term objective. 
After Independence, in December 1963, Kenya inherited a largely rural 
economy based primarily on subsistence agriculture and some commercial and 
industrial activity which, however, started to falter, arising from capital flight 
and stagnation of investment as many foreign investors in the country decided 
to leave. The new Independent Kenyan Government reacted by the 
establishment of a number of parastatal institutions in order to develop a mixed 
economy and ensure the gradual transfer of control of the commanding heights 
of the economy to indigenous Kenyans. Overall this strategy worked 
reasonably well until the difficulties of the early 1970s showed themselves. 
Since the mid-1980s, in order to revive its economy, Kenya has tried to 
implement a structural adjustment strategy which includes a process of 
privatization of its economy, reduction of import prohibitions, price 
liberalization, improved marketing systems and cost-sharing in the case of the 
Govemment's provision of basic needs services. The new development strategy 
was outlined in Sessional paper No. 1 of 1986 and the 1989-1993 National 
Development Plan. A process of decentralization, called the District Focus for 
Rural Development Strategy, was already embarked upon by 1983 in trying to 
streamline the processes of planning and implementation of projects in the 
districts. This should correct the old situation by which decision-making and 
project implementation was directed from the Nairobi Headquarters (see e.g. 
Rutten 1990). At present, besides contributing to food security, the national 
product and foreign exchange earnings, agriculture is still of major importance 
in providing employment in Kenya as demonstrated by table 2.14. 
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Table 2.14 Agricultural and Non-Agricultural Employment in Kenya, 1976-88 
1976 % 1988 % 
Non agriculture 
Agriculture 
Total employment 
Reserve labour force 
Total labour force (87.3% of 13-64 age cohort) 
1.172.900 
3.783.900 
4.956.800 
1.219.200 
6.176.000 
30 
70 
100 
1.986.000 
6,312.000 
8.298.000 
258,000 
8,556.000 
24 
76 
100 
Source: author's compilation from World Bank 1983:343; RoK 1988a. 198" 
Although we should be careful in deducting a trend from these figures obtained 
from different sources, it can be safely concluded that the importance of the 
agricultural sector has not diminished between 1976 and 1988, though there 
has probably been a rising level of hidden unemployment in the agricultural 
sector. Other classifications of the Kenyan employment structure, made along 
the lines of rural, urban informal, modem wage and modem self-employment, 
also show the importance of employment created by the agricultural sector. 
For example, the Kenyan National Development Plan for 1989-1993 reveals 
that rural employment, defined as the sum of non-wage agriculture, farm and 
rural non-farm employment, remains by far the largest employer in the 
economy accounting for some 79 per cent (6.2 million people) of total 
employment in 1987 (see RoK 1988a:48). Consequently the mass of the 
population heavily depends upon access to land as its prime source of income, 
as most of them are smallholder producers. 
Urban informal employment, though increasing rapidly, provides a mere 5 
per cent of all Kenyan jobs and only 16 per cent of the Kenyan labour force is 
employed in the modem sector, i.e. all of the public sector, large-scale private 
enterprises located in urban centres, large-scale farms and other large-scale 
enterprises such as mines located outside the urban centres. Again, (modem) 
agriculture is responsible for over 20 per cent of employment in the "modem" 
sector. 
The Kenyan Government is of the opinion that Kenya could support a much 
larger population but that the inability of Kenya's natural resource base and 
industry to sustain rapid labour force growth tends to lead to low incomes, 
unemployment and unacceptable living standards. The Kenyan Government 
expects that full utilization of excess capacity in industry, increased production 
of tea and coffee in the agricultural sector and the expansion of small-scale 
|3 
It should be recognized that the 1988 figures are estímales by the Kenyan Government and 
are thought to underestimate the reserve labour force. The 1988 labour force has been computed 
by Ihe Kenyan Administration as a proportion of the population aged 15-64 years on the basis of 
observed participation rales. No deiinilion was provided by the World Bank report, though it 
seems that this is also a percentage of the 15-64 years of age cohort This uncertainty should be 
kept in mind when dealing with this data. 
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enterprises in both sectors are among the most hopeful opportunities for 
combating unemployment. For now, as explained in the Sessional paper No. 2 
of 1985 on Unemployment, the Kenyan Government is attempting to create 
new jobs through rapid economic growth which should mainly come from 
import substitution and manufacturing for export and increased productivity 
and output from the small farms which utilize more workers per hectare than 
do large ones in the short term as well as programmes of land consolidation 
and registration, agricultural credit, good domestic agricultural prices and new 
fiscal and monetary policies in the middle term (see RoK 1985:3/4). The 
Government's 1988-1993 employment scenario expects the creation of 1.9 
million jobs of which more than half should be found in the small farm sector. 
The Kenyan Government nevertheless reaffirms its wish to put more effort 
into the non-agricultural, especially industrial, sector to promote economic 
growth and employment opportunities for its people. The Plan states; 'in the 
circumstances, and in the context of a rising population, Kenya's vision and 
eventual goal is to become an industrial nation. Hitherto, we have pursued a 
policy of import substitution for consumer goods which is approaching its 
limit Further industrialisation will be directed towards the production of 
intermediate goods in the medium-term, with an orientation towards the export 
market while at the same time establishing a base for the eventual production 
of capital goods' (RoK 1988a:35). 
An example of this strategy is the development of a Kenyan automobile 
industry as announced in 1986 and which resulted in the presentation of the 
first Nyayo Pioneer car in February 1990. If this development is to be a sound 
strategy resulting in a successful venture can only be judged in the years to 
come. For now it has already been concluded by the World Bank (1983:xii) 
that the encouragement and promotion of the industrial sector has tilted the 
incentive structure toward that sector to the detriment of agriculture. Still, the 
Bank itself believes that the creation of jobs outside the agricultural sector is 
the best strategy because 'a high and sustained rate of growth of non 
agricultural employment [should be] reached in order to prevent an intolerable 
strain on the agricultural sector. Even with slowing population growth, a 4 per 
cent growth rate of non agricultural employment would force agriculture to 
absorb [by the year 2037] more than five times its present [1976] number of 
workers' (World Bank 1983:345). 
Livingstone (1986:158), however, still seeks a solution in the rural sector 
acting as a "sponge" for the absorption of population and labour. The most 
direct way in which the "sponge effect" has operated so far was by subdivision 
of the family smallholding. This, however, has resulted in a dramatic reduction 
over time in the average availability of agricultural land per person (see 
section 2.4). It is unclear how long this process can continue. Nevertheless, 
Livingstone disagrees with the Kenyan Government and World Bank policy 
centred mainly at the creation of non-agricultural jobs as a major solution to 
the unemployment issue because: 
68 Selling Wealth to Buy Poverty 
'accelerated industrial and urban development would not absorb increases 
in workforce on this scale. Output-employment elasticity is low. The 
urban population in Kenya is already expanding without an adequate base 
of manufacturing activity. The limited number of jobs involved and the 
degree of polarisation associated with industrial development means that 
such development does not cany a positive income distribution effect as 
between individuals and regions; nor does it do most for the most needy 
regions. Most important, industrial development is dependent upon 
expansion in agricultural incomes and purchasing power in the domestic 
market' (Livingstone 1986:190). 
Livingstone, referring to Tidrick (1979), offers two alternative options, both 
available within the agricultural sector: 
(a) bringing new land into play, through either 
(i) expanding agriculture into medium and low-potential areas 
(ii) irrigation 
(iii) drainage of wet or swampy areas and 
(iv) conversion of forest or 
(b) fuller use of existing arable lands in the high-potential areas. 
The first opportunity of expansion towards the medium and low-potential areas 
is considered to be an unsound development both on the grounds of ecological 
damage and the modest production and employment potential of these regions. 
'Indeed it would be desirable actually to reverse some of the migration which 
has already taken place were that feasible' (Livingstone 1986:190). The other 
options, of opening up new land is thought to be more promising. Especially 
the drainage of poorly-drained land is expected to have an employment 
potential of some 2 million jobs. Cutting of forest replanted with tea would 
provide approximately 800,000 jobs while irrigation would create only an 
estimated 150,000 jobs at very high cost. By contrast, Senga, also referring to 
Tidrick, estimated the irrigation potential to vary between 200,000 and 500,000 
hectares, providing a maximum employment of 2 million jobs (see Senga et al. 
1980:43). According to Livingstone the best approach would be to make fuller 
use of existing arable lands in the high-potential areas and by intensification of 
agriculture through the provision of agricultural credit for the purchase of 
inputs (see Livingstone 1986:196/7). 
Authors like Leo (1984) and Hunt (1985) provide us with a more radical 
solution of land reform. They point at the unbalanced distribution of land 
among the Kenyan population. The following section will analyze this situation 
in more detail. 
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2.4 The Unequal Distribution of Land 
2.4.1 Introduction 
During the 1950s the European hold on power in the British Colony of Kenya 
began to weaken following the Mau Mau rebellion. In their struggle for 
independence it was freedom as well as land for which Kenyans gave their 
lives. Since the beginning of this century the European colonialists, large, small 
and multi-national companies too, had been favoured in every way and very 
effectively by a strict land policy operated at the expense of the indigenous 
African population. "Scheduled Акав" had been set aside exclusively reserved 
for European ownership. The most important of these were the so-called 
"White Highlands". This enclave was spatially juxtaposed with African 
Reserves or "Non-scheduled Areas" where a majority of the indigenous 
population resided in a state of relative political and economic deprivation. In 
Kikuyuland, for example, a reserve of almost 1 million hectares surrounded on 
all sides by European farmland, the population doubled to more than one 
million people over the 1910-1952 period contributing to the classic situation 
of land hunger and diminishing returns. What remained of bush and forest land 
was cleared, utilized and soil erosion and impoverishment occurred (see Hellen 
1977:66).14 
By the late 1950s the "White Highlands" comprised of about 3 million 
hectares of land, or about 75 percent of the total high-potential land in Kenya. 
Divided amongst less than 4,000 farms and estates the area yielded more than 
80 percent of Kenya's agricultural exports and much of its domestic 
requirements. Mixed farms and ranches each accounted for about 1.4 million 
hectares while the remaining area was devoted to plantations (see World Bank 
1983:320). These holdings provided employment for 6,900 full-and part-time 
European workers and for almost 300,000 Africans (42 per cent of the total 
Kenyan wage labour force). They also contained about 1 million landless 
Africans (see Best & de Blij 1977:441). The loss of land and land rights was 
at the heart of African suffering. 
In 1960, only one year after the rebellion had ended and just prior to 
Independence, the British Government passed an Order in Council ending the 
original reservation of the "White Highlands" for fanning by Europeans only. 
Land transfer schemes, based on a willing buyer/willing seller basis, were 
constructed to promote the gradual purchase of land by Africans. Besides the 
transfer of undivided large-scale farms, low-density peasant schemes, averaging 
some 15 hectares, were created. 'The idea was to introduce into the Highlands 
Africans who would farm, if not on the same scale as Europeans, at least on 
something approximating it Their small numbers and their dispersal would 
This figure excludes public grazing and forest reserves, which together come to some 
587,412 hectares (see Middleton 1953:12). 
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make them acceptable to Europeans and the latter would help and advise them' 
(Carey Jones 1972:271). 
However, it was not to be the landless who were able to profit from the first 
land transfer programmes but the more prosperous Africans, as the former 
lacked the capital needed to buy a plot in the "low-density" schemes. To settle 
the less well-off African families "high-density" schemes, purchased in large 
blocks of some 5,000 acres having a mean plot size of some 11 hectares, were 
introduced in areas of relatively low-quality land. Nonetheless, it was clear that 
to settle all of the poor more European-held land should be made available. 
2.4.2 The Distribution and Availability of Land11 
After Independence some Europeans took out Kenyan citizenship, but most 
European farmers left Kenya within a few years. Up till then, the location of 
settlement had depended on European fanners offering land for sale on the 
condition that the price was such that a viable smallholder scheme could be 
mounted. 
This changed drastically after the introduction of the so-called Million Acre 
Settlement Scheme. Introduced mid-1962 and completed in 1971, it settled 
some 35,000 mostly landless smallholder families at an estimated cost of 
nearly K£ 30 million (see Okoth-Ogendo 1981:331). Finances to buy out the 
Europeans were provided, by loans as well as grants, particularly from the 
United Kingdom, West Germany and the World Bank. The one million acres 
of land were, disregarding the plantations and ranching lands, found on the 
periphery of existing African areas, especially in Nyandarua District. Before 
the arrival of the British this area had belonged to the Maasai but was 
allocated to the Kikuyu after Independence. Quoting a letter written in 
December 1962 from the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Settlement, 
Mr. Carey Jones, to the Kenya Council of Ministers, Wasserman describes how 
the Kikuyu were favoured in respect of the provision of land at the expense of 
other groups in rader 'to prevent a flood of Kikuyu from other parts of the 
Central Region and from the Rift Valley region (driven by unemployment and 
pressures from other tribes) into the parts of the Central Region west and north 
of the Abeldare Mountains, which could effectively drive out the Europeans, 
and replace them with squatters' (see Wasserman 1976:146-7). 
From the early 1960s onwards, beginning with the Kinangop plateau (a 
fonner ritual area of the Maasai), some 24,000 hectares or almost half of the 
UnTommaiely there aie no recent figures available concerning the distribution of all types 
of landhokbngs in Kenya. The latest figures for smallholder farms date from 1979. Moreover, data 
available should be handled with great care as m most cases they are extrapolations based on 
samples and/or suffer bom inconsistencies and incomparabiluy due to a change of classifications, 
definiuon or method of opetauonalization The reader should keep this in mind when studying the 
following pages. 
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total settlement schemes area was created in Nyandania area for some 15,000 
settler families. By 1970 some 35,000 families were settled on these schemes. 
It is estimated that high-density schemes were the most common type of 
schemes and accounted for some 62 percent of the settlement area (see Odingo 
1971:200). Land for settlement was purchased by, or vested in, the Settlement 
Fund Trustees who offered it in lots to prospective settlers at a price based on 
an estimate of its productive value. Ability to repay the loan was an important 
factor in the selection of settlers. This policy resulted in 'that the majority of 
the people who were actually settled were far from being the absolutely 
landless - the people who had given the political impetus for the scheme' 
(Okoth-Ogendo 1981:332). 
By 1965, so-called "Haraka Schemes" were started to settle squatters on 
plots averaging about 10 acres on abandoned or mismanaged European farms. 
Another type of settlement scheme, "Shirika", was introduced under which 
large farms were run co-operatively. This aspect of scale was in line with the 
new official policy, as advised by a British Mission, which propagated the 
transfer of large farms and de-emphasized small-scale settlement. 
By 1968 the subdivision of large farms in the heart of the former "White-
Highlands" had in effect been abandoned (see Migot-AdhoUa 1981:49). 
Smallholdings were thought to be uneconomic. The Government favoured the 
purchase of complete farms by African fanners. Approximately 390,000 
hectares of land had been transferred in this way by 1968. In Uasin Gishu, 
Nakura and Trans Nzoia, the first two former Maasai territories, land was 
transferred to individual owners. Table 2.15 summarises the situation of land 
transferred to Africans up to 1968. 
Table 2.15 Classification of Land Transferred to Africans as at 1968 
FannType 
Smallholder Settlemenu 
- High-density 
- Low-density 
• Squaaere 
Sub-total 
Area Transferred 
(ha) 
319,000 
76.000 
35,000 
«0,000 
No. of 
farms 
26,700 
5,200 
14,000 
45,900 
Average area 
(ha) 
11.9 
14.6 
2.5 
9.4 
Large Farms 
- Individually owned 386,000 1.192 324.0 
- Operated by co­
operatives or the 
Department of 
Settlements 118.000 34 3 464.0 
Sub-total 504,000 1.226 411.0 
AU Types 934,000 47,126 19.8 
Source: House & КіШск 1УН1 table 8 
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The total number of officially registered smallholdings stood at 777,000 by 
1969 covering an area of some 2,646,000 hectares. Large farms in former 
scheduled areas numbered 3,175 owning a total of 2,690,000 hectares (see 
World Bank 1975:510). 
The new policy of transferring large farms was criticized by the 
International Labour Office 1972 mission, which pronounced modest farms to 
be more economical than large ones. This statement, at least, will have 
tempered opposition to a process of informal subdivision of large farms. Many 
land-buying companies which had been formed by the early 1960s were 
responsible for this development of unofficial fragmented farms.16 After 
acquiring a large farm it was unofficially subdivided among the shareholders of 
the company. The position of large-scale agriculture was further weakened by 
the fact that many of the Africans who had bought large-scale farms soon 
found themselves in financial difficulties and needed Government assistance. 
By 1974, the officially held position by the Government was that large-scale 
agriculture, though still welcome, was necessary only in a limited number of 
areas, which included the production of wheat and hybrid seed maize and the 
maintenance of breeding herds of livestock (see Leo 1984:177). 
Other settlement schemes were started to relieve continued pressure, both 
from landless people and from well-off Africans. These were called Stateland 
Schemes and Harambee Schemes, also located outside the former scheduled 
areas. By the end of the 1970s over 500,000 hectares of land had been taken 
over for settlement schemes, mostly from large mixed farms. Of the remaining 
900,000 hectares some 35 per cent had been informally (and often illegally) 
subdivided. If we include the 185,000 hectares (cropped area only) held by 
plantations, about 800,000 hectares of arable land is still fanned on large 
holdings of 50 hectares or more. This is about one-half of the area held by 
plantations and mixed farms in the Scheduled Areas in 1960. The above 
sketched developments resulted in a situation at the end of the 1970s whereby 
the Kenyan agricultural area, estimated to be some 8.0 million hectares, was 
divided between 1.7 million smallholdings (0-<20 ha), 40,000 "gap farms" (20-
50 ha) and some 2,460 large farms (>50 ha). The distribution of holdings as 
well as employment figures for each of these three categories is shown in table 
2.16. 
It can be concluded that the land was unevenly distributed. About half of the 
land was in farms of less than 20 hectares with an average of approximately 2 
hectares, while the other half had an average size of 1,000 hectares. 'In spite of 
settlement schemes and unofficial subdivision, however, large mixed farms and 
plantations still cover one-seventh of the area devoted to arable agriculture. 
Counting gap farms as well, about one-third of the arable agricultural land is 
fanned in holdings of over 20 hectares' (World Bank 1983:338). In other 
16
 From 1963 until 1983, 24,000 private land-buying firms were registered in Kenya (see Leo 
1984:185). 
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words some 2.4 per cent of the Kenyan holdings own some 32 per cent of 
arable land in the country. 
Table 2,16 Distribution of Agricultural Holdings and Employment, 1977 
Nnmber of 
farms 
Area 
(ha) 
Appr average 
bolding size ha. 
Employment 
(thousands) 
Employment per 
hundred ha. 
Small farms 
Irrigation schemes 
Gap farms' 
Large farms 
- mixed farms 
- plantations 
- commercial ranches9 
1.704.009 
4.744 
40.000 
2.460 
1.800 
475 
100 
3,500.000 
8.728 
1,000.000 
2^00,000 
900,000' 
185,000· 
650,000 
2 
2 
25 
1.000 
500 
390 
6,500 
2,236 
5 
80 
371 
ZOO3 
129 
64 
60 
8 
15 
22 
704 
Source World Hank 1V8J Vol 11 (able 1U 
1 Gap farms are those not covered by either the Integrated Rural Survey or the Large Farm Survey Most 
are believed to be 20-50 hectares In size Area and mean size are estimates, 
2 Up to 35 per cent of this area has been subdivided Into smallholdings, 
3 Includes estimated 144,000 squatters m large farm area, 
4 Cropped area only, 
5 Ranches larger than 1,000 hectares Government-operated ranches are excluded. 
Information concerning smallholders has been collected in the "Integrated 
Rural Surveys" which were conducted in the middle of the 1970s and are 
presented in table 2.17. Unfortunately, recent figures are not available apart 
from extrapolations made using 1RS data. 
Table 2.17 Distribution of Smallholdings by Size 
Size of Holdings (ha) 1RS 1 (1974/75) 1RS 2 (1976/77) 
Number % Number % 
COOO) COOO) 
1RS 4 (1978/79) 
Number % 
('000) 
0 
001-04 
05-09 
10-19 
20-29 
30-39 
4 0 4 9 
5 0-79 
804-
206 
266 
400 
224 
132 
107 
96 
51 
14 
18 
27 
15 
9 
7 
7 
3 
508 
405 
362 
156 
88 
59 
67 
59 
30 
24 
21 
9 
5 
4 
4 
4 
5818 
678 8 
5414 
425 6 
1967 
86 2 
431 
754 
646 
216 
252 
201 
15 8 
73 
32 
16 
28 
24 
1000 Total piota 1,483 100 1,704 100 2,693 6 
Total land (ha) 3,458,300 3,458,300 3,216,100 
source Munt і вэ unies ι із ana 114 (columns ι ana ¿), Slaüsücal Abstract IWl tables Уі and 
96 (column 3) 
Furthermore, the 1RS data were collected through sampling within the major 
agricultural zones only and different operationalizations are responsible for 
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some of the changes which seem to have occurred between different years. For 
example, the much higher number for very small-size holdings in 1976/7 as 
compared to 1974/5 is the result of the inclusion of very small "back-garden" 
type of holdings which before were excluded. With regard to the large farm 
sector more recent figures are available. They show us that the number of large 
fanns has increased from 2,750 in 1966 to 4,097 in 1989, while the total area 
in this period decreased slightly from 2,641,900 ha to 2,345,400 ha. The clue 
as to this apparent paradox is subdivision of the large farms resulting in a 
growing number of small "large farms" as shown by table 2.18 concerning the 
distribution over the different size classes. 
The reduction of some 11.2 per cent in the total area categorized as large 
farm land in the 1966-1989 period is mainly the result of a loss of the large 
farm land use categories of temporary crops, temporary meadows, forest land 
and uncultivated meadows and pastures which outstripped the increase of land 
under permanent crops on these farms. 
Table 2.18 Distribution of Large Farms, 1966-89 
Size of holdings 
(ha) 
Number 
1966 
of 
1970 
plots 
1975 1980 1985 1989* 
0-19 
2049 
50-99 
100-199 
200-299 
300-399 
400499 
500999 
1.0001,999 
2,0003.999 
4,00019.999 
209,000 + 
281 
252 
255 
344 
266 
219 
181 
466 
246 
112 
115 
13 
417 
324 
304 
364 
321 
253 
218 
498 
243 
107 
111 
15 
455 
355 
306 
393 
347 
256 
219 
490 
211 
114 
105 
13 
677 
500 
406 
428 
362 
252 
203 
482 
205 
89 
112 
19 
1,022 
1,063 
433 
382 
303 
210 
156 
358 
161 
85 
87 
11 
1.031 
1,063 
435 
382 
305 
210 
156 
363 
152 
-
-
. 
Total plots 2,750 
Total area ('000 ba) 2,641.9 
Source SUbshcal Abstract 1Ш, \Ш 
3,175 
2,688.6 
3,264 
2,672 8 
3,735 
2,670.1 
4.271 
1,986.2(?) 
4.097 
2,345.4 
: provisional Inclusioa of 019 ba of large farms is probably because of subdivision. 
Another aspect of the Kenyan land situation that we should consider is 
landlessness. Opinions concerning the extent of this phenomenon vary from the 
undefinable (Leo 1984) to "guestimates" calculating their number at over two 
million people in 1980 (see Okoth Ogendo 1981:337). The latter author states 
that the number of absolutely landless people is increasing at a rate of not less 
than 1.5 per cent annually. This would imply that by 1990 at least some 2.3 
million Kenyans, or approximately 10 per cent of the total population would 
fall into the category "landless". 
This seems to be in line with the World Bank early 1980's estimate of 11.0 
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per cent of all rural households being classifíed as landless or 7.3 per cent of 
all rural households landless and also poor. In addition, 200,000 people have 
migrated from high-potential areas, where they were landless, to dry areas 
which were marginal for fanning. Of these, 110,000 people are estimated to 
live below the poverty line of Ksh. 2,000/- per annum per household (see 
World Bank 1983:216/340). 
Landlessness is thought to be the result of the privatization of land, the 
expulsion of squatters from large farms, forced land sales to repay loans and 
widowhood or divorce. '(···) it appears that purchases of land are made by 
relatively high-income urban dwellers both with a view to its speculative return 
as well as for retirement purposes. There is a fair amount of absentee 
ownership in Kenya. For instance, a survey of a location within Central 
Province in 1971 found that 90% of farms over three hectares had absentee 
landowners' (World Bank 1983:232). In response the landless migrate away 
either to: (a) settlement schemes; (b) large farms, where they are squatters; (c) 
semi-arid lands, previously occupied by pastoralists or (d) urban areas. 
This latter option seems to have been chosen by a minority of the landless. 
Most of them have either moved to settlement schemes, large farms or semi-
arid areas. From the Central Province people have moved to the few medium 
to high-potential areas within Narok, Kajiado, Nakuru and Laikipia District 
Other groups like the Luo, Luhya and Kamba from Nyanza, Western and 
Eastern Province, respectively, have also migrated within and outside their 
provinces (to Rift Valley and Coast Province, mainly). 
Mbithi and Bames (1975), Wisner (1978) and Campbell (1978), have 
reported about this phenomenon of "spontaneous" migration which according 
to Livingstone (1986:19) is 'the single most important way in which population 
pressure has been absorbed". Indeed outmigration by landless people seems to 
be one of the most frequent solutions sought for and is responsible for a major 
part of rural-rural migration. Pushed by a severely populated area lacking 
sufficient land they are pulled towards those areas where land is still in 
apparent abundance and where it could be possible to make a living. Table 
2.19 shows the most important push and pull areas of Kenya. 
Many of the immigrants farm smallholdings without a legal title, they use 
techniques of cultivation, less suited to marginal areas and which can cause 
severe erosion. They are repeatedly confronted with the marginality and 
insecurity of their plots, from a tenurial as well as a climatic point of view. 
Moreover, the movement of the potentially landless to the drylands has brought 
them into conflict with the pastoralists, another less well-off group. They 
compete for the same meagre land resources (see e.g. Bos & Peperkamp 
1989:35). 
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Table 2.19 Lifetime Migration by District and Province, 1979 
District/ZVov/Hce 
Nairobi 
Kiambu 
Kinnyaga 
Muranga 
Nyandarua 
Nyeri 
Central Province 
Mombasa 
KUifi 
Kwale 
Lamu 
Taita-Taveta 
Tana River 
Coast Province 
Embu 
Isiolo 
Kitui 
Maisabit 
Mem 
Eastern Province 
G arissa 
Mandera 
Wajir 
North Eastern Province 
Net-Migration 
+ 524,373 
-108,305 
+ 374 
-112,346 
+ 54,123 
- 106,724 
- 272,878 
+ 167,879 
-6.874 
+ 12,402 
+ 4,714 
- 7,759 
+ 4,911 
+ 175.273 
+ 208 
-1,519 
-51354 
- 110^90 
+ 1,683 
- 11371 
-173,343 
+ 5371 
- 25,955 
+ 8,191 
-12,193 
Source: KoKAJBS undated table УІ 
Oistrìct/Province 
Kisii 
Kisumu 
Siaya 
South Nyanza 
Nyanza Province 
Bungoma 
Busta 
Kakamega 
Western Province 
Вaringo 
Elgeyo-Marakwet 
Kajiado 
Kericho 
Laikipia 
N alcuni 
Nandi 
Narok 
Sambum 
Trans-Nzoia 
Turitana 
Uasin Gishu 
WestPokot 
Rift Valley Province 
Net-Migration 
-60,468 
-24306 
- 133.717 
-44,679 
- 263,170 
-26,693 
- 12380 
- 247,708 
- 268,781 
- 14,682 
-15,664 
+ 28,839 
+ 6,093 
+ 57,943 
+ 159,157 
+ 8,465 
+ 29,065 
- 10,867 
+ 93394 
- 20,742 
+ 120354 
+ 7.610 
+ 485,365 
Table 2.20 presents the estimated availability of good agricultural land per 
person for a large number of Kenyan districts.17 Examining the districts with 
lowest and highest availability of land underlines the picture of push and pull 
regions as shown by table 2.19. 
In general it is thought that actual average availability for the people Involved in 
cultivation will be higher than presented here by Livingstone because this table includes the urban 
and pastoral populauon as well. Furthermore, it should be stressed that the 1989 figures have been 
derived by extrapolation of the 1969-1979 οαύ. 
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Table UXt Estimated Availability of Good Agricultural Land per Person, 
per District in 1969, 1979, 1989 (in hectares of High-Potenùal 
Land Equivalents (hple)) 
District Population ('000) HPLE HPLE/Capita Decrease 
1969 1979 1989 ('000) 1969 1979 1989 69-89(%) 
Nan* 
Lamu 
Tana River 
Sambuni 
I jnlrinin 
Uasin Glshu 
Trans-Nznia 
Nyandama 
Marsabu 
WestPnko« 
Banngo 
Nandi 
Natomi 
Kitiu 
South Nyanza 
Isiok> 
Busia 
Kencho 
К wale 
Bungoma 
Ganssa 
Wa)tr 
Elgeyo Marakwet 
Embu 
Kisumu & Siaya 
Kilifl 
Muranga 
Kinnyaga 
Taita-Taveta 
Kajiado 
Meni 
Nyen 
Turkana 
Kakamega 
Máchateos 
Kiambu 
Kisu 
Manden 
125 
22 
51 
70 
66 
191 
124 
177 
52 
82 
162 
209 
291 
343 
663 
30 
200 
479 
206 
345 
65 
86 
159 
179 
784 
308 
445 
217 
111 
86 
597 
361 
165 
783 
707 
476 
675 
95 
213 
42 
92 
77 
134 
304 
260 
233 
96 
158 
203 
293 
522 
464 
818 
43 
300 
635 
287 
503 
129 
139 
149 
262 
957 
428 
647 
295 
148 
149 
831 
487 
143 
1033 
1019 
686 
870 
106 
345 
75 
157 
84 
253 
460 
507 
371 
167 
286 
249 
396 
882 
611 
986 
59 
431 
821 
384 
710 
239 
193 
141 
370 
1 144 
573 
905 
388 
191 
213 
1 164 
641 
275' 
1324 
1413 
951 
1096 
117 
915 
74 
119 
156 
138 
327 
208 
265 
74 
107 
190 
234 
301 
305 
567 
26 
163 
380 
163 
253 
44 
57 
105 
103 
438 
162 
217 
100 
50 
39 
263 
160 
71 
325 
284 
170 
220 
27 
7 32 
336 
2 33 
223 
209 
171 
168 
150 
142 
130 
1 17 
112 
103 
089 
086 
0 85 
082 
079 
079 
073 
068 
066 
066 
0 58 
056 
0 53 
049 
046 
045 
045 
044 
044 
043 
042 
040 
036 
0 33 
028 
430 
176 
129 
203 
103 
108 
080 
1 14 
077 
068 
094 
080 
058 
066 
0 70 
060 
054 
060 
0 57 
050 
034 
041 
0 70 
0 39 
046 
0 38 
034 
034 
034 
026 
0 32 
0 33 
050 
0 31 
028 
025 
025 
025 
266 
0 98 
076 
185 
0 55 
0 71 
041 
0 71 
045 
037 
078 
0 59 
034 
050 
058 
043 
038 
046 
042 
036 
018 
029 
074 
028 
038 
028 
024 
026 
026 
018 
023 
025 
026 
025 
020 
018 
020 
023 
64 
71 
67 
17 
74 
58 
76 
51 
68 
72 
33 
47 
67 
44 
33 
49 
54 
42 
47 
51 
74 
56 
12(+) 
52 
32 
47 
51 
43 
42 
60 
48 
43 
40 
40 
50 
50 
39 
18 
source Livingstone 1У86 іаые í i figures lor lujumo, uanssa, маікюа, Marsaoit, i mana, isioio 
and Wajtr calculated from Statistical Abstract 1982 96 and Population censuses 1969, 1979 
Last column also based on author's calculation 
Noie estimates of distnct populations in 1989 calculated on assumptions that district growth rales 
1969-1979 are maintained to 1989 Five ha of medium and 100 ha of low-potential land are taken as 
the equivalent to 1 ha of higb-potential land Elgeyo Marakwet increase in availability of land is due to 
boundary changes Figures have been rounded * author's esumale. 
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Figure 2.2 combines the availability of good agricultural land for 1989 with 
migration patterns in Kenya. Push regions like Western and Central Province 
have a low average availability of good agricultural land while pull regions 
like the Rift Valley and Coast Province show a relatively better situation in 
this respect 
Table 2.20 also highlights the trend in the availability of good agricultural 
land in Kenya over the 1969-89 period. The number of districts having less 
than O.S hectares of high-potential land equivalents per person increased from 
12 to 26 during this time. Kiambu district, once an important outlet for 
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landseeking people within Central Province, has become one of the most 
congested districts. Kajiado District, one of Kiambu's main outlets in tum, has 
reached a similar position now. Narok District still has the largest amount of 
good agricultural land available, although this has been reduced to 2.66 ha per 
person only. 
The favourable position of Narok has also been noted in official documents, 
where pressure has been excercised for the opening of this district for the non-
Maasai. Citing overall population densities of some 150-200 persons/km2 in 
Western, Nyanza and Central provinces the 197S World Bank report on Kenya 
stated that 'The Masai occupy almost all of Narok, but they are relatively few 
in numbers, whereas elsewhere large numbers of people of different tribes are 
short of land. If the Government does nothing, infiltration will continue until 
there is more intense tribal conflict' (World Bank 1975:470). The World Bank 
plead for the creation of a land market by adjudication and registration of these 
Trust lands in order to enable more people to move and restore the population-
land balance. Also, 'the Government should not allow the Masai or the County 
Council, as custodians of the Trust Land, to interfere' (World Bank 1975:471). 
Besides criticizing the exclusivity of rights to parts of Kenya for particular 
ethnic groups, the report also points out the colonial heritage of large scale 
farms set aside as Government land within districts with a growing number of 
landless people. The World Bank report of 1983 repeated both of these 
criticisms concerning the existence and continuance of the Kenyan land 
problem, although in a slightly more subtle way. It is recognized that: 
'Much of Narok is undoubtedly suitable for fanning and economic 
pressures are gradually converting some of the best land to cultivation. 
However, in the drier pastoral areas there is no major potential for 
increased labor absorption. Development strategy in the marginal areas 
must be to try to raise the living standards of the existing population 
rather than to expand production through in-migration' (World Bank 
1983:357-8). 
In order to combat land concentration it is proposed to reduce the 
attractiveness of land as a speculative asset through land taxation, capital gains 
taxes on land or legislative restrictions on absentee ownership. In the following 
section we will consider Kenyan land policy in more detail. 
2.4.3 Kenyan Land (Use) Policy 
In its latest Development Plan, 1989-1993, the Kenyan Government spent less 
than half a page on its land use policy. Concerning issues such as the system 
of land tenure, consolidation, adjudication, registration and the use to which 
land may be put the Government states that 'These issues exhibit a high degree 
of sensitivity and complexity in Kenya where people have a strong affinity to 
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land on which the great majority depends for their sustenance' (RoK 
1988a:130). An Independent Land Use Commission was announced with the 
task of reviewing questions related to land and advising on optimal land use 
patterns for present and future generations in various agro-ecological zones. 
In its previous Development Plan for the 1983-1988 period, the Government 
had proclaimed that land in the private sector was underutilized because of 
absenteeism, speculation, disputes over land rights, poor management practices, 
lack of credit and access to markets (see RoK 1983:50). As we have seen 
above, this statement is rather revolutionary when compared with the policy of 
the 19760s and 1970s which officially promoted the large farm sector. A 
special Task Force, another land use committee, was responsible for this 
analysis. Among the recommendations of the Task Force were measures to: 
invest Government with greater control of land; abolish freehold tenure in 
favour of a system of leasehold; lease to individuals or companies any large 
tracts of Government land not being put to productive use; give top priority to 
land adjudication; establish a Land Laws Review Commission; and address the 
problem of underutilization of land. However, the appointment of yet another 
commission and the lack of clear policy guidelines is illustrative of the 
indecisiveness of the Kenyan Government. 
Besides the transfer of land in the former scheduled areas from European 
settlers to African farmers and the creation of settlement schemes, the 
Government's land use policy has so far been directed to the adjudication and 
registration of land in the non-scheduled areas. 
At the close of the colonial period the Kenyan land surface was classified 
under four categories of land: Private land, Special Reserve (or Crown Land), 
Special Areas (or Trust Land) constituting the native reserves and Non-Special 
Areas, comprising 1.0, 1.3, 22.4 and 75.3 per cent of the Kenyan land area, 
respectively (see Hellen 1977:67). The Land Adjudication Act of 1962 was the 
vehicle for transferring land into freehold statutory estates held by Africans. 
The Land Control Act of 1967 set up local boards charged with examining 
land transactions and protecting the interests of the poor and illiterate (Cohen 
1980:390. 
At the time of Independence less than 600,000 hectares had been registered. 
By 1986, in the former non-scheduled areas alone, this figure had increased to 
almost 7.0 million ha. Ignoring for a moment the initial political incentive, the 
rationale behind the replacement of customary land rights by individual tenure 
through adjudication of ownership, registration of these units and issue of title 
deeds, was to create a collateral for loans and the encouragement of long term 
investments in land and farm development. The consolidation of separate 
fragments of land into single land units was aimed at increasing farm 
efficiency. 
Livingstone, however, questions the importance of these measures in the 
East African context as 'lack of titles to land has in no way prevented 
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producers from planting tree crops, such as coffee and tea [and] it is not likely 
that land titles have had any effect except in the minority of large fully 
commercial farm units' (Livingstone 1986:246). Moreover, against the rather 
uncertain benefits Livingstone mentions some definite disadvantages. 
The most obvious are increased stratification, as the well-to-do buy out poor 
farmers, and the development of landlessness. Indeed, the Fourth Development 
Plan acknowledges this by stating that with 'the supplementation of land 
adjudication and registration, the volume of land transactions among 
smallholders has increased. Consequently, the incidence of concentration in 
land ownership among the better-off small-scale fanners has increased' (RoK 
1979:53). Yet, as Cohen remarks, 'trends in this direction were clearly visible 
by the mid-1960s, but policies to correct them have yet to emerge. The 
government has no policy on land concentration, and wealthy farmers appear to 
favor acquisition of land titles over alternative capital investment' (Cohen 
1980:365). 
In this respect, it should be mentioned that the process of stratification of 
land ownership in Kenya also involves a significant amount of land purchased 
for purely speculative or asset purposes, carrying with it a low degree of land 
utilization. Given the problem of population absorption which Kenya faces, this 
is not a process which it can afford. In an economy which is largely 
agricultural, employment and access to land may be synonymous; no land may 
mean no employment. The social consequences of landlessness would be at 
least ameliorated if there was a parallel increase in opportunities for rural 
development at a reasonable wage. House and Killick (1980:36) state that it is 
doubtful whether this has occurred on a sufficient scale. 
To solve the Kenyan problem of landlessness and its related need to find 
employment for a rapidly growing number of people a whole range of 
measures has been proposed by several scholars and international organizations 
such as the World Bank. Among the most important proposals are a reduction 
of population growth, creation of non-farm employment, the carrying out of a 
land policy that prevents the concentration of land holdings and the 
intensification of land use. As the former two solutions are mainly long-term 
options, the latter two proposals are thought to be the most effective to address 
the requests for employment and productivity for the years to come. 
With regard to land policy it is stated that this should focus on the 
prevention of a concentration in land holdings, encouragement of intensive 
development of under-utilized high-potential areas and the discouragement of 
land speculation. Measures to promote an efficient pattern of landholdings 
might include: 
(a) ceilings on the size of holdings; 
(b) capital gains taxes on land transactions; 
(c) raising interest rates to increase the costs and reduce relative attractiveness 
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of land as a speculative asset; 
(d) controls on new acquisitions (see World Bank 1983:xviii). 
In order to redistribute land downwards, Tomlinson (1981:182/3) proposes two 
sets of land taxes on holdings above a certain size/income earning potential 
and/or unproductively used farms. Both measures are targeted at the large farm 
and plantation sector. Because implementation of this measure is thought to be 
difficult, direct action such as land ceilings and controls on new acquisitions 
are thought to be more effective. 
Intensification of land use through the use of high value labour intensive 
crops like potatoes, tea and pyrethrum instead of wheat and maize and the use 
of more inputs like fertilizers which result in increased yields is another option 
for creating employment In certain parts of Kenya this change has already 
materialized a few decades ago (see e.g. Odingo 1971:211). Raising output can 
also be realized through improved farming methods and the use of high-
yielding crops. Of course, several constraints such as land quality and market 
demand exist but these could at least partially be overcome through the 
provision of active Government support. Furthermore, more land in Kenya 
could be brought under cultivation. Drainage of valley bottoms is thought to be 
possible in order to provide an extra 1 million hectares of high and medium-
potential land offering jobs to some 2 million people (see Livingstone 
1986:194). Irrigation, though very risky and costly, forest clearing for tea, 
although highly controversial, and dryland agriculture could provide another 
120,000, 800,000 and 300,000 jobs, respectively. 
The redistribution of land is thought to be another possibility for raising the 
intensification of land use and the creation of employment opportunities. It was 
assumed by many that the breakdown of formerly well-developed European 
farms would result in a serious drop in the productivity of the land. These 
gloomy forecasts have failed to materialise. In fact, it turned out that the 
subdivision of large farms resulted in an increase of productivity and a rise in 
both subsistence and marketable output as the former underutilization of the 
land came to an end. The Integrated Rural Surveys in the 1970s revealed that 
on holdings of less than 0.5 hectare, output per hectare was 19 times and 
employment 33 times greater than on holdings over 8 hectares. This would 
mean at the national level that every 10 per cent reduction in holding size 
raises output per hectare by 7 per cent and employment by 8 per cent (see 
World Bank 1983:71). This same report gives a warning in respect of some 
activities like production of sisal, seed maize and ranching which are better 
performed on large farms as well as towards subdivision in marginal areas 
which could lead to ecological deterioration. The Kenyan Government is being 
prompted to take the development of the smallholder section firmly in hand. 
So far, the Kenyan Government has taken action to formalize the de facto 
spontaneous subdivision of large group-owned farms. However, an active 
support of subdivision has yet to be developed. A possible explanation for the 
Chapter 2: Kenya: Economy, Land and People 83 
Government's hesitation in addressing the Kenyan land issue stems (partly) 
from the fact that the urban political elite itself is highly involved in the 
acquisition of land. As Hunt (1985:287) displays, referring to a study done by 
Kaplinsky, politicians, bureaucrats and others of influence are among the large 
land-owners. Table 2.21 shows the profession of the most important large-farm 
owners in Nakuru and Kiambu districts in the late 1970s. 
Table 2Л1 Land Ownership in Nakuru and Kiambu Districts, 1979 
Nakuru District 
Top 38 owners of 40 individoally Number 
owned large mixed farms 
(>500 acres) 
Members of Parliament 6 
Senior Government S 
Administrators 5 
Senior Police Chiefs 2 
Land Board Members 2 
County Council Officials 2 
Former Chiefs 1 
Ambassadors 1 
Company Executives 14 
Fanners, Traders 
Kiambu District 
Top 44 landowners holding over 30 Number 
per cent of all Afncamzed land m 
Kiambu District 
Members of Parliament 5 
Senior Civil Servants 4 
Other Government Officials 4 
Ambassadors 3 
Executives of Parastatals 7 
Church Officials 2 
Farmers, Traders, Professionals 19 
source Kaplinsky ічы ownership and bquity in Kenya institute ot Development studies, 
Sussex University muneo cf Hunt 1985 287-88" 
The implication of the situation as described above is that the political 
constraints to carry out a real land reform is very high indeed. Yet, as Hunt 
highlights in her study, all encompasing land reform reducing farm sizes in the 
large, gap and smallholder farm sectors alike in combination with other 
measures both in the agricultural sector and outside it, is the most important 
option to make a really substantial contribution to alleviating poverty and 
unemployment in Kenya, at least for the next decade to come. This will be 
very necessary as the projections concerning population size, the potential 
labour force, (unemployment and poverty are calling for action. 
Kenya's population will have grown from 5.4 million to 45 million people 
between 1948 to 2013. By the year 2000 the labour force will have increased 
to 14.1 million people, while some 12 million people out of a total of 30 
million are estimated to be living in poverty. Since independence, part of the 
Of the 38 owners of Nakuru eight were having additional land in Kiambu Districi, one of 
the most densely populated areas having an average 0 2 5 hectares per person ш 1979 
Furthermore, three others had extra land in Nakuru District through their membership of land 
owning companies. 
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rising labour force has been absorbed through land transfer and the growth of 
the modem and informal non-fann sector. Up till the year 2000 these latter 
sectors will be able to absorb respectively 13 and 9 per cent of the new labour 
force entrants (since 1976) estimated to be 4.3 million by 1990 and 6.1 million 
by 2000. Consequently this leaves 75 to 80 per cent of the labour force 
increase which will be forced to obtain an income from agriculture. 
A redistributive land reform which imposed a 3 hectare ceiling for existing 
farms and created new farms averaging 0.75 ha of high-potential land to 4.5 ha 
of low-potential land could provide a sufficient number of holdings to absorb 
6.2 million new labour force entrants. Assuming an average of two labour 
force members per holding would mean that the resulting incomes would be 
above the poverty line (see Hunt 1985:278)." Off-farm employment could 
also be sought as these farms would not provide full employment throughout 
the year. Meanwhile, as stated above, other measures such as a reduction of the 
growth of the population and the creation of more non-farm employment will 
be necessary as beyond the year 2015 the absorption capacity of the 
agricultural sector will have been completely used up. 
The time of implementation is of the utmost importance. By 1990, it would 
still be possible to provide a living for the 4.3 million new labour force 
entrants (since 1976) seeking employment within the agricultural sector. Also, 
all the agricultural labour force already living in poverty from 1976 and 
numbering scone 1.75 million by 1990, could be helped. By the year 2000 the 
number of new entrants will have grown to 6.1 million people. Early 
implementation would lower the cost of compensation, estimated to be some 
K£ 132 million in 1979, allow for slightly larger farm sizes and provide the 
opportunity for fanners living in the low-potential areas to move to high-
potential lands.20 Any delay in progressing with this proposed radical land 
reform will raise the cost and produce either plots that are not viable or leave a 
large number of people without land. 
If a short term and impressive land refonn is not be carried out, and hopeful 
signs have not yet appeared, a process by which the poor may sell land to their 
Using a 3 ha ceiling redisinbuuon of land in Kenya and taking into account the mimunal 
farm sizes needed would release a predicted 19 million ha of high potential land in the large and 
gap farm sector and an addmonal 07 million ha of variable potential land m the smallholders 
sector This could generate 3 1 million new farms ranging from 0 75 ha to 4 S ha depending on 
the land potential Because it is expected that a 1-1 S ha farm needs an input of 0 64 man years 
per hectare there would not be hill employment, although the output could be enough to provide a 
living above the poverty line as defined by Collier and Lai 
20
 For this calculation Hunt used a ceiling land pnce of Ksh 1,200/- per hectare (Ksh. 500/-
per acre) allowing for the redistribution of 2.2 million hectares The compensation money needed 
(K£ 132 million) represented 90 per cent of the Kenya Government new long-term borrowing In 
1980 (see Hunt 1985 284-6) High-potential land pnces in 1990 averaged some Ksh 50,000/- per 
acre' (author's estimate is based on mean land pnces of agricultural plots offered for sale m the 
Kenyan daily newspapers) 
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wealthy neighbours and migrate to the semi-arid areas will, in all probability, 
continue and intensify. In the dry areas these immigrants compete with a fast 
growing young generation of landseeking pastoralists and with those Kenyans 
interested in land speculation (see Migot-Adholla 1981:44). 
2J5 Summary and Condusion 
This chapter has explored the national and international context for the 
livestock producing economy of Maasai pastoralists. We started this exercise 
by analyzing the economic, demographic and physical features of Kenya. 
Modestly populated by some 23.5 million people, but experiencing one of the 
highest population growth rates in the world (3.8 per cent), the Kenyan 
population is expected to increase to a total of 34 million people by the year 
2000 and approximately 62-64 million by 2025. The country's labour force is 
expected to rise from 9 million people in 1989 to an estimated 14 million 
people by 2000. Over this period, the total number of people living in poverty 
will probably double to some 12 million (approximately 35-40 per cent of the 
total population). 
Some 80 per cent of the Kenyan population is concentrated in the medium and 
high-potential zones covering only some 10 per cent of Kenya's land area. The 
rapid population growth will increase the demand for the limited supply of 
good agricultural land. Over half of the 1989 Kenya population (i.e. 11.8 
million people) was in the 0-14 years of age-cohort, a world record. Kenya 
thus faces a large influx of new jobseekers in (he years to come. However, the 
Kenyan economy is primarily characterized by a large percentage of its 
population living in rural areas (78 per cent by 1988). As non-agricultural 
opportunities are limited the new jobseekers will mainly be searching for a 
small piece of land in order to make a living. 
After Independence in 1963 Kenya inherited a largely rural economy based 
primarily on subsistence agriculture. Commercial and industrial activities had 
been modest and had already started to collapse. In the aftermath of Kenya's 
independence and up to the early 1980s, the Kenyan economy performed very 
well. Both the agricultural and industrial sectors contributed to the overall 6.8 
per cent annual growth rate. The establishment of a mixed economy involving 
newly created parastatal organizations turned out to be a successful approach 
until the economic difficulties of the 1970s showed. Development slowed down 
to 4.2 per cent a year for the 1980-90 period. Kenya's export-oriented 
agricultural economy faced decreasing world prices for coffee and tea. These 
products together were responsible for 48.8 per cent of the country's total 
export earnings in 1988. The growth of the industrial sector also lagged 
behind. 
The Kenyan economy was ranked 25th among the lowest-income economies 
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of the world by 1990. The average per capita GNP was US$ 370 only. Still, 
Kenya has a relatively favourable position in comparison to other Sub Saharan 
countries. 
Special attention was paid to Kenya's livestock sector. Some 12-14 million 
head of cattle, 10-15 million head of small stock and almost 1 million camels 
graze Kenyan pastures covering some 50 million ha. The livestock sector is 
characterized by a huge diversity in the aspects involved such as the object of 
production, technology, characteristics of producers, pastures and livestock 
species. The commercial cattle sector can mainly be found on large farms in 
the disease free, higher-rainfall zone. These ranches are mainly owned by 
companies, co-operatives or rich individuals. Land is either owned or leased 
from the government Livestock, improved beef or high-grade dairy animals, 
are kept under capital intensive methods. 
The group of smallholders residing in the western better-watered regions of 
Kenya keep a large number of Kenya's improved dairy animals for subsistence 
as well as for commercial purposes. Most animals, however, are found in the 
Rift Valley and Eastern Provinces covering mainly the pastoral areas. 
Livestock production in Kenya is faced with a decreasing availability of land 
(approximately 1.6 million ha between 1975-90), poor marketing facilities, low 
prices, harsh climatic conditions, diseases (esp. Foot & Mouth) and 
competition from wildlife species. In fact, by the 1980s a domestic deficit of 
meat was prophesied. No clear solution could be provided if this situation did 
indeed occur as several contradicting production estimates for the 1980s were 
circulated. Still, by early 1990 a renewed warning for a livestock deficit for the 
year 2000 was made. 
Kenya's aim of becoming a major livestock exporting country is seriously 
hindered by these local problems. Though more live animals were transported 
in the latter half of the 1980s, their value decreased. The export of meat and 
meat preparations dwindled in both quantity and value. The breakdown of the 
export-oriented Kenya Meat Commission will also probably have contributed 
to this. Only the export of hides and skins, Kenya's most important source of 
livestock earnings, increased over the 1980s. 
Besides domestic problems, Kenya faces stiff competition on the world meat 
market as a result of overproduction and hygienic requirements. The European 
Community is the main importer of Kenyan meat and horticulture products. 
However, in spite of Kenya enjoying a special agreement with the EC for meat 
exports which allows for exemption of duty, exports to the Common Market 
have been virtually non-existent 
In order to combat poverty, Kenya is in urgent need or job creation. At present 
the agricultural sector is still of the utmost importance for the provision of 
employment The Kenyan government's strategy for creating new jobs is based 
on import substitution, export-oriented manufacturing and increased production 
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from small farms. Eventually, Kenya wants to become an industrialized nation. 
It is supported in this wish by the World Bank, which sees the diminishing 
labour absorbing capacity of the agricultural sector. Others disagree with this 
policy which they believe to contribute only marginally to the creation of new 
jobs. 
Two alternative options are being offered, both within the agricultural 
sector bringing new land under agricultural production and making intensified 
use of existing arable lands in the high-potential areas. The opportunity for 
expansion towards the semi-dry regions is not thought to be viable. The second 
alternative is considered to be more hopeful. Drainage of poorly-drained land, 
replacing forest with tea and irrigation would create some 3 million jobs. 
Other authors underline the unequal distribution of land. This distorted 
ownership is a legacy of the colonial period during which high-potential arable 
and good pasture land was reserved for Europeans. Some land reform 
programmes had started shortly before and after Independence. However, 
except for the Million Acre Scheme, it was not the landless who profítted from 
these but the more prosperous Africans. By the late 1970s it was estimated that 
some 2.4 per cent of Kenyan holdings owned some 32 per cent of Kenya's 
total arable land. 
Landlessness in Kenya is estimated to affect some 10 per cent of the total 
population by 1990, and is increasing by at least 1.5 per cent annually. 
Landlessness is thought to be the result of the privatization of land, absentee 
landownership, expulsion of squatters from large farms, forced land sales and 
widowhood or divorce. Strategies used by the landless are to migrate away 
either to settlement schemes, large farms, urban areas or, most importantly, 
semi-arid lands. 
Migrations from Central, Western, Nyanza and Eastern Province towards the 
few medium- to high-potential areas within the Rift Valley and Coast Province 
are especially common. Nakuru, Uasin Gishu, Trans-Nzoia, Laikipia, Narok 
and Kajiado are among the receiving Rift Valley districts. All but Kajiado 
District were among the group of districts having the highest high-potential 
land equivalents by the late 1960s. However, by the late 1980s this situation 
could be said to have changed dramatically. Over this period the availability of 
high-potential land equivalents per capita in the districts mentioned above 
decreased between 58 (Uasin Gishu) and 76 per cent (Trans-Nzoia). Nation-
wide this figure stood at 48 per cent Though Narok District (2.66 hple/cap) is 
still considered to have the most favourable position, Kajiado District by 
contrast, has now dropped to the least advantageous position in terms of high-
potential land equivalents available for its population (0.18 hple/cap). 
Nowadays, 26 districts have less than 0.5 ha/pp of good agricultural land as 
compared to 12 districts in 1969. 
In order to deal with this problem of diminishing land availability 
organizations like the World Bank have urged breaking away from the system 
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of Trust land ensuring certain groups exclusive rights of ownership over vast 
tracts of land. Instead a free land market should be created in order to enable 
more people to migrate away from the most to the less densely populated 
regions (especially towards Narok District). 
Besides the transfer of land formerly held by Europeans to African fanners 
and the creation of settlement schemes, the Kenyan land use policy has so far 
been directed at the adjudication and registration of land in the "non-
scheduled" areas. The rationale for this replacement of customary land rights 
into individual tenure arrangements was to create a collateral for loans and the 
encouragement of long term investments. A negative consequence, however, 
has been the creation of a group of landless, as land became increasingly 
concentrated in the hands of a happy few. This newly emerging elite of 
African fanners is constituted particularly of businessmen, politicians and civil 
servants. This was exemplified in the Nakuru and Kiambu districts by the late 
1970s where, in the case of the latter region, 44 landowners, mostly 
representatives of the above mentioned groups, possessed over 30 per cent of 
all Africanized land. This probably explains the high political constraints for a 
real land reform policy within Kenya. Only recently has a more serious attitude 
been taken by the Kenyan Government to the land problem. At least the 
process of and links between land concentration, speculation and 
underutilization are now being officially recognized. 
Among the solutions proposed to deal with this situation are the imposition 
of land ceilings, taxation, higher interest rates on capital loans and increased 
control over land acquisition. According to Hunt redistributive land reform 
imposing a 3 hectare ceiling and the creation of new farms in the released 
lands alone could provide a sufficient number of holdings to absorb 6.2 million 
new entrants to the labour force. If this was realized by 1990 it would mean 
that all the needs of those living in poverty and those looking for land to be 
cultivated could be met Early implementation would also reduce the costs 
involved in the acquisition of large farm land. Unfortunately, the installation of 
yet another Land Use Commission to review these questions and advise on 
optimal land use patterns is illustrative of the Government's indecisiveness on 
this issue. Given the rocketing high-potential land prices, any delay in 
accomplishing the proposed land reform will make it less possible a substantial 
contribution to be made from this approach. 
According to Leo (1984:181) 'Land is Kenya's obsession, as order is 
Germany's and self-sufficiency is Israel's'. Other authors have made similar 
statements concerning the importance of land in the Kenyan context (see e.g. 
Hellen 1977, Zwanenberg & King 197S). The Kenyan land question is a 
steadily ticking time bomb and a very hot issue. For now, some relief is 
provided by migration of landless people to the high-potential zones within the 
semi-arid areas. Let us turn to these dry areas of Kenya, home of the 
pastoralists and increasingly the asylum of the "spontaneously" landseeking 
Kenyan fanners. 
CHAPTER 3 
THE ARTO AND SEMI-ARID LANDS (ASAL) OF KENYA 
3.1 Introduction 
A general outline of the arid and semi-arid areas of Kenya has been discussed 
in chapter 2. In this chapter a more detailed presentation of the characteristics 
and developments taking place in the semi-arid districts is presented. This 
allows for making a judgement concerning Kajiado District's position within 
this group of semi-arid areas. In chapter 4 the Kajiado District qualities in the 
fields of population, physical geography, economy, infrastructure and land use 
will be discussed in more detail. 
32 Location and Main Characteristics of Arid and Semi-
Arid Kenya 
Several criteria and definitions exist to distinguish arid and humid zones. 
Figures for rainfall, evaporation and altitude can be found in several 
combinations and given weighted significance to produce a map of the dry and 
wet zones of a region (see e.g. Sombroek et al. 1982:43). Different terms have 
been used by various authors to designate essentially the same kind of zone. 
The resulting maps differ mainly in detail and the location of boundaries and 
intermediate zones like semi-arid and sub-humid regions. More problematic is 
the sometimes overlapping categorization providing difficulties of 
comparability. Dietz (1987:36), for example, found that what was called 'semi-
arid' by a UNESCO-map covered the 'semi-arid' as well as partly the 'arid' 
zone locations of the Kenya Soil Survey map of 1982. Moreover, within one 
category, areas are included which vary in respect of certain specific 
characteristics. For example, comparable average rainfall figures can be the 
result of a low but year round rainfall pattern or of a high but concentrated 
period of precipitation. In combination with soil characteristics this will be of 
utmost importance for the possibility or impossibility of producing certain 
crops. The ecological zone IV (sub-humid to semi-arid) in particular differs in 
terms of vulnerability to drought. 
Figure 3.1 presents the semi-arid zone and district boundaries for Kenya. The 
map, which includes ecological zones VI, V and risky IV, stresses the low 
agricultural potential of Kenya. The position of the semi-arid areas in 
demographic, economic and social respects as compared to other regions and 
Kenya as a whole has been presented by Dietz and Koninx (1984). A summary 
of this exercise has been displayed in Dietz (1987). As the 1989 Kenyan 
population census is still not published Dietz' figures are the most update 
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Figure 3.1 Kenya- Semi-Arid Zone and District Boundanes 
Source adapted from Dietz 1987 figure ZS 
Another spanai classification has been made by Tonduison (1981) dividing Kenya Into core 
and penpheral areas He uses income levels, agncultural potential, production modes and 
population density figures of the early 1970s to define five typical regions 
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In Kenya as a whole 45 per cent is arid while 38 per cent of the land area is 
classifìed as semi-arid. Nine districts have more than 75 per cent of their area 
in the semi-arid zone: Kajiado, Samburu, Kitui, Laikipia, Taita-Taveta, 
Machakos, В aringo, Lamu and West-Pokot Table 3.1 compares the position of 
these semi-arid districts within Kenya on a variety of variables.2 
Table Э.1 Ecological, Demographic and Socio-Economie Position of Kajiado 
District and the Semi-Arid Districts in Kenya as at 1979 
Total area (km1 χ 1,000) 
Percentage and and seim-and area 
Population density (inh/km11979) 
Sex ratio (МЛ1 20-50 years 1979) 
Population growth 1969-79 
Wage labour (as % of population 15-60 year 1979) 
Wage labourers m private sector 
(as % of all wage eameis 1979) 
Wage income per capita 1979 (Ksh ) 
Estimated agricultural pioducbon value/capita 
(in Ksh. for 1977) 
Civil servants per 1,000 people (1979) 
School attendance (% of all eligible children 1979) 
Educated people (% of all people 1979) 
KD 
21 
94 
7 
098 
1.73 
9 
35 
362 
314 
25 
38 
30 
SAD 
138 
91 
18 
0 82 
144 
9 
41 
282 
395 
20 
60 
44 
AD 
321 
100 
21 
101 
137 
4 
15 
216 
112 
16 
12 
10 
HD 
55 
4 
70 
0 82 
139 
14 
58 
416 
925 
22 
70 
53 
KEN 
536 
83 
27 
095 
140 
16 
56 
763 
733 
28 
62 
49 
source compiled trom uietz 1У8 / taoies ¿ ¿, L з, i 4, ι э ana appendix 11 
Note KD = Kajiado District, SAD = Semi-And Districts, AD = And Districts, HD = Humid 
Distncts, KEN = Kenya. Urban Districts (Nairobi and Mombasa) are not presented in this table 
but are included m tbe Kenya total Narok, Meni, Embu, Elgeyo Marakwet, Kilifi and Kwale are 
left out of this analysis and excluded from the Kenya total as well due ω their mixed ecological 
potential which prevents a clear categonzalion of these regions 
From this data it can be concluded that the group of 'semi-arid districts' on 
most variables, except for the intercensal annual population growth rate, scores 
between the humid and the very-arid groups. Kajiado District is also shown. 
Among the group of semi-arid districts it is in a relatively weak position in 
respect to education. Table 3.1 also stresses Kajiado's relatively high 
population growth rate which is mainly the result of immigration, although 
overall population density is still low. The highest densities in semi-arid areas 
can be found in Machakos and parts of Kitui. 
Due to continuing immigration and relatively higher population growth rates 
of agricultural groups, the balance between pastoralists and non-pastoralists is 
changing in favour of the latter. For example, the percentage of non-Maasai in 
Dietz (1987) grouped Turkana, Ganssa, Isiolo, Mandera, Maisabit, Tana River and Wajir as 
tbe arid districts, who together make up some 45 per cent of Kenya's lemlory The provinces of 
Central, Nyanza and Weston and of the Kencbo, Nakuiu, Nandi, Trans Nzoia and Uasm Gishu 
distncts of the Rift Valley Province made up the group of humid distncts, the mam suppliers of 
the merely 17 per cent of Kenya's temtory classified as 'humid' 
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Kajiado and Narok districts has increased from 31.4 and 33.5 for 1969 to 37.2 
and 43.8 by 1979, respectively (see section 4.3.2). After comparing projected 
district population totals with figures for maximum farm population, Senga 
concluded that Kajiado, Kitui, Samburu, Turkana, Nakuru and Kericho would, 
by the year 2000, have populations too high for every family to earn an annual 
Ksh. 2,000/- in addition to subsistence from fanning (see Senga et al. 
1980:41). 
33 Cultivation in Kenya's Semi-Arid Lands 
In most of the semi-arid districts small islands of population concentrations can 
be found reflecting the scattered pockets of available good agricultural land: 
Ngong, Chyulu Hills, Nguruman and Loitokitok in Kajiado, Mnagei in West 
Pokot, Taita Hills and Mbooni in Machakos, Kitui town in Kitui, Tugen Hills 
and the Eldama Ravine in Baringo, the Coast region and islands of Lamu and 
the southwest of Laikipia. Most of these regions are to be found in the higher 
altitudes or near swampy regions which allow some simple irrigation. Figure 
3.2 shows the extent of cultivated area within Kenya. 
It reveals that in addition to almost the entire high and medium-potential 
zones which are already under cultivation, (rainfed) fanning has also extended 
beyond these agro-ecological zones into the semi-arid zone which is less suited 
to cultivation. For the 1972-1982 period, Epp and Kilmayer estimated an 8 
percent increase of the cultivated area in Kitui District largely at the cost of the 
marginal land zone of the district (see Kliest 1985:80). For Kenya as a whole, 
the FAO estimates indicate an expansion of the cultivated area of some 4.8 per 
cent between 1974 and 1981 (see Kliest 1985:101). This would mean that 
Kenya's cultivated area is extending at a rate of some 0.5 per cent per year. A 
major part of this increase is taking place in less suitable regions. As the 
production potential of these new areas is minimal, the increase in agricultural 
output from the expansion of the cultivated area alone will probably be less. 
From Muchena's listing of soils present in semi-arid Kenya it can be 
concluded that, in some parts, relatively favourable Fluvisols, Cambisols, 
Vertisols ("black-cotton"), Ferralsols and Nitosols are available. However, in 
general, the soils occurring in the arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL) have 
topsoils with a low organic matter content which tends to form a strong surface 
crust or cap under rain drop impact (see Muchena et al. 1988). This can 
increase both the run-off and the erodibility of the soil. 
Part of this erosion stems from natural causes, such as wind, water, cold and 
heat Of more importance, however, is man-made erosion. To prepare the field 
for planting of cereals, the fanners cut down trees and clear the land 
completely of all weeds and grasses to secure every drop of water for the 
cereal plants. In most cases land is ploughed too deep. Furthermore, fallow 
periods are shortened and, because of the low moisture holding capacity of the 
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soils and the leaching of nutrients, abandoned fannlands in the ASAL do not 
recover quickly and sometimes not at all. Iirigation sometimes leads to 
salinization of the soil. Finally, high concentrations of people lead to the 
destruction of trees in the near surrounding for building material and firewood. 
The annual fuel-wood consumption of African cultivators is estimated to be 1 
m3 per person, which is some ten times as high as that for nomadic pastoralists 
(see Lusigi & Glaser 1984:24). In most cases the cutting of trees takes place in 
vulnerable water-catchment areas, increasing the risk of local soil erosion. 
Figure 32 Cultivation in Kenya's Semi-Arid Zone, 1979/80 
Soon«' Kliest 1985 cf Epp and Kilmayer 1982 
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Worldwide, O'Keefe (1983:302) estimated man-made erosion to be a factor 1.5 
higher than natural erosion. Replacement of natural vegetation or grasses for 
cereal cultivation will lead to an increase of the washing away of tons of soil 
as well as the loss of water through increased runoff.3 It is estimated that 
under the existing erosion rates the life of soils in the semi-arid areas of Kenya 
is between 50 and 2000 years (see Muchena et al. 1988:25-7). Observation in 
the ASAL has revealed that the cultivation of areas which should preferably be 
used as grazing lands leads ultimately to the formation of gullies and badlands, 
particularly in Machakos, Kitui, Kajiado, Baringo, Sambuni, Turkana, Meni 
and Marsabit (see Obara 1988:27 cf Brown 1963). 
Possible measures to stop these negative effects are terracing, i.e. changing 
the length of a slope; contour-stripping, i.e. wide strips with alternating crops 
under rotation through which it is tried to prevent runoff and soil loss; water-
spreading and ley-farming whereby periods of arable cropping are followed by 
a period of planting grass and legumes utilized for livestock production. This 
latter practice, for example, is applied in Narok District whereby land under 
wheat after 5-8 years is turned to grass again. 
Other methods are applied to lower crop failure risk and to increase crop 
yields. Water-harvesting methods in Machakos, Kitui and Turkana have been 
applied using sand-made bunds and small ditches to concentrate water for trees 
and cereals (see Rutten 1985:125). Also, increasingly multi-purpose trees are 
planted. These are fastgrowing, drought-resistant, fruit-bearing, fuel-wood and 
fodder-supplying trees which additionally fix nitrogen, add organic matter and 
improve the soil. Special drought resistant crops, such as Katumani maize and 
certain bean varieties, having a short growing season or high drought 
resistance, have been introduced.4 Agro-forestiy, combining the growing of 
trees and crops, is another method which tries to combine both objectives of 
soil protection and crop production. 
Nevertheless, as has been demonstrated in Machakos and Kitui by Wisner 
(1978) and Kliest (1985), smallholders of the marginal areas face high risks of 
total crop failure, sometimes ultimately resulting in famine. During the period 
1950-1976 26 per cent of all harvests in the long rainy season failed in part 
and 33 per cent failed completely in the Kitui District Eleven out of the 27 
recorded years could be characterized as being severe famine years (see Kliest 
1985:82). 
Soil erosion tests in Tanzania over a two-year penod on 50m1 red sandy loam soil on a 
pediment slope of 3.5 gradient concluded thai, for ungrazed thicket, 0 tons of soil and 0 4 per cent 
of rainfall were lost by water runoff For grass these figures were 0 tons of soil and 1.9 per cent 
nmoff, while nullet (78.0 tons of sou/26 0 per cent runoff) and bare fallow (146.2 tons of sou/50.4 
per cent ranoff) showed a dramatic increase of erosion (see O'Keefe 1983 303). 
4
 According to Kliest (1985.76) early maturing bulrush millet, posho and foxtail millet and 
early maturing sorghum should be the leading gram vaneues instead of maize which is still widely 
planted 
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Another problem resulting from the extension of cultivation in the semi-arid 
areas is the growing tension between pastoralists and the invading 
agriculturalists. The latter settle on the better watered dry season pastures and 
push the fonner towards the drier parts of the area. While the total area 
confiscated in this way may be small, its impact is much larger as it is a vital 
link in the chain needed in times of drought stress for the survival and resting 
of the lower potential areas. Sometimes settling is allowed for a temporary 
period by the pastoralists, as in most regions land is held under trust and 
cannot be sold. For the "invading" fanners this is a very insecure situation, as 
they can, in principle, be moved out at any moment. In areas where land has 
been turned into private ownership, for example the Ngong area of Kajiado 
District, a process of selling out can be observed In fact, a large part of the 
Kenyan land problem has moved from the centre to the periphery where the 
landless, migrant farmers and pastoralists, all belonging to the poor of Kenyan 
society compete over the same scarce land resources. Often, this competition 
turns into a conflict whereby people are seriously wounded and sometimes 
even killed (see chapters S and 7).5 
The fact that group ranches are in a process of subdivision opens an 
alternative for invading groups of cultivators to settle legally and securely with 
a title deed. Some fear that, as a result of the exclusion of vital areas from the 
pastures, the viability of the pastoral sector, considered to be the most viable 
option for the arid and semi-and zones, will be undermined. This will force 
pastoralists to search for alternatives to at least counterbalance the negative 
effects of the loss of their grazing areas. 
This reduced availability of land and livestock for an ever growing human 
nomadic pastoral population lies, as stated in the introduction and chapter 1, at 
the heart of our survey. Before dealing with the official Kenyan policy towards 
the arid and semi-arid areas let us consider in more detail the pastoral groups 
of Kenya. 
3.4 Livestock Production in Kenya's Arid and Semi-Arid 
Lands 
Kenya houses nine main pastoral peoples: Somali (383,000 people), Maasai 
(241,500), Turkana (207,000), Pokot (170,000), Samburu (73,500), Borana 
In the Narok District particularly, fights between the Kipsigis and the Klsii against tbe 
Maasai have continued for some decades causing severe injuries and deaths almost every year In 
Kajiado Distnct the Maasai clash mainly with the Kamba, the Kikuyu and the Chagga from 
Tanzania. From the Kalembwani and Rombo areas in Kajiado Distnct in paracular repons of 
conflicts are repeatedly brought forward. Otherwise Kajiado Distnct is relatively peaceful 
Worldwide, most profound conflicts between groups of cultivators and Fulani pastoralists resulting 
in large numbers of people killed are reported from Niger (see Volkskrant 08/11/91) 
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(69,000), Onna (32,000), Gabbra (30,500) and Rendille (22,000).6 Except for 
the Maasai and the Pokot, most of these nomadic pastoral groups inhabit the 
arid areas of Kenya (see figure 3 3). 
Figure 33 Pastoral Groups of Kenya 
Source adapted from Dyson-Hudson 1982 
The numbers presented here include all membeis of these ethnic groups disregarding their 
actual occupation and place of residence m 1979 As such the total number of group nembers 
actually engaged m livestock keeping will be lower The numbers presented here are restricted to 
Kenyan auzens. Somali, Pokot, Maasai and Gabbra also bve m the neighbounng countries of 
Somalia, Uganda, Tanzania and Ethiopia, respectively The Turkana are closely related lo the 
Kanmojong and the lie in Uganda. In tunes of stress these groups practice m and outmigration, 
which can somewhat blur the total population figures either positively or negatively This 
happened, for example in 1979, when many of the Turkana fled to Uganda to escape starvation 
and hostile pastoral groups from the Sudan (see Rutten 198S) 
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Table 3.2 summarises for each major nomadic pastoral group living in the arid 
or semi-arid area the total number in Kenya for 1962, 1969, 1979 and the 
estimated for 1989. The main district(s) which more от less function as the 
home area for each group is also mentioned. Finally, the number of each group 
living outside their main districts) as per 1979 is given. The semi-arid districts 
not mentioned in table 3.2 -Machakos, Kitui, Taita Taveta, LaUdpia and Lamu-
are the home of agro-pastoral groups such as the Kamba, Taita, Taveta or of 
hunter-gatherers like the Ndorobo in Laikipia and fishing people/agriculturalists 
like the Bajun. Furthermore agro-pastoral groups can be found particularly in 
Elgeyo-Marakwet, Kericho, Nandi and Uasin Gishu Districts. 
Table 3.2 Human Population Trends of Nine Major Nomadic Pastoral Groups 
in Kenya 1962-89 
Ethnic Inhabited Districts Population (x 1,000) outside 
Group "core" 
districts 
Somali 
Maasai 
Pokot 
Turkarn 
Borana 
Sambum 
Orma 
Gabbra 
Rendille 
Toca! 
Gaiissa/Mandeta/Wajir 
Kajiado/Narok 
West Pokot/Banngo 
Turkana 
Maisabit/Isiolo 
Sambum 
Tana River 
Marsabit 
Marsabit 
1962 
249 5 
1540 
76І 
1815 
58.5 
49 0 
11.5 
115 
13.5 
705 5 
1969 
315 5 
155 0 
9Э.5 
203 0 
340 
55 0 
16 5 
160 
18.5 
9070 
1979 
3830 
241 5# 
1700 
207 0* 
69 0* 
73.5 
320 
3 0 5 · 
220 
1,228 5 
1989@ 
465 0 
375 0 
3090 
2115 
1390 
98 0 
620 
58 0 
25.5 
1,743 0 
(1979) 
32% 
12% 
3% 
34% 
25% 
12% 
4% 
23% 
10% 
Source Population Census \Ш Vol 111, 1%9 Vol 1 & IV, 1У7У Vol 1 & 11 and Dietz 1987 
@ Estimated, using mlercensal growth rates for 1969-1979, meaning thai in all probability the 
numbers of Borana and Maasai will be overestimated while those for Turkana will be 
underestimated 
* Some 30,000 Maa-speaking Ndorobo, hunter-gatherers, registered themselves as Maasai m 
1979 
* At the time of the 1979 census many Tuikana had left the district looking for green pastures in 
neighbouring districts and Uganda 
* Décimes followed by high growth rates for Borana and Gabbra are probably m the mam due to 
the unreliability of the coverage (undercountmg) m the 1969 census and frequent boundary 
crossings mto Ethiopia and vice versa. 
Table 3.2 clearly shows the rapid increase of most nomadic pastoral people 
during the last decades. Nonetheless, part of this growth is due to 
undercounting in former population censuses and incorporation of small related 
groups to larger bodies of related peoples. Overall, the annual growth rate of 
the nomadic pastoral population is thought to be between 2 and 3 percent 
which is below the national average of 3.8 per cent The increasing availability 
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of medical facilities, better sanitary provision and famine relief are among the 
main causes for the rise in the number of nomadic pastoralists. 
In section 2.2.2 we showed that for Kenya the total number of livestock was 
estimated by the FAO to be about 13 million cattle, IS million sheep and goats 
and 0.8 million camels by 1990. Slightly more than half of the Kenyan cattle 
and sheep can be found in the high potential areas and the more humid parts of 
the medium potential rangelands. Goats (54 per cent) and camels (100 per 
cent) stay mainly in the arid or semi-arid zones (see also Jahnke 1982:236-39). 
According to Bekure et al. (1987:23) the area of the Kenyan rangelands 
(zones Г , V, VI and П) is 88 per cent, which is slightly above the 83 per 
cent estimate made by Dietz (see section 3.2). Bekure et al. made a division of 
the Kenyan rangelands into two regions: the pastoral areas, i.e. south-east 
(Kajiado and Narok), north-east (Mandera, Wajir, Garissa and most of Tana 
River and Isiolo) and north-west (Turkana, Sambum and Marsabit) and the 
mixed-farming areas, i.e. west (Baringo, West-Pokot, and Laikipia), east (Kitui, 
Machakos, Meni, Embu and part of Isiolo) and coast (Taita, Kwale, Kilifi, 
Lamu and part of Tana)). They concluded that by 1983 the three pastoral 
regions, comprising 75 per cent of the total rangeland area, contained 27 per 
cent of the human population and 69 per cent of rangeland livestock units. 
It has been estimated by the Ministry of Livestock Development that for Kenya 
as a whole some 50.31 million hectares were available for grazing in the mid-
1970s. This amount was expected to decline to about 48.7 million hectares, a 3 
per cent decrease, due to increasing cultivation and other land uses by 1990. 
This loss of pastures reduces the carrying capacity by 14 percent from almost 
12 to about 10 million livestock units, because the withdrawal of land from 
grazing is expected to affect mostly the higher potential areas with a higher 
carrying capacity. The actual reduction in livestock production is even thought 
to be as high as some 20 per cent, because of the higher productivity of higher 
potential areas (see MoLD 1980:11). 
We would like to add that a loss of the small portions of high potential land 
in the semi-arid areas would even undermine the viability of the livestock 
system in its very essence. Although the land available for livestock keeping is 
decreasing the demand is expected to rise. The FAO total Kenyan herd 
estimate for 1975 was some 6.7 million Tropical Livestock Units while for 
1990 this had almost doubled to 13.0 million Tropical Livestock Units. 
Unfortunately, as livestock figures are provided by district and not by ethnic 
group, it is necessary to concentrate on those districts populated almost 
exclusively by pastoralists in order to be able to deduce a trend in livestock 
numbers and, more importantly, of pastoral livestock wealth. For this we 
analyzed ten arid and semi-arid districts inhabited primarily by the nine groups 
of nomadic pastoralists mentioned above. Table 3.3 provides available 
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livestock figures of cattle, camels, sheep and goats taken from aerial flights 
from 1969 to 1988. 
Table 33 Livestock Numbers and Trends for Selected Arid and Semi-Arid 
Districts 1969-88 
1969 1977 1985 1987/8 
(x '000) cattle camel shoals cattle camel shoats cattle camel sboals caille camel shoals 
Mandera ÏÖÖ 900 143 0 33 7 105 3 4517 ΠΓΪ 433 483 o ï l 7β0 308 9 
Garissa 3610 100 740 3823 508 2797 1846 596 1944 2579 42.5 273 1 
Wajir 1560 760 740 1976 1195 3049 703 1331 2425 1304 1534 4971 
Marsablt 2300 1490 5080 1204 1150 4528 1007 456 3475 1254 922 9239 
Isiolo 2100 100 340 1159 1550 3719 699 209 2783 1225 529 423 8 
Turkana 1100 1690 6250 4828 976 20225 nfa nfa nfa 1973 1021 14463 
Tana River 1390 - 880 2415 431 3052 nfa nfa nfa 3052 524 4028 
Sambura 4480 120 3180 1777 95 2930 920 53 2293 1464 13 2 4600 
WesiPokot 1500 - 1580 1689 • 969 nfa nfa nfa 1242 0 5 1335 
Kajlado 6870 - 3710 373 1 - 6268 nfa nfa nfa 4758 - 6390 
Narok 6490 - 4840 5128 - 411.5 nfa nfa nfa 5659 - 4372 
Baringo 2075 - 6857 1729 - 2609 nfa nfa nfa 1418 05 3117 
Total 2778 5 516 0 3562 7 2979 6 6997 5877 8 1684 8 418 5 29005 2654 1 587 7 6247 3 
Source Stabsücal Abstract 1У 6, Heden 1УЯ4, Mbugua 1УНО, Unmblau et al 1У8У, Said et al 
1989 
1
 Totals for 1985 include Тшкапа, Tana River, West Pokot, Kajiado, Narok and Baringo District 
by a reduction (тот 1988 figures using livestock growth trends of the other districts 
When comparing these figures, it can be concluded that over the 1969-1988 
period the total livestock numbers did not follow the near doubling of the 
human population figures but remained instead more or less constant. Some of 
the major disasters in the mid and late 1970s and the 1984 drought were 
responsible for this and resulted in huge drops in the number of animals in the 
arid and semi-arid areas of Kenya. The 1988 data indicate that some recovery 
has occurred but has not reached the 1969 level, except for small stock which 
have fast reproduction and relatively low mortality rates. In general, a trend 
can be seen in the Kenyan rangelands of an ever increasing shoats/catde ratio. 
This ratio mcreased from 1.28 in 1969 to 2.3S in 1988. The abundance of 
camels in the most arid areas of the country is also shown. 
If livestock figures are combined with demographic data derived from the 
human population censuses of 1969 and 1979 the levels and trend in per capita 
availability of livestock numbers can be calculated. For this we reduced the 
total district population with all ethnic groups not belonging to one of the nine 
major pastoral populations as the former are thought to be non or minor 
livestock owning people. As a consequence, we had to leave out those semi-
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and districts having a (too large) component of agriculturalists.7 The outcome 
of this exercise is provided in table 3.4. 
Table 3.4 Average Availability of Livestock per Capita for the Pastoral 
Population of Selected Arid and Semi-Arid Districts 1966-88 
Mandera 
Garlssa 
Wajlr 
Marsablt 
Idolo 
Turtana 
Tana River 
Samburu 
WestPokot 
Kajlado 
TLU(i 
1969 
165 9 
277 2 
2088 
3810 
165 6 
357 0 
106 4 
359 9 
1194 
5214 
[ 1,000)' 
1977 
183 4 
3570 
3081 
258 3 
298.5 
642 7 
2487 
166 7 
129 0 
329 7 
2,662 62,922 1 
1 
1985 
685 
2203 
228 6 
152 9 
991 
n fa 
n.fa 
905 
nfa 
nfa 
1988 
158 7 
257 9 
315 8 
2721 
183 6 
4011 
313 1 
157 8 
1004 
395 9 
1,633 3 2^56 4 
Nr of; 
1969 
910 
62 2 
845 
49 8 
231 
163 7 
164 
65 9 
74 0 
59 5 
6901 
pastorallsts (x 1.000) 
1977 
89 8 
1011 
612 
827 
35 4 
1315 
39 8 
683 
133 3 
900 
1985 
104 3 
127 6 
77 2 
104 4 
447 
165 9 
503 
862 
168 3 
1136 
1988 
123 8 
139 4 
843 
114 1 
488 
1813 
549 
942 
183 8 
124 1 
833 1 1,042 5 1,148 7 
TLU/CAP' 
1969 
182 
446 
247 
764 
717 
2 18 
6 59 
546 
161 
8 76 
3 86 
1977 
204 
3 53 
504 
3 12 
843 
4 89 
625 
244 
0 97 
366 
351 
1985 
066 
173 
296 
146 
2 22 
nfa 
nfa 
105 
nfa 
nfa 
157 
1988 
128 
185 
3 75 
238 
3 76 
2 21 
5 70 
168 
055 
319 
2 23 
source autnors compuauon trom population census І 6У ana ІУ/М, uietz і н/, tame i i1 
1
 Totals for 1985 Include Kajiado, West Pokot, Tuikana and Tana River District through 
extrapolation from 1988 using growth trend of the other districts Figures for 1969 exclude 
donkeys, which m general make up some 1-2 per cent of total TLUs only 
1
 District pastoral population figures for 1979 have been estimated to be m Mandera. 95,194, 
Ganssa: 107,208. Wajir 64,883, MarsabiL 87,739, Isiolo 37,529, Turkana. 139,441, Tana 
River 42J46, Samburu. 72,468, West PokoL 141,387 and Kajiado 95,425 Population figures 
for 1977, 1985 and 1988, using a 3 per cent average annual growth rate are based on this 1979 
census estimated pastoral population and were denved using a 0 94, 119 and 1 3 multiplier, 
respectively. 
From table 3.4 it can be concluded that Kenyan pastoralists do not have a 
special position but are part of the trend noted in our introductory words of a 
diminishing livestock related base for making a living. In fact, if we take a 4 
TLU per capita availability to be an absolute minimum level, it will be clear 
that since the early 1970s, several Kenyan pastoral groups, notably Tuikana, 
Samburu, Somali and Pokot pastoralists are no longer able to sustain a purely 
livestock-based existence. It should be noted, however, that the figures are 
mainly presented to show a trend in overall livestock ownership and that one 
should be careful in drawing too strict conclusions as far as minimum levels 
It is presumed that estimation of the real average availability of livestock per capita will be 
as correct as possible if the non-pastoral group is very small As a consequence, unjustified 
inclusion of livestock belonging to this group will be minimal and will be offset by incorrect 
inclusion of all members of the nine major pastoralists group as bemg mvolved m hveslock 
keeping 
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are concerned. For example, livestock figures were collected using aerial 
countings which, in general, are some IS per cent below real numbers. 
Moreover, we did not recalculate our human population in adult equivalents. 
Both adjustments would probably raise the TLU/Cap figures by some 30-35 
per cent. 
Also, we used the same TLU conversion rates for every species while 
differences between for example the small Maasai Zebu and large Boran cattle, 
or the small Turkana camel and the larger Somali camel do exist. On the other 
hand, as a result of crossbreeding, the quality of the pastoralists' herds, has 
definitely increased in the last decades resulting in a higher milk/meat output 
per animal. This should be taken into account when comparing livestock 
numbers over time. 
Finally, competition from wildlife for grazing resources is often overlooked, 
but should, in my opinion, be included in dealing with carrying capacity 
estimations. The extent of the competition for grazing for several arid and 
semi-arid districts is shown by comparing livestock and wildlife TLU densities 
as shown in table 3.5. 
Table 3.5 Livestock and Wildlife TLU Densities for Selected Arid and Semi-
Arid Districts 1977-88 
Dismct 
Mandera 
Ganssa 
Wajir 
Maisabit 
Isiolo 
Turkana 
Tana River 
Sainbuni 
WestPokot 
Kajiado 
Banngo 
Laikipia 
Laim 
Narok 
Area 
(km5) 
26,470 
43,931 
56.501 
73,952 
25,605 
63304 
39,072 
17,521 
9,305 
21,852 
10,732 
9,666 
6,153 
7,832 
TLU/kmJ 
1977 
6 9 
8 1 
5.5 
3 5 
117 
104 
6 4 
9 5 
14 2 
16 8 
151 
21.9 
1 0 
254 
1988 
6 0 
5 9 
5 6 
3 7 
7 2 
6 3 
8 0 
9 0 
108 
181 
118 
141 
1 0 
251 
Wildlife TLU 
1977 
10,549 
91,281 
35.681 
56,915 
40,255 
25,564 
109,931 
44,062 
192 
114,451 
1.633 
63323 
76,259 
255,747 
1988 
3.637 
45,852 
19,742 
27,009 
17,592 
5,336 
37.466 
16381 
410 
67302 
450 
55,781 
36.020 
164,255 
Wildlife 
TLU/kni 
1977 
0 4 
2 1 
0 6 
0 8 
1 6 
0 4 
2 8 
2 5 
0 0 
5 8 
0 2 
6 5 
117 
15 9 
1988 
0 1 
1 0 
0 3 
0 4 
0 7 
0 1 
1 0 
0 9 
0 0 
3 1 
0 0 
5 8 
5 9 
9 2 
Total 1 
TLU/km2 
1977 
7 3 
102 
6 1 
4 3 
13 2 
108 
9 3 
120 
14 2 
22 7 
15 3 
28 4 
127 
4 1 2 
1988 
6 1 
6 9 
5 9 
4 1 
7 9 
6 4 
9 0 
9 9 
10 8 
212 
118 
19 9 
6 9 
3 4 3 
Source author's compilation oasea on Mougua ІУІЮ, uninblatt et al 1УНУ, Said et al 1У89-. 
Peden 1984 
The Maasai area (Narde and Kajiado districts) is inhabited by several wildlife 
species like wildebeests, giraffes, zebras, gazelles, impalas, elephants and the 
like. For example, in Kajiado District a mean of 3.1 TLU per Ion2 or 14.6 per 
cent of the total TLU figure for the district, is made up by wild species. This 
reduces the availability of grazing and water resources for domestic animals. 
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Besides being direct competitors for grazing and watering, wild animals kill 
livestock, transmit diseases to domesticated animals resulting in livestock 
losses and the avoidance of certain grazing pastures for some time of the year. 
This latter aspect also counts for the effect of tsetse infested areas. In the last 
decades the setting apart of large areas in the arid and semi-arid areas for 
national parks has also reduced the area actually available to livestock-keeping. 
Lack of watering points in certain areas and agricultural activities further 
diminish the range open for livestock-keeping. 
With the loss of many traditional drought grazing reserves due to expanding 
dry-land agriculture and the establishment of National Parks and Reserves as 
well as Forest Reserves the drought risk for cattle production has considerably 
increased. This, together with the increase in the human population, has 
reduced the self-reliance in terms of food production of the pastoral population, 
especially during drought periods. 
To counterbalance this trend national and international authorities and 
researchers have proposed solutions in the commercialization of livestock 
production in the arid and semi-arid zone (see section 3.5). Offtake from the 
"traditional herd" is usually said to be as low as 9-10 per cent, attributable to 
lack of interest by the herders. As Raikes (1981:97) points out this reluctance 
'is at least in part due to low prices and poor organization of marketing'. 
Aldington and Wilson (1968) found an overall average offtake rate of 13.3 per 
cent in Kenya, ranging between 27.5 per cent in the commercial ranching area 
and 7.5 per cent in the most arid pastoral areas (see Raikes 1981:116). On 
average the marketed offtake within the "traditional herd" is estimated to be 
around 12 per cent 
Cattle offtake figures provided by White and Meadows for Kajiado District 
over the 1962-1978 period range between 10 and 38 per cent Following the 
major drought in 1960/1 offtake ratios dropped to a low of 10 per cent for 
1962/3, while, at the height of the 1975/6 drought period it reached 38.4 per 
cent (see Evangelou 1984:110). Patterns of offtake also vary among 
households. Although "rich" households in an absolute sense marketed most 
animals "poor" households have higher offtake ratios. In addition to low 
market prices and poor market organization, it seems clear that 'range 
conditions and herd size set general levels of market involvement but the 
particular production circumstances which each pastoralist faces -and his 
perception of opportunities and costs- ultimately determine the sale decision' 
(see Evangelou 1984:111). 
Schwartz studied these aspects for Northern Kenya, the breeding pool for 
immature cattle to be fattened in the ranching areas, concluding that 'pastoral 
livestock production in Northern Kenya is still subsistence oriented. Sales of 
animals for slaughter or fattening do not guarantee a sufficient income during 
dry seasons and drought years to stimulate a market-oriented livestock 
production' (Schwartz 1981:63). Imposition of quarantine regulations makes 
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traders reluctant to buy animals in large numbers at reasonable prices. This 
means that many pastoralists have no choice of compensating for the shortage 
of milk in a dry season or year by purchasing of other foodstuffs even though 
they have sufficient animals ready for sale. As a consequence they are 
condemned to employing their traditional strategy of keeping large numbers of 
female stock to guarantee a minimum milk supply throughout the year. Despite 
substantial inputs for water development and steadily increasing marketing 
facilities for both immature and slaughter stock, stock sales from the Northern 
rangelands have more or less stagnated since the mid sixties. The major reason 
for this are the recurring drought periods which adjust the supply of and the 
demand for immature cattle. 
3.5 Government Policy Towards the Arid and Semi-Arid 
Lands 
As stated before, the conservation of fauna is of major importance, not only 
from an ethical point of view, but also because wildlife is one of the most 
important attractions of the Kenyan tourist industry. Since the late 1980s this 
sector of the Kenyan economy has become Kenya's main foreign currency 
earner. Other economic contributions from the arid and semi-arid areas, include 
soda ash mining from Kajiado, commercial ranching from Laikipia mainly, 
commercial arable fanning like wheat from Narok and the provision of cheap 
labour from Machakos and Kitui. Before we tum to a detailed description of 
Kajiado District and its socio-economic and physical characteristics let us 
consider the policy of the Kenyan Government towards the arid and semi-arid 
areas. 
In her analysis of poverty and the Kenyan land problem. Hunt explicitly 
states that 'we shall not consider the difficulties and opportunities that pertain 
to raising incomes from pastoralism [because this] so far proved particularly 
intractable' (Hunt 1985:162). She is rather pessimistic about the future of 
nomadic pastoralists, who are thought not to have enough land and cattle to 
absorb their growing numbers, even if immigrant smallholders were to 
withdraw from the arid and semi-arid zones. 
Many years earlier, the British Colonial Government showed a remarkable 
similar attitude as it was not interested in the development of the ASAL areas 
either. Migot-AdhoUa (1981), Ngutter (1981), Raikes (1981), Wiggins (1985) 
and Diete (1987) have all reported on (post) colonial development policy 
towards the rangeland areas in Kenya.' The ever present and overlapping tone 
in these reports is one of a general outcry concerning the neglect of the dry 
A detailed analysis, with spedai reference to the Maasai area, is provided in chapters S and 
6. Here we will just review the main periods in the history of development policy in the arid and 
semi-arid lands in short 
104 Selling Wealth to Buy Poverty 
zones in Kenya. Nonetheless, since the beginning of the 1980s a change in this 
policy to the betterment of the dry zones can be seen as Dietz (1987:64) has 
observed. 
With the exception of Somalia, Niger and Mauritania, pastoralists are 
generally, minority communities in the new states of Africa. In Kenya, also, 
pastoral societies are geographically, politically and economically peripheral for 
an economic and social system dominated by agricultural groups. A century 
earlier the pastoralists were, politically, economically and geographically, at the 
centre of what became the Kenya of today. Droughts, diseases and famines 
have undermined their power which has ultimately been reduced as a result of 
the arrival of the Europeans in the interior of the country. The colonists started 
a policy which favoured settler agricultural and ranching interests, at the cost 
of the wellbeing of the pastoralists. 
Early colonial policy towards the nomadic pastoralists was mainly 
concerned with pacification, collection of taxes, discouragement of socio-
cultural traditions such as circumcision, the establishment of reserves and the 
setting aside of large areas for ranching purposes. Besides semi-arid areas the 
pastoralists, especially the Maasai and the Pokot, lost important humid lands. 
Quarantine regulations prohibiting the legal movement of cattle and some years 
later veterinary campaigns to reduce the incidence of disease in native 
livestock were started. In fact, both measures were designed primarily to 
protect the European livestock economy (see Ngutter 1981:27). 
Since the early 1930s, another factor, i.e. land conservation, was added to 
the list of dry area policies. As a result of the veterinary improvements and, 
according to the Administration, the pastoralists' wish to own as many animals 
as possible, pressure on the available grazing resources had increased 
considerably. Baringo, Maasailand and the Kamba areas (Kitui and Machakos) 
in particular were thought to be heavily oveipopulated and overstocked (see 
Dietz 1987:53). Instead of opening up closed areas or allowing the herders to 
move to those traditional areas confiscated but seldom used by the Europeans, 
an attempt was made to reduce livestock numbers belonging to Africans. 
Heavy taxation proved to be only partly successful. By the late 1930s the 
Kamba herdsmen of Machakos were even forced to sell part of their stock, a 
practice that was stopped after a fierce protest that reached as far as the House 
of Commons in London. Alternative destocking measures proposed included 
the establishment of markets replacing the practice of itinerant traders as the 
channels for stock export. However, the prices paid were much too low and 
illegal trade flourished. During World War Π the pastoralists "donated" huge 
numbers of animals to support the war. 
After the war interest in the "African areas" increased. Until this time 
developments in water and education for the dry areas in particularly had been 
minimal and in fact financed by the pastoral groups themselves via taxes. 
Apart from a lack of development funds, shortage of technical staff also 
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undermined any substantial improvement in the dry regions. The "Ten-Year 
Development Plan (1946-1955)" called for the total development of African 
land, crops, livestock and water. This time finances where available as the 
result of a post-war economic boom which strongly increased Government 
revenue. The African Land Development Board (ALDEV), established in 1946, 
concentrated its efforts on the semi-arid areas. In addition to water 
development, new campaigns for stock limitations and ecological conservation 
were initiated. The pastoralists were still seen by the majority of civil servants 
and visiting commissions as devastating the ecological balance in the dry 
regions. The establishment of Game Reserves and National Parks which 
restricted grazing use especially for Maasai, Borana, Somali and Kamba 
pastoralists in the semi-arid areas soon after the war was recognized as being a 
new blow to the herding societies of Kenya, but this did not weaken this 
conservationist approach. Special African Livestock Marketing Boards were set 
up to purchase stock from the dry areas, without much success, however. 
By the mid-1950s a more integrated approach was adopted. The 
"Swynnerton Plan" initiated the intensification of the development of African 
agriculture, including the semi-arid areas. These areas were "discovered" to be 
able to provide a substantial contribution to the economy of Kenya. The 
ALDEV-programme was integrated in the new plan and supported by an 
increased pool of money mainly in the form of loans and staff. Grazing 
schemes, establishing of boreholes and cattle dips, education in modem 
husbandry practices, reseeding trials and pasture research were added to the 
continuing effort of limiting the number of livestock. Still, it should be realized 
that, in comparison to the more humid regions of Kenya, the pastoral regions 
received only marginal attention and that most efforts with respect to range 
management failed. 
Moreover, rainfed agriculture and minor irrigation schemes supported by the 
Government were started in the better-watered areas of the dry regions 
especially in the Machakos and Baringo districts, in response to overcrowding 
in the fertile regions and stimulated through the introduction of newly 
developed drought resistant crops. Most of these schemes, however, failed 
unless a high priced commercial crop was established and market accessibility 
assured. Irrigation schemes also started to appear in the arid lands, though on a 
minor scale. 'By 1961 only 1,500 families had been settled on some 6,388 
acres in Embu, Baringo, Machakos, Elgeyo, Taita and Tana River districts' 
(Migot-Adholla 1981:47). 
Independence in 1963, heralded the breakdown of tribal boundaries and the 
disbanding of a number of restrictive regulations towards the livestock sector 
in the arid and semi-arid areas. A new and integrated approach was looked for. 
'Ideas were formulated to organize a stratified beef industry. Arid areas would 
raise calves. After that, ranches in the semi-arid areas would fatten the cattle. 
In the vicinity of the market, in more humid surroundings, the fattening would 
be finished, producing heavy-weight, high quality animals' (Dietz 1987:56). In 
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practice, however, this was not a big success, except in some parts of 
Maasailand and in Somali-area. Low beef prices have, in general, seemed to be 
the major obstacle in developing the livestock sector in Kenya (see also section 
2.2.2). 
The country-wide drought of the early 1960s had resulted in increased 
attention being paid to the ASAL areas. Repoits of those days concerning the 
semi-arid areas (eg. Brown 1963, Lawrence et al. 1966) and for the Maasai 
area particularly (Fallon 1962, Jacobs 1963) called for an institutionalised form 
of territorial organization using traditional indigenous structures. 
Figure 3.4 Types of Ranching in Kenya 
Source- Oxby 1981 
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By the late 1960s, group ranches (established on tiustland in the pastoral areas 
with a title deed vested collectively in groups of some 30 to 450 pastoral 
households being the traditional users of the land) were formed in the northern 
fringe of Kajiado District and later also in parts of Narok (see Doherty 1979a), 
Sambuni (see Fumagalli 1978), Kwale, Pokot (see Livingstone 1975), Laikipia 
and Baringo (see Wales et al. 1979). Other forms of ranching such as 
commercial ranches (leased or owned on freehold basis, mainly in Laikipia, 
Nakuni and Machakos), company ranches (land leased for a collectively held 
herd owned by a private company chiefly found in Laikipia, Nakuni and 
Machakos), co-operative ranches (run on profit sharing arrangements primarily 
in Taita-Taveta, Tana River, Kwale and Kilifi districts) and grazing blocks (in 
north-eastern Kenya) were started as well (see figure 3.4). 
A major stimulus for these new developments came from the Kenya 
Livestock Development Project (KLDP) initiated in 1969 to enhance the 
development of livestock production in Kenya. The objectives were to increase 
meat production, enhance employment in the livestock sector, ensure 
conservation etc. Funding for the project came from the World Bank (IBRD), 
USAID (United States Agency for International Development), IDA 
(International Development Association), SIDA (Sweden), США (Canada) and 
ODA (United Kingdom). A major aim was to implement strict grazing 
management in combination with infrastructural developments like boreholes, 
dips, firebreaks and waterdams. Loans were provided and were scheduled to be 
repaid by the fattening of steers bought from the arid regions and resold to the 
Nairobi meat market at a profit. However, management problems and the 
drought period in the beginning of the 1970s resulted in severe problems for 
the group ranch concept which, at least in Kajiado, had been initiated without 
having had a firm and properly established sociological and ecological base 
anyway.9 A second phase of the KLDP was started in 1974, though with less 
enthusiasm and financial support. The first two phases of the project affected 
about 200 Kenyan beef ranches, out of a total of 450 to 500 in the country (see 
Wales et al. 1979:3). 
In 1976 a Marginal/Semi-Arid Lands Pre-investment Study team was 
established. It had already been argued in 1972 by the International Labour 
Office (ILO) that the dry regions should receive more Government attention in 
order to develop the area and to co-ordinate activities such as like forestry, 
wildlife, agriculture and livestock keeping where potential conflict could arise. 
The droughts of 1971-73 and 1976 which resulted in severe problems in the 
(semi)-arid lands activated foreign donors and the Kenyan Government alike. 
The latter acknowledged the fact that the neglect of the dry regions throughout 
the colonial period had persisted during the 1960s and early 1970s (see RoK 
1988:132). Experimental integrated development projects were started in 
Machakos, Kitui and Baringo districts. In 1979 the nationwide "Arid and Semi-
Chapter 7 describes in detail Che history of group ranches in Kajiado District 
108 Selling Wealth to Buy Poverty 
Arid Lands Programme" was launched. It aimed at the improvement of the 
welfare of the people in the ASAL by: 
- developing productive potential and creating income-earning opportunities; 
- providing basic needs services; 
- conservating of resources; 
- improving integration of ASAL areas within the national economy. 
Foreign donors fínancially "adopted" an ASAL programme which mostly 
began in specific administrative regions. For example, Norway concentrated in 
Turkana, Switzerland in Laikipia, the Netherlands in West Pokot, the USA in 
Kitui, the United Kingdom in Embu, Mem and Isiolo and Denmark in Taita 
Taveta. International donors, like EEC and World Bank also provided funds for 
ASAL programmes. By the end of the 1980s some 19 programmes were 
operating or planned for in 22 districts. Most ASAL programmes operate over 
a broad range of development activities stretching from road building, small 
scale irrigation and livestock improvement to rural health, adult education and 
support of women groups. In table 3.6 some details are presented. 
Table 3.6 ASAL Programmes in Kenya, 1989 
DISTRICT 
Machakos (МШР) 
Banngo 
Embu/Mera/Isiolo (EMI) 
Tinkana* 
Kitin 
West Pokot 
Elgeyo Maralcwel@ 
Kiambu@ 
Kwale/KiliTi 
Taita Taveta 
Siaya 
Bungoma* 
Kajiado 
Sambura 
Narok 
Marsabit 
Lamu 
Tana River 
DONOR 
FFT 
IDA 
United Kingdom 
Norway« 
USA 
Denmaik 
Netherlands 
Netherlands 
Netherlands 
Switzerland 
IFAD 
Denmark 
IFAD 
Norway 
Netherlands 
Proposed (Germany) 
Proposed 
Proposed (UNESCO) 
Proposed 
Proposed 
Sourc* KoK 1УКУ, van Klinken 1У88 (table 2) 
YEAR 
STARTED 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1980-91 
1981-87 
1988 
1982 
1982 
1983-88 
1984 
1984 
198S 
1986 
1987 
1987 
ARmmf 
RANKING 
13 
14 
19/20/4 
5 
9 
16 
22 
24 
12 
18/17 
8 
-
-
11 
10 
23 
3 
15 
7 
BUDGET 
1988/89 (K£) 
348,700 
27,160 
34,460 
1,065.450 
12,050 
157,020 
43,200 
600 
296,200 
72,900 
144,000 
? 
7 
77.500 
* Norwegian aid was stopped m 1991 by (be Kenyan Government m reaction to continuous cndcism 
concerning Kenya's violation of human rights 
# Of this budget UNDP provided K£ 40.000/-
@ Dutch assistance in Kiambu stopped in 1988 Finances for operating expenses m 1988/89 were 
provided by the Kenyan Government The Elgeyo-Maiakwet Programme was halted between 1988-
1990 due to management problems 
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According to Wiggins (1985:92) 'six years after the detailed planning of the 
first programme began, the record looks patchy. [There is] too little technical 
success, slow planning and lack of community involvement in planning'. Lack 
of support for the drylands among the politicians and technical difficulties of 
raising dryland production do indeed seem to be the major obstacles faced by 
the ASAL programmes. 
A variation in operational approaches exists between programmes, even 
those financed by the same donor. In some cases strong co-operation with the 
existing local administrative machinery is sought (e.g. in Kajiado), while in 
others a new more independently operating device is created (e.g in Turkana). 
In cases where local Government capacity is underutilized and well-suited the 
fonner approach might be most advantageous. However, in the case of 
difficulties, either managerial or political, it may be better to operate as 
independently as possible from the local apparatus (see van Klinken 1988.5). 
Recently it has been tried to streamline the huge heterogeneity of 
programme activities and implementive approaches. A new Ministry of 
Reclamation and Development of Arid, Semi-Arid and Wasteland was created 
in 1989, replacing a special task force within the Ministry of Planning and 
Development. This will probably change the present structure whereby ASAL 
Programmes are completely left on their own in formulating their policies and 
strategies. The second generation of ASAL programmes will have to leam 
from the mistakes of the past and expand their strength in flexibility. Every 
effort to streamline the programmes should leam from the lessons learned of 
the past 
Besides the appearance of the ASAL Programmes, attention to the dry areas 
in Kenya has also increased within the sectoral ministries. Dryland research 
and development activities within the Ministries of Agriculture, Livestock, 
Water Development, Tourism and Wildlife, Natural Resources and Education 
were expanded. Projects initiated by several Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs), especially those by missionaries, have also been very important. In 
some dry districts their efforts have only recently become available to the 
people. The growing importance of the dry regions within the overall Kenyan 
and international development policy is illustrated by table 3.7.10 
Not every minislry Included mforaiaüon concerning the specific areas of opération This is 
the major reason for the discrepancy between the Kenyan total budget figure and that for all 
districts. In addition, not all funds are presented In the Printed Development Estimates. 
International donors sometimes use their own channels for financing By contrast, not every 
approved allocation will indeed be spent in (he district For example, an analysis for Kajiado 
District of 41 projects (K£ 15,056,125) approved at the national level for 1988/9 showed that only 
29 of these projects (totalling K£ 732,867) actually appeared in the Kajiado District Final 
Development Budget Allocation of 1988Д In addition, 15 new projects were presented with a 
total budget allocation of K£ 742,730 In other words, only some 3 per cent of the originally 
approved estimates for 1988/9 were actually implemenled m that same year (see Runen 1990 164). 
Il is nevertheless fell that the results of the analysis are interesting and eye-opening 
по 
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Table 3.7 Approved District Development Budget Allocations 1986-89 
District 
Semi-Arid Districts 
Kajiado 
Taita Taveta 
Lamu 
Kitui 
Machakos 
В aringo 
Sarnbuni 
Laikipia 
West Pokot 
Arid Districts 
Gansea 
Isiolo 
Mandera 
Marsabit 
Tana River 
Turkana 
Wajir 
Humid Districts 
Central Province 
Western Province 
Nyanza Province 
Rift Valley Highlands 
Kenya Rural Districts 
Urban Districts 
Kenya Districts 
Total Dev Budget 
Approved Allocation 
(inmlnKsh) 
1985/6 1986/7 1987/8 1988/9 
807 
22 
22 
40 
90 
340 
181 
35 
36 
41 
485 
27 
11 
16 
25 
218 
169 
18 
531 
267 
342 
868 
3938 
979 
4917 
8,187 
557 
43 
28 
61 
67 
114 
150 
19 
32 
43 
297 
20 
30 
24 
20 
160 
35 
6 
439 
185 
250 
717 
2887 
972 
3799 
596 
76 
32 
48 
114 
122 
114 
18 
24 
47 
241 
17 
69 
21 
28 
38 
46 
22 
470 
270 
291 
901 
3128 
812 
3940 
10.74912,476 
source ІУК Ь dala trom Uielz 1У8/. 
1013 
445 
52 
41 
84 
125 
165 
28 
42 
30 
366 
26 
94 
27 
32 
119 
50 
17 
701 
358 
607 
1329 
5029 
909 
5961 
16,123 
Average 
Allocation 
• for 
(1986-89) 
743 
146 
34 
48 
89 
175 
152 
25 
34 
40 
347 
23 
51 
22 
26 
134 
75 
16 
535 
270 
372 
954 
3745 
909 
4654 
11,884 
Estimated 
Population 
(* 1.000) 
3112 
201 
188 
64 
598 
1351 
253 
91 
211 
243 
1076 
201 
56 
126 
144 
137 
228 
184 
3105 
2388 
3279 
2803 
18618 
1576 
20194 
1986-89 authors calculations Irom KoK 
Ksh 
per 
Capita 
239 
726 
181 
750 
149 
130 
601 
275 
161 
165 
322 
114 
911 
153 
181 
978 
329 
87 
172 
113 
113 
340 
207 
577 
230 
588 
-RÎT:: 
to Rural 
Districts 
(Ksh. 
201) 
+ 
++ 
. 
++ 
. 
-
++ 
+ 
-
-
+ 
_ 
++ 
. 
. 
++ 
+ 
-
-
_ 
_ 
+ 
++ 
KoK. 1988b, 
RoK 1989 
Note "Kenya Rural Districts" includes the humid/and districts of Narok, Elgeyo Marakwet, Embu, 
Mem, Kilifi and Kwale (est. average allocation Ksh 229/- per capita) (figures are rounded) " 
Table 3.7 shows the per capita allocation of area-marked approved budget 
estimates over the 1985-89 period. Most striking is the increase in the 
approved development budget allocation for Kajiado District in the 1985-88 
It should be noted that in some cases allocations for certain districts serve a regional or 
even national interest, such as agncullural research inslitates or hydro-electncal power plants This 
applies mainly to the Urban Districts (espeaally Nairobi) and Rift Valley Highlands (espeaally 
Nakuni and Uasin Gishu Districts) 
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period. A rise from Ksh. 22 million to Ksh. 445 million means a 1,923 percent 
growth. Compared to the national average of 21 percent increase over the same 
period an explanation of this is urgendy required! This is found in part in that 
some huge programmes have been started during this period like the 
Kilimanjaro-Machakos (Noolturesh) water project. 
This project does not only serve Kajiado, but also maybe primarily 
Machakos District. In other words, in fact it is not a district-specific project A 
total of over Ksh. 1,000 million has been allocated for this project that is to 
pipe water from the Noolturesh spring at the foot of Mt Kilimanjaro up to 
Machakos district first and then back to Kajiado. Italy acts as a soft loan 
creditor for financing this investment A total of almost Ksh. 270 million (i.e. 
over 60 per cent) was allocated for the 1988/9 financial year. Another major 
allocation during this year was for road improvement projects (Ngong-Isinya: 
Ksh. 50 million and Loitokitok-Emali: Ksh. 43 million). Still, even without 
inclusion of these projects the district total has increased tremendously as 
compared to the 1985/6 budget. 
It seems that the "Economy of Affection", described by Goran Hyden 
(1983:8), as 'a network of support, communications and interaction among 
structurally defined groups connected by blood, kin, community or other affini-
ties' has been at work during the 1986-89 period favouring the Maasai from 
Kajiado District In other words, the major reason for the increase in the 
Kajiado District development budget is political. The Vice-President, Prof. G. 
S aitoti, who is also the Minister for Finance, is the Member of Parliament for 
Kajiado North. He has held the post of Finance Minister since 1983 and that of 
Vice-President since 1989. Since he took up a position in the Kenyan 
Government there has been a considerable increase in the allocation of funds 
for his constituency, especially the Ngong area, for the ministries of Public 
Works, Health and Water Development. Instead of having a considerable 
number of development projects still pending at the end of the financial year 
due to lack of money, equipment or manpower, the situation in Kajiado 
District has now turned to one in which new non-scheduled projects are started 
because the workplan had been finished early. It will be no surprise that most 
of these unplanned projects are situated in the Ngong area. It should also be 
realized that funds allocated in this way are not included in the Printed 
Development Estimates. 
The high score for Baringo District can also be included under the 
"Economy of Affection" explanation as this is the home base of President Moi. 
Roads, water, health and electricity are specifically cared for. Other well off 
districts within the group of arid and semi-arid areas are Lamu (settlement 
schemes, hospital), Isiolo (hospital), Tana River (irrigation scheme and 
causeway), Samburu (food security project) and Turkana (ASAL). However, it 
should be noted that for these latter regions mainly grants by foreign donors 
are responsible for one time favourable allocations. 
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3.6 Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter we have tried to place Kajiado District within the group of arid 
and semi-arid lands in Kenya. In terms of aridity Kajiado District ranks 11th. 
Though having an estimated total of 94 per cent of its area in the arid and 
semi-arid zone the district's overall carrying capacity is not unfavourable when 
compared to other arid and semi-arid districts. 
The 1979 population census revealed for Kajiado District's population a 
rather low density in comparison to Kenya's semi-arid districts. Its population 
growth from 1969 to 1979, however, was above the national average and even 
every other agro-climatic region in Kenya (see table 3.1). In respect of its sex 
ratio, being balanced suggesting a minimal importance of out- or in-migration 
of (male) jobseekers, its position was more comparable with the arid than 
semi-arid regions. In terms of school attendance and literacy levels Kajiado 
District takes an intermediate position. 
Livestock ownership per head of the Kajiado pastoral population is 
relatively high. Figures presented seem to suggest, however, that this position 
is slowly deteriorating. By 1969 an estimated 8.76 TLU were available for 
Kajiado pastoralists as compared to a mean figure of 3.86 TLU per capita for 
other pastoral peoples in Kenya. By 1988, these figures had dropped to 3.19 
TLU/capita and 2.23 TLU/capita, respectively (see table 3.4). The district's 
livestock density (18.1 TLU/km2 by 1988) is also higher than in most other dry 
regions, though less pronounced as livestock ownership would suggest 
In addition, it should be realized that wildlife numbers in Kajiado District 
are also top ranking. For 1988 3.1 wildlife TLU/km2, which is some 14.6 per 
cent of the total 21.2 TLU/km2 density, was approximated. Only Narok district 
had a higher overall livestock and wildlife density. 
Finally, attention was paid to the development policies exercised in Kajiado 
District by the Government and international (non-govemmental) organizations. 
From the situation of sheer neglect that prevailed for most of this century a 
remarkable change had occurred by the end of the 1960s (introduction of 
ranching types). By the late 1970s the Kenyan dry regions became the focus of 
(international) attention in order to improve the quality of life of their 
inhabitants. Isolated and timebound policies geared at destocking, land 
conservation and quarantine regulations were now replaced by an integrated 
development approach. Under the umbrella of the "Arid and Semi-Arid Lands 
Programme" development of productive potential, provision of basic needs 
services, conservation of resources and integration within the national economy 
were promoted. Indeed, in terms of approved allocated funds these regions in 
general had a favourable position for the 1985/6-1988/9 period. Some districts 
in particular showed extremely favourable allocations which were partly 
explained by foreign donor preferences or by the powerful position held by 
district representatives within the Kenyan government. In the following chapter 
specific attention is paid to the features of Kajiado District. 
CHAPTER 4 
KAJIADO DISTRICT: THE EASTERN HOME OF THE 
MAAS AI 
4.1 The Physical Environment and Natural Resources 
Kajiado District stretches out just south of the equator from lo10' to 3o10' 
south and between 36o05' to 37055' east It is located in the southern part of 
the country in the Rift Valley Province and is bordered by Tanzania to the 
south-west, Taita-Taveta district to the south-east, Machakos district to the 
north-east, Nairobi, Kiambu and Nakura districts to the north and Narok 
district to the west. Kajiado District comprises a total area of 22,106 km2 
which is equivalent to some 3.5 per cent of Kenya's land surface. Its highest 
point is at 2,761 m (Ol Doinyo Orok near Namanga) and the lowest point is 
just under 500 m near Lake Magadi Kajiado District can be divided into four 
physiographic sectors (see figure 4 I):1 
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Figure 4.1 Kajiado District Physiographic Zones 
Source Bekuieetal 1987 
1
 Sod classificaüoo ишц refer lo the exploralory sod map of Kenya, 1980 as published by 
the Kenya Soil Survey Landforms are also referred to (e g А ж Floodplams, В = Bottomlands, F 
= Fodslopes, H = Hüls and minor scarps, L = Plateaus and high-level structural plains, Ls s Step-
faulted floor of the Rift Valley, Ps = sedunemary plains; Pn s Non-dissected erosiona] plains. R = 
Volcanic footndges. Um s lower middle-level uplands, Up s Upland/high-level plain transitional 
lands, Ux в Uplands undifferentiated levels, Y s Piedmont piarne (see Sombroek et al 1982). 
114 Selling Wealth to Buy Poverty 
1. the Rift Valley in the west; this depression covering some 7,000 km2 forms 
part of Africa's famous Great Rift Valley, a system of faults containing a 
chain of lakes and volcanic mountains running 5,600 km from the Red Sea 
to Mozambique, along which East Africa is slowly drifting apart. In Kajiado 
the Rift is some 50-60 km wide and it includes Lake Magadi, which has 
substantial deposits of soda ash, and the extinct voléanos Mount Suswa and 
Olorgesailie. Tertiary and Quaternary volcanics and patches of Quaternary 
sediments as well as a basement complex (precambrian rocks) in the south-
east are the geological features found. 
The soils are predominantly stony, well drained, calcareous loam 
Cambisols (Lsl), with some patches of imperfectly drained, clay Vertisols 
(B4) in the bottom lands. In the south-western part, well drained, silty clay 
loam Fluvisols (A2) are present A ridge on the western side of the Rift, the 
Nguraman Escarpment, separates Kajiado District from neighbouring Narok 
District Originating from the Nguruman Escarpment three main perennial 
streams (Oloibortoto, Entasopia and Sampu) provide the possibility of 
irrigation. These also feed the Euaso Ng'iro river, which starts from the 
southern flank of the Mau Escarpment and drains much of Loita Hills in 
Narok District. The river ends in the Engara Ng'iro swamp near Shompole, 
at the Tanzanian border. 
2. the upland Athi-Kapiti plains in the north; in the district this area of some 
2,000 km2 consists mainly of open rolling land. Geologically, the Athi-
Kapiti plains derive from Tertiary volcanics. The soils are extremely varied 
though dominated by stony, imperfectly drained, very deep, black clay 
Vertisols (Lll) as well as other types of deep 'black-cotton' Vertisols and 
Planosols (e.g. L14, L15, L26). It rises to the west the highest peaks being 
the Ngong hills. From Ngong hills the Mbagathi (or Embakasi) and Kiserian 
streams drain eastwards towards the permanent Athi River. 
3. the Central Broken Ground Hills; the south-eastem edge of the Athi-Kapiti 
plains give way to a generally steeper east-falling slope of the precambrian 
Basement System rocks. The area comprises some 4,400 km2. Numerous 
gneiss and crystalline limestone hills extrude from the slope, the largest of 
which is Ol Doinyo Orok (2,800 m) near Namanga. The eastward slopes are 
much dissected and divided by water courses like the Selenkei and 
Olkejuado rivers. However, none of these water courses hold surface water 
throughout the year. 
Soils developed on the Basement System rocks in the western footslopes 
and piedmont plains are very well drained, very deep, dark reddish brown, 
loose, sandy loam to firm, sandy clay Luvisols with luvic Arenosols (F13 
and Y8). Well drained, shallow to deep, brown, sandy clay loam chromic 
Luvisols and Cambisols exist on the lower-middle uplands of 
undifferentiated Basement System rocks in the north (Um25). In the higher-
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level southern uplands the dominating soil type is an association of chromic 
Luvisols with, on the lower slopes, imperfectly drained, deep, black. Гит, 
clay, eutric Planosols (Up8). On the hills, stony, shallow, reddish-brown, 
friable, sandy clay loam Regosols can be found. Finally, a complex of 
predominantly loamy to firm, cracking clay, calcane Fluvisols and chromic 
Vertisols along the rivers (A12/A8). 
4. the Amboseli plains in the south-east; the overall slope of this 6,300 km2 
section is from north-west to south-east The gently undulating plains in the 
western half are an extension of the Basement System of the Central Broken 
Ground. In the southwest Quartenary sedimentation can be found near Lake 
Amboseli, which is mostly dry. The eastern and southern part of the 
Amboseli plains are of Quartenary volcanic origin. Towards the south they 
are flanked by the snowcapped Mount Kilimanjaro, the highest (Pleistocene 
volcanic) mountain in Africa (5,894 m) at the Tanzania-Kenya border. In 
the north-east the more recent volcanic Chyulu Range forms the natural 
border with Machakos District 
Soils in the western part are mostly deep reddish-brown clay loams 
(Luvisols Pnl3, FY2). The eastern part has well drained, deep red-brown 
silty clay loam though rather stony (R8). The northern area shows a 
complex of chromic Luvisols and chromic Cambisols (Ux2, Ux8). 
4.1.1 Rainfall, Evaporation and Temperatures 
Rainfall is the single most important factor influencing agricultural activities, 
whether crop or livestock production, in Kajiado District Norton-Griffiths 
(1977:iii) has shown that annual rainfalls in Kajiado District are strongly 
influenced by mountains, hills and the Rift Valley. High rainfalls occur around 
the Ngong, Machakos and Chyulu Hills, the slopes of Mt Kilimanjaro and the 
western wall of the Rift Valley, with even isolated hills such as Namanga (01 
Doinyo Orok) producing locally higher rainfall. 
The nmgelands of Kajiado District are characterised by lower rainfalls, 
particularly around Lake Magadi, to the north of Kajiado Town, and in parts of 
the Amboseli basin. This is either due to rainshadow effects from neighbouring 
hills and mountains or, as in the Amboseli case, to divergent wind flows 
between mountain ranges (i.e. Chyulu Hills and Mt Kilimanjaro). Table 4.1 
shows mean rainfall figures for a number of years recorded at some selected 
stations in the district The high altitude stations of Ngong and Loitokitok also 
show the highest recorded average precipitation, whereas Magadi represents the 
opposite situation. Another station in Magadi located at a high altitude of 1,859 
m recorded over a period of 25 years a mean annual rainfall of 757 mm. In 
Loitokitok, however, at an altitude of 1,845 m an average precipitation of 926 
mm was recorded. This information is presented to illustrate the importance of 
elevation as well as to demonstrate the local character of the rainfall pattern. 
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Moreover, as Potter (1989:2-4) stresses, the historical rainfall data have been 
collected at relatively few (62) and predominantly high altitude stations located 
near small townships and so are hardly representative of the general situation 
of the plains in Kajiado District. Only nine gauges are situated in the rangeland 
areas of Kajiado, which make up some 90 per cent of the District Moreover, 
these nine rangeland gauges are not representative of the seasonally used 
pastures (see Norton-Griffiths 1977:4). 
Table 4.1 Mean Rainfall Recorded at some Selected Meterological Stations, 
Kajiado District 
Station 
Kajiado 
Magadl 
Loitokitok 
Ngong 
Masbuni 
Namanga 
Kiboko 
Athl River 
Konza 
Source 1AKUA 1УМ ft 
Altitude (m) Annual average (mm 
1738 
613 
1982 
2043 
1585 
1372 
976 
1509 
1655 
ι, Norion-linlhths ІУАГІІ, 
502 
414 
728 
791 
509 
599 
572 
603 
447 
, KJJUP 1УНИ 2 
i) No of years 
39 
45 
29 
46 
18 
32 
27 
58 
54 
Zone 
rv/v 
VI 
II 
Ш 
V 
Ш 
V 
IV 
rv/v 
With the above points in mind, some general comments on the rainfall patterns 
of Kajiado District can, however, be made. Three quite distinct types of 
seasonal rainfall patterns are found in Kajiado District. 
Type 1: centred around the Ngong Hills; heaviest rainfall occurs in April and 
May. 
Type 2: occurs around the Chyulu Hills and Mt Kilimanjaro slopes; heaviest 
rainfall in November-December 
Type 3: found throughout the rangelands of Kajiado District; a small rainfall 
peak in December and a single high peak in April. 
Four seasons are distinguished in each of the above described types. The "short 
rains" of November and December; an intermediate period in January, 
February and March; the "long rains" in April and May; and a major dry 
season lasting from June through to October. 
Rainfall intensities are generally low in Kajiado District ranging from 4.4 
mm/h in the northern Athi-Kapiti's to 6.0 mm/h at Lake Magadi (see 
UNDP/FAO 1978:43). It is estimated that some 20 per cent of the rain falls at 
very high and potentially damaging intensities, only.2 Most of the rains fall at 
Diurne (1977) has demonstrated that the rates of runoff and erosion are moie strongly 
determined by ninfali intensities, hill slopes and soil charactensücs than they are by the type and 
cover of the vegetation (see Nonon-Gnffiths 1977 17) 
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night at an intensity that maximises infiltration and minimises runoff and 
evaporation. 
As with precipitation, temperatures in the district vary with altitude. 
Average monthly temperatures vaiy between 30oC at Magadi and 160C at 
Loitoldtok. The coolest months are July-August while the hottest months are 
Febniaiy and March. Average minimum temperatures for Magadi and 
Loitoldtok are 23°C and 10CC. Mean maximum temperatures for these 
locations are 35°C and 210C, respectively. Average annual potential 
evaporation (Eo) ranges from about 1,700 mm in the Ngong and Loitoldtok 
areas to about 2,500 mm in the Magadi area. Figure 4.2 presents the mean 
annual rainfall and evaporation figures for Kajiado District 
Figure 42, Kajiado District Mean Annual Rainfall and Evaporation 
Source Kajiado District Atlas 1990 (draft) 
118 Selling Wealth to Buy Poverty 
4.1.2 The Vegetation of Kajiado District 
The close relationship between rainfall and primaiy production which is 
prevalent in rangeland areas like those of Kajiado District has been stressed by 
Norton-Griffiths (1977:4). The vegetation of Kajiado District has been analyzed 
by Mumiukha as part of the UNDP/FAO Wildlife Management Project (see 
Mumiukha 1976).' Table 4.2 is drawn from Ecosystems Ltd. (1982) which 
used the Wildlife Management Project data to determine the percentage 
distribution of vegetation categories for each of the physiographic zones of 
Kajiado District 
Table 43, Kajiado District Vegetation 
Physiographic Zone 
Types as Proportion of Each 
Category 
Gnssland 
Wooded & Bushed 
Grasslaod 
Busbland 
Wood & Bushlaud 
Woodland 
Potest 
Swamps 
Soda Lakes 
Total Area 
source: Mosysiems 
Rift Valley 
km2 
617 
5.070 
685 
411 
. 
. 
-
69 
6.852 
1У82:17 
% 
9 
74 
10 
6 
. 
. 
-
1 
100 
Athi-
Kapit 
km2 
1,451 
. 
593 
2,044 
1 
% 
71 
. 
29 
. 
. 
. 
-
-
100 
Central 
km2 
622 
444 
89 
3.152 
89 
44 
-
-
4,440 
% 
14 
10 
2 
71 
2 
1 
. 
-
100 
Amboseli 
km2 
2,318 
. 
3,196 
376 
125 
. 
188 
63 
6,266 
% 
37 
. 
51 
6 
2 
. 
3 
1 
100 
Kajiado 
District 
km2 % 
5,008 26 
5.514 28 
4,563 23 
3,939 20 
214 1 
44 1 
188 1 
132 1 
19,602 100 
- Rift Valley 
Rainfall in the area is very low (300-500 mm). This is reflected by the 
vegetation being limited to stunted thom bushes and small patches of grass. In 
the north of the Rift the dominant plants and grasses are Tarchorumthus 
camphoratus and Themeda triandra. In the most southern parts, the dominant 
shrubs and trees are Acacia species. Ecosystems Ltd. did not include the Euaso 
Ng'iro swampy area which totals some 70 km2, and which is characterised by 
extensive beds of Typha and Nymphae. 
- Upland Athi River 
The vegetation is mainly grassland and wooded grassland. The mean annual 
rainfall is between 500-800 mm with the highest figures recorded on the 
Ngong hills. Themeda grassland sometimes bushed with the Acacia 
3
 More recently, Touber (1983:106) presented a detailed description of the Amboseli Plains 
vegetation only. 
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drepanolobium shrub is the most dominant vegetation found in this sector. 
Some small patches of forests can be found near Ololua, Embakasi and Ngong 
on the northern edge of the Athi-Kapiti plains. 
- Central Broken Grounds 
The vegetation is dominated by wood and bushland both mixed and separate, 
with a wide range of trees and shrub species (predominantly Acacia species). 
Some parts have grassland or wooded/bushed grassland. The Central Broken 
Grounds receive between 500 and 600 mm rainfall a year. 
- Amboseli Plains 
Vegetation of the Amboseli plains is dominated by bushland and by open 
grassland (Acacia and Commiphora species mainly). Swampy areas can be 
found mainly at the foot of the slopes of Mt. Kilimanjaro. Rainfall varies 
considerably with the northern half receiving some 500-700 mm annually, 
while the middle southern and eastern parts receive less than 400 mm a year. 
An exception must be made for the slopes of ML Kilimanjaro which receive 
from 500 up to 800 mm annually. 
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4.13 Agro-dimatic Zones and Carrying Capacity 
As stated before, out of 41 districts Kajiado District ranks eleventh in tenns of 
aridity (see table 3.6). Roughly speaking half of the district is in the semi-arid 
zone, one third is arid and only 6-8 per cent have some reasonable potential for 
cultivation. Most of this higher potential land is situated near Ngong and other 
parts of the Athi Kapiti Plains, near ML Kilimanjaro, Nguruman, Namanga and 
Meto. The Kenya Soils Survey has produced an agro-climatic zone map that 
combines rainfall, evaporation and temperature characteristics for the 
establishment of the area's suitability for agricultural purposes (see Sombroek 
et al. 1982). Figure 4.4 presents the Agro-climatic Zones of Kajiado District 
Figure 4.4 Kajiado District Agro-Climatic Zones 
Source: Kajiado Distria Atlas 1990 (draft) 
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Table 4.3 provides an overview of the estimated availability of agro-climatic 
zones for each of the physiographic sectors of Kajiado District 
Table 4.3 Distribution of Agro-climatic Zones over Kajiado District 
Agro-climatic zone 
Physiographic 
sector 
Rift Valley 
Attai-Kapiü 
Central Hüls 
Amboseli 
Kajiado Distnct 
Source Hekureet al 1У87 
Г 
(percent) 
7 
31 
14 
15 
8 
V 
(percent) 
71 
69 
69 
26 
56 
VI 
(per cent) 
23 
0 
27 
69 
36 
Total Area 
(tan2) 
6,850 
2,040 
4,400 
6,270 
19.560 
In chapter 1 the concepts of carrying and grazing capacity have been discussed. 
For Kajiado District several authors have provided an estimation of the optimal 
or maximum number of livestock and human population (e g. Holland 1986, 
Campbell 1979a, Ecosystems 1982, Bekure et al. 1987, MoLD 1988). The 
percentage distribution of agro-climatic zones can be used to calculate a 
potential livestock carrying capacity of the district by applying different 
stocking rates for each and specific zone expressed in stock units per hectare 
(SU/ha). Table 4.4 shows the outcome of this exercise. 
Table 4-4 Kajiado District Potential Carrying Capacity 
Agro-climatic Ha 
zone 
IV 156.500 
V 1,095,400 
VI 704,100 
Total 1,956,000 
Source. Sombroek et al WH'2. Uekure et al 
SU/ha 
1-2 
0 25-1 
005-0 25 
mi 
Potential Carrying 
Capacity (in S U ) 
156,500 - 313,000 
273,850 -1,095,400 
35,205 - 176,025 
465.555 -1,584,425 
Note one Slock Unit (SU) is a 300 kg liveweight animal consuming 3,000 kg Dry Matter/year 
The range in the (safe) stocking rate figures per zone expresses the variety of 
the potential carrying capacity between the dry and wet season. Local soil 
conditions also influence the carrying capacity. The outcome of this exercise 
suggests that Kajiado District is able to support between some 465,555 to 
1,584,425 Stock Units. For the whole of Kajiado District this is equivalent to a 
mean requirement of land per SU of 1.2 ha in the wet and 4.2 ha in the dry 
season. 
The Ministry of Livestock Development in Kajiado District, however, 
propagates an average stocking rate of 6 ha per SU as a safe one. Using this 6 
ha figure the Ministry of Livestock Development is of the opinion that the 
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district's long term maximum carrying capacity is only 331,537 SU. This 
means that, according to the 1988 Livestock Census which reported a total of 
515,633 stock units, the district was thought to be overstocked by some 55 per 
cent at that time. This actual average stocking rate of some 4 ha/SU is, 
however, within the limits of the potential carrying capacity estimate of 
Sombroek et al.. Support for the latter is provided by Bekure et al. who 
concluded that for Olkarkar group ranch (10,000 ha) a long term carrying 
capacity of 1.7 ha/Livestock Equivalents (LE) would be reasonable.4 For 
Kajiado District in general they estimated stocking rates of 1.5 ha/TLU for the 
wet and 4.2 ha/TLU for the dry season (see Bekure et al. 1987:161-3 and 
section 8.2.2). As a result a rough estimate for the Kajiado District rangelands 
would place the fluctuating potential carrying capacity at 465,700 for the dry 
and 1,304,000 TLU for the wet season. 
Besides the climatic conditions the aspect of mobility will also influence the 
actual safe stocking rate. Potter, for example, showed the acceptability of a 2 
ha/TLU stocking rate for the Athi plains under pastoral conditions, though he 
considered 4 ha/TLU to be a safer stocking rate for a 100 ha enclosed farm in 
the Athi Kapiti zone (see section 8 2.2 note 5). Croze et al. (1978:iii), who 
studied the Athi-Kapiti plains during the 1975-76 drought period, reported that, 
in general, the Athi-Kapiti ecosystem is not overstocked. Only during 
prolonged drought periods does the nutrient supply fall below demand, more 
because of inhibited plant growth than of high herbivore density. 
Other authors (e.g. Holland 1986, Campbell 1979a) - using different 
classifications and varying distribution of ecozones as well as other maximum 
(uniform) stocking rates - present lower potential stocking levels than 
Sombroek, Potter or the ILCA team.1 For example, Campbell, taking into 
account the seasonality aspect, estimated a maximum livestock carrying 
capacity of 219,613 Standard Stock Units (SSU) for the dry and 544,991 SSU 
For the ILCA survey a model was produced to detemune the development of livestock 
numbers and range condition for Olkarkar group ranch (10,000 ha In zone V) over a 30 yean 
penod. It was found that, at a stocking rate of 1 7 ha/LE, the ranch would be seriously 
overstocked for only S years while for 22 years the ranch was under or correctly stocked The 1 7 
ha/LE rano was the actual stocking rate found during 1981-3 (see Bekure et al 1991 133) The 
Ministry of Livestock Development, however, recommended a stocking rate of 7 0 ha/SU (5 7 
ha/LE) for Olkarkar 
These authors mainly use the ecozone classification presented by Pratt & Gwynne (1978) 
Kajiado District is subdivided in Ecozone Π (22,030 ha), ΙΠ (13,900 ha), IV (783,072 ha) and V 
(1,390,578 ha) The required hectares per livestock unit by ecozone are 0 8, 1 6, 4 0 and 12 0, 
respectively The resulting maximum carrying capacity per zone is 24,699, 13,125, 186,000 and 
105,900 livestock units making a total of 329,724 units for the whole of Kajiado District (see 
Holland 1986 73) Unfortunately, confusion exists between the exact livestock equivalent ratios for 
Pratt & Gwynne's livestock units Holland speaks of "Standard Stock Units" (a 450 kg hveweight 
steer) whereas Pratt & Gwynne's slocking rate figures seem to refer to the 'Zebu Unit' of 300 kg. 
It should also be noted that the district area used by Ecosystems (i e 1,956,000 ha) is diffoent 
from that used by Campbell ani Holland (1392,672 ha for zones IV and V only) 
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for the rainy season (Campbell 1979a:6).6 Croze et al. (1978:2) states that 
Pratt and G Wynne's carrying capacity estimate, the first district-wide 
approximation ever for Kajiado District, emerged from a circular argument; 
carrying capacities were assigned to zones rather than derived from first 
principles, making the source and/or authority of data unclear. In other words, 
the potential carrying capacity of Kajiado District is a complicated and much 
debated phenomenon, and it is highly unlikely that there is one single number 
of biomass which can be supported. In any case, the threshold used by the 
Ministry of Livestock of 331,537 SU is, in my opinion, considered to be too 
strict Higher stocking rates are thought to be possible as theoretical and 
empirical evidence provided by Potter, Croze et al. and Bekure et al. suggest. 
Relating the actual stocking rates of Kajiado District, as presented in tables 
3.4 and 3.5, to the potential carrying capacity shows that in general terms and 
for most years the stocking rates seem to be within the safe range. 
Nonetheless, in some years the dry season threshold level is exceeded by the 
actual number of livestock present, especially when taking into account wildlife 
densities (e.g. it was estimated that 521,400 TLU populated the district in 
1969). To overcome these periods of stress several options are open; one can 
move out of the rangelands into the higher zones or even leave the district. 
Selling one's animals is another possibility. In the past all of these measures 
have been practised indeed, although damage to livestock and pastures (i.e 
losses in weight or even mortality and overgrazing) also occurred. Moreover, 
loss of access to the high-potential zones and reduced mobility in the 
rangelands would put further strain on these anti-drought or anti-disease 
strategies. 
Starting out from the estimated maximum stocking rates, several researchers 
(e.g. Campbell 1979a and 1986, Sindiga 1986, Holland 1986) tried to 
determine the potential human carrying capacity of Kajiado District under full 
subsistence pastoralism. Performing this exercise implies the need to determine 
the variable of human (food) needs expressed in minimum livestock 
requirements per head of the population.7 
Sindiga estimated that an average Maasai household of 4.5 adult equivalents 
would need 42 SU in the humid and 45 SU in the arid to semi-arid zones of 
Campbell recalculated Pratt & Gwynne's hectare requirements per livestock mut for each of 
the ecological zones- zone IV wet season 2.5 ha - dry season 5 5 ha/hvestock unit, zone V wet 6 0 
- dry 180 ha/livestock unit Like Holland, Campbell named these livestock units 'Standard Stock 
Units' (i e the 450 kg livewelghl steer) In other words, in terms of the 300 kg 'Zebu Unit' the 
carrying capacity figures for both wet and dry seasons should be raised, roughly speaking, by 50 
per cent (see Campbell 1979a:6 and Pratt & Gwynne 1978 43/279). 
Considenng the variability of needs and the heterogeneity of the human population m terms 
of age and sex, it will be clear that this will additionally raise the uncertainty of reaching a correct 
estimation of carrying capacity concepts The following statements concerning potential human 
carrying capacity should be considered with this restriction in mind. 
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the district to be able to meet its milk ration, eat meat and have some Ksh. 
4,000 cash on an annual basis. He took into account a situation of unimproved 
livestock and pastures (see Sindiga 1986:225).' 
Further he determined a land/household requirement for each agro-climatic 
zone by relating (Sombroek's) carrying capacity ratios to his average 42-45 SU 
per household livestock requirement. The resultant figures for zones IV, V and 
VI were 22.50-45.00 ha, 45.00-18000 ha and 180.00-900.00 ha. Sindiga then 
related the size of his sample of Kajiado District sublocation areas to an 
estimated number of households residing there in order to detennine the 
potential availability of land per household. For zone V sample sublocations he 
reached a surplus population of 54 per cent while for zone VI this figure was 
as high as 89 per cent above his estimated potential carrying capacity. 
It should be noted that Sindiga made this calculation using dry season 
requirements only. Applying the land requirements for the wet season provides 
a picture of underpopulation for the zone V sublocations of 46 per cent of its 
potential. For zone VI sublocations the situation in the wet season would still 
result in a situation of overpopulation of 47 per cent. However, in these 
sublocations (i.e. Orok Kiteng and Kuku) many non-Maasai cultivators are 
resident who inhabit the better watered highlands and swampy locations of the 
rangelands. In other words, the estimated subsistence-oriented livestock 
keeping population has probably been overestimated by Sindiga. 
Holland estimated that Kajiado Distnct rangelands (i.e. ecozones IV and V) 
would be able to support only 84,903 human beings under subsistence 
pastoralism conditions. He concluded that this number had already been 
reached before 1979 when a total of 93,560 Maasai were counted in Kajiado 
District (see Holland 1986:79). 
Campbell (1979a: 10) reached a figure of 92,931 people (or 76,561 adult 
equivalents) as the maximum human carrying capacity, during the dry season, 
taking a 3.5 SSU/aduIt equivalent ratio. He estimated that this figure would be 
exceeded by 1986. When taking into account an estimated loss of almost 14 
per cent in the dry season livestock capacity due to the influx of non-Maasai 
fanners into the high-potential zones, a maximum population of 66,061 adult 
equivalents (some 80,186 people) was estimated by Campbell. In his view the 
demands of the pastoral population would exceed the capacity of land by 1980 
rather than 1990. Campbell (1979a:13) concluded that in the period 1980-2000 
a crisis would develop in both the pastoral and agricultural communities of 
Kajiado District over access to resources - even if those communities were at a 
subsistence level of livestock and land ownership. 
' Sincfaga (1986 222) refere to Pratt & Gwynne's 'Zebu Unit' of 300 kg hveweight animal 
However, the standardization factors used by Sindiga (0 65 for mature cattle, 04S for 1-3 years 
old cattle, 0.2 for calves and 015 for shoals) are differenl from the ratios given by Pratt & 
Gwyime and seem to be more m line with the 'Livestock Units' used by Jaetzold & Schmidt 
(1983-215) for Kenya. 
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Box 4.1 Major (natural) disasters timetable 1890-1990 
1891/92 severe drought and major Rinderpest (Olodua) epidemic killing some 90 per cent 
of Maasai stock Epidemic smallpox (Enüdtyaí) outbreak by the middle of 1892 
causing large numbers of human victims In selected areas of Maasailand (Oimelta 
pee emosi ¡slrkon) 
1897 outbreak of Contagious Bovine Pleure Pneumonia (OUdplel) ш the Ngong area 
1898 failing rains and reappearance of rmdapest among cattle of Naivasba Maasai 
(lasted until mid-1900) 
1909 East Coast Fever (ОШкапа) outbreak In the southern Maasai reserve 
1911/12 movement of northern Maasai of the Laikipia area towards the southern Maasai 
Reserve resulting m huge animal losses 
1915/16 lack of rams leading to groups of Maasai wanting to return to the northern 
Reserve 
1918 period of drought and livestock diseases (especially Rinderpest) resulting m heavy 
losses of slock and consequent raiding of neighbouring groups 
1925-27 loss of stock following severe drought and shortage of glass especially m the 
Magadl area. Great famine in Maasailand (OUmeyu Loolonllo) 
1929 severest drought m the whole of the district m the last thirty years further 
exacerbated by locust infestations In spite of quarantine regulations concessions 
were granted to the Maasai to water and graze their cattle outside the distnct's 
zone of that tune Some 50,000 cattle lost Provision of famine relief tai certain 
areas 
1933-35 great famine (Olomeyu Looloylk) due to drought and locust invasion, some 35 per 
cent loss of livestock 
1938/39 serious drought 
1943-46 severe drought and hopper infestations Great famme (Ebool Enkurma Naryokie) 
Complete failure of 1944 harvest on Government ran Wbeatlands near Kitengela 
1948-50 failure of rains, army wocm outbreak and nndeipest epidemic (esp m Kaputici) 
1951 Plenty of ram - flooding (Olan Uxmkariak) 
1952 outbreak of Foot & Mouth (OloirobO placing the whole of Kajiado District under 
quarantine regulations 
1953 ECF m south-eastern Kajiado Distnct leading to losses of up to 75 per cent 
1953-56 period of drought Famine relief provided 
1956 heavy losses due to ECF m the north-western area of Kajiado District 
1959 beginning of a severe drought and CBPP outbreak 
1960/61 extremely severe drought with stock losses up to some 70 per cent Famme relief, 
mvolving international organizations provided to some 40,000 Kajiado Maasai It 
took until 1965 for most drought victims to recover from this disaster (Ebool 
Enkurma Sikitoi) 
1963 Plenty of ram - flooding (Olari le Nteke) Food relief supplied by helicopters 
1968 outbreak of rabies in an area north of Amboseh 
1969 below average ramfall 
1973-76 severest drought since 1961, 1976 especially was a bad year when an estimated 
150,000 cattle as well as thousands of wild animals died Outbreaks of rabies and 
anthrax were reported in 1975 m the whole of south eastern Kajiado District 
Some 60,000 people (40 per cent of the district population) received famme relief 
(maize meal) at the height of the drought Ramfed agricultural production failed 
during most seasons m this period, except on the higher slopes of Mt 
Kilimanjaro and because of ungated agriculture m the plains fanners were able to 
produce a reasonable crop 
1979/80 failing rams 
1984 severe drought and outbreak of ECF resulting in the loss of about half of 
livestock 
1985 devastated pastures due to outbreak of army worms forcing herders to move to 
neighbouring districts and Tanzania 
1986 outbreak of CBPP, probably imported from Tanzania 
1987 (local) invasion of wildebeests forcing herdsmen to search for other pastures 
1988 favourable rams but outbreak of army worms In most of the district and 
rinderpest in the Ngong area necessitating the closure of livestock markets 
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42 Administrative and Political Units 
Administratively, Kajiado District is part of the Rift Valley Province and 
divided into five divisions, i.e. Central, Ngong, Loitokitok, Magadi and 
Mashura. The latter division was installed only in April 1989 after splitting the 
Central Division into two parts. Because the data available all refers to the pre-
1989 situation referral will be made in this book mostly to the old 
administrative set up.9 The four divisions are further subdivided into 21 
locations and 54 sublocations (see table 4.5 and figure 4.5). 
Table 4.5 Distribution of Locations and Sublocations by Division, 1988 (1989) 
Name of Division 
Central 
Ngong 
Magadi 
Loitokiiok 
(Mashum) 
Kajiado District 
Source KDUF 1У88, District Atlas Ka: 
Locations 
12(8) 
4 
2 
3 
(4) 
21 (21) 
liado iwu (drall version) 
Sublocations 
28(20) 
11 
5 
10 
(10) 
54(56) 
The 'Provincial Administration' forms the backbone of this administrative 
system through a hierarchy of Provincial and District Commissioners, District 
Officers (division). Chiefs (locality) and Assistant Chiefs (sublocality). The 
Provincial Administration is the main executive arm of the Central Government 
operating under the direct supervision and authority of the Office of the 
President. The other technical ministries (Agriculture, Livestock, Education, 
Water, Health, Co-operatives, Wildlife) are also represented by their own 
officers at various territorial levels. Kajiado Town (6,000 inhabitants) located 
in Central Division is the district's headquarters. Here the ministries are 
primarily represented with some also having offices in the Divisional 
headquarters of Ngong, Loitokitok and Magadi 
Co-ordination of development efforts is sought through the District 
Development Committee (DDC), headed by the District Commissioner (DC) 
assisted by the District Development Officer (DDO) and furthermore composed 
of the heads of all ministries, representatives of local authorities, local 
members of parliament, chairmen of Divisional Development Committees, 
officers of development-related parastatale and the district KANU executive 
officer (until recently KANU was the only Kenyan political party - see Rutten 
1990:157-8). 
The restructuring of administrative boundaries is an ongoing process (e g Magadi Division 
was installed only by 1984) The number of locations and sublocauons is also under review 
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Figure AS Kajiado District Administrative Boundaries 1989 
The DDC meets at least four times a year. Technical support for its activities 
is provided by the District Executive Committee (DEC), which meets at least 
once a month. Day to day co-ordination is taken care of by the office of the 
District Development Officer and the newly installed District Planning Unit 
(DPU). 
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Alongside the DDC, DEC, DPU and the ministries, several special purpose 
subcommittees operate in a specific field of development (e.g. the District 
Agricultural Committee, District Education Board, District Land Control 
Board). The Divisional Development Committee (DvDC) operates at divisional 
level. 
The Locational Development Committee (LDC) and Sublocational 
Development Committee (SLDC) ought to represent the grassroots-level 
community and are responsible for the discussion of community needs and the 
initial identification of projects and activities to address those needs. 
In addition, there are two local authorities in the district namely Olkejuado 
County Council (OCC) whose area of jurisdiction coincides with that of the 
district, except for the area covered by the second local authority namely the 
Kajiado Urban Council. These administrative bodies are of a more political 
nature as, apart from some nominations, most councillors are elected. Activities 
perfonned are in the sphere of the charging of fees, running of livestock 
holding grounds and market centres and housing development However, due 
to limited funds their impact is far less pronounced than that of the district 
administration. 
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4.3.1 Maasai Origin and Socio-Culture: Myths and Facts 
In the opening pages of this book the map of the Maasai traditional territory 
(i.e. before the arrival of the European adventurers and settlers) was presented 
(see figure 0.4). However, the Maasai have not always occupied this area. 
Their geographical origin has been much debated. Related to this puzzle of the 
Maasai's "place of birth" is the question of the Maasai's origin as a distinct 
ethnic group. One stirring theory held by Merker, a German colonial officer 
stationed in Tanganyika at the end of the 19th century, stated that the Maasai 
are probably one of the lost tribes of Israel. Merker postulated that famine as a 
consequence of overpopulation which outpaced the fertility of the soil, drove 
individual ' Semitic tribes' away from the Arabian Peninsula over a period of 
thousands of years towards either Asia or into Africa (see Merker 1904:1). 
This is a much contested and not convincing theory (see Mol 1980:4). 
Archaeological excavations have revealed evidence of livestock 
domestication in various parts of Maasailand beginning as early as the first 
millennium ВС. This is supported by both Greek and Chinese records referring 
to milk-drinking pastoralists in the interior of East Africa as early as 130 В.С 
and A.D. 838 of whom the Maasai may be descendants (see Jacobs 1975:410). 
However, linguistic evidence and the oral traditions of the Maasai point to the 
Nile Valley, somewhere in the Sudan-Uganda border area as the original birth­
place of the Maasai (see Mol 1980:4). 
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Because of pressures building up in the area the group decided to move 
southwards into the Rift Valley, probably around A.D. 1400. During their 
migration they displaced, by-passed and absorbed several peoples (e.g. the 
Dtatua a southern-Nilotic speaking pastoral group) inhabiting the plains before 
them. After a temporary residence west of Lake Turkana in the Kerio Valley, 
the Maasai reached the Serengeti Plains in northern Tanzania probably by the 
17th century. The Maasai have several stories about their origin and past, that 
more or less accord with these assumptions (see box 4.2). 
Box 4.2 Maasai Myths 
Some of the Maasai myths refer to tte ongrn of life on earth or moie specifically to the birth 
of the Maasai as a pastoral people Voshaar (1979 107) stresses thai several versions exist, 
which vary per section, family, individual, time and occasion Still, all of the stones have 
similar aspects In common 
One story reveals how the Maasai obtained their cattle from Naitemkop (a kind of half-God 
also called Maasinta "founder of the Maasai") One day Naitemkop dropped a rope from 
heaven and let cattle down which were then collected by the Maasai The Maasai moved away 
with all cattle leaving the Ndorobo empty-handed. From there the Ndorobo had to shoot wild 
beasts for their food (see Hollis 1905 270-71) 
One of the most famous myths is presented by Sankan (1971 67-69) He tells us how m the 
beginning, all Maa-people found themselves m a low, dry land, suffering from famine and 
drought One day the people discovered green grass that had been dropped by a bird Scouts 
were sent to follow this bird, and look for fresh pastures So they did Upon reaching an 
escarpment (Kerio) a bridge was built to let all the people and domestic animals pass When 
half the people had reached the other side the bridge collapsed Those who had reached the neh 
pastures became the Maasai pastoralists, while those who failed became ¡¡meek, the non-Maasal 
agnculturalists Only a few groups, like the Somali, managed to later ascend the escarpment to 
become non-Maasai pastoralists 
Holhs (1905 280-81) tells us how the Maasai, directed by Naitemkop from the area round 
Mount Kenya further south reached a cave at Athi River Some of the Maasai entered the cave 
and travelled for ten days before they emerged again and settled ш the vicinity of a salt-lake 
These people were said to be the Lumbwa Maasai who, in appearance are similar to the 
Maasai, but aie agriculturalists 
Finally, the Maasai reached the hills of Ngong They found a hole orphan boy, Kidomg'oi 
Iloibonok, sitting on top of the hill He is said to have been dropped onto the Mountain of 
Muya (Ngong Hills) by Naitemkop The child was adopted and, after becoming a grown man 
was found to possess extraordinary powers of prophecy, healing and blessmg He became the 
first ololbonl, the fint ntual expert of the Maasai (see Galaty 1982a 12 and Mol 19806) 
Determining of who does and who does not belong to the group of Maasai is 
less easy a task than one would expect it to be. From a linguistic point of view 
it is a less complicated exercise. The people speaking Nilotic languages (of the 
Nilo-Saharan stock) are subdivided into River-Lake Nilotes, Highland Nilotes 
and Plains Nilotes. The latter group includes three separate clusters: the Barí 
cluster (e.g. Latuka of Sudan), the Itunga cluster (e.g. Teso of Kenya and 
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Uganda) and the Maa-speaking cluster (see Voshaar 1979:IS).1 0 The Pastoral 
Maasai, Samburu, II Chamus (Njemps) and some groups of the 'Ndorobo' of 
Kenya as well as the Baraguyu, II Anisha and Pastoral Maasai of Tanzania 
belong to the Maa-speaking cluster. These groups all speak a certain dialect of 
the Maa language and have much in common fremi a cultural point of view." 
All those speaking the language of 'Maa' could thus be called Maasai.12 
However, it is possible from an ethnic point of view to distinguish between 
the 'Maasai proper' (Pastoral Maasai) and 'Maasai-like' groups. Each of these 
groups has its own set of social beliefs and practices as well as economic 
organization. For example, the Ndorobo are hunter-gatherers and the Π Anisha 
and II Chamus are more oriented towards cultivation than the Maasai proper. 
Sambuni and Baraguyu are more close to the Maasai proper. The Maasai-like 
are sometimes called 'Iloikop', 'Ilumbwa' or 'Ilkuafi' as against 'Ilmaasm' a 
name used for the Maasai proper.'3 
According to Jacobs (1975:406-8) until the early 1960s the majority of the 
Pastoral Maasai not only rejected the non-livestock based alternative modes of 
subsistence available to them, but they possessed strong prohibitions against 
the eating of agricultural and other non-pastoral foods. Their diet is said to 
Another distincuon is often made between Western (= River-Lake), Southern (= Highland) 
and Eastern (= Plains) Nilotic speaking groups In Kenya, the Western Nilotes aie lepiesenied by 
the Luo near Lake Victoria The southern Nilotic-speaking Kalenjin (ι e. Pokot, Kipsigis, Nandi, 
Tugen, Elgeyo, Marakwet, Sabaot) mainly occupy the intermediate zone between highlands and 
plains of the Rift Valley The Eastern Nilotic are represented by the Tuifcana, Teso, Maasai, 
Samburu, U Chamus and 'Ndorobo' (see Kaplan 1984 92) It should be noted, however, that 
cultural differences between groups of Nilotic people can be quite profound For example, the 
Nilotic Luo, with their egalitarian society and mixed economy of agriculture and animal 
husbandly, resemble their Bantu-speaking neighbours Kisu moie closely than some of the other 
Nilotic groups (see Gulliver 1969b 36). 
11
 According to Jacobs (1975-411) the Maasai split from the Sambuni probably some 
thousands years ago Sun (1980'12) concluded that both groups are able to understand each though 
younger generations face moie diflìculties since both groups were separated from each other by 
the colonial authorities at the beginning of this century Gulliver (1969a 224) reports that the Π 
Anisha was founded in about 1830 as a settled and recognizable group when a few small groups 
of Maa-speaking people came to settle on the lower edge of the forested, south-western slopes of 
ML Meni m what is now northern Tanzania These settlers were refugees from Maasai internecine 
wars of the early nineteenth century Rigby (1983 S3) places the separation of the Baraguyu at the 
late 18th and early 19th century from the same mutually hostile relations 
1 2
 According to Galaty (1982a.4) the word Maa stems from a characteristically polite 
utterance used by Maasai people as an intioducuon for a staiemenL Other explanations aie that 
Maa-sai means "I will not beg" or thai Maasai steins from "isaen" a term for the beads This last 
explanation is probably not correct (see Mol 1978 99) 
The use of the name 'Iloikop' still is object of discussions The Samburu, foi example, 
name the Maasai proper also 'Iloikop' (see Galaty 1982a.9) Apparently use of this term depends 
on the relative position the user takes In general 'Iloikop' seems to be used to refer to the 'other 
Maasai' or even 'the enemy' (see Mol 1978 99, Galaty 1982a.9, Voshaar 1979 23-7) 
Chapter 4: Kajiado District: the Eastern Home of the Maasai 131 
have been based solely on milk, meat and blood and some naturally growing 
fruits. It is said that this is slowly changing and that except for pig meat maybe 
the Maasai diet is quite varied nowadays and includes cereals, vegetables and 
even chicken. Still, evidence exists that, especially in times of stress, Maasai 
did eat agricultural foods either traded for or even grown by themselves (see 
Lawren 1968:578). 
By 1979, of 241395 Kenyan Maasai the majority resided in Narok (48.9 per 
cent) and Kajiado District (38.8 per cent). Kenyan Maasai were projected to 
number some 350,000 persons by 1989. Kenyan Maa-speakers totalled 329,766 
in 1979 and were estimated to rise to some 455,100 people by 1989. Including 
Tanzaniane our total estimate is approximately 742,900 Maa-speakers for 1989. 
Table 4.6 Maa-speaking Population in Kenya and Tanzania 
M aa-Kenya 
-Dmaasai 
-Samburu 
-D ChamuB 
-Ndorobo 
Maa-Tanzanla 
-Umaasal 
-Baraguyu 
-П Anisha 
Total Dmaasai 
Maa-speakers 
1919 1948 
97.624 
46,000 67.201 
20.000 
3.423 
(7.000·») 
103309 
47.276 
3,223 
52,020 
114.477 
(200,100) 
1962 
221.888 
154,079 
48.750 
4.681 
14.378 
(161.000) 
78,000 
8.000 
(75.000O 
232.079 
(383,000) 
1969 
237,372 
154,906 
54,796 
6.526 
21.034 
78.000 
С) 
О 
232.906 
η 
1975 
(Jacobs' 
esumate) 
251,000 
164,000 
58.000 
7,000 
22,000 
188,000 
62,000 
29,000 
97,000 
226,000 
438,000 
1979 
329,766 
241,395 
73.625 
7,546 
7,200 
229,100 
90,000 
32,000 
107,100 
331.395 
558.861 
1989 
COOO) 
projecuon 
455 1 
335 3-376 1 
98 9-1016 
87-104 
2 5-9 9 
287 8 
1110 
39 8 
1370 
4667 
7429 
1999 
COOO) 
projecuon 
630 9-729 7 
462 7-586 0 
132 9-1402 
100-14 3 
08-137 
366 4 
1400 
510 
175 4 
6644 
1.046 7 
Source Hopulaüon Census ІУ48. 1У62, ІУоУ, 1У7У, Jacobs 1УЛ, Huniingtoid ІУІЗ, Uminde 
1984, Peberdy 1969, Smdiga 1986, Sandford 1919, Arhem 1985 
Note The 1948 census underestimates Ihe African population probably by as much as 30 per cent 
(see Onunde 1984 35) The 1962 census is based on samples Jacobs 1975 estimate is based on the 
Tanganyika 1958 census and the Kenya 1969 census, adjusted and brought up to date by a 2 per 
cent annual increase for the Kenyan Maa-speakers and Ihe Tanzaman Maasai and a 2 S per cent 
increase for the Anisha and Baraguyu The Tanzaman census does not provide information on 
ethnic groups. Figures provided are the best guestimates and are dismct-based. 
For all Kenyan Maasai the average annual growth figure for the 1969-79 
period was 4.6 as compared with 3.8 per cent for the total Kenyan population. 
This is in strong contrast with generally accepted human population increases 
of 2.0-2.5 per cent for pastoral groups (see Campbell 1979a:5 - giving a figure 
of 2.2 per cent for Kajiado Maasai). Several causes could have contributed to 
this high intercensal growth figure. Besides improved health facilities the main 
reason, in my opinion, can be found in the status of the 1969 figure. 
This is thought to be an underestimate as the Kenyan Maasai number for 
1969 (154,906) was just slightly above the 1962 figure of 154,079 people. 
Other factors thought to have affected the high 1969-79 intercensal growth rate 
are the improved recording at the time of the 1979 census; Ndorobo being 
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recorded as Maasai in 1979 as opposed to 1969 (explaining the sudden drop of 
Ndorobo in the 1979 census, see table 4.6 and note 16); (increased) 
assimilation of non-Maasai women by way of marriage (especially Kikuyu 
women); non-Maasai (especially Chagga and Sonjo from Tanzania) and 
Tanzanian Maasai pretending to be Kenyan Maasai in order to legalize their 
residence. 
Another issue blurring the definition of Maasai-like and Maasai-proper 
people stems from the fact that the latter are further subdivided in so-called </· 
oshon (sing, ol-osho meaning 'plateau') (see figure 4.6 and box 4 3). The clan 
(olgilata pi. ilgilat) and age-group system (olporror) also need some 
clarification (see box 4 4). 
Figure 4.6 Kajiado Maasai ll-oshon 
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Box A3 D-oshon (Maasai Sections) 
The pastoral Maasai ¡l-oshon, sometimes called tnbes, sub-tribes or sections, number fourteen to 
date In addition, some aulhois include the Sambuni as a distinct ol-osho The original meaning of 
tbe word ol-osho is 'plateau' Initially, in order to distinguish between the vinous 'plateaus', the 
inhabitants of such a plateau were given a specific name Giadually the word acquired the 
exlended meaning it has today, whereby it refers to an independent group of people, having their 
own name, specific taritoiy with well-defined boundaries, peculianoes of dress, beadwork, 
speech, bousing, celebialloo of ceremonies and even having their own defence force (see Mol 
1978 100) Some of the tl-oshon, are numerous, othen fairly small in numbers The Kisonko-
Maasal seem to be tbe overall largest group and the Moitanik the smallest To date, the following 
sections are distinguished. 
Table 4.7 Maasai U-oshon 
Country/District Ol-osho Region of Habitat Est 
pop 
1979 
Kenya Loodotílani 
Kajlado District Kapuüel 
Matapalo 
KeckonyoUe 
Dalalekutuk (or Kanltere) 
Kisonko (or Lottolcliok) 
ndamat 
Purko 
around Lake Magadl (SW Kajlado) 14.988 
from Athl-River to Chyulu (N Kajlado) 16,041 
around Namanga (S Kajlado) 14,486 
from Suswa-Ngong downwards (NW Клраіо) 15,636 
around Enkorika (Central Kajiado) 5,601 
Ambosell and Rombo area (SE Kajlado) 42,781 
surrounding Kajiado Town (C Kajlado) 5,492 
around Blssel (C Kajlado) 1.808 
Kenya 
Narok District 
Loita 
Purko 
Udamat 
Uasinklshu (or Kirasha) 
Moitanik 
Siria 
around Loila Hills (SE Narok) 
Lemek area (Central Narok) 
near Cls Mara, Mau (NE Narok) 
around Kilgoris (W-NW Narok) 
Shartuka. Masaiura (SW Narok) 
around Lolgorien (SW Narok) 
Tanzania Kisonko 
Sikirari 
Laltayiok 
Loita 
Purko 
from Lake Natron to Mt Kilimanjaro southwards 
west of Mi Kilimanjaro 
Serengeti south of Lake Natron 
west of Lake Natron 
west of the Loita and Lake Natron 
Source Mol ШН W, Vosbaar 197У TO 
In addition to these U-oshon, mention should be made of some of die Maasai sections thai are 
extinct Among the best known are the Iltaanomodoon, Dosekelai, Doogolala and the Паікіріак 
These groups have been rooted out by other Maasai during tbe Iloikop wars of the 19th century 
Most of these groups either jomed Ndorobo groups or other Maasai sections For example, it is 
said that survivors of tbe Ilaikipiak joined the Purko and Uasinklshu Maasai (see Mol 1978 99) 
CLANS 
Maasai society is also subdivided along the lines of clans and sub-clans (moieties) The first 
division is m two major molelies Orok Kiteng and Odo Mongi Each of these is further 
subdivided into seven major clans (Ilmakesan, Ilmoleban, Utaamosera, Dukumai, Ilaiser, nmamasita 
and Ilaitayiok) Theoretically, every sub-clan can be represented in every ol-osho Membership of a 
certain clan is detennined by birth into tbe father's clan A Maasai does not many within bis own 
sub-clan (see Voshaar 1979 53, Mol 1978 43) 
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Box 4.4 Age-Group System 
The age-group system (olporror) of Maasai society is an important aspect of Maasai society In 
the Maasai literature several descriptions of the age-group system exist, all having their own 
slightly different interpretations Indeed, the details and vanous names of age-groups and age-
sets are rather confusing (see Mol 1978 17 who provides an overview of these vanous 
interpretations drawn from HoUls, Fosbrooke, Jacobs and Sankan) In the words of Voshaar 
(1979-38) the age-group system, 'integrates Maasai society more than all the other structures 
mentioned so far ( ) It is a system of religious thought and practice expressed in ntes and 
ceremonies ( ) It is a system of political Organization, of bonding and inumale fnendstups It is 
a system that secures unity and well-being m the land of Maa.' 
Generally speaking an age-group refers to a group of peers that, as a generation, are some 
seven years ahead or behind the following or previous age-group During the span of tune an 
age-group will be promoted into a new age-grade by way of ceremonies Grom 'boyhood' via 
'wamoihood' (emurrano) to 'elderhood' These accompanying ceremonies are circumcision 
(murata), eunoto and olng'esher, respectively In general there are six age-grades 
Maasai Age-Set Chronology 
inalala 1881-1905 
1 early boyhood appr 1-7 years Iluyioki 1791-1811 Iltuati II 1896-1917 
2. laier boyhood appr 7-15 llmeinshan 1806-1826 lllareto 1911-1929 
3 junior o/murroni appr 15-22 Ilkidotu 1821-1841 Iltento 1926-1948 
4 senior оітшталі appr 22-30 Iltuati I 1836-1856 Ilnyangusi Π 1942-1959 
5 junior elder appr 30-45 Ilnyangusi I 1851-1871 Iseun 1955-1978 
6 senior elder appr 45+ Ilaimer 1866-1886 Ilkiseeyia 1970-1990 
As shown m this list the group of junior elders totals a penod of 15 years This is the result of 
the coming together of two age-groups combining to become one age-set (olajf) An age-set is a 
generation some fifteen years removed from the former and latter age-sets It should be noted 
that the 7 and 15 years periods are variable as is the actual age of the age-mates belonging to a 
certain age-group or age-set Often one can find a person belonging to a younger age-group 
which is older than a member of an older age-group This is the result of the fact that one (i e 
mostly the father of the boy) is somehow free to choose to which age-group he wants to belong 
Each newborn age-group is given a name that mostly differs for each il-oshon (only the final 
elders age set have a umform name all over (Kenyan and Tanzanian) Maasailand Formation of a 
new age-group starts when the one above the one m formation feels the latter has grown large 
enough This is reported to the members of the group above them, who are considered to be the 
protectors of the new group They will actually close the recruitment for the new group Once 
the group is formed the creation of a completely new group will start This Qme the intermediate 
age-group (i e the youngest but one) will be recruiting their boys In other words, a system of 
rotation exists, whereby alternating groups are linked lo each other 
Periods of recruitment and circumcision take up some three to four years After another three to 
four years after closmg the circumcision there is a second group of boys who will start their 
period of circumcision. This means that there are so called right hand and left hand age-groups 
Only at the tune of olng'esher will these two age-groups form one single age set (olajl) (see for 
more details of the age-group system and related ceremonies the description by Voshaar 
1979 58-97) 
According to the age-group there are several taboos on ihe use of food and social behaviour 
For example, traditionally the wamors left their parents home to live together in one single large 
camp called mányala (pi Imanyat) They were not allowed to dnnk milk and the eating of meat 
in the présence of women was prohibited Only after the olng'esher ceremony were these taboos 
lifted and the newborn (junior) elders were allowed to many Nowadays, the emurrano stage still 
exists but is restricted m duration and residence as the Kenyan Government no longer allows the 
building of imanyat The wamors (llmurran -sing olmurram) having lost their task as defenders 
are stunilaled to go to school instead To this end a Maasai traditional leaders meeting at Sultan 
Hamid passed a resolution ending Ihe practise of emurrano by April 25th 1985 (see DN 
27A)4/85) 
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4.3.2 Population-Numbers and Structure 
The 1979 population census provides the most up to date information 
concemmg the Kajiado District population size, distribution, composition by 
age-group and ethnic variance.14 A total of 149,005 people were counted for 
the Kajiado District in 1979 whereas there had been 85,903 inhabitants in 
1969. This is the equivalent of an annual growth rate of 5.66 per cent for this 
period. Recent projections for 1989 estimate a total district population of some 
250,000-260,000 people, rising to some 400,000-450,000 by the end of this 
century (see table 4.8). 
Table 4.8 Kajiado District Population and Ethnic Composition 1927-2010 
Year 
1927 
1948 
1962 
19Ö9 
1979 
1989 
1999 
2000 
2009 
2010 
source 
Total Population 
14,799 
28,234 
68,411 
85.903 
149,005 
262,485· 
162,000-206,000 (DSPP nd) 
213,000 (Livingstone 1986) 
249,849 (CBS-Kajiado 1988) 
254,078 (RoK/CBS 1983) 
470.482» 
400,360 (TARDA 1984) 
857321· 
401,954 (Ecosystems 1982) 
646,157 (TARDA 1984) 
KDAK 1У7/, 1У4У, Hopulati 
Maasai % 
12,781 864 
25,748 91 2 
53,219 77 8 
58,961 68 6 
93,560 62 8 
148,462 56 5 
235,581 501 
373,822 43 6 
on census ivoz 
NOD Maasai 
2,018 
2,486 
15,192 
26,942 
55,445 
114,123 
234,901 
483,499 
1У6У, ІУ/У 
% 
13 6 
88 
122 
314 
372 
43 5 
499 
564 
UVUJI 
; KikuyuKambaOthos 
! 253 272 1.493 
! 1,354 95 1.037 
! 6,233 3,975 4.984 
| 16258 4,321 6,363 
¡ 33,630 8,798 13,017 
1 
1 
1 
1 
; 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 1 
i 
1 
1 
1 
Ρ 
I 
1 
itone 1УК6, HoKAJUS 
1983 128, Ecosystems 1982.39, TARDA 1984, DSPP nd 33 
* author's projections based on 1969-79 growth trend. The group of "others" includes especially 
Luo, Luhya and Somali. 
As highlighted by table 4.8, Kajiado District is also populated by several non-
Maasai groups of which the Kikuyu and the Kamba (both Bantu ethnic groups) 
are the most numerous. The districts recognized as being traditional Kikuyu 
areas are Nyandania, Nyeri, Muranga, Kirinyaga and Kiambu situated to the 
north of Kajiado District in Central Province. The Kamba can mainly be found 
in the Machakos and Kitui districts to the east of the Kikuyu country and 
Unfortunately the latest 1989 census experienced some logistic difficulties A proposed 
renewed attempt was not conducted. Sample studies made 6 months later, however, suggested that 
overall the 1989 Census was reasonably correct For Kajiado an esumate of 259,000 people Is 
rumoured. Still, official figures aie not yet available. This means that oar analysis of population 
numbers and other demographic characteristics is hindered and al best offers projections based 
only on assumptions however careful calculated. Note thai Ibese projections do not take uno 
account an expected rise m mortality due to AIDS, and an increase In immigration as a result of 
group ranch subdivision (see chapter 7). 
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north-east of Kajiado District in Eastern Province (see figure 2.1). By 1979, the 
Kikuyu (3,202,821) and the Kamba (1,725,569) ranked at first and fourth 
position, representing 20.9 and 11.3 per cent of the Kenyan population, with 
the Maasai totalling only 1.6 per cent Compared to the 1969 situation 
(2,201,632 Kikuyu and 1,197,712 Kamba) the annual growth rate of the 
nationwide increase in Kikuyu and Kamba was 3.82 and 3.74 per cent, 
respectively. 
The absolute and relative importance of this group of non-Maasai in Kajiado 
District has increased tremendously since the 1960s (see figure 4.7). The 
average annual growth figure for the whole of Kajiado District was 5.7 per 
cent for the 1969-79 intercensal period. The net growth in the number of 
Kajiado Maasai for this timespan amounted to 34,599 people (4.7 per 
cent/year) and the number of non-Maasai more than doubled with a rise of 
28,503 persons (7.6 per cent/year) " These non-Maasai mainly settle in the 
high-potential agricultural areas and the major urban centres. 
(1 MBO) % 
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Figure 4.7 Kajiado District Population Growth and Ethnic Composition 1927-79 
According to the 1979 population census from the 120,166 Kenyans bom in 
the Kajiado District a total of 109,635 people still resided in the district In 
other words, 10,531 had migrated away, either temporarily or permanently to 
It is thought that (he actual growth of the Maasai population is not as high as 4.7 per cent 
Campbell estimaied this to be 2 2 per cent This probably means thai the 1969 figure of the 
number of Maasai is an undeiestunaie (see Campbell 1981b SS) 
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other districts. As the total enumerated population was 149,005 immigration 
must have totalled 39,370 people. Unfortunately, these figures do not 
discriminate as to ethnicity. However, even if we consider the outmigrants to 
be only Maasai this figure is rather low. It is thought that Kajiado District, 
unlike some other districts in Kenya, has contributed minimally to the labour 
market in the country (see DSPP nd:131). Dietz (1986a:23) estimated for 
Kajiado District a zero percentage of male labour migration for 1969 as well as 
1979. In my opinion, if outmigration occurs, it will mainly be for temporary 
reasons like education or rebuilding one's herd by looking for a job as a 
watchman in Nairobi (as happened again en masse after the 1973-76 drought). 
Another group of outmigrants will be those Maasai joining the army and those 
moving to neighbouring Narok district. 
Comparing the 1979 figures with those of 1969 does not show a fast 
growing increase in outmigration as a proportion of those born in the area. Van 
Doome (1980:176) presented data showing that out of 68,850 Kajiado bom 
Kenyans, 3,647 or 5.3 per cent no longer were living there by 1969. With the 
Kenyan mean outmigration figure at 16.6 per cent the Kajiado figure was the 
lowest for the 24 districts analyzed. The destination of the group of 
outmigrants was Nairobi (20.1 per cent), other Rift Valley Province districts 
(46.2 per cent), Central Province (19.3 per cent), Eastern Province (5.6 per 
cent), Coast Province (4.8 per cent), Nyanza Province (2.9 per cent) and 
Western Province (0.8 per cent) (see Holland 1988:26 cf Rempel 1974:50-51). 
Ominde (1984:74) has provided data for the group of 1,686 people who 
migrated from Kajiado District to other Rift Valley districts. This confirms our 
idea of the importance of Narok District as an important target for Kajiado 
outmigrants as 937 people or 55.6 per cent of the intraprovincial migration was 
directed to Narok District. Other important receiving districts were Nakuru 
(19.8 per cent), Turkana (6.7 per cent) and Uasin Gishu (6.0 per cent). Narok 
(32.5 per cent) and Nakuru (21.4 per cent) were also the most important Rift 
valley districts with respect to the birthplace of this specific group of Kajiado 
District immigrants, totalling 1,516 people by 1969. 
By 1979 the percentage of outmigrants from Kajiado District had increased 
to 8.8 per cent The effects of the 1976 drought period will certainly be one of 
the major causes for this rise. Holland (1986:113) also concluded that the 1979 
percentage of 12.3 per cent of all Maasai living outside Kajiado and Narok 
districts (not necessarily because of migration) is not unusually high. In 
addition he pointed out the lack of data concerning the occupation and 
education of Maasai living in other districts. In a more recent article, however, 
he was rather outspoken after relating the 1979 figure of 12.3 per cent with the 
1969 figure of Maasai staying outside the two districts (8.2 per cent). Holland 
(1988:29) states that this seems to indicate dramatic migratory movements of 
the Maasai. However, we would like to point to the problem of the Ndorobo-
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Maasai switch, especially in Laikipia, referred to earlier.16 Furthermore, lack 
of detailed information does not allow for an analysis of the destination of the 
group of Kajiado District leavers.17 
Several sources expect that for the Kajiado District over the next decades there 
will be continuous immigration into the district on a substantial scale, raising 
population densities and leaving little land under-utilised (see e.g Ecosystems 
1982:40). The Kajiado District Development Plan for 1989-93 foresees even 
faster rates of immigration because of group ranch subdivision and an 
increasing number of Nairobi city workers moving towards the nearby small 
towns of Ngong and Central Divisions. 
Table 4.9 Divisional Population Distribution and Density, 1979-90 
Division 
Central 
Ngong 
Loilokitok 
Magadi 
Total 
Source KJJUP 
Area 
(km1) 
8.546 
3,412 
5,726 
1,921 
19,605 
1988 18 
Population % 
1979 
50,963 34 2 
45.680 307 
42,781 287 
9,581 64 
149.005 
Projection 
1990 
89.537 
80374 
75.138 
16.756 
261.805 
% 
342 
307 
28 7 
64 
Density 1979 
(peis/km2) 
60 
134 
75 
50 
76 
Density 1990 
(pers/km2) 
10.5 
236 
131 
87 
134 
Divisional population figures are presented in table 4.9. The average population 
density for Kajiado District in 1979 was 7.6 persons/km2 as compared to 4.4 
p/km2 in 1969. Within Kajiado, the availability of high-potential land is also 
reflected in that Ngong Division is the most densely populated, with 13.4 
p/km2 (and even as high as 212 p/km2 in Ngong location), followed by 
Loitokitok (7.5 p/km2), Central (6.0 p/km2) and Magadi (5.0 p/km2). This is 
rather low as compared to its neighbouring (high-potential) districts of Kiambu 
(280 p/km2), Nakuni (90 p/km2), Machakos (72 p/km2), Narok (13 p/km2) and 
Taito-Taveta (8 p/km2) (see Statistical Abstract 1988). 
In 1969, Ndorobo were mainly ш Nakuni (10,636 persons) and Laikipia (7,315 persons) 
distncls By 1979 these figures were 3,979 and 181, respectively By contrast the number of 
Maasai changed from 3,892 to 4.540 m Nakuni and from 1,125 to 10,116 m Laikipia (see RoK 
1970a, RoK/CBS 1981) 
17 
Assuming that most outnugrants will be Maasai some conclusions can be drawn from 
analyzing the number of Maasai residing outside Kajiado and Narok distncls Figures do not allow 
for separating Narok from Kajiado Maasai In 1979 Maasai were counted m Nairobi (3,425), 
Central (1,850), Western (2,132), Coast (1,509), Eastern (854), Nyanza (442), North Eastern (57) 
and the Rift Valley Province (excluding Narok and Kajiado) (19,475 especially Laikipia (10,116), 
Nakuni (4,540). Tranz Nzoia (2,185) and Uasm Gishu (1349) distncls As compared to the 1969 
figures the relatively largest increases occurred m Nairobi ('69 970), Coast Province ('69 439 
Mombasa-effect''), Eastern Province ('69 258) and the Rift Valley distnct of Laikipia ('69 1,125 
Ndorobo effecf) 
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For the year 2010 densities for Kajiado District are expected to rise to 19 
persons/km2. Projections for neighbouring districts are: Narok (35 p/km2), 
Machakos (194 p/km2), Nakuni (243 p/km2) and Kiambu (755 p/km2) (see 
Ecosystems 1982:39). 
Table 4.10 shows us the structure of the Kajiado District population and its 
pyramid-like shape, having a very young population. Indeed for 1979 the group 
of 0-19 year of age made up 89,240 people or 59.9 per cent of the Kajiado 
District population. Their number is expected to have risen to 160,199 people 
or 63.1 per cent by 1989. 
The 5-14 years age-cohort totalled 44,132 by 1979 and is expected to rise to 
76,732 by 1989. The active population cohort (15-59 years of age) is projected 
to have changed from 68,800 to 111,885 by 1989. The group of retired people 
above 60 yean of age is predicted to grow only modestly from 6,560 to 
probably 7,990 Kajiado District inhabitants. This means that major efforts must 
be devoted to provision of schooling facilities and employment opportunities. 
Table 4.10 Population Age-Groups and Sex Ratio. 1979-89 
Age group 
(yeais) 
(M 
5-9 
10-14 
15-19 
20-14 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
4044 
4549 
50-54 
55-59 
60*1 
65-69 
70-74 
75+ 
Toul 
Census 
1979 
29,513 
25381 
18,751 
15,695 
13,186 
10,709 
7,928 
6.333 
5,125 
4.120 
3,281 
2,423 
1,988 
1.540 
1.230 
1.802 
149,005 
% 
19 8 
17 0 
126 
10.5 
89 
72 
53 
43 
35 
2.8 
2.2 
1.6 
1.3 
1.0 
08 
1.2 
1000 
m/f 
ratio 
098 
103 
114 
098 
094 
099 
093 
096 
103 
121 
110 
116 
105 
113 
102 
099 
102 
Projecnon 
1989 
57.471 
43.944 
32.788 
25 596 
21,684 
16,647 
12,688 
10,939 
8.316 
6.638 
4.999 
3.978 
3.165 
2,117 
1,553 
1,155 
254,078 
% 
226 
173 
129 
102 
85 
66 
50 
43 
33 
26 
20 
16 
12 
08 
06 
05 
1000 
m/f 
ratio 
100 
105 
115 
104 
097 
099 
0 87 
096 
095 
108 
101 
097 
093 
080 
0 82 
079 
101 
4 J J Education 
The 1979 census revealed that in Kajiado District 62 per cent of the 5-75+ age 
group had never attended school. For men this figure was 54 per cent and for 
women even as high as 70 per cent. This situation placed Kajiado in the group 
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of Kenyan districts having the lowest rates of literacy (21-39 per cent)·'8 
By the end of the 1980s enrolment rates in primary (65 per cent) and even 
more in secondary school (18 per cent) are still rather low. School attendance 
by girls is particularly poor. Approximately 57 per cent of the girls as against 
some 74 per cent of the boys in the district were attending a primary school by 
the end of the 1980s. In the past this ratio had been even more distorted (see 
table 4.11). 
Table 4.11 The Expansion of Primary Education in Kajiado District 1927-88 
Year 
1927 
1948 
1957 
1963 
1969 
1974 
1979 
1983 
1988 
Schools 
1 
5' 
20" 
22 
40 
60 
94 
123 
148 
Pupils 
87 
294 
546 
3,000 
6,687 
15,923 
26,135 
30,987 
38.205 
Boys 
87 
279 
442 
9 
4,242 
7 
? 
17,510 
21,829 
Girls 
0 
15 
104 
7 
2,445 
7 
7 
13,477 
16,376 
Participation ι 
24b 
4% 
7 
15% 
20%7 
40% 
7 
7 
65% 
Source Ueecher et al 1949, KJJAK 1У27, 1948. 1УІ7, 1У6У. 1У/4, Uorham 19/7, hshiwani el al. 
1988, Seitab nd. RoK/MEO 1988 
* excluding two missionary schools with an unknown number of pupils located m Ngong 
Table 4.11 also shows that over the years school attendance has increased. It is 
important to realize, however, that higher rates of school attendance among 
groups of non-Maasai are partly responsible for this development In the past 
most schools were located in the small towns and rural centres, where the 
Maasai were outnumbered by non-Maasai. For example, out of the 6,363 
people making up the 1962 Kajiado District 'urban' population only 510 were 
Maasai (see RoK 1966:170-74). Secondly, an unknown number of the Kajiado 
young people (Maasai and non-Maasai from Ngong in particular) are attending 
schools in Nairobi (see Seitab nd:4). 
After independence, education became the responsibility of the local County 
Council which included taking over the staffing and equipping of mission-run 
schools as well as several non-African primary schools which existed in the 
townships (see Gorham 1977:11). From 1970 onwards education in Kajiado 
District was handed over to the Central Government By 1987, of a total 
number of 145 primary schools in the district 127 (88 per cent) were run by 
churches, while only 17 schools belonged to the District Education Board and 
Neighbouring districts are in group 1 mainly (Kiambu, Taita 60-68 per cent literacy), 
group 2 (Machakos 50-59 per cent), group 3 (Nakuru 4049 per cent), group 4 (Narok 21-39 per 
cent) (see Abduba 1988 13) By the early 1980s about 28 8 per cent of the Kikuyu spoke English, 
23 4 per cent of the Kamba, while only 2 0 per cent of the Maasai (see DN 18/11/81) 
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one to the Magadi Soda company.19 
A Presidential Decree at the end of 1973 to make the first four years of 
primary education free increased total primary enrolment rates by SO per cent 
(see Gorham 1977:24). The result was severe overcrowding in the schools and 
a lack of trained, and sometimes motivated, teachers. This last problem is 
becoming even more urgent at the present time. By 1983 the district had 620 
trained and 283 untrained teachers in the primary schools, resulting in a 
pupil/teacher ratio of 34. By 1988 the number of teachers has risen to 1,194 of 
which 692 were trained and 502 untrained teachers. This is a decrease in the 
relative number of trained teachers from 69 to 58 per cent over the 1983-88 
period. The pupil/teacher ratio dropped to 31 (see KDDP 1988:239). 
Education in Kajiado District also suffers from a high percentage of drop­
outs. In times of drought or after the raising of school fees the Maasai children 
often leave school. In Maasai society there is also much resistance to (female) 
education for a number of reasons: housework has to be done, parents fear 
corrupting influences including prostitution when girls stay far away at an 
(urban) boarding school and marriage which occurs at young age (13-15 year). 
So, it is particularly girls who are among the group of unfinished 
schoolleavers.20 Those at school do not seldom lack basic writing materials, 
text books, tables and chairs (see Eshiwani et al. 1988:30). 
Table 4.12 Kajiado District KCPE Score 1985-89 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989* 
Kajiado mean 
267 55 
278 86 
27170 
278 52 
31038 
Best district 
score 
346 87 
358 02 
34715 
n.fa 
41242 
Kajiado/ 
best dislna 
077 
0 78 
0 78 
nfa 
0 75 
Position 
36 
37 
38 
36 
42 
Source bshiwam et al im. 16, Standard 2У/ШУ 
* higher score due to Introduction of a new subject (max score now 700 points instead of 600) 
In the light of the above pictured situation it will be little wonder that Kajiado 
District primary school performance rate in the national examinations over the 
years has been disappointingly low. Kajiado standard eight pupils scored far 
below the national average in the Kenya Certificate of Primary Education tests, 
with Maasai pupils' results below those of non-Maasai. The highest position 
1 9
 Church sponsorship Is usually small. The majority of the school Income is realised from 
the parents harambee contribution (see Seitab od 5) 
In 1988 Kajiado District there were 135 nursery (pre-pnmary) schools having 6,675 pupils 
(3,589 boys and 3,086 guls). This illustrates the higher participation rates of girls al a young age. 
In chapter б more attention will be paid to factors influencing school attendance m Kajiado 
District. 
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out of 45 education districts was reached in 1981 (place 30). By 1989, there 
seemed to be a widening gap between Kajiado and other districts (see table 
4.12). As a consequence, the number of Kajiado (Maasai) students allowed to 
continue for (Government) secondary schools is minimal. 
In 1965 the first secondary school was opened in Kajiado District By 1980 
twelve had been established rising to 21 secondary schools, mostly in Ngong 
Division, by 1988 (see table 4.13). These secondary schools are either run by 
the Government (8), harambee (6), private (5) or a church (I).21 In earlier 
days every Kajiado District secondary student had to leave for another part of 
the country. This practice still occurs. It should be realized that in Ngong most 
of the students in private secondary schools are from outside the district. It is 
estimated that some 30 per cent of secondary school pupils are Maasai. 
Table 4.13 Kajiado District Secondary Schools, 1987 
Division 
Ngong 
Central 
Loitokitok 
Magadi 
Kajiado District 
Source КШН 1У8Н 23' 
No. 
1 
of Schools 
9 
7 
4 
1 
21 
No. of Students* 
1.565 
1,308 
809 
86 
3,768 
% Schoolgoing 
24 
18 
13 
6 
18 
* excluding number of students for one of the nine Ngong schools 
Mention should also be made of four Youth Polytechnics present in Kajiado 
District (Isinya, Oltiasika, Entasopia and Meto). These are all run by the 
Presbyterian Church of East Africa (PCEA). In 1988 seventeen courses (in the 
fields of carpentry, welding, agriculture, veterinary care, etc.) were offered for 
181 students, 90 per cent being non-Maasai. 
Whereas by the late 1970s the literacy rate of the Kajiado population from 
the age of five was estimated to be some 38 per cent, the percentage of literate 
adults in the district is thought to be as low as 12 per cent (see KDDP 
1988:45). In an attempt to raise these low standards adult education classes are 
available, given by 99 teachers (mostly part-timers). Churches are also very 
active in this respect Training concentrates mainly on Kiswahili, mathematics 
and agricultural issues. Attendance, however, is rather low (1,204 women and 
514 men in 1987) and increasingly falling as compared to 1980 (1,751 women 
and 1,432 men). As Abduba (1988 11) shows this trend is nationwide (404,709 
in 1980 to 158,887 in 1987), and probably caused by a weakening impact of 
the 1979 newly created adult education campaign. Also higher enrolment by 
Harambee is the Swahili word for 'let us unite' The Idea, propagated by Kenya's first 
president Mzee Kenyatta, is that people themselves take the imuative and collect funds for a 
school, dispensary ani the like (see Maas 1986 21-22) 
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women is a uniform picture. Approximately 66 per cent of the students are 
Maasai (see Kantai 1989b: 17). Kantai's study also revealed that besides the 
problems mentioned above for primary schools, adult education suffers from 
(old) men not liking to be taught by younger (female) teachers and from the 
absence of ilmurran during ceremonies.22 
4.3.4 Health Sector 
Major diseases affecting the Kajiado District human population are said to be 
respiratory diseases (27.1 per cent of sicknesses), malaria (26.1 per cent), 
diarrhoea (7.1 per cent), skin diseases (6.6 per cent) and eye-infections (S.3 per 
cent) (see KDDP 1988:221). These figures refer to the 1986 number of 
reported diseases. Kajiado District figures provided by the Nomadic Health 
Unit of the African Medical and Research Foundation (AMREF) for 1988 
show a similar picture, with acute upper respiratory infections (11,221 recorded 
treatments), eye disorders (520 cases) and skin diseases (scabies 482, ascariasis 
256) prevailing (see AMREF 1989:59-66). In addition, AMREF mentioned 
malnutrition (516 cases) as an important condition but recorded less malaria 
(164 cases only as against 56,920 for 1986). This is due to the fact that both 
'diseases' have a highly seasonal occurrence. 
Food habits, like the drinking of unboiled milk or the eating of poorly 
cooked food and poor sanitation and hygiene are said to be responsible for a 
number of the diseases mentioned above (i.e. especially eye and skin diseases 
as well as worms and brucellosis). It is estimated that only some 35 per cent of 
Kajiado District households have access to clean water and only 25 per cent 
have latrines (see KDDP 1988:221). 
4.4 Economy, Employment and Land Use Patterns 
The economy of Kajiado District is, in spite of the fast increasing importance 
of (irrigated) cultivation, still dominated by the livestock sector. In terms of 
people involved as well as land occupied pastoralism and ranching form the 
core of the district's economy. 
The Kajiado District Development Plan 1989-93 estimated that in 1987 
about 81 per cent of the population derived its livelihood from livestock 
production, with about 67 per cent of the total District labour force being 
involved (see table 4.14). The commercial and cultivation sector in particular 
were expected to grow fast in the 1987-1993 period. Let us briefly introduce 
the main economic sectors of Kajiado District as they exist today. 
Especially in the Loilokilok area ilmurran ace said to flood the classes willing to leam 
Kiswshili and maihemaiics mainly because of their involvement in (be trade of livestock (see 
Kantai 1989b:8). 
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Table 4.14 Kajiado District Labour Force 
Pastoralists 
Agriculture (7,086 households) 
Public sector 
Rest of wage-employment 
Self-employed/unpaid family 
Total Labour Force 
Source: KJJUi1 iyBK:4U 
1987 (nr) 
57,460 
17,602 
3,821 
3475 
3,608 
86,066 
1987 (*) 
66.77 
20.45 
4.44 
4.15 
3.56 
100.00 
Target annual 
growth rale 
2.67 
18.20 
2.0 
7.7 
5.0 
1993 (nr) 
67302 
48,000 
4,303 
5,588 
4,834 
116,3677 
Note: "Rest of Wage employment" is a residual after subtracting public sector employment from 
aggregate data. Pastoralists are also calculated on a residual basis! Self-employment and unpaid 
family labour Is based on licenses issued by the District Trade Office, The Kajiado Urban Council, 
and the OUcejuado County Council. Note that the 1993 total labour force figure does not match 
with the sum of 130,027 workers. 
4.4.1 The Livestock Sector 
Livestock keeping is the economic backbone of the district. In the past the 
predominant system was one of a nomadic pastoralism whereby the people and 
their herds spent within grazing distance of permanent water areas during the 
dry season, while spreading out during the wet season to take advantage of 
pastures that were otherwise unavailable. Since the early 1960s the mobility of 
human beings has become less as people are increasingly settling more 
permanently either freely or by being forced to due to the loss of dry season 
pastures. 
In the foregoing pages some information concerning the livestock sector of 
Kajiado District has already been provided (see section 3.4). For example, table 
3.3 and 3.4 gave numbers of the district's livestock as well as human pastoral 
population for 1969, 1977 and 1988. By way of aerial counts it was estimated 
that by 1988 a total of 475,800 cattle and 639,000 shoats (i.e. 395,900 TLU) 
roamed Kajiado District. These were appraised to be in the hands of some 
124,100 pastoralists, meaning an average livestock ownership of 3.19 
TLU/capita. 
The latest livestock census conducted in Kajiado District by early 1988 
reached a total of 633,338 cattle, 500,430 sheep, 466,505 goats, 17304 
donkeys, 19 camels, 82,251 chickens, 2,143 pigs, 2,245 rabbits and 1,157 
beehives. This is equivalent to a total livestock population of 515,633 SU. 
Table 4.15 provides an overview of livestock numbers and the stocking rate on 
a divisional level. In terms of stock units (SU), it is clear that cattle are the 
most important, making up to 73.2 per cent of the Kajiado District livestock 
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population. Sheep and goats exist in more or less equal numbers.23 
Table 4.15 Divisional Distribution for Different Kinds of Livestock, 1988 
Central 
1,011.615 ha 
(46%) 
Loitolutok 
652.483 ha 
(30%) 
Ngong 
357,883 ha 
(16%) 
Magadi 
188,619 ha 
(8%) 
Kajiado District 
2,210,600 ha 
caule 
270,443 
(43%) 
189,078 
(30%) 
136,387 
(21%) 
37/430 
(6%) 
sheep 
172,334 
(34%) 
77,868 
(16%) 
171,447 
(34%) 
78.781 
(16%) 
Livestock population (nr) 
goals donkeys 
187.440 
(40%) 
72,581 
(15%) 
143,133 
(31%) 
63351 
(14%) 
633.338 500,430 466,505 
Source MoLD 1988 51-54 
8348 
(48%) 
3.882 
(22%) 
2,724 
(16%) 
2.355 
(14%) 
17309 
camels 
9 
(47%) 
4 
(21%) 
6 
(32%) 
0 
(0%) 
19 
chickens 
19,159 
(23%) 
12,800 
(16%) 
49.542 
(60%) 
756 
(1%) 
82,257 
rabbits 
180 
(8%) 
516 
(23%) 
1349 
pigs beehives 
94 
(4%) 
152 
(7%) 
1,897 
(69%) (89%) 
0 
(0%) 
2,245 
0 
(0%) 
2.145 
116 
(6%) 
792 
(40%) 
1,044 
(53%) 
5 
(0 2%) 
1,957 
The information presented in table 4.16 also highliehts the differences between 
divisions with Ngong and Magadi Division representing two extremes. The 
fonner has a much more diversified livestock population than the latter 
reflecting agro-climatic as well as sociological differences as the large presence 
of non-Maasai in Ngong Division is mainly responsible for the bulk of poultry, 
pigs, rabbits and beehives found here. Likewise dairy cattle can mainly be 
observed in the Ngong and Loitokitok Division and some parts of Central 
Division (see KDDP 1988:98).24 The animals reared for commercial milk 
production, besides a few pure exotic breeds like Friesians, are mainly cross 
breeds of S ahi wals with the indigenous small East African Zebus. The latter 
still make up some 60 per cent of the Maasai herds (see KDDP 1988:98). 
In general the high percentage of female cattle represent a double purpose 
characteristic of nomadic pastoralism geared at subsistence and selfsufficiency: 
milk production for domestic consumption and a high rate of reproduction. 
23 
In the past, however, (he importance of smallstock was said to have been minimal Only a 
few households kept smallstock With the exception of the Loitokitok Division, maybe, the 
importance of sheep and goals has Increased sigmficanüy over the last decades. Smallstock is 
mainly used for home slaughter. 
At present the marketing of milk is constrained by a lack of marketing mfrastiucture. 
There are only two milk co-operatives In the district (Ngong and Kajiado Town) Also a lack of 
storage and cooling equipment is a setback Direct milk delivery from producers to consumers Is 
mainly undeitakea near small centres (lomma'ed by non-Maasai. 
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Table 4.16 Kajiado District Livestock Units, 1988 
Central 
Loitokitok 
Ngong 
Magadi 
Kajiado Distnct 
Cattle % 
160.628 75 1 
116,823 83 7 
77.124 64 7 
22.877 53 2 
377,452 73 2 
Source MOLD 1988 1UI-1U2 
Sheep % 
21.542 101 
9,733 7 0 
21,432 18 0 
9.848 229 
62355 12 1 
Goats % 
23,432 109 
9,073 6 5 
17,892 15 0 
7,920 18 4 
58317 113 
Donkeys 
8,348 
3,882 
2.724 
2,355 
17309 
% 
39 
28 
23 
55 
34 
Total SU 
213,950 
139311 
119,172 
43.000 
515,633 
% 
42 
27 
23 
8 
100 
peroent 
100 % of total SU 
23% 
Cattle Sheep Goats Donkeys 
Figure 4.8 Distribution of Stock Units by Division and Type of Animal 
Source MoLD 1988 
Comparing the average 58 5 percentage of mature female cattle in the Kajiado 
Distnct herds with figures of the past seems to suggest that the rate of 
commercialization by way of a meat-onented hvestock production is stall 
modest (see table 4.17) In the latter case the percentage of steers for fattening 
in the producer's herd is very high 
Table 4.17 Composition of Cattle Herds by Division, 1988 
Central 
Loitokitok 
Ngong 
Magadi 
Kajiado D 
Bulls % 
7312 27 
5314 29 
3,410 25 
949 25 
16,910 27 
bouree MoLU 1988 6У-Л 
Steers % 
49.699 184 
20,462 10 8 
2.044 15 
5.982 160 
73,911 117 
Cows % 
96348 35 6 
85362 45 2 
61375 45 0 
15.471 170 
264.609 41 8 
Heifers % 
45,071 167 
32,869 174 
23,187 17 0 
5,898 15 8 
105.767 16 7 
Calves * 
72,013 26 6 
44,871 237 
46371 340 
9,130 244 
172,141 27 2 
Total 
Caule 
270,443 
189.078 
136,387 
37,430 
633,338 
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The marketing of livestock is an important mechanism for the Maasai 
pastoralists acquiring cash which, in turn, is used to buy goods and services 
ranging from food, clothing, medication and schooling to the purchase of 
(upgraded) breeding stock and livestock production inputs (e.g. acaracides, salt, 
veterinary drugs). Outbreaks of diseases or periods of drought will force the 
pastoralists to sell. Shortly after a period of distress, herders need to rebuild 
their herds and flocks and are not willing to market their animals. As a result 
pastoral livestock offtake rates fluctuate widely over time. Official livestock 
offtake figures for Kajiado District are presented in table 4.18. 
Table 4.18 Production and Marketing Trends, Cattle and Shoats 1983-89 
Cattlt 
Populauon 
Sale for slaugbler 
Offtake* 
Tons of Beef 
Shoals 
Population 
Sale for slaughter 
Offtake % 
Tons of Meat 
1983 
692,020 
60,788 
88 
9,119 
1,200,000 
47,899 
40 
958 
1984 
311,409 
126.680 
407 
10,029 
918,500 
39,400 
43 
788 
1985 
436,318 
56.563 
13 0 
8,785 
1,000.000 
25,032 
26 
513 
1986 
442,635 
47,758 
108 
7.164 
1,000,000 
25,632 
25 
504 
1987 
662,329 
51,158 
77 
7,674 
1,000,000 
23.844 
24 
477 
1988 
633,338 
966.935 
1989 
703,731 
56.483 
77 
8,472 
1,300.861 
34,809 
27 
696 
Source RUUH im IIHJ, MoLU/AK m\) 8 
In section 3.4 reference has already been made to "normal" traditional herd 
offtake figures of 10 per cent as compared to some 25 per cent for commercial 
ranchers. White and Meadows estimated nonnal Maasai cattle offtake rates of 
17 per cent during the 1960s and 1970s, showing extremes of up to 38.3 per 
cent (249,866 cattle) and as low as 10.0 per cent (20,955) for the 1975/76 
drought and 1962/63 post-drought periods. ILCA found livestock net offtake 
figures of 9-14 per cent. Commercial selling comprised some 64-75 per cent. 
Other, often neglected, grounds for extracting animals from one's herd were 
exchange (5-12 per cent), gifts (12 per cent) and home slaughter (12 per cent) 
(see Bekure et al. 1987:315). Kajiado District's livestock marketing system 
functions by a chain of intermediate selling places, stock traders and livestock 
trekkers." 
Unfortunately, as highlighted in box 4.5, the livestock marketing 
infrastructure in Kajiado District is poorly developed. Evangelou (1984:9), 
however, estimated that two-thirds of the beef, mutton and goat meat 
consumed in Nairobi comes from Maasailand (i.e. Narok and Kajiado District). 
As mentioned in section 3 4 range conditions and an increase in cash demand were fourni 
to be major determinants for cattle sales Not surprisingly then that poor households are 
characterized by higher offtake rales than are wealthy families 
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Box 4.5 Kajiado District Livestock Markets 
Within Kajiado Distnct livestock is maiketed at 13 centres scattered over the district, though a high 
conceotralua can be found m the north western pan of the distnct in the Ngoog region (Email, 
Dbissil, Isinya, Kajiado, Kibiko, Kisamis, Kisenan, Kitengela, Mbinkam, Mile 46, Namanga, 
Ongata Rongai and Rombo) Ongata Rongai, situated along the Nairobi-Mombasa road bordering 
Nairobi city, is (on a weekly base) the most important market of Kajiado District It has two 
slaughterhouses and over 20 butcheries 
A survey conducted by ASAL at the end of 1988 in 10 operative livestock markets revealed that 
after correcting for differences in marketing days approximately 1,078 head of cattle were officially 
marketed m these centres per week Of these 56 per cent were steers, 13 per cent bulls, 25 per cent 
fonale cattle and 6 per cent calves 
Livestock pnces differ per market centre (the closer to the final buyer the higher), (season of the) 
year, and differences per animals m terms of sex, type and physical appearance In general healthy, 
exotic, mature bulls or productive females will be most expensive, while old, sick, weak and lood 
Zebu will go for very low pnces Average market pnces for slaughter stock were Ksh 2,755/-, Ksh 
3,068/- and Ksh 2,129/- for steers, bulls and females Calves for rearing were bought at Ksh 971/-
Small stock sales totalled some 755 a week. Kisenan and Namanga are the most important small 
stock markets Mean buying pnces were Ksh 298/-, 273/-, 314/- and 319/- for a male goat (62 per 
cent), female goat (17 per cent), male sheep (16 per cent) and female sheep (5 per cent), 
respecovely 
The operating days of the Kajiado Distnct livestock markets vary from one to six days a week 
Sometimes, as a result of outbreaks of disease market centres are closed for an unknown period 
altogether Two types of markets can be distinguished intermediale or terminate In the first market 
the animals after being sold (large stock mostly) are transported live to other markets In the latter 
case the animals are finally slaughtered m a nearby slaughterhouse The meat is either consumed 
locally or uansfored to other places (Nairobi mostly) The market centres in Kajiado Distnct act as 
a land of chain through which roughly speaking, livestock is transported from the inner parts of the 
distnct towards the local, Nairobi or Mombasa consumer, to Machakos Distnct or to local 
pastoralists for reanng purposes The mam buyers are local butchers, livestock rearas and traders 
(Kamba, Kikuyu mostly as well as some Maasai and Luo) Three main types of livestock traders 
can be disffliguisbed 
1 a first group of livestock traders buys to order for butchers or restaurants m Nairobi or other 
outside destinations 
2 a second group acts as middleman between the initial seller and the ultimale buyer They buy at 
the boma or mtennediale market (e g Email) and sell at a higher pnce at a terminate market 
located near the final destination (e g Ongaa Rongai located near Nairobi) Between the onginal 
boma and the final buyer an animal may have changed hands 2-6 tunes This change of 
ownership m most cases takes place outside the official market channel simply along the 
trekking routes 
3 a thud group of livestock traders represents those people involved in speculation They buy and 
sell m the same centre a few days later In this way they try to make a small profit 
Market centres are also visited by people willing to buy livestock for improving and rebuilding their 
own herd or for reanng purposes Calves, young steers and emaciated females are used in this latter 
respect, when after fattening they are sold to fetch a higher pnce Email market is the leading 
centre for purchasing reanng animals in the distnct 
Live transport is the main method of getting animals to market Though cheaper than motorized 
transportation u is time-consummg and reduces the animal's weight and as a consequence its pnce 
The trekking routes are more or less fixed After payment of a trekking fee permits are issued by 
the Kajiado County Council allowing transport of the animals along the route In order to avoid this 
payment animals are illegally moved by night sometunes In general these trekkers, Maasai mainly, 
also charge a certain pnce (eg up to Ksh 700/- for the Namanga-Nairobi route lasting 3 days) 
Additional costs have to be paid for slaughtering, totalling some Ksh 6<V- to Ksh 75/- for large 
and Ksh 20/- to Ksh 30/- for small stock at the tune of late 1988 In other words traders have to 
meet costs involving transport, fees and buying pnces in relation to their revenues composed of the 
selling pnces of the animal as well as the selling of the skin, head, hoofs and intestines Meat 
selling pnces per kg were Ksh 27/- or Ksh 28/- for large stock and Ksh 28/- to Ksh 30/- for 
small stock 
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It should be realized that actual offtake estimates for Kajiado District are hard 
to determine because of a not insignificant number of cattle illegally imported 
from Tanzanian Maasailand.26 It would seem reasonable to conclude that 
overall Maasai herd offtake rates are not as low as often suggested. 
The Ministry of Livestock Development estimated that about 58 per cent of all 
hides and skins in 1988 had been smuggled from Tanzania (see table 4.19). In 
chapter 2 we saw that the export of hides and skins was the most important 
revenue earner of the Kenyan livestock sector (Ksh. 271.7 million for 1989). 
Kajiado hide & skin traders earned over Ksh. 2S.2 million in 1989 (see 
MoLD/AR 1989:10). Average hide prices ranged from Ksh. 20/- to 40/- per kg 
depending on the quality. Small stock skins sold at between Ksh. 10/- and 40/-
a piece. 
Table 4.19 Hides and Skin Production 1983-89 (nr) 
Year Cattle Hides Sheep skins Goatskins 
82,520 
83.089 
121,787 
92,395 
109,173 
154,289 
81,792 
85,259 
69,603 
117,866 
102,367 
124,131 
162,723 
125,656 
145,538 
131,431 
228,863 
181,443 
213,480 
245,421 
172,861 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
Source KDDH 1У8В ІЦУ, MoLU/AR 1У8У 8 
Mention should also be made of the production and marketing of milk. 
Commercial dairy cattle are to be found mainly in small stretches of high 
potential areas of Ngong and Loitokitok Division. Otherwise the majority of 
the cows are local less productive Zebu. The Kajiado Ministry of Livestock 
Department estimated a total production of 99 million litres of milk for 1988, 
of which only some 2 million litres were officially marketed. In other words, a 
mean daily production of some 271,000 litres by 264,609 cows suggests an 
average of one litre per adult female head of cattle. Actual daily production 
will be somewhat higher as the period of lactation is approximately 300 days. 
Production during the wet season will be higher than in the dry season. Maasai 
management also influences milk availability for human consumption by 
regulating the time calves are allowed to suckle. 
Commercial milk production of some importance is currently concentrated 
in the high-potential zones of the district Near urban centres like Kajiado 
Town, Namanga, Bissel and the like some ranchers also sell to the local 
population or to a co-operative. In the rest of the district surplus production is 
Caule smuggling from Tanzania mainly follows the Namanga-Bissel or Meto-Bissel stock 
routes Anally ending m Email or the Nairobi neighbouring markets of Ongatt Rongai, Kibiko and 
Dagoretu Arusha or Kisonko Maasai (rom Tanzania act as partners for their Kenyan counterparts 
Major setbacks for local producers are the importation of diseases, and low(er) livestock pnces 
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restricted to the wet season mainly and still subsistence oriented. A major 
factor hindering commercial milk production is the lack of a good marketing 
system and the absence of an adequate number of milk coolers.27 
Finally, in 1988 some 2.54 million eggs, 17,612 chickens and 10 tons of 
honey were officially sold. While eggs and honey sales almost doubled as 
compared to 1984 the sale of chickens has decreased from some 30,000. Again 
most of this produce resulted from Ngong and to a lesser extent Loitokitok 
Division. 
With regard to livestock production and the land tenure system Kajiado District 
faces a very turbulent phase. Group ranches formed from the 1960s onwards in 
most parts of the district are now in a process of subdivision. This will result 
in an enormous increase in the number and land covered by individually 
owned ranches. Before subdivision small individual holdings already existed, 
especially in the Ngong and Loitokitok Divisions, as a result of land 
consolidation and the selling out to non-Maasai. Large individual ranches 
mostly owned by Maasai covering between 300 to 800 ha can be found 
concentrated along both sides of the Namanga - Kajiado main road; near 
Konza; north of Рока (subdivided) group ranch; east of Elang'ata Wuas group 
ranch; near Kimana; north of Olkiramatian group ranch; west of Kitengela and 
otherwise in small pockets scattered all over the district (see figure 4.9). 
4.4.2 The Agricultural Sector 
Though Kajiado District's economy is dominated by livestock production, the 
importance of cultivation in terms of land occupation and, even more 
profoundly, by the number of producers involved is increasing rapidly. 
The Kajiado District 1988 Faim Census counted a total of 7,846 farming 
households (59,700 people) holding a total area of some 46,841 ha. It should 
be noted, however, that some farmers, Maasai mainly, mentioned large chunks 
of land owned, with only a small part being arable or cultivated. The actual 
area under cultivation was therefore 13,823 ha (0.7 per cent of district surface) 
with only some 34,444 ha (1.7 per cent) considered arable (see table 4.20). 
In section 4.1 we concluded that Kajiado District's agricultural potential is 
limited. This is more due to the unfavourable rainfall/temperature situation and 
physical impediments such as steep slopes, extreme rockiness, salinity and 
sodicity than to actual soil fertility. 
According to (he Kajiado Duina Ministry of Livestock Development 1989 annual report 
two dauy oo-operauve societies are operauve in the district ( ie Oloolaiser in Ngong and 
Olkejuado m Kajiado Town. A third one called Kule was formed ш Knengela in 1989 Like 
Oloolaiser it received a new milk cooler of 1,200 litres capacity In total 891,233 litres of milk 
were delivered to the dairy co-operatives (Ngong mainly 809,049 litres) as compared to 489322 
litres for 1988. Milk was either sold locally or to the KCC or used ю make cheese (see MoLD/AK 
1989 11) (see also section 10S 3) 
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Table 4.20 Kajiado District Farmer' Household Size Related to Possessed, 
Arable and Cultivated Land, 1988 
Central Ngong Magadi Loicotatok Loiiotatok Kajiado Disinct 
(n=954) (№2,314) (n=273) Ram Fed Irrigated (»-7,846) 
(ii»2,751) (іі=1.5Я) 
mean sum mean sum mean sum mean sum mean sum mean sum 
HS(pp) 9 44 9,006 7 47 17.286 5 68 1,551 7 87 21,650 660 10,256 761 59,708 
LH (ha) 18 54 17,687 6 3214,624 4 15 1,133 5 28 14,525 2 54 3,947 5 97 46,841 
LA (ha) 8 77 8,367 5 2112,056 400 1.092 401 11,032 2 22 3,450 4 39 34,444 
LC(ha) 125 1,193 110 2,545 163 445 2 83 7,791 119 1,849 176 13.823 
source autnor's denvauon based on raw data lUjiaao uismct t-ann census ІУ8» 
Note HS= household size, LH= Land holding, LA= Land arable, L O Land culivated. 
According to Ecosystems (1982:9) a maximum of 4 per cent of the district's 
surface is located in agro-climatic zone IV having soils with an unimpeded 
high-fertility. Some 13 per cent of these good soils are located in zone V. For 
medium-feitile soils these figures are 2 and 14 per cent, respectively. In other 
words, at best some 33 per cent of the district's surface has some potential for 
agriculture, though with a variable need for increasing soil fertility or provision 
of water. This suggests that by 1990 the total cultivated area is still a fraction 
of its potential. 
For 1980, Campbell (1979a:7) estimated a total Kajiado District farming 
population of 31,779 people and 4,965 farms covering 17,378 ha. His 
predictions for the year 2000, based on a 3.3 per cent growth rate, were 60,834 
people, 9,505 farms and 33,268 ha cultivated. With regard to the number of 
farmers at least Campbell's predictions are probably conservative, especially 
considering the fact that the 1988 Farm Census did not cover some newly 
opened fanning zones. Table 4 21 presents the variation in size of landholdings 
for each of Kajiado District's divisions, the area considered arable and the 
actually cultivated territory. 
Over 53 per cent of all fanners cultivated a total tract of land of less than 
one hectare. As expected, the irrigating farmers cultivated small plots. An 
exception should be made for the Magadi region, however, where land 
holdings show a less biased distribution. When taking into account the 
ethnicity of the farmers a pattern emerges of Maasai landowners having large 
plots, while non-Maasai were over-represented in the 0-1 ha plots (see note 
table 4.21). 
This presence and continuing influx of non-Maasai into Kajiado District 
made Ecosystems (1982) postulate a much faster growth of the cultivated area 
in the district Indeed of all farming households only some 27 per cent are of 
Maasai origin. Kikuyu cultivators make up almost half of all Kajiado District 
farmers (see table 4.22). 
Table 4.21 Distribution of Plot Size Categories over Possessed, Arable and Cultivated Landholdings Among Kajiado 
District Fanners by Agricultural Division, 1988 (%) 
Plot 
size 
(ha) 
0-1 
1-2 
2-3 
M 
4-5 
5-15 
7.5-10 
10-15 
15-20 
20-50 
50-100 
>100 
Central 
(1) 
38.4 
22.5 
10.6 
2.1 
5.3 
1.5 
3.0 
2.3 
0.8 
3.4 
2.7 
7.4 
(2) 
415 
25.6 
11.8 
3.3 
4.2 
2.7 
2.0 
0.7 
0.2 
Z9 
1.6 
3.5 
(3) 
58.7 
28.7 
8.0 
1.1 
1.4 
1.1 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0.3 
0.1 
0.0 
Ngong 
(1) 
34.7 
22.5 
18.1 
4.3 
5.2 
4.7 
17 
2.4 
1.1 
2.1 
1.0 
1.1 
(2) 
35.6 
23.1 
18.0 
4.7 
5.2 
4.5 
2.6 
2.0 
1.1 
1.6 
0.8 
0.8 
(3) 
62.2 
24.5 
8.3 
Zl 
1.2 
1.0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.1 
0.3 
0.0 
0.0 
Magadi 
(1) 
9.9 
17.9 
16.8 
10.6 
11.4 
19.4 
10.3 
1.8 
0.4 
1.5 
0.0 
0.0 
(2) 
9.9 
17.9 
17.6 
11.0 
11.7 
19.8 
8.4 
2.2 
0.0 
1.5 
0.0 
0.0 
(3) 
32.2 
39.6 
14.7 
8.1 
2.6 
15 
0.7 
0.4 
0.0 
0.4 
0.0 
0.0 
Loitokitok RF 
(1) 
33.7 
24.5 
15.7 
5.0 
65 
4.6 
1.7 
3.6 
1.0 
Z8 
0.4 
0.5 
(2) 
34.2 
24.2 
15.8 
5.1 
6.4 
4.9 
2.2 
3.5 
1.0 
2.2 
0.4 
0.2 
(3) 
35.6 
26.0 
16.0 
5.3 
5.5 
4.6 
2.3 
2.5 
0.6 
1.4 
0.1 
0.1 
Loitokitok IR 
(1) 
46.8 
25.7 
13.9 
4.5 
2.8 
2.6 
0.9 
1.8 
0.5 
0.4 
0.0 
0.2 
(2) 
48.0 
27.4 
13.4 
4.6 
2.5 
1.9 
0.8 
0.6 
0.2 
0.3 
0.0 
0.2 
(3) 
74.4 
18.1 
4.1 
1.5 
1.1 
0.3 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
Kajiado District 
(1) 
35.8 
23.7 
15.9 
4.7 
5.5 
4.6 
2.3 
17 
0.9 
11 
0.7 
1.1 
(2) 
36.7 
24.3 
16.0 
5.0 
5.3 
4.6 
2.3 
12 
0.8 
1.7 
05 
0.6 
(3) 
53.8 
24.8 
10.4 
3.2 
18 
11 
0.9 
1.0 
0.3 
0.6 
0.1 
0.0 
bouree: aumor s oenvauon Dasea on raw data lujiaoo District farm census ivss 
Note: (1) land owned or rented; (2) arable land; (3) cultivated land; RF = rainfed cutlivauon; IR = irrigated cultivation. 
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Table 43.2 Ethnicity and Tenurial Status Kajiado District Fanners (% of all) 
(n=7.846) 
Maasai 
Kjkuyu 
Kamba 
Other 
Total 
Source auUior's 
Owner 
226 
33 0 
41 
13 
610 
oenvauon oasea 
Tenant 
36 
14 2 
62 
122 
362 
on raw oata luiia 
Sharecropper 
04 
01 
01 
0 2 
0.8 
Else 
02 
16 
01 
01 
20 
do District harm Census 1Ш№ 
Total 
268 
48 9 
10.5 
13.8 
1000 
Note, figures have been adjusted for non-response and unknown categories 
Land tenure arrangements show that in majority land is owned (61.0 per cent) 
or rented (36.2 per cent).28 The favourable position of Maasai fanners and to 
a lesser extent of Kikuyu cultivators is also shown. 
Differences also exist among the group of cultivators in objectives of 
production. Table 4.23 clarifies that overall subsistence production, either 
solely or in combination with a market-orientation, prevails in the district A 
mere 7.8 per cent of the farmers, Maasai mainly, claimed to practise 
commercial cultivation without producing for their own subsistence. 
The non-Maasai cultivators can mainly be found in the high-potential areas 
of Ngong and Loitokitok divisions Kikuyu fanners, in particular, dominate 
these regions. In the most lucrative, irrigated regions of Loitokitok and Magadi 
Division, the Maasai are still the most important ethnic group present (see also 
section 7.S.1 for more details). Table 4.24 also highlights the variation in the 
object of production over the divisions. Irrespective of the ethnicity of the 
fanner, production in Ngong and Central divisions is geared at subsistence 
level. 
The Loitokitok and Magadi areas are populated by cultivators interested also in 
additional commercial agriculture. In total the Kajiado District 1988 Farm 
Census counted 35 different crop types cultivated by Kajiado fanners. Maize 
and beans are the most important crops grown. Farmers practising rainfed 
agriculture restrict themselves to these crops either in pure or in intercropped 
stands. The Census revealed that at least in one out of three seasons 
(April/May 1987, November/December 1987 and April/May 1988) 79 and 78 
per cent of all Kajiado District farmers grew maize and beans, respectively. 
This was followed by tomatoes (14 per cent), irish potatoes (11 per cent), 
onions (9 per cent) and bananas (4 per cent). 
Shareoopping ("KanpunT) is the most dominant land tenure anangeiratt m the Namelok 
irrigated scheme In general the Maasai landlord provides land, water, seeds, chemicals and 
fertiliza, while the sharecropper contributes his labour for irrigation, maintenance, weeding, 
spraying and guarding. Both are involved in harvesting and marketing After selling of the produce 
the revenue is divided equally after subtraction of the mput costs. 
Table 4.23 Ethnicity and Objective of Cultivation, Kajiado District 
Massai 
Kikuyu 
Kamba 
Other 
Total (n) 
2,164 
3.757 
873 
1,052 
Subsistence 
12 3 
248 
53 
26 
Commercial 
3 4 
2 6 
0 7 
11 
Subsistence & 
Commercial 
И З 
2 1 0 
4 8 
9 9 
All 7,846 
Source autnor's oenvauon Dased on raw dala Kajiado District harm census 1988 
Note figures have been adjusted for non-response and unknown categories 
45 2 78 47 0 
Table 4.24 Objecti 
Subsistence 
Commercial 
Subs & Com. 
Subsistence 
Commercial 
Subs & Com. 
ve of Cultivation by Ethnicity and 
Central (954) 
Maasai 
(474) 
914 
05 
81 
Kikuyu 
(122) 
667 
3 8 
295 
Loltokltok RF (2,731) 
Maasai 
(559) 
250 
0 6 
74 4 
source autnors oenvauon Dased ι 
Kikuyu 
(1.169) 
160 
13 
82 7 
Kamba 
(339) 
85 0 
20 
13 0 
Kamba 
(250) 
43 2 
0 4 
56 4 
Other 
(19) 
647 
0 0 
35 3 
Other 
(773) 
19 5 
17 
78 8 
D i v i s i o n 
Ngong (2,314) 
Maasai 
(379) 
85 3 
0 8 
13 9 
Kikuyu 
(1.847) 
863 
12 
125 
Loltokltok IR (1.554) 
Maasai 
(620) 
58 
43 6 
506 
m raw data Kajiado Uistnd Farm Census 1988 
Kikuyu 
(567) 
3 0 
314 
65 7 
(51) 
813 
21 
16 7 
Kamba 
(152) 
2 8 
27 7 
69 5 
Other 
(37) 
829 
29 
14 3 
Other 
(215) 
10 
35 2 
63 8 
Magadi IR (273) 
Maasai 
(132) 
42 3 
0 8 
56 9 
Kikuyu 
(52) 
15 7 
0 0 
843 
Kajiado District (7.846) 
Maasai 
(2.164) 
45 6 
126 
418 
Kikuyu 
(3.757) 
513 
5 3 
43 4 
Kamba 
(81) 
6 3 
25 
913 
Kamba 
(873) 
49 9 
61 
440 
Other 
(8) 
500 
125 
37 5 
O u » 
(1.052) 
19 1 
8 3 
72 6 
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Table 4.25 Production and Consumption of Some Major Crops by Settled 
Fanners in Kajiado District, 1983-88 
Crop/Year Production 
(Tons) 
30354 
3,174 
24,478 
26,508 
37,835 
2,460 
868 
16.575 
23,744 
26.887 
4,704 
1.914 
3,614 
4.116 
10.443 
Consumption 
(Tons) 
3,562 
3,706 
4,994 
6.571 
6.803 
1,781 
1,853 
2,497 
3.286 
3.402 
851 
894 
1,572 
1,628 
1,637 
Surplus Surplus Value 
(Tons) (K£) 
Maize 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
Potatoes 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
Horticultural 
Crops 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
26,792 
-532 
19,484 
19,937 
31,032 
679 
-985 
14,078 
20,458 
23.485 
3.853 
1,020 
2,043 
2,488 
8,806 
1,568,076 
-59,628 
1,794,693 
2,437,852 
3,238,534 
90,533 
-32,696 
3,851,010 
5,330,445 
6,132,194 
319,240 
18,124 
212,368 
344,177 
798,704 
8,309 
5,348 
13,541 
7,618 
566 
666 
889 
681 
7,743 
4,682 
12.652 
6,937 
1,606.673 
883,490 
3,161.735 
1,191,083 
Source: KUUP 1488:50; МоАУАК ШЪ lor ШЪ horticultural crops 
Table 4.25 shows the estimated production and consumption of major crops by 
Kajiado District settled agriculturalists. In ternis of district needs these fanners 
(excluding those households that practised some additional cultivation in 
addition to livestock keeping) were even able to produce surpluses over total 
district demands in 1987 with the exception of potatoes. The total surplus of 
agricultural production was estimated at K£ 1,200,560 (see KDDP 1988:51). 
As with differences in the objects of production and the fanner's ethnicity the 
divisions show specific characteristics with regard to crops cultivated. It is the 
Loitokitok area in particular where approximately 80 per cent of food crops are 
produced. Least involved in crop production is Central Division, although 
cultivation of crops (maize, beans, tomatoes) in this division is on the increase. 
However, Central Division farmers often face crop failure while, for the same 
season Ngong, Loitokitok and Magadi claim success (see MoA/AR 1985:17). 
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In the ungated areas in particular horticultural crops (e.g tomatoes, onions), 
"Asian vegetables" (e.g okra, chillies) and fruits (e.g melons, mangos, oranges) 
are grown in addition to maize and beans. In Ngong tomato growing is more 
important than in Loitokitok, where the cultivation of onions and Asian 
vegetables is concentrated. Magadi Division is famous for its mangos, oranges 
and other fruits. 
The growing of industrial crops such as coffee, pyrethrum and cotton has 
followed a pattern of rise and decline throughout the years. Overall, production 
was on a modest scale due to quota regulations, low profitability and a lack of 
processing facilities. Pyrethrum is an exclusively Ngong grown crop. Cotton is 
mainly grown in Rombo and Kimana and some in Nguruman. As a result of 
the rise of onion cultivation cotton farming has decreased. Coffee was uprooted 
in the late 1970s in Ngong leaving Loitokitok as the most important coffee 
farming location. 
Table 4.26 summarises particulars of the Kajiado District's most important 
irrigation schemes. With the exception of Nguruman all of these schemes are 
located in Loitokitok Division. It should be noted that the acreages presented 
are official figures which are lower than the totals found in the 1988 Farm 
Census survey. In contrast, the latter survey counted less fanners. In any case, 
Loitokitok Division has the 3rd highest concentration of irrigation activities, in 
terms of hectares cropped as well as in terms of number of plot-holders within 
Kenya after Mwea Division (5,818 ha) in Kirinyaga District and Bura Division 
(2,454 ha) in Tana River District (see Statistical Abstract 1990:112). 
Water sources for irrigation are springs or connected rivers. A system of 
main and small trenches leads, by way of gravity, to individual plots which are 
either flat or filled with small ridges. Temporary weirs of timber, stones or 
mud are applied to regulate the flooding of the fields. Irrigation of a plot takes 
about 2-4 hours every 7-16 days. Irrigation in Loitokitok was started as an 
autonomous process. In contrast to other irrigation schemes (e.g. Bura) no 
financial subsidies have ever been received from the Government Lacking on-
river water storage facilities irrigation is directly dependant on spring yields. 
In general there is a 30 per cent variation in water yield, which could 
increase with progressive degradation of water catchment areas. Irrigation in 
Nguruman is said to have a huge potential. Its area has increased from 6 ha in 
the 1960s to approximately 175 ha by 1987. Potential areas for the extension 
of irrigated agriculture are said to be Kitengela in Central Division, Euaso 
Kedong' in Ngong Division and Inkisanchani, Illasit/Olkaria and Elang'ata -
Enkima/Oloorika in Loitokitok Division (see MoA/AR 1987:22). 
According to Kimani (1988:5/23) 90 per cent of the Loitokitok produce is 
thought to be destined for Mombasa some 300-400 km away, while the 
division accounts for 70 per cent of the tum-over of the Mombasa wholesale 
market in onions and tomatoes. 
Table 4.26 Kajiado District Imgation Schemes, 1988 
Inigation scheme 
(group ranch) 
Dale started Farmers Ha Nr of Source 
hMTOWs 
Main o o p s l ient 
КаЬУут/асге 
Ethnic groups 
l.Kimam 
(Kimana Tikoodo) 
2. Tikondo 
(Kimana litando) 
3. Rombo 
(Rombo) 
4. Tnlfieftwhani 
(Kuku) 
S.Illasit 
(individua) ranch) 
6. Osoit (Okxnka) 
(individual ranch) 
7. Impinn 
(Kuku) 
S.Namelok 
mid-1950s 
mid-1950s 
1950s 
300 
240 
734 
early 1950s 220 
early 1980s 27 
1986 
1974/82 
1976/82 
(Olgulului/Kimaiia/Mbiiikani) 
9. Isinet 
(Kimana Tikondo) 
10. Bang'ata Eiddma/ 
Okxxika 
(Kuku) 
11. Nguruman 
(Olkiramatian) 
1950s 
1974 
1978 
1986 
30 
200 
375 
120 
160 
200 
182 
49 
395 
121 
Π 
8 
89 
250 
73 
65 
140 
12 
18 
Kimana river-spring on, to, av, mz, be, cb TOW- U, ch, ka, ma 
Tikoodo springs/Impiron river on, to, mz, be, ba 7 Id, ch, ka, ma 
RomboOlcborro springs av, lo, on, mz, be ? ch, ki. ma 
Nootturesh on, to, ka, mz, so, be, pe Ksh. 400-1,000 n a , ka, cb. ki 
Kikelelwa river/Mto wa Eliud to, on, cb, mz, ba Ksh. 1,000 ц ¡¡^ lu, ka, cb 
spring 7 7 
cluster of springs/Impiron river on, to, mz, be, pe, cb, ci 7 
CH Makau spriog/Egumi spring on, to, mz, ka, ca 7 
Isinet river on, to, mz, cb, ka 7 
Noohuresb oo, to, ka, mz 7 
Id, ma, lu, ka, cb 
ma, ki 
ma 
ma, k a , c h 
ma, ka. Id, lb, ch 
Oknbortoto/Enlasopia river mz, be, on, pw, mg, ok, ci 7 
ma, ka ,ki 
Source: Kimam 1УНН; 1ШЛК 1988 
Note: oii=ooions; to=tomatoes; av=asian vegetables; mz=maize; 
ca=carrots; pw=papaws; mg=mangos; ok=okra; 
be=beans; cb^abbage; ba=bananas; ks=kales; so=sorghum; pe=peas; ci=citrus; cs=cassava 
ld=Kilaiyu; ka=Kaiiiba; ch=Chagga; ma=Maasai; lu=Luo; lb=Luhya. 
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Asian vegetables, mainly grown in Rombo, are destined for the export market 
(e.g. EEC countries). A major problem for the fanners are high transport costs 
resulting from poorly maintained roads in the district and high rents for the 
renting of boxes supplied by the Mombasa-based brokers.29 A drop in market 
prices frequently leads to a loss to the farmer, especially for tomatoes. Nearby 
Nairobi is the most important market for the Ngong fanners. 
4.4 J Other Economic Activities 
Beside livestock and cultivation exploitation of mineral resources and tourism 
are the most important activities in the district, both from an economic as from 
a land use point of view (see figure 4.9). 
Most obvious in this respect is the Magadi Soda Company which, in 1911, 
was granted a 99 year lease concession in the Magadi Division of some 900 
Km2 comprising the waters of Lake Magadi and its surroundings. The Magadi 
Soda Company is Kenya's oldest chemical industrial concern and one of its 
largest30 Lake Magadi contains a virtually inexhaustible supply of crude 
soda.31 Soda ash (sodium carbonate) is mainly used for the production of 
glass. Other applications are in the manufacturing of soap, oil refining and the 
paper industry. 
At the time of Independence the Magadi Soda Company produced some 
140,000 tons of soda ash a year and contributed £ 1 . 5 million annually to 
The Loitokuok-Emali road is the worst mam road I have seen in the whole of Kenya. It 
took one bumpy and dusty hour to do a mere IS km. Recently, road improvement has started 
which could possibly increase the profitability of horticultural production m the Loitokitok 
Division In 1987, ASAL-Kajiado Programme supported the start of the 'Loitokitok Horticultural 
Fanners Association' with a Ksh 50,0(XV· grant However, suspicion among members of the co-
operative resulted in the collapse of the LHFA Brokers moved m again to continue their 
exploiting practices In 1991, ASAL promised to help revive the co-operative by putting up a 
buying shed and through the provision of carpentry tools for tomato-box production (see Kajiado 
Focus 1991a.7). Both improvements could possibly result in the extension of the Irrigated area. 
3 0
 Initially the first Magadi Company went bankrupt in 1923, due to the effects of World 
War I as well as to competition from manufacturers in Europe By 1926 the Company became part 
of the Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd (ICI) today's most important Bnush industrial company 
Recently, ICI decided to sell its soda activities to Pennce-Auslraha for 90 million Bnush pounds 
(see Volkskrant 28/D6/91) 
Lake Magadi is a natural wonder It is located in the lowest depression of the Rift Valley 
and is continuously fed by innumerable hot springs with water containing two per cent sodium 
carbonate and bicarbonate, one per cent salt, and a small proportion of sodium fluoride High 
temperatures of up to 40°C and low relative humidity of 23-40% results in an evaporation of 7-8 
times as high as the annual rainfall As a result crystals have formed a mort-like mass called trona 
of 20 km long and 2-3 km wide, which is so (luck thai one can easily drive a car over it The 
trona is scrapped and the crude material transported to a manufacturing plant where mainly soda 
ash and salt are produced Because the lake has no outlet the increase is far in excess of the 
amounts being removed 
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Kenya's export earnings. Independence, however, cut off its considerable soda 
ash exports to South Africa and production fell significantly.32 By the early 
1970s, annual production had recovered to 160,000 tons. Over 90 per cent of 
production is exported mainly to the Far East (i.e. over 60 per cent is 
transported to countries like Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines). 
By the early 1980s, production fell to some 147,000 tons of soda ash of 
which only 27,000 tons were exported. The company operated at a loss until 
the mid-1980s when an all time record production of 237,650 tons was reached 
of which 229,000 tons valued at Ksh. 283 million were exported. This was 
equivalent to 1.5 per cent of Kenya's total export earnings. In 1989 207,000 
tons were exported valued at Ksh. 442 million equivalent to 2.2 per cent of 
Kenya's total export value. 
Locally, the Magadi Soda Company provides a source of employment to 
some 700 workers (mainly non-Maasai), both permanent and temporary, by the 
late 1980s. These are settled in flatbuildings erected by the company. The 
Company has also taken care of its own hospital, school, water provision, 
railway, tarmac road, sports facilities, and the like. In addition to local 
employment spin-off effects have been created for the Mombasa Port, Kenya 
Railways and local glass industries mainly. 
Since the mid-1970s Government officials regularly voiced Kenya's 
willingness to acquire a majority share within the Company. Due to a lack of 
funds this has never materialized. The Magadi Soda Company pays royalties to 
Central Government (Ksh. 20 million by 1981) leaving the local council empty 
handed. To offset this situation the OCC repeatedly proposed the introduction 
of ал annual levy of Ksh. 10/- per acre owned. 
Another important mining industry of Kajiado District is the quarring of 
marble and limestone. The oldest and most important firm in the district is the 
Kenya Marble Quarries (KMQ) located south-west of Kajiado Town along the 
Magadi railway. Besides its traditional use for decorating buildings, marble is 
used in the shoe, chemical and steel industry, in a variety of products such as 
rubber soles, insecticides, paints and stockfeeds. 
Another important location where limestone is found is the Kibim quarry in 
south Kaputiei which has been exploited for the production of cement by the 
Portland Cement Company. The latter's processing factory is located at Athi 
River, bordering Kajiado District The largest marble producing company of 
Kenya and shoe and leather companies using raw materials which come mainly 
Perhaps the re-openuig of South Africa to Kenyan produce will agmficamly increase 
Magadi's export possibilities By the early 1980s plans had already been presented to double the 
plant's production capacity to some 500,000 tons annually. In fact Magadi and the USA 
(Wyoming) are the only two producers of natural soda ash ш the world By 1989, the world 
market for soda ash was In an equilibrium. This situation has recently changed as Botswana also 
entered this market (Sua Pan-Soda Ash Botswana. 300,000 tons of soda ash and 630,000 tons of 
sail Is expected to be produced per year). The effect of this is yet to be seen Compétition from 
aluminium, paper and plasties in case of packing material also influences potential exports. 
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from Kajiado District are also located in Athi River. Exports of marble and 
limestone are mainly to neighbouring countries and the Near East 
Other minerals found in greater or lesser quantities in Kajiado District are 
diatomite, feldspar, wollastonite, garnet, gaylussile, quartzite, meerschaum, 
sand and gypsum. Exploitation of the latter, which is used in the manufacturing 
of cement, mainly occurs in the Embolioi ranch to the north of Kajiado Town. 
Large areas of pasture land are turned into wastelands because of strip-mining. 
Figure 4.9 Kajiado District Land Use 
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As stated before the tourist industry is of major importance for the Kenyan 
economy. The tourist industry in Kajiado District is largely the result of the 
abundance of wildlife. Most revenue is earned by the Amboseli National Park 
which covers some 400 km2 and is served by six lodges and three campsites. 
Visitors to Amboseli averaged some 150,000 annually in the period 1984-88 as 
compared to a mean number of 85,000 visitors for 1974-78. The number of 
tourists in this group of visitors (i.e. excluding local residents) was 
approximately 64 per cent Amboseli National Park is now Kenya's most 
important park. Of all tourists visiting Kenya between 1974-78, not less than 
19 per cent of them visited Amboseli. Assuming a similar percentage of 
visitors to be tourists we estimated that in the mid-1980s 20 per cent of the 
tourists had paid a visit to Amboseli. In financial terms it has been estimated 
that in 1976 Kajiado District contributed some Ksh. 69 million to the Ksh. 
1,288 million earnings from tourism (see UNDP/FAO 1978:10 and Olang 
1983:75) (see also section 7.5.2). Nationwide a total of Ksh. 7,000 million has 
been earned from tourism by 1989 (see DN 30/11/89). Another tourist 
attraction is the Olorgesailie prehistoric site. 
Finally, reference should be made to some small scale commercial and 
manufacturing activities. The number of licensed businesses increased sharply 
from 1,020 in 1983 to 2,264 by 1987. A majority of these trade licenses are 
granted out to owners of retailshops (65 per cent), hotels (18 per cent), bars 
and restaurants (5 per cent) and butchers (4 per cent). The commercial sector 
of Kajiado District's economy is also dominated by non-Maasai. 
Lack of capital, insufficient institutional support, poor business skills and an 
inadequate infrastructure are said to be among the major constraints inhibiting 
faster growth in the manufacturing sector (see KDDP 1988:160-1). At the 
moment Kitengela (bordering Athi River), Ngong, Ongata Rongai and Kajiado 
Town have the largest concentration of small and medium industries. There are 
also open air jua kali artisans spread throughout the numerous trading centres 
in the district. Carpentry, vehicle repair work and tailoring are among the most 
important activities in this respect 
4.5 Infrastructure 
43.1 Urban Areas and the Transport Network 
The whole of Kajiado District has a very low level of urbanization. In 1969 
only 3.9 per cent of the total district's population was urbanized and this had 
increased to 9.5 per cent by 1979. This significant increase was mainly caused 
by the growth of the centres in the Ngong area, due to their proximity to 
Nairobi. The rate of urbanization was nevertheless below the 1979 national 
average of 15 per cent Of the 39,402 people living in the urban centres of the 
district most were in Ngong (5,564), Kajiado Town (4,8%), Magadi (3,561), 
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Loitokitok (2,877) and Namanga (2,803). Estimates for 1988 were 5,795, 
6,000, 5,000. 4,144 and 3,310, respectively (see KDDP 1988:26-7; figure 4.10). 
NAKURU 
NAROK 
О 
road (mam) 
road (minor) 
railway 
river 
lake 
mountain 
ridge 
National Park 
or game reserve 
Nfuginl 
50 km 
Figure 4.10 Kajiado District Topographic Map 
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Post offices and telephone services are only available in these towns. Most of 
the towns mentioned, besides having an administrative function as divisional 
headquarters, serve as market centres. By the late 1980s three commercial 
banks were operating in Kajiado, Loitokitok and Ngong towns. The first one 
had not started before 1979. Other fast growing centres or those expected to do 
so in the near future are Dlasit (2,221 people), Kitengela (2,080), Sultan 
Hamud (1,523). Isinya (472), Bissel (389), Kiserian and Mashuru. 
The transport network in the district is dominated by roads in the north-
south axis connected to the main Nairobi-Mombasa road. The main road within 
the district is the Namanga-Athi River road. This and the Ngong-Magadi road 
are both tarmacked and of good quality. The roads in Loitokitok division to 
Amboseli National Park and the Loitokitok-Emali road are in poor condition, 
though the latter is being upgraded now. Other roads in Kajiado District are 
poorly maintained and this frustates and sometimes even prohibits transport in 
the rainy season. The Nairobi-Mombasa railway line can be found following 
the motor-highway along Kajiado District's northern border. It is linked to the 
Magadi-Konza line used for transportation of soda ash. 
4.5.2 Water Facilities 
A major problem in Kajiado District is the provision of water. In the larger 
areas of the district streams are virtually non-existent Alternative sources such 
as wells and springs mostly dry up in the dry season. Eastern Ngong and 
north-eastern Central Division form the best aquifers in the district The rest of 
Ngong, Magadi and eastern Loitokitok have poor groundwater potential. 
As from 1927 until April 1988 a total of 387 boreholes had been sunk in the 
district of which only 139 (36 per cent) are still operative (see Mwangi 
1990:115). The average depth at which borehole water was struck is 80 m, but 
water at depths of over 250 m was also found (see Ecosystems 1982:13). 
Ngong Division especially has a large number of boreholes. The owners are 
the Ministry of Water Development (54), other Departments (37), the Kajiado 
County Council (37), institutions like schools, companies, hotels (49), 
individuals (150) and group ranches (43). Costs involved in drilling and 
equipping a borehole are very high (some Ksh. 1.5 million). Sometimes 
funding has been obtained from NGOs and international donor agencies. 
Government maintained water supplies are to be found in Kajiado, Ngong, 
Loitokitok, Namanga, Ongata Rongai, Kiserian, lUasit and Bissel. All but 
Namanga are unable to meet the demand. A major water provision project 
(National Noolturesh Water Project) was started officially in late September 
1987. Italian grants and soft loans for studies and construction totalling Ksh. 
948 million were provided to develop the 262 km pipeline project bringing 
water from the Noolturesh springs located at the foot of Mt Kilimanjaro to 
Machakos District (Machakos Town and Athi River Town) and back to 
164 Selling Wealth to Buy Poverty 
Kajiado Town." 
Technical consultants have warned that the Noolturesh supply will, however, 
not be enough for the growing demands of the three towns. Extra sources 
should be developed near these towns and the pipeline could be used mainly to 
serve the rangelands with a supplementary function for the urban areas. At the 
present time the local Maasai will hardly profit if at all from this mega-project 
4.5.3 Electricity and Other Sources of Energy 
The Kajiado District infrastructure is poorly developed. Single-phased 
electricity reached Kajiado Town only in July 1972. For industrialization, 
however, three-phased power is needed. Confronted with entrepreneurs willing 
to invest but not able to do so because of the poor power and water 
infrastructure, the County Council repeatedly urged Central Government to 
raise standards in these respects. These requests were honoured only by the late 
1980s when attempts also began to bring electricity to other towns (e.g. 
Loitokitok). 
Firewood and charcoal are still the main sources of energy used (over 93 
per cent). Wood fuel for cooking and heating is mainly used in the rural areas, 
while charcoal is more used in the urban regions. Paraffin is mainly used for 
lighting and petrol and diesel for stationary engines (e.g. for borehole pumps). 
Solar and wind energy are also used occasionally for this purpose. Gas (LPG) 
is sometimes used for cooking. Biogas is unknown so far. The demand for all 
of these energy forms is expected to rise significantly in the years to come. 
43.4 Social Infrastructure 
In the foregoing we have already given some information in respect of 
education and health facilities. For this reason we will now focus attention on 
other welfare related issues. Efforts to raise people's standards of living are 
promoted by associations such as women-groups, self-help groups and co-
operative societies either with or without assistance from churches or (foreign) 
Non-Govenunental Organizations (NGO's). 
In Kajiado District the number of women's groups increased from 206 and 
11,479 members in 1983 to 388 groups with a total membership of 12.7SS 
(some 20 per cent of the women above 15 years of age) by the end of 1988. A 
survey among 58 Loitokitok women's groups revealed that 93 per cent were 
engaged to a greater or lesser extent in agriculture (e.g. farming, stock rearing, 
poultry and pig keeping), 60 per cent in some kind of business (e.g. dealing in 
The general layout follows the existing railway pipeline constructed in 1956. The main 
principle is to convey water by gravity over a distance of 126 km to a pumping station situated SS 
km north west of Sultan Hamud A second pumping statica will raise waler sufficienliy for it to 
gravitale to the tenmnal réservons (sec Mwangi nd 1). 
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hides &. skins, handicrafts, shop keeping, land buying) and only 7 per cent in 
home improvement Approximately half of these groups received some 
Government assistance. 
The growth in the number of co-operatives was likewise spectacular. From 
32 in 1984 they numbered 65 by 1987. Membership rose from 5,017 to 8,080. 
The co-operative movement is most strongly represented in the marketing 
sector of livestock and agricultural products. Savings and credit societies are 
also important According to the Kajiado authorities co-operatives in Kajiado 
District face major problems as a result of a lack of adequate and suitable 
business premises, insufficient capital and the poor education of managers and 
members (see KDDP 1988:128). 
Self-help or harambee groups are said to have increased albeit slowly in the 
district The idea is that people themselves collect sufficient money and/or 
labour for the construction of a school, dispensary or whatever they feel is 
needed in their own location. Often the Government will pick up such an 
initiative and support the group. Unfortunately misuse of funds and political 
manoeuvnngs sometimes interfere, frustrating progress and levels of 
participation. 
Outside help for the Kajiado District population has been provided in almost 
all fields of development. Church involvement in the provision of education 
and most of all health facilities has already been referred to. A distinction can 
be made in organizations actually working in the area or those who only 
provide funds. An organization like AMREF (better known as the "Flying 
Doctors") receives funds for its Kajiado activities from all over the world (e.g. 
the USA, Ireland, the UK, Germany, the Netherlands) either from national 
Governments or from private organizations. In 1968, for instance, Oxfam 
financed the building of the Oltepesi airstrip. 
Other major NGO's working in the district are ICROSS, World Vision 
International and churches like the African Inland Church (AIC), the 
Presbyterian Church of East Africa (PCEA), the Catholic Diocese of Ngong 
and the Church of the Province of Kenya (CPK). The latter operates the 
Maasai Rural Training Centre in Isinya and 6 others in the district. These are 
involved in livestock improvement, irrigated agriculture, literacy campaigns 
and the like. In addition, the Anglican CPK constructed a waterdam and also 
runs four youth polytechnics. The Catholic church is mostly involved in 
education in awareness and also the running of a model-farm, a tree nursery 
and home for the disabled. Other well-known projects are World Vision's 
"Child Survival Project" that between 1982 and 1991 aimed at improving 
nutrition, increasing immunization, controlling diseases and family planning 
(see DN 23/09/88). The AIC is mainly involved in sponsoring children and in 
the treatment of disabled young people. Finally, mention should be made of the 
"Maasai Action for Self Improvement" project (MASI) started in 1969 by the 
PCEA (Oxfam, USA, Britain and the Netherlands sponsored) near Oloseos. 
This project concentrated on the water supply, igloo-like houses, crops and 
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fish. 
Sometimes direct grants are provided by the national governments of other 
countries, as in the case of the Loitokitok hospital and secondary school that 
were built in the early 1970s using funds from Austria and the Netherlands, 
respectively. The Japanese assisted the Ministry of Water Development and the 
World Bank provided loans for the Kenya Livestock Development Project 
(KLDP: 1969-82). The Netherlands provide finances for the Arid and Semi-
Arid Lands programme (ASAL) started in 1987. 
In the following chapter we will focus on the late 19th century arrival of the 
Europeans in the heart of Maasailand. Special attention will be paid to the 
policy developed by the British colonizers concerning the use and ownership of 
land until the time of Independence. 
CHAPTERS 
PRE-INDEPENDENCE HISTORY OF LAND USE AND 
LAND POLICY IN KAJIADO DISTRICT 
5.1 Introduction 
The following historical account deals with four major periods. Two criteria 
have been decisive for arriving at this division; the statutory status of Kenya as 
well as Government development policies practised. Attention will be 
foremostly directed towards the trends in the use and ownership rights of land 
and the land use policy of the Colonial Government in the Maasai area. 
Firstly, we will look at the pre-colonial period until 189S, the year that the 
British Government established the East Africa Protectorate, an area more от 
less congruent with present-day Kenya east of the Rift Valley. This section 
describes the early Maasai history and the arrival of the Europeans in 
Maasailand. 
Secondly, we will review the period 1896-1919. We will consider the two 
important Maasai Treaties of 1904 and 1911 in detail and the resulting 
establishment of the Maasai Reserve which included the present day Kajiado 
and Narok Districts. This period is of eminent importance for the 
understanding of Kenyan Maasailand and its present-day people. The first part 
of this period was one of enormous turbulence while, since the end of World 
War I, the Maasai became more and more peripheral in the social and 
economic development of Kenya as the Colony officially became in 1920. 
Thirdly, we will consider the period 1920-1945 during which the pressure 
from outside to enter the Maasai Reserve increased rapidly. During this period 
the Kenya Land Commission of 1934 reviewed the Maasai requirements for 
land. 
Fourthly, we will consider the Kajiado District during the period 1946 to 
1963, the year that Kenya gained Independence. This period was dominated by 
the increasing concentration of Colonial Government on economic development 
in the Maasai area. Efforts were mainly directed towards the introduction of 
grazing schemes and the destocking of the pastures. We will also give special 
attention to the influx of non-Maasai and the increasing importance of other 
forms of land use. 
52 Pre-Colonial - 1895: The Rise and Fall of Maasai Power 
and the Arrival of the Europeans 
Several authors, early travellers, missionaries, anthropologists, historians and 
geographers, have contributed to descriptions of the early history of the Maasai 
(e.g., Thomson, Krapf, Fosbrooke, Jacobs, Mol, Bemtsen, Sorrenson, Tignor 
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and Waller). They inform us that little has been known of the Maasai until the 
arrival of the British. Egyptians, Persians, Chinese, Arabs and Portuguese had 
established themselves in present-day Kenya from even before our modem era, 
but their arrival was restricted only to the coastal area. Untili the end of the 
18th century the coastal strip and the interior were virtually separate areas. 
Maps of Africa dating from the beginning of the 19th century still leave a big 
blank space for the interior of East Africa. Difficulties in solving the puzzle of 
Maasai history are exacerbated because the Maasai themselves are said to have 
no 'special interest in, nor particularly expert knowledge about, their past' 
(Jacobs 1975:22). 
In Chapter 4 we already indicated at some of the mythological stories about 
their origin and their move southward from the Nile valley in the Uganda-
Sudan borderzone into the Rift Valley probably by 1400 A.D. More detailed 
and accurate accounts are available for the early 19th century. During this 
period the Maa speaking people began a period of successive wars among 
themselves. The relatively peaceful pastoral Maasai on the one hand and on the 
other hand the more aggressive agro-pastoral Maasai (Jloikop), who are said to 
have started these wars, clashed over livestock and land, and fought for their 
very existence. The first war began around 1810 on the Uasin Gishu plateau, 
located in the north of Maasai territory. Two more 'Iloikop Wars' were fought 
in 1862 and 1873 in the central Mau area and on the Laikipia plateau 
respectively. In all of these the pastoral Maasai defeated the Iloikop Maasai. 
Survivors of the latter group fled towards other neighbouring ethnic groups like 
the Nandi and Kipsigis or were absorbed by the former. 
Natural disasters started to undermine Maasai power by the early 1880s. 
Contagious Bovine Pleuro-Pneumonia, a cattle disease, spread from the north 
and lingered for several years. The Maasai lost many head of cattle and 
accordingly had difficulties controlling their pastures. The areas incorporated 
into pastoral Maasailand after the successful 'Iloikop Wars' could no longer be 
controlled because of the disparity in manpower between the pastoral Maasai 
and the neighbouring groups. 'Kamba, Kikuyu and Kalenjin raiders were 
already making inroads into Maasailand (...) encroaching on Maasai grazing 
areas. Further to the north west, the Suk [Pokot] and Turkana were pressing 
inwards' (Waller 1976:532). 
Through the trade caravans, in the hands of Arab and Swahili merchants, 
news from the interior reached the coast. Spurred on by the increased demand 
for ivory in the Zanzibar market, these people had pushed into the interior as 
early as the 1840s. They had taken over from local groups like the Kamba, 
Digo and Segeju (see Bemtsen 1979:112). Trade caravans returned with slaves, 
ivory and with stories from the interior especially about the ferocity of the 
Maasai. Several authors stressed (e.g. von Hohnel, Jacobs) that this 'myth' was 
purposely spread by the Arab and Swahili traders in trying to prevent the 
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Europeans from taking over their monopoly.1 The 'myth' was further 
strengthened by early European observers who attributed acts of violence 
committed by the Iloikop Maasai as far as the coastal area, to the pastoral 
Maasai. 
While the Maasai expansion and hegemony came under the attack of 
neighbouring groups, important developments occurred in Europe which were 
soon to influence Africa's history as never before. France and Germany began 
to catch up with Great Britain's industrialisation by the end of the 1870s. An 
economic depression during the beginning of the 1870s had started a period of 
economic nationalism and protectionism. To secure the supply of raw materials 
and to open new export markets, the struggle for overseas territory began. This 
grasping for colonies occurred under the motto of 'who gets there first'. 
In East Africa, Gennany and Great Britain were the main competitors. By 
the beginning of the 1880s the struggle for the interior started. In the wake of a 
few missionaries, adventurers and explorers sent by German and British 
Geographical Societies, tried to reach Lake Victoria. Fischer, a German 
botanist, managed to reach Lake Naivasha by 1882.2 The first European to 
travel through the whole of Maasailand was a young Scottish geologist, Joseph 
Thomson, in 1883/84. 
In 1891 the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC), founded by a 
Scottish shipowner, Sir William Mackinnon S years before, obtained 
permission from the Sultan of Zanzibar to have a monopoly of trade and other 
privileges in the interior of East Africa. The company was mainly interested in 
the exploitation of the fertile and wet area of Uganda and not so much in the 
less attractive tract of land stretching from the coast towards Uganda and on 
which the feared Maasai and Kamba moved. However, the company turned out 
to be a failure from the start. British capitalists were the most reluctant to 
invest in East Africa. The hope of discovering minerals soon dwindled and the 
existing trade in ivory was still firmly in the hands of the coastal Swahilis and 
Arabs. The unattractiveness of the area was affirmed by the beginning of the 
1890s. 
Barely recovered from the natural disasters of the 1880s, the Maasai suffered 
severely when the Great Rinderpest Epidemic, a hitherto unknown disease in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, swept through the whole of East Africa from Ethiopia 
The British had already established a post in Mombasa by 1823 and on Zanzibar in 1877. 
2
 The German missionary Rebmann bad opened a station among the Chagga near ML 
Kilimanjaro as early as 1848. Until the beginning of the 1880s no European had travelled beyond 
this point 
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downwards to South Africa, reaching Maasailand by 1891.3 It overwhelmed 
the Maasai by its rapidity and virulence. Waller reports that the Keekonyokie, 
Dalalekutuk and Loita sections lost their herds within only a week to two 
months. 'By the end of 1891, most of the cattle were dead or dying and the 
Maasai themselves were facing famine' (Waller 1988:77). 
This event not only killed most cattle but also triggered off the first and 
only war between the pastoral Maasai.4 The War of Morijo, named after the 
area of battle south of the Loita Hills, was started in 1891 by the Loita Maasai 
who raided their Kaputiei and Matapato brothers in order to restore their herds 
which had suffered most during the Rinderpest Epidemic. This struggle for 
survival will probably also have contributed to the 'myth' of the Maasai being 
a very brutal and warlike people. The precarious situation was exacerbated 
because of a severe drought in that same year. Famine was wide-spread and 
made people vulnerable to a smallpox epidemic which, in 1892, resulted in the 
deaths of thousands. A missionary passing through the area of today's Nairobi 
wrote that 'Hundreds of skeletons of Maasai were lying about in all directions. 
Deserted kraals were dotted about here and there and around them skins, 
broken calabashes and household utensils' (Tucker cf Mol 1980:7). It is 
estimated that nearly all the cattle and over half of the pastoral Maasai died as 
a result of this accumulation of disasters (see Leys 1973:111). 
Maasai society faced economic and social collapse. Waller describes three 
survival strategies adopted by those Maasai who had been lucky to escape 
death; hunting and cultivating as practised by the Maasai in the Loitokitok 
area; regrouping and raiding neighbouring il-oshon for livestock as undertaken, 
for example, by the Purko and the Odamat and, thirdly; seeking refuge among 
neighbouring agricultural peoples. 'Many Maasai from all sections were 
absorbed in this way into Kikuyu, Mem, Arusha, Taveta and Chagga 
communities. Often they were used as extra labour in cultivation and herding. 
(...) A variant of this strategy was the transference of children as sureties or 
debt pawns in return for food' (Waller 1976:534). 
The arrival of missionaries had opened another possibility for shelter which 
attracted many Maasai refugees. Matapato and Kaputiei Maasai used another 
new option by asking for the protection of the IBEA Company's post at Fort 
Rinderpest had entered the Afincan continoli as early as 1840 through cattle brought into 
Egypt as well as in the course of the Nile expedition of 1884-85 (see Mol 19807) However, the 
devastation that really affected almost all of Afnca began m Ethiopia due to infected cattle 
probably imported from India through the Italian controlled Red Sea port of Massawa some tune 
dunng 1887 (see Pankhurst & Johnson 1988 48/64). 
Minor clashes have always occurred between pastoral Maasai secoons mainly over the 
issues of land and water and are sdii going on, e.g between the Kaputiei and Kisonko Maasai in 
the Selenkei area of Kajiado District 
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Smith (located just south of Nairobi) in December 1893.' The company had 
established several of these posts to control their trade routes in the area. The 
British Government had granted the company permission to organise the 
administration of the interior of this part of East Africa. The Maasai-Company 
alliance turned out to be advantageous for both sides. The latter saw its troops 
considerably strengthened, whilst was at the same time being relieved of the 
potential problem of conflict and danger that the Maasai were thought to 
embody. The Maasai also gained from this arrangement as they obtained 
security as well as the possibility of regenerating their herds. Maasai warriors, 
used by the British during punitive expeditions on other ethnic groups like the 
Kikuyu, Nandi and Kamba, were rewarded with one third to one half of the 
loot. This alliance continued until 1905. 
Also, in another way some of the Maasai gained some advantage from the 
co-operation with British officials. Mbatiany, the Maasai oloiboni (ritual 
expert), had died in 1890 leaving his succession in dispute between his two 
sons Sendeu and Olonana. The two brothers were divided among two rivalling 
il-oshon, each giving their ritual blessings and organizational support. The 
British misinterpreted the oloiboni's powers. Political power among the Maasai 
rests with the elders. Instead, Olonana was regarded as the hereditary chief and 
given support accordingly in order to gain control over all of the Maasai. 
By 1893 it became clear that the British investors' lack of confidence in the 
ШЕЛ Company had been justified. The company was not able to balance the 
costs of keeping control and the difficult and time consuming transportation 
from the coast into the interior. The British Government decided to buy out the 
ШЕА Company. The major driving force behind Britain's eagerness to 
establish its power in this region originated from its strategic location, not so 
much from economic reasons. 'British interest in East Africa was part of a 
global strategy designed to protect British interests in India' (Robinson 1968 cf 
Harbeson 1973:7). According to this strategy, control of Egypt was necessary 
to maintain access to the Suez canal. Control of Egypt, under threat of France, 
in tum justified control of Uganda because the Nile headwaters were situated 
there. 'It was these considerations more than hopes of commercial gain, that 
led Lord Salisbury to partition East Africa with Germany in the agreements of 
1886 and 1890, and Lord Roseberry to establish the Uganda Protectorate in 
April 1894 and the East Africa Protectorate in June 1895' (Soirenson 1968:9). 
The British-German agreement resulted in drawing a line with a ruler from the 
eastern portion of Lake Victoria to the village of Vanga on the coast. The 
negotiators broke the line at the base contour of Kilimanjaro and squiggled 
round it to give the disputed mountain to Kaiser Wilhelm Π as a birthday 
present (see Amin 1987:35). Thus ML Kilimanjaro was annexed to Tanganyika 
Fort Smilh was closed in 1899 and transferred to tbe heart of Kikuyu land and renamed 
Fort Hall. 
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which was under German influence while the area north of the boundary was 
given to Wilhelm's aunt, the Empress Victoria of England. The boundary 
between the protectorates of Uganda and East Africa was drawn along the Rift 
Valley (see figure 5.1). 
Figure 5.1: Map of East Africa Protectorate 1895 
Source Kajiado Distnct Atlas 1990 (drafl) 
On June 30th, 1895, the Administration of the area was handed over from the 
company to the Protectorate authorities. Sir Arthur Hardinge, British Consul 
General in Zanzibar became the first Commissioner of the East Africa 
Protectorate. The African Protectorate Department of the Foreign Office was 
given the task of keeping control over the new Protectorate. Thus by the end of 
the 19th century the Maasai people found their original homeland divided 
between three different administrations. 
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S3 1895 - 1919: The Early Colonial Period, the Arrival of 
the White Settlers and the Loss of Maasai Pastures 
5.3.1 Introduction 
The opening of the East Africa Protectorate gained great impetus from the 
British Government's decision to construct the "Uganda Railway" running from 
Mombasa to Lake Victoria. In fact the continuing political crisis in the Nile 
Valley was the main reason for building the almost 1,000 km long railway. 
Labourers from India were recruited. The construction started in 1896, was 
finished in December 1901, and cost some £ 5,550,000 to the British taxpayer 
and the African population of the Protectorate. To recover some of the costs 
the Government decided to lease land within the 1 mile zone on both sides of 
the railway. 
Commissioner Eliot, who had replaced Hardinge in early 1901, actively 
tried to interest more settlers in coming to the new Protectorate by making 
large areas of land available. Because the response from Europe was very 
meagre he turned to South Africa.6 There he succeeded in attracting people to 
move northwards towards the new Protectorate. Most of them were colonists or 
adventurers looking for new opportunities after the ending of the Anglo-Boer 
war. 
The British Government also actively tried to interest possible settlers in the 
Protectorate. Jewish refugees from Eastern Europe were offered land in the 
East Africa Protectorate. Eliot, not well pleased with this move on the part of 
his superiors in London, offered them land on the Uasin Gishu plateau, home 
of the Uasinkishu Maasai, far away from the railway. The Jews produced a 
package of extensive wishes and requirements after they had sent a delegation 
to the Protectorate to investigate Eliot's offer. On the other hand, the early 
settlers, headed by Lord Delamere, a fine British aristocrat, formed an 'anti-
zionist immigration committee'. The "problem" solved itself when the Zionist 
Congress of August 1903 decided to reject the East African proposal and 
instead opted for the establishment of an autonomous Jewish state in Palestine. 
5.3.2 The First Maasai Move of 1904: Creation of a Northern and 
Southern Maasai Reserve 
During the early years of the Protectorate the land issue remained the most 
important topic of debate. 'The big question was how much land should be 
made available to any individual settler and on what terms (length of lease, 
etc). The London officials hoped to prevent land speculation such as has been 
6
 The failure of several misskms to expkm for minerals, the lack of an Internal market and 
die inaccessibility of tbe area before the construction of the railway line were the major reasons 
for the lack of Interest from Europe. 
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experienced in other areas of white settlement' (Zwanenberg & King 1975:37). 
The local administration, however, was first and foremost in a hurry to attract 
as many white settlers as possible. This called for a "settlerfriendly" land 
policy and legislation. The fust legislative regulations concerning land had 
been issued in 1897 offering "certificates of occupation" with a renewable 
twenty one years tenn. This, however, prohibited the buying and selling of 
land. Pressure from the settlers supported by the local administration on the 
Foreign Office demanding freehold titles continued. Eliot, by using his power 
as the Commissioner, tried to amend the regulations in favour of the settlers. 
He became more and more convinced of the economic potential which the 
temperate zone of the Protectorate offered. In his view the highlands should 
become a "White man's Country". 
In 1902, "The First Crown Lands Ordinance" allowed the local 
administration to issue settlers with ninety nine year leases and the possibility 
of selling land up to 1,000 acres per lot Bigger portions were also obtainable, 
but only after consultation with the Foreign Office. The Ordinance proclaimed 
that all public land (i.e. unoccupied land) was Crown land which, for the time 
being, was subject to the control of His Majesty by virtue of any Treaty, 
Convention or Agreement. However, the decision as to whether land was 
vacant or not was in the hands of the Commissioner and his subordinates. In 
practice this meant a denial of traditionally established African rights in land. 
This was the result of a lack of understanding of African legislation concerning 
land and the unwillingness to hinder settlers. 'The prices of land were 
exceedingly low. A homestead of 640 acres cost an average Rs. 2 per acre, or 
£ 80, and this could be paid over 16 years. A pastoral lease of 5,000 acres, 
with a rental of l/2d. per acre, cost the lessee £10 8s. 4d. per annum. In the 
more remote areas, land was granted free' (Soirenson 1968:143).7 
Settlers were allowed to go out and look for attractive holdings themselves. 
No attempt was made to separate land available to settlers from that required 
by Africans. The settlers showed no interest in land that Africans themselves 
had avoided. They knew that African occupation was a sign of good land and 
made their selection accordingly. The area north of Nairobi, occupied by the 
agricultural Kikuyu was particularly attractive to the settlers. 'Between 1903 
and 1906 approximately 60,000 acres of Kikuyu territory in the Kiambu-
Limuni district were alienated to settlers' (Sonenson 1968:180). As a form of 
compensation the Rs. 2 per acre had to be paid to the Kikuyu landowner 
instead of to the local administration. Of course this was a severe 
undervaluation of the land "bought". 
Moreover, the 1902 Ordinance prevented the selling of land to non-
Europeans (i.e. Asians and Africans). In fact this meant a policy of racial 
segregation. Most settlers must have felt quite at home. To encourage this 
feeling Eliot went on (mis)using his power by amending the 1902 Ordinance. 
7
 16 anna (d.) = 1 Rupee (Rs.) and IS Rupees = £1. 
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In July 1903 he drew up rules for the lease of pastoral land up to 10,000 acres 
at a rent of 1 anna (Id.) per acre. He also wanted to raise the maximum area 
that could be sold without reference to the Foreign Office. His fight for the 
interests of the settlers began to show fruit In 1902 there were approximately 
thirty Europeans living around Nairobi. By 1903 the influx of settlers had 
increased considerably. In that year 117 Europeans (mainly from South Africa) 
had applied for land and the following year this figure rose to 300. The offer 
of a freehold grant of 10,000 acres to two South Africans in return for the 
enlistment of South African settlers will also have helped to increase the rise in 
immigrants. This deal, however, was made without the consent of the Foreign 
Office. Some large concessions had been granted in the Rift Valley, with the 
approval of the Foreign Office, to some rich British aristocrats. Lord Delamere 
had obtained 100,000 acres on a 99 year lease; Grogan and Lingham had a 50 
year lease of 120,000 acres of the Eldama Ravine Forest and the East Africa 
Syndicate, formed by South African and British entrepreneurs, obtained a lease 
of 400 square miles of pasture land in the Naivasha area, north of Nairobi, in 
the heart of the Maasai country. 
It became clear that the Kikuyu and the Maasai -who were a nomadic 
people and still recovering from the late 19th century disasters- were under 
threat 'Applications for those areas which were not continuously occupied by 
the Masai were accordingly made by the Europeans, and the attention of the 
Government was drawn to the question of how far the country could, with 
safety and justice, be opened to white settlement without thereby encroaching 
on the native grazing rights' (Sandford 1919:20). Considerable discussion took 
place between Eliot and his sub-commissioners residing in the areas involved. 
The former was of the opinion that although the Maasai had the right to 
inhabit particular districts they had no right to monopolize these areas. He 
favoured a policy of integration by inducing them to settle in small villages 
among Europeans. He was of the opinion that a process of civilization and 
employment as cattle guards for the superior Europeans would be to the 
advantage of both the economy and the Maasai. This last statement, concerning 
the positive effects for the Maasai, was questioned by his sub-ordinates Bagge, 
Jackson and Hobley, who preferred to divide the Rift Valley pastures and set 
apart a reserve for the Maasai where settlers could not interfere. 
Jackson, sub-commissioner for the Naivasha Province, on leave in Great 
Britain, told the Foreign Office that although Eliot had convinced the Maasai 
that no more applications would be considered after the 400 square miles grant 
to the East Africa Syndicate, more than 75 percent of the grazing areas in the 
Rift Valley had been applied for by the settlers. When asked for an explanation 
Eliot replied in a secret and confidential letter stating: 'No doubt on platforms 
and in reports we declare we have no intention of depriving natives of their 
lands, but this has never prevented us from taking whatever land we want (...) 
I have no desire to protect Masaidom. It is a beastly, bloody system, founded 
on raiding and immorality, disastrous to both the Masai and their neighbours. 
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The sooner it disappears and is unknown, except in books of anthropology, the 
better' (Sorrenson 1968:76). Eliot had to resign. 
His successor. Sir Donald Stewart, decided that the Maasai had to be 
"given" an area of their own. Two reserves should be set aside for them. These 
reserves were planned outside the Rift Valley: the Laikipia plateau (12,350 
km2) in the north and another reserve south of Ngong and the railway (11,250 
km2). In fact the Maasai were presented with the most inferior cigars from 
their own cigar box, as both areas were traditional Maasai pastures, while this 
offer also meant the loss of their best pastures near Naivasha. 
Figure 52: The Northern and Southern Maasai Reserve by 1906 
Source, based on Hollis 1905, Sandford 1919, Morgan 1972 
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On the 9th of August 1904 Stewart and his officials met the Maasai leaders in 
Naivasha. A treaty was signed between the two groups. It was agreed that the 
Purko, Loita, Keekonyokie, Ddamat and Loitatok Maasai would move to 
Laikipia. The Kaputiei, Matapalo, Loodokilani and Sikirari il-oshon were 
confined to an area south of the railway and Ngong, between Suswa to the 
west and 01 Doinyo Orok (near Namanga) to the east (see figure 5.2). This 
area was not of much interest to the settlers and had formerly been set aside as 
a Game Reserve. The Government agreed to fulfil a few conditions set by the 
Maasai. They would provide a road between the two reserves (approximately 
400 km) and set aside a S square miles area in the Kinangop area, an 
important place for Maasai ceremonies. Finally, it was stated that this 
agreement would be enduring 'so long as the Masai as a race shall exist, and 
that European or other settlers shall not be allowed to take up land in the 
Settlements'. 
The Maasai who had moved northwards, soon came to find that the water 
supply and grazing potential of the Northern Reserve was totally inadequate to 
meet the demands of their herds. Immigration and the natural increase in 
numbers of animals required more land. As a result two extensions in a 
southward direction had to be made within a two year period. Accordingly, 
some settlers had to move and, together with an extra grant, were compensated 
with land elsewhere. The total area of the two new Maasai Reserves comprised 
approximately 24,000 km2 as compared to the pre-colonial Kenya Maasai 
tenitory of some 55,000 km2; a reduction of almost 60 per cent 
While the call for a third extension was made in 1908, another idea of moving 
all the Maasai from the Northern Reserve gained importance. It was not so 
much the welfare of the Maasai as the still unsatisfied hunger for territory on 
the side of the growing number of settlers that was the driving force behind 
this latter proposal. 
In April 1905 the Administration of the East Africa Protectorate had been 
handed over from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office (CO.). The CO. 
installed the traditional machinery of a "Crown Colony" Govenunent The 
Commissioner was designated as the Governor. Executive and Legislative 
Councils and a Land Board were established. Delamere was one of the settlers' 
representatives in these newly introduced bodies. In fact the unofficial 
relationship which had always existed before between the Government and the 
settlers now became institutionalized. The CO. saw as its major task to control 
the land issue. Speculation as had taken place in Australia and other colonies 
had to be avoided. 
The 1902 Lands Ordinance was amended by the CO. with the introduction 
of a land tax, anti-dummying regulations and the raise of rents. The settlers 
protested strongly about these adjustments. But they need not have worried as 
the local Government did not enforce the new roles. Moreover, the system for 
land application could easily be abused by speculators or anyone else who 
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wished to acquire more than the maximum area of land allowed. For example, 
Lord Delamere, who had several times demanded a liberal policy concerning 
the transfer of land, had accumulated another 61,161 acres by 1906. It was 
clear that the official CO. policy of preventing the accumulation of land for 
speculation had failed. 
Another important change in the land policy in the Protectorate was the 
acceptance of reserves set aside for the African population. Traders, 
adventurers and/or speculators should be prevented from entering districts not 
yet under administrative control by the British.8 The Government could 
declare such a reserve a closed district, only to be entered if one was in 
possession of a special pass. After the establishment of administrative stations, 
a certain area could be reopened and, when needed, land set aside for 
interested European settlers. The Maasai Reserves were among the first areas 
to be declared "Closed Districts" by 1906. The size of the reserves were not to 
provide for more than the existing population. This would, it was hoped, secure 
the provision of labour towards the white settler areas and the diversification of 
the local economies. The headquarters of the Protectorate were transferred from 
Mombasa via Machakos (1904) to Nairobi by 1907, that being the central 
supply station of the railway. It became the capital of the country and centre 
for further colonization. 
5.3.3 The Second Maasai Move of 1911-12: Creation of a Single 
Extended Southern Maasai Reserve 
By 1909 it was estimated that approximately 4,000 square miles of land had 
been alienated with a maximum of another 4,000 square miles being left for 
future settlement9 The continuous influx of new settlers called for the rapid 
opening of these "unsettled" areas. 
In January 1909 Sadler, who had replaced Stewart met Olonana to propose 
the removal of the Northern Maasai towards an extended Southern Reserve. To 
Sadler's surprise Olonana was not unwilling to accept the proposal if certain 
conditions were met 'No European in the country imagined for a moment that 
the Masai on Laikipia wished to leave i t The area, though small, is a fine 
piece of country as there is in Kenya, with rich soil and perennial streams, 
vastly superior in every way to the country south of the Rift Valley' (Leys 
1924 repr. 1973:120). It is said that the oloiboni's motives for accepting the 
withdrawal from the north was to restore his authority over all the Maasai 
which, due to the division, was waning. The connection between the two 
a 
Turkana District in ihe far most north western comer of the Kenya Colony and Protectorale 
was the last area to be placed under admmistraive control only by 1926. 
о 
At lu maximun the "White Highlands" set apart for the Europeans would comprise 
31,000,000 ha comprising 400,000 ha of agricultural land, the remaining area being forest or 
pastures (see Somus 1986:143). 
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reserves was often cut off as a result of quarantine regulations for cattle. 
Suitability surveys concerning the area west of Suswa, i.e. the Loita plains 
towards the Mara river, were made. This area was traditionally occupied by a 
few il-oshon of the Maasai and by that time partly occupied by European 
settlers. It was concluded that the availability of water was inadequate. A plan 
for irrigating the plains was produced but never implemented. The superior 
potential of the Laikipia plateau was also known to the settlers. Seven of them 
had been offered land in that area before the 1904 agreement was signed. All 
but two, Lord Delamere and his brother-in-law Cole, had accepted the granting 
of land, including a SO percent increase, elsewhere. Stewart's prophecy that 
jealous eyes would probably one day start looking at the Northern Reserve was 
fulfilled within five years. 
Because of the fact that most governors had failed, wittingly or unwittingly, 
to implement the CO. policy, Girouard was chosen to take over from Sadler. 
Girouard had the name of being loyal, tough and trustworthy. However, by 
June 1909 he had offered settlers land on the Laikipia plateau without 
informing the CO.. After a few months in the Protectorate Girouard had 
already made up his mind. He needed the settlers for economic development, 
so he defended their fight over the land regulations. However, the removal of 
the Maasai from Laikipia could not be done openly. So, the Colonial 
Government made it look as if the removal of the Maasai from the Laikipia 
area was solely the result of the wish of Olonana and his people. 
In August 1909, the Purko Maasai (still) living in the Southern Reserve wanted 
to proceed to Kinangop for their E-unoto ceremony. Because of East Coast 
Fever they were forbidden to take their cattle with them as they would have to 
pass through the lands occupied by Europeans. Olonana told the Northern 
Maasai to proceed from Kinangop to the Southern Reserve in order to hold the 
ceremony at Ngong. He also reaffirmed his wish for the regrouping of all 
Maasai in the proposed extended Southern Reserve. Of course Girouard was 
quite willing to assist Olonana in this respect. By February 1910 the consent of 
the two chiefs of the Northern Maasai, Masikonde and Ole Gilisho, was 
obtained. Everything seemed to be going well. 
The big trek southward was started in April 1910 without the consent of the 
CO.. However, one month before, the CO. had received a confidential letter 
from a subordinate official from the Protectorate, stating that Girouard and the 
settlers were in the process of mistreating the Maasai by trying to remove them 
from Laikipia under the cover of an E-unoto ceremony. When the CO. came 
to hear of the start of the move, Girouard was told to suspend iL The 1904 
Treaty did not allow for such action unless all the Maasai agreed to withdraw 
from it voluntarily and sign a new agreement The CO. mainly feared 
reactions in the House of Commons. 
In May 1910 a provisional agreement was made between the Government 
and the Maasai reaffirming the proposal of regrouping the Maasai in an 
180 Selling Wealth to Buy Poverty 
extended Southern Reserve. To the west of the Southern Reserve an area of 
approximately 14,600 km2 was to be added in return for the loss of the 
Northern reserve. By this time, however, Legalishu made it clear that this new 
reserve was not large enough for all the Maasai. 'In 1904 there were estimated 
to be a total of 30,000 cattle and 1,500,000 sheep held by the Maasai of the 
Rift Valley and of the stretch between Nairobi and the German frontier; within 
just six years, the cattle had increased (...) to a total of 130,000, and the sheep 
had risen to a figure of 2,250,000 (King 1971a: 122-23). A survey confirmed 
Ole Gilisho's view and also pointed out the lack of water and the danger of 
cattle raids by the neighbouring Kipsigis. The matter was left to rest until April 
1911, when new negotiations started. 
Olonana had died in March 1911. One of his last statements had been that 
the (Laikipia) Maasai had to obey the Government and should move with their 
cattle to the Loita Plains in the south. Girouard used this argument for an 
explanation concerning the "change of opinion" among the Laikipia Maasai 
with regard to the removal from the Northern Reserve. Another violation of the 
truth, as Ole Gilisho has only agreed to leave Laikipia under the threat of 
exportation and imprisonment in Europe. 
The Second Maasai Treaty was signed in April 1911 and approved in May by 
the CO.. On signing the agreement Girouard "added" the traditional Maasai 
area between the Namanga Hills and the Kilimanjaro, comprising of 
approximately 8,000 km2. In June 1911 a new move was started from the 
Northern Reserve through the Rift Valley towards the Loita area. By 
September it had become clear that the trek had failed due to the outbreak of 
heavy rains. The roads became impassable. Many people and animals suffered 
and decided to return to the Rift Valley. Moreover, it had become clear to the 
first groups of Maasai who were able to make the journey, that the size of their 
new area was not large enough to allow all of them to come. Also the local 
officers came to believe that they had greatly underestimated the number of 
stock possessed by the Northern Maasai. For Girouard the only solution was to 
add another large area, the "Trans Mara area" located west of the Mara River 
and comprising approximately 2,300 km2, to the Southern Reserve, which he 
and his officers presented as the "promised land".10 Finally by May 1912, 
while Girouard was on leave, the CO. instructed that a third attempt should be 
made to bring the remaining Maasai from the north down to the extended 
Southern Reserve. The chiefs offered no opposition and the Maasai, broken up 
into small groups, were sent on their way. 
However, by the end of June 1912, Ole Gilisho and several other Maasai 
chiefs made a last attempt to stop the move by bringing the case to Court. 
In fact this area was already mhabiled by the Sina Maasai. In latter years two more 
Maasai ¡l-oshon, the Uasmkishu and Moitarak, moved into this area Until the 1930s they had 
moved around near Lake Banngo and in pans of North Nyanza (see Waller 1984:257). 
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They were supported in their fight by a British lawyer, A. Morrison, and 
probably also by Norman Leys, a medical officer. The Colonial Administration 
used all kinds of intimidation and frustrating practices to press Morrison and 
the Maasai to stop the case. Leys, for his part, was transferred to Nyasaland. 
The Maasai lost the case on the grounds that they were not British subjects and 
owed no allegiance to the Crown. The Treaty of 1904, being an agreement 
between two sovereign states, was not recognised by any British Court The 
Maasai had their responsibilities; paying of taxes, living in peace and order 
under British Law but they apparently had no rights. 
By April 1913 the move was complete. Approximately 10,000 Maasai, 
200,000 head of cattle and 550,000 sheep had been moved since June 1912 
(see Sandford 1919:36). The Maasai in the British Protectorate numbered in 
total approximately 40,000 people. Sir Girouard was not able to witness what 
he had so long fought for as, like Eliot, he had to resign over a case related to 
the Maasai. His continuous and downright denial to the CO. of the granting of 
land to Europeans on the Laikipia Plateau was found to be totally untrue. The 
Governor in whom so much faith and trust had been placed, had turned against 
his superiors. This lack of loyalty and obedience rather than the much vaunted 
principles of fairplay, protection of native rights and the prohibition of land 
speculation was the driving force behind the C.O.'s indignation. 
In fact, by this time, the CO. no longer wanted to propagate a policy which 
would support the creation of a colony of small settlers only. Faith in 
economic development was put in large-scale ranchers, planters and companies. 
The rapidly growing influx of mainly British settlers in 1912 had resulted in a 
boom in land values and transfers of land. The speculators took their profits. 
Farms in the "White Highlands" which had cost 6d. per acre in 1908 were sold 
for 10 shillings per acre in 1912 and even £1 per acre in 1914; a forty-fold 
price rise. The clamour for the opening up of new districts grew. The African 
people, especially the Kikuyu living in Limuru and Kiambu, were pushed 
towards their own reserves. 
The CO. wanted to deal with the land issue once and for all. The number 
of amendments to the 1902 Crown Lands Ordinance had created a situation of 
confusion. It was time to put things straight and clear in a new Ordinance. This 
task was put in the hands of the new Governor Belfield. Within three years he 
had produced the 1915 Crown Lands Ordinance. This new legislation was a 
victory for the settlers and the local Government officials who supported it; 
leases were extended from 99 to 999 years with rentals being extremely low; 
restrictions on the accumulation of land were withdrawn, while the transfer of 
land to Asians and Africans was still prohibited." The 1915 Ordinance also 
'When in 1912 some Masai wanted lo purchase European farms on the Kinangop plateau, 
and offered large sums of money for them, they were told that the government would not allow 
them or any other Masai to purchase land outside the reserves' (Sorrenson 1968:224). 
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extended the definition of Crownlands to 'all lands occupied by the native 
tribes of the Protectorate and all lands reserved for the use of any members of 
any native tribes' (Sorrenson 1968:223). By the end of 1915, 5,275,121 acres 
от 21,348 km2 of land, an area as big as present day Kajiado District, had been 
acquired on behalf of about one thousand white settlers (see figure 5.2). The 
distribution of this vast area, located mainly in the Highlands and the Rift 
Valley, was very uneven. A small number of British aristocrats and companies 
owned approximately 20 percent of this land. 
The Maasai had bitter feelings towards their removal from the Northern 
grazing pastures. They felt betrayed by the British to whom they had always 
shown their loyalty. Although the extended Southern Reserve totalled over 
36,000 km2 the Maasai had, among all the African groups of the Protectorate, 
lost the most land. Moreover, they had lost their best areas. Due to the Second 
Treaty they were restricted to a reserve which prohibited their access to their 
best traditional grazing areas. 'The Maasai reserve, clearly created economic 
hardship for the people, primarily by depriving them of their old dry-weather 
grazing area' (Tignor 1976:91). 
One week after the Second Maasai Treaty was signed, a lease of land, 
which had been granted before -during the time of the old Southern Reserve of 
1904- was renewed and handed over to the newly formed Magadi Soda 
Company for the exploitation of soda ash. The company obtained a large 
concession for a lease of 99 years over the waters and surrounding areas of 
Lake Magadi (790 km2) and the northern part of Lake Natron (46 km2). It 
allowed them to exploit and transport all soda ash and other mineral deposits 
and precious stones they found. The company constructed a railway (148 km) 
from the Lake to Konza where it joined the main line to the port of Mombasa. 
Land along the line (1/4 mile on both sides, totalling some 120 km2) and a 
1,000 acre site (Kajiado), to be used as a settlement, were also set aside for the 
company. As compensation for the total area leased to the Magadi Soda 
Company, partly watered and measuring approximately 900 km2, the Maasai 
Reserve was extended in August 1914 by some 965 km2 from Kikelelwa (near 
Kilimanjaro) towards Rombo. 
Finally adjustments were made along the north-western comer of the Maasai 
Reserve, near the Mau Narok region, enlarging it by some 580 km2. The result 
of these modifications was a Maasai Reserve District as gazetted in 1918 and 
comprising of almost 38,000 km2. As compared with the former Northern and 
Southern Reserves of 1906 (24,000 km2), the total area officially allocated to 
the Maasai had increased by some 60 per cent. However, as stated before, the 
quality of the "new" pastures was not equal to the former grazing areas 
belonging to the Maasai and which had been lost to the European settlers. 
By 1914, World War I had appeared virtually in the heart of Maasailand, 
stressing the international character of this battle which involved the African 
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population and the Maasai in particular. During the War the Colonial 
Administration passed a conscription Ordinance in order to recruit Africans to 
assist the British in their struggle with the Germans. In contrast with their 
involvement during the punitive expeditions against other ethnic groups, this 
time, Maasai interest was very low. Efforts to forcefully recruit ilmurran were 
withdrawn the moment the British feared a general uprising among the Maasai. 
The Maasai had lost all confidence in the British, their former allies. They 
preferred to be left alone. 
However, after completion of the move to the Southern Reserve, the 
Government tried to introduce an administrative structure as was present in 
other reserves of the Protectorate. This task was put onto the shoulders of Mr. 
Hemsted who, by August 1912, was appointed Officer-in-Charge of the Maasai 
Reserve. To strengthen the grip of the Protectorate Administration on the 
Maasai the Reserve was divided into two districts by June 1913. Narok District 
on the west and Ngong District on the east side of the Euaso Ng'iro River, the 
boundary situated in a north-south direction from the Mau range towards the 
Anglo-German border. 
"Paramount Chief' Seggie, who had taken over from Olonana, was not as 
co-operative as his father. In 1918 the British abolished the rare phenomenon 
that they had created themselves. Hailey reports 
'Following the abolition of the post of Paramount Chief in 1918, the 
Government endeavoured to find agencies for local administration in the 
promotion of three institutions, a Central Masai Council, a series of 14 
Native Councils each representing a different tribal Section, and 
Headmen, created as far as possible on the model of the location 
Headmen found elsewhere in the Colony. The Central Masai Council at 
Ngong was composed of the presidents of the Native Councils and was 
to meet twice a year. The 14 Native Councils were designed to take the 
place of the informal Council of Elders. (...) They were recognized as 
tribunals exercising powers under the Native Tribunal Rules of 1913, and 
were moreover given the position occupied by Collective Headmen under 
the native Authority Ordinance then in force (No. 22 of 1912). The 
members of these Councils consisted of the recognized Counsellors 
(L'aigwanak) of the different Age Grades in the divisions, with a few of 
the more influential Elders and Moran added' (Hailey 1957:171). 
The new administrative structure was based on the typical British method of 
indirect rule as practised among many other colonized peoples. 
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5.4 1920 - 1945: Kenya Colony and the Maasai; Alien Influx 
and Land Grievances 
5,4.1 Introduction 
In 1920 the East Africa Protectorate was renamed the Kenya Colony and 
Protectorate.12 Ex-serviceman had settled in the new colony a year before, 
raising the number of Europeans to approximately 10,000 (see Low and Smith 
1976:567). They were outnumbered by some 3.8 million Africans and 25,000 
Indians. The latter especially tried to challenge the position of the Europeans. 
Their main grievance was the ban on the possibility of acquiring land by 
Indians in the "White Highlands". They were only allowed to buy land in 
towns, the coastal area and less favourable areas. 
In 1919, E. Northey, the new Governor, had made it clear that European 
interest should be paramount throughout the Protectorate. The influence of the 
settlers, now with a reduced South African character, was very high. Settlers 
were represented in the Land Board, Legislative Council and Executive 
Council and were often even consulted before the introduction of new bills 
thus giving them the opportunity of suggesting modifications. The white 
settlers had always made it clear that they were striving for self-government. 
For a start, they wanted an elected majority, outnumbering Government 
officials, in the Kenya Legislative Council. In the beginning of the 1920s the 
African population joined the Asian's complaints against white dominance. The 
Kikuyu, Kamba and Luo organized themselves in political associations, like the 
East African Association and the Kikuyu Central Association. Some educated 
Maasai, mainly living in Nairobi, joined these political groups as early as 1921 
(see King 1971a:126). 
The years following World War I had severely worsened the situation for 
the African population. A famine in 1919, movement restrictions through the 
introduction of a registration card bearing finger-prints for male Africans 
(kipande), higher taxation, a cut in wages due to the economic depression of 
the early 1920s had deteriorated the African standard of living. Those groups 
such as the Kikuyu, Luhya, Luo and Kamba, who were the most integrated 
into the settler economy, suffered and started to protest openly. 
By 1923, after negotiations took place between Europeans and Indians in 
London, the CO. published a White Paper which denied responsible 
government to the settlers. This time it was stated that Kenya primarily was an 
African territory and the interests of the African population should be 
paramount The idea of self-government, as had been given that same year to 
the Southern Rhodesian settlers, never materialized in Kenya. On the other 
Along the coast a small stop of land remained a Protectorate as it was obtained from the 
Sultan of Zanzibar on a lease The Colony and Protectorate were, however, governed by one 
Legislative Council. 
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hand, the paramount declaration turned out to be mere words to stop the 
European and Indian row as no real improvement for the African population 
was carried through. For example, the land policy was left unchanged and 
Africans, in contrast to Asians and Arabs, were given no seat in the Legislative 
or Executive Councils. Instead, a European missionary was nominated to the 
Legislative Council in 1924 to represent African interests. A formal 
proclamation by the Colonial Government of a "Dual Policy" stating that 
agricultural development had to be nourished in European and African areas 
alike was of not much real value either. 
In the following years the British sent a huge number of commissions to 
analyze the situation of the new Colony regarding land, labour, economic 
performance and potential. The Onnsby-Gore (1925) and Hilton-Young (1929) 
Commissions both stressed the marginal and fragile African position. It was 
urged that they officially proclaim the reserves as soon as possible to secure 
African rights. Alhough the 1915 Crown Lands Ordinance had given the 
Governor the power to create reserves, this was done only for most ethnic 
groups by 1926. However, a clause in the 1915 Ordinance gave authority to 
the Governor to extract reserve land 'no longer required by the natives' for 
sale or lease. Accordingly, a feeling of insecurity still remained among the 
African population. 
In 1928 an attempt was made to streamline land policy in the Colony by the 
introduction of the Native Lands Trust Bill which declared that lands in the 
reserves should be held in a trust exercised by the Governor. The Bill was 
turned into the Native Lands Trust Ordinance of 1930 stating that non-natives 
could only obtain leases or one year licences for lands in the reserves if they 
were not occupied or required by the Africans.13 A Central Trust Board and 
Local Land Boards were installed as the administrative bodies exercising 
control over land issues. They could object to a lease or licence, although the 
Secretary of State had the power to overrule them. 
In trying to expand the volume of Kenya's export, bans on the growing of 
cash crops by Africans were lifted in the late 1930s. At the same time it was 
recognized that the problem of land erosion was becoming more serious. This 
was partly related to the problem of land shortage which became increasingly 
acute year by year. Land alienated by the settlers amounted to 12,200 square 
miles or 5.5 per cent of the total land area. With regard to good arable land the 
European settlers occupied 18 per cent of the total 41,630 square miles. It is 
estimated that between 1920 and 1948 available agricultural land (with 30" rain 
per annum) decreased from 14 acres to just over 5 acres per head of the 
According to Tignor the number of European occupiers m 1929 was merely 2,035 and ibe 
total amount of land tbey cultivated was only 635,590 acres Nonetheless, the European farmers 
owned 3,000,648 acres. Some of this land was grazed, but a considerable proportion was put to no 
effective use- a fact commenied upon frequently by land hungry Afncan farmers and pastoralists 
(see Tignor 1976:25). 
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African population living in those areas (see Zwanenberg & King 1975:29). 
Subdivision and fragmentation of holdings into smaller and smaller units was 
the result 
5.4.2 Kqjiado District Administrative Changes 
1909 ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARIES KAJIADO DISTRICT 1918 ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARIES • KAJIADO DISTRICT 
1924 ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARIES - KAJIADO DISTRICT 1929 ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARIES KAJIADO DISTRICT 
Figure 5 J Administrative Boundaries 1909 - 1961 
Source. Kajiado District Atlas (1990 draft) 
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Figure 5.3 provides an overview of the renaming and adjustment of boundary 
lines of the Maasai Reserve. In 1924, for instance, the Maasai Reserve was 
renamed Maasai Province. The total area comprises approximately 39,000 km2 
when including minor adjustments made since the creation of the Maasai 
Reserve District In 1926, the interdistrict boundary between Kajiado and 
Narok District was, at its northern part, shifted to the east and the Ngong 
Headquarters transferred to Kajiado Township. The Central Maasai Council 
and the 14 Native Councils gave place in 1930 to two Local Native Councils, 
at Narok and Kajiado. 
Following the recommendations of the Carter Commission, which reviewed 
all land issues of the Kenya Colony in 1932, the Maasai Province was renamed 
by proclamation No. 109 in 1933 as the Maasai Extra Provincial District. Its 
area totalled 39,291 km2. Kajiado District amounted to almost 22,000 km2. 
Other recommendations of the Carter Commission resulted in the proclamation 
of the new land legislation by way of the Native Lands Trust Ordinance 1938 
and the Kenya (Native Areas) Order in Council 1939. The Crown Lands 
(Amendment) Ordinance, 1938, defined the various categories of land: 1) 
'Native' instead of 'Crown' land in the case of the original reserves, 2) 
Temporary Native Reserves and 3) Native Leasehold Areas (see Sorrenson 
1965:689). In 1942, Magadi Company's houses at Kajiado Township were 
purchased by the Government for £3,500. This consolidated the position of 
Kajiado as a Government Station. 
5.4.3 Infiltration by Other Groups into the Maasai Reserve 
In a quantitative sense the Maasai had lost more land than any other group as a 
result of the arrival of the Europeans. These other groups, however, suffered 
most from being restricted in a Reserve that was too small, the Kikuyu in 
particular. They lost high quality land to the Europeans and their area was 
densely populated. The practice of selling land between each other had also 
worsened this situation. Wealthy and influential Kikuyu could, by a variety of 
means, accumulate land at the expense of the poor, debtors and tenants. 
The shortage of land stimulated the Kikuyu to look for alternatives such as 
squatting on the land of Europeans or moving into other Reserves. In Kajiado 
District, the Kikuyu looked hungrily at the slopes of the Ngong Hills, the Ol 
Doinyo Orok near Namanga and Mt. Kilimanjaro, being the areas suitable for 
cultivation. However, a special permit was needed to enter the Maasai Reserve. 
A Kikuyu who wanted to start cultivating for himself was refused an entry 
permit. 'In view of the general desirability of discouraging such emigration of 
Kikuyu natives, the policy has been adopted in the Masai Reserve of 
prosecuting all Kikuyu living in that reserve who cannot claim by long 
residence or circumcision rights to have become Masai, and of returning them 
to their own reserve' (Sandford 1919:55). 
The Maasai and Kikuyu had been neighbours for a long time, engaging in 
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trade during good and bad times. Moreover, many Kikuyu women had married 
Maasai men especially those from their closest neighbours the Kaputiei and 
Dalalekutuk. Sometimes Kikuyu relatives were able to follow these wives into 
Maasailand, forming small Kikuyu colonies. 'Cultivation in the Ngong area, 
which had begun with the settlement of destitute Maasai at the end of the 
nineteenth century (Low, 1965), expanded as increasing numbers of Maasai 
married Kikuyu women who cleared small plots and as relatives of these 
women moved into the area to farm' (Campbell 1981a:218). Besides the 
possibility of kinship, the Kikuyu tried to find Maasai who were willing to 
employ them as cultivators. If employed, non-Maasai Africans could not be 
refused being in the Maasai Reserve. 
Besides the shortage of land other reasons could be responsible for the 
immigration of Kikuyu into the Maasai area. Towards the end of the World 
War I quite a number of Kikuyu fled into the Masai Reserve, trying to avoid 
recruitment as porters for the Carrier Corps. These emigrants, attempting to 
escape enrolment, signed agreements to work as servants for Indians, Somali 
and Maasai. 'By 1928 the pénétration pacifique of Kikuyu into the Mau area 
of the Masai Reserve had assumed such significant proportions that the Masai 
Local Native Council passed a resolution forbidding Kikuyu to cultivate land 
outside the townships of Narok and Ngong' (Sorrenson 1967:38). 'The attitude 
of the Masai to this problem is not easy to understand or explain. As a tribe 
they have been emphatic in refusing to agree to impenetratíon but as 
individuals they have welcomed the Kikuyu' (MIRMD 1936-December:6/7). 
In one case, however, the Maasai and the Kikuyu agreed as a group to the 
exchange of some land. Ndeiya, an area of approximately 75 square miles 
located to the west of Ngong and south of the Kiambu District, was the only 
area within the recognized tribal boundaries which was not settled in 1930 (see 
Bullock 1978:3). It is said that originally Ndeiya belonged to the Dorobo. Later 
the Maasai obtained it but in tum handed part of it over to a group of Kikuyu 
as a gift. On June 5 th 1929, elders of both groups agreed that, in return for 
grazing rights in western Ndeiya, the Maasai would offer an area in eastern 
Ndeiya near Kibiko. This exchange of grazing was a temporary measure and 
renewable annually. However, as large numbers of Kikuyu were evicted from 
European farms and other Reserves, pressure was rapidly building in the 
Kikuyu Reserve by the end of the 1920s. Ndeiya, with its marginal 
environment and being less populated than other parts of their Reserve 
'became a dumping ground for thousands of the displaced and dispossessed' 
(Bullock 1978:34). These people not only brought their livestock with them, 
but they also wanted to cultivate. The question of Kikuyu cultivation in the 
Ndeiya region would remain in the centre of discussion within and between the 
Local Native Councils of both Kikuyu and Maasai. However, permitted or not, 
by June 1932 already 400 families were cultivating land and had erected 
fences. By January 1933 the Central Trust Board consented to the setting apart 
of the area as a grazing area. 
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Another zone of influx was the area around Loitokitok on the slopes of Mount 
Kilimanjaro. Loitokitok was occupied in 1921 as an administrative station. 
Kamba labourers employed to build the post came from Campi ya Simba. This 
camp had been established by Hobley in early 1900 and was located 65 km 
south of Simba near the Chyulu Hills. It was used by scouts of the Game 
Department The Kamba labourers started some cultivation around Loitokitok. 
'Certain advantages accrued to the Akamba and Masai for the area occupied 
was good agricultural land but useless for stock, owing to "fly". The clearing 
of the bush would have led eventually to the extermination of the "fly"'(KDAR 
1930:6). However, the Machakos District Administration wanted to evict all 
Kamba back to their own Reserve although the Maasai District Commissioner 
had positively welcomed Kamba cultivation. In January 1930, without the 
knowledge of the DC Kajiado, all but a few Kamba left to harvest were 
returned by the Machakos Administration. In correspondence with other 
officers responsible the DC Kajiado proposed to offer a lease to the Kamba if 
they would return and continue cultivating. 
While this discussion was still going on the Kamba had already returned by 
March 1931. The DC Machakos (Mr. Silvester) wanted to remove them again, 
this time they announced it in due time. The DC Kajiado (Mr. Storrs Fox) and 
the PC Maasai Province (Mr. Butler) took the side of the Kamba in Campi ya 
Simba pointing to the advantages resulting from their presence in the Maasai 
Province: development of agriculture, payment of rent to the Kajiado Local 
Native Council, fly infested area cleared and the supply of labour for Kajiado 
District. Despite these arguments the DC Machakos insisted and in July 1931 
all the Kamba were sent away from Campi ya Simba and Campi ya Mwarabu 
(Rombo). In a last effort the PC Maasai Province suggested that the DC 
Machakos was allowed to collect hut tax among the Kamba living in the lease 
area in Kajiado District. Again this offer was not accepted and by March 1932 
all the Kamba seemed to have moved away towards Taveta east of Kajiado 
District 
Some cultivation, however, was practised in the south-east comer of Kajiado 
District thanks to the Chagga from Tanganyika who employed a similar 
strategy as the Kikuyu in the north-west. '(...) by the 1930s individual Maasai 
were owning plots which were cultivated either by their Chagga wives or by 
Chagga labourers hired by the Maasai. A major incentive to cultivation was the 
frequent failure of the rains which led to losses of livestock and encouraged 
the Maasai to seek alternative sources of subsistence' (Campbell 1981a:218). 
Although the Carter Commission had established the boundaries of the 
Reserves for every group in Kenya the influx of Kikuyu, Kamba and Chagga 
in the Maasai area continued in the late 1930s and became a major point of 
concern for the Maasai. The Administration, however, endured their double 
feelings conceming this immigration as shown before in case of the Kamba of 
Campi ya Simba. 
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In a letter dated June 27th 1934, the DC Kajiado invited the DC Machakos 
to send the Kamba to Campi ya Simba on condition of payment of Sh. 12/- per 
year per holding to the Kajiado Local Native Council. A second prerequisite 
was the construction of a road from the Camp towards the main road between 
Simba and Loitokitok. When the Kamba from the Game Department situated 
in another location (Esoit Pus near the Noolturesh River) turned out to be a 
source of conflict with the Maasai (over shamba trespass) and of corruption 
(illegal tax collection) this enthusiasm for inviting more Kamba quickly 
diminished. 
Troubles in the north-west comer of Kajiado District between the Maasai 
and Kikuyu immigrants also persisted. The droughts of 1933 and 1934 resulted 
in high stock mortality in Ndeiya and among the Maasai. Stock thefts and 
inter-tribal conflict increased and, the following year, the Maasai cancelled the 
exchange agreement The main grievance of the Maasai was the continually 
growing number of Kikuyu coming to Ndeiya, building huts and making 
shambas in an area which had been set aside only for grazing. Rising 
population pressure in the Kikuyu Reserve was responsible for this 
development, due to a steady return of Kikuyu from other parts of Kenya and 
the growing imbalance of land ownership amongst them. Wealthy Kikuyu, 
administrators and teachers, bought the land from the less fortunate and less 
educated members of the community. By the beginning of the 1930s they had 
also started to show interest in the Ndeiya area. 
In October 1935 a group of 117 Kikuyu families from the Ndeiya area in 
the Ngong region were ordered to go 'home'. Only those who had stayed in 
Ngong Township or who were employed by the Maasai and in possession of a 
permit were allowed to stay. 'The Kajiado Local Native Council has expressed 
an opinion that Kikuyu natives should not be allowed to come into any 
division of the Kajiado District unless they first obtain a permit from the Chief 
of that division, which he should only give after consultation with his elders' 
(KNA DC/Kaj/2/3/14). The willingness on the side of the Maasai to keep some 
Kikuyu in the Reserve was partly to support the Colonial Government in 
relieving the congestion in the Kiambu District.14 Maasai leaders, once more, 
offered the Government a large area of the Chyulu Hills, between the Kiboko 
River and Campi ya Simba and Campi ya Marabu (near Noolturesh river) for 
occupation by the Kikuyu provided that the Mile Zone and the Chyulu 
Triangle would be added to the Maasai Reserve. This was not accepted by the 
Government 
The removal of Kikuyu families from the Maasai Reserve, however, was 
called off at the instigation of the DC Kiambu and the Provincial 
Commissioner Central Province. In November 1936 the OiC Maasai (Mr. 
Approximalely 30,000 people from this district dispossessed of (heir lands by the 
Government, could find no place in the Kikuyu Reserve They were living in townships, as 
squauers on European land or were attempung to get some land in other Reserves 
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Fazan) announced a new system for the Ndeiya exchange allowing the Kikuyu 
herds to continue grazing in the area loaned to them on the condition that they 
returned to their own Reserve every night Individual Kikuyu living in the 
Ngong Division of the Maasai Province for longer than twelve years could 
obtain free permits. Others could obtain a temporary occupation licence if the 
consent of the chief and elders was obtained. It seems that this arrangement 
was partly the product of the British Administration as Fazan ends his letter 
stating 'It must be understood that this arrangement is subject to alteration if 
my successor does not approve of it The object is, on the one hand, to put a 
stop to the continued and growing encroachment by Kikuyu into Masai without 
authority, and, on the other hand, to give a reasonable security to those who 
obtain permits' (KNA/DC/Ngong/1/1/22-12/11/1936). Non-Maasai infiltration 
nevertheless continued and, in 1937, after complaints by Mr. Cowie, a settler 
in the Ngong area concerning the Kikuyu and the Somali entering the 
Mbagathi River area, around 35 Kikuyu were immediately prosecuted and 
removed from this part of the Maasai Reserve.15 
Infiltrators started looking for alternative locations in Kajiado District 
'Kikuyu were found to have come in and settled in the high ground on the top 
of Oldonyo Orok at Namanga. These were removed and returned to Kiambu. 
The modus operandi is for the Kikuyu to get himself signed on by a Masai as 
labourer at 3/- per month. Some 70 acres of virgin forest has been destroyed 
by this method. In April an Akamba village was found near Kiu. (...) It had got 
a footing through a bastard Masai-Akamba' (KDAR 1939:12). 
5.4.4 Evidence and Memoranda Presented to the Carter Land 
Commission 
In October 1930, the first Maasai political organization, the Maasai 
Association, was formed. Its leaders were recruited from among the educated 
Maasai, mainly from Narok and Nairobi. Most of them had been trained by 
missionaries in or outside Maasailand. They had revolved against their former 
teachers, who had attempted to stop certain Maasai practices like traditional 
dress, ornaments and, especially, circumcision. In 1929 the AIM church at 
Siyiabei (Narok District) lost almost all its members over this. However, 'land 
and white men in general taking things from them' were the main reasons for 
the closing of Maasai ranks (see King 197la: 130). 
The drought of 1929, called the "Famine of the Hides", had made clear once 
again to the Maasai that their Reserve was lacking the quality and quantity of 
As early as 1900 twelve Somali and then families were allowed to take up residence OD 
ibe north bank of the Mbagathi nver as a reward foi servie« with the Uganda Rifles in the 
preceding decades This area, called the Nairobi Commonage, was later to become the Nairobi 
National Park. Following the Kenya Land Commission's recommendations the Somali were 
allowed to stay In the Park (bring the lifetime of the head of each family after which they would 
have to leave (see Ecosystems 1982 65/6). 
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the pastures they had previously possessed. Maasai from this political party 
were responsible for the writing of a memorandum concerning Maasai land 
grievances presented to the Kenya Land Commission, chaired by Sir Morris 
Carter. 
л - в Eastern Mau Forest exchange (22 sq. m. - 20.7 sq. m); 
с - D Kinangop Circumcision area exchange (69 sq. m. - 11 sq. m.); 
в Two settler owned faims the Maasai wanted to purchase m order to get an extra mile of the 
river. The pnce asked was far in excess of the value and negotiations were dropped; 
F - о Ndeiya exchange (10 sq. m. · 16.5 sq. m.) F leased by Kikuyu to Maasai and G vice vosa; 
H Colvile exchange (230 acres) adjusting of the boundary to ease acces to the river for Maasai 
livestock. 
I -1 Fertile agricultural land (I) of some 8 sq. miles within the Maasai Reserve had been leased to 
a group of Kikuyu for some years. The group was evicted by the Colonial Government in the 
late 1920s. It was proposed before the Carter Commission by Europeans to exchange this for 
a piece of чпяііпрдкчі Crown land of some 69 sq. miles to the south of Lake Naivasha; 
к Good agricultural land vacated by the Maasai except in periods of severe drought (69 sq. m). 
Figure 5.4 Maasai Land Claims and Areas of Exchange 
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In April 1932, the Carter Land Commission was appointed on the request of a 
British Parliamentary Committee. 'It was required to examine African 
grievances and recommend the best way to settle them; to study existing 
African requirements in land and consider what land could be set aside to 
satisfy them on a tribal or individual basis; to consider the working of the 
Native Lands Trust Ordinance of 1930; and, on the European side to define the 
Highlands, within which persons of European descent are to have a privileged 
position' (Sorrenson 1965:687). In short, historical rights to and future needs 
for land had to be investigated in order to solve the Kenyan land problem once 
and forall. In Kajiado District the following areas had been the most often in 
dispute over the years: 
- the One Mile Zone between Athi River Town and Sultan Hamud south of 
the Uganda Railway (140 km2), 
- the Chyulu Triangle, covering an area of approximately 480 km2 stretching 
from Sultan Hamud towards the Kiboko River near the Chyulu Range, 
- the 1/4 Mile Zone flanking the Magadi Railway on both sides. An area of 
approximately 100 km2. 
In total an area of 720 km2, almost as large as the Magadi Concession, was in 
dispute. Furthermore the Commission had to consider some proposed 
exchanges of land, including the Kinangop area, between the Maasai and the 
Kikuyu and some European farmers (see figure S.4). 
In October 1932, the Carter Commission started its enquiries and hearings with 
the Maasai, Government officials and other informants. The Maasai presented a 
memorandum pointing out once more that they had lost their best grazing areas 
and that the present Reserve failed to fulfil their needs (especially in the Narok 
District) due to the influx of Maasai from the north, the region's semi-arid 
character, the presence of tsetse fly and the lack of watering points. 'We, as a 
tribe who were once the overlords of all other tribes in these territories, are 
assigned a part of the country which is decidedly inferior to and worse than 
almost all other native reserves* (KLC 1934:1224). 
In their memorandum the Maasai frequently quoted the Hilton Young 
Commission Report with respect to the insecurity of their landownership; 
'It may be said that effective safeguards against possible detriment to 
native interests can be created if it is provided that native land cannot be 
sold but only leased for a limited period during which the natives are not 
likely to require it, and that native representatives must be consulted 
before anything is done. (...) once the boundaries of 'native reserves' 
have been fixed nothing which might be regarded as handing over to 
non-natives the beneficial use of any substantial areas of land within 
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these boundaries ought to be permitted, at least, until the natives 
themselves have obtained such a standard of education and civilization 
that they can be regarded as really competent to give a representative and 
responsible expression of public opinion' (KLC 1934:1227/8). 
Furthermore, the Maasai asked for the removal of the artificial boundary 
dividing the Kenya and Tanganyika Maasai and to join the latter in an 
extended area of the Kenya Colony. Finally, they requested the handing back 
of the Laikipia area as parts of it were still available to or occupied by other 
ethnic groups like the Sambuni. In fact the Maasai were indirectly attacked as 
well supported by Mr. Deck, the Maasai Provincial Commissioner, when in a 
memorandum provided for the Carter Commission he stated that in general 
'The principle of reserving certain areas for native occupation is 
unassailable. (...) Land, which is acquired compulsory in a native reserve 
should be leased to landless natives (...) The rental should go as 
compensation to the Local Native Council funds. The Crown should also 
be empowered to acquire land already alienated to Europeans. Extensive 
areas alienated as farms years ago have never been utilized beneficially; 
and it has become apparent that much of the land is of inferior quality, or 
so short of water, that no European can make a living on it' (KLC 
1934:1264). 
Nevertheless, by 1932 the Laikipia region and the international boundary with 
Tanganyika were no longer a topic of debate for the Land Commission. The 
land claims named above were the only issues allowed to be discussed: 
A. One Mile Zone and Chyulu Triangle 
With regard to these areas the Maasai stressed before the Carter Commission 
the importance of these zones for their livestock economy as they were the 
only pieces of land in the vicinity with a few streams and springs to which 
they had recourse during the dry season.16 
By the late 1920s, a Sub-Committee of the Executive Council had already 
advised the Colonial Government concerning the land claims made by the 
Maasai. This commission, however, could not reach an unanimous point of 
view as the Provincial Commissioner, Mr. S. Deck, applied in a minority 
report for the inclusion of the One Mile Zone and Chyulu Triangle. Major С 
Buxton, the District Commissioner Kajiado and who had worked in Narok 
In the south of the Maasai Province access to other watering points had become mote 
difficult. Due to an amended demarcation of the international Kenya-Tanganyika boundary m 
1926, the Meto and Namanga areas were reduced by some IS square miles including about a 
dozen springs and wells To relieve some of the difficulties during the dry seasons the "Kenya 
Massai" were granted some concessions which only lasted till 1933. 
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District before, had given evidence before the Sub-Committee but had not been 
able to change the minds of the other members. According to Buxton the 
Maasai had been using the Mile Zone since time immemorial. This use had 
continued after the proclamation of the Maasai Reserve except for 1917, 1918 
and 1927 when they were removed from the area by the British but allowed to 
return after Maasai protest 
Officially, however, the Mile Zone and the Chyulu Triangle were not 
included as belonging to the Maasai Reserve in the 1911 Treaty. The omission 
of the Triangle seems to have been an eiror as in 1916 Governor Belfield 
approved alteration of the boundary to include the Triangle. Later, by Gazette 
notice, the Triangle was again excluded from the reserve, probably to be set 
apart for soldier settlement. Buxton also stressed that alternative water facilities 
would not compensate the Maasai for the loss of the two zones and that in 
other Reserves the One Mile Zone near the railway had been abandoned. 
Finally he criticised all those 'anti-Maasai' officers who point to the large area 
available to the Maasai by stating that Maasai pastoralists lost many animals 
during 1929, in spite of having been given some extra grazing concessions. Of 
course these officers stated that the Maasai Reserve was overstocked and if the 
Maasai were to be given more land the problem would repeat itself within a 
short period of time. 
In May 1930 the Executive Council decided that the Maasai had no claim 
for extension of their reserve by the addition of the Mile Zone. The Chyulu 
Triangle, however, could be included if the Native Lands Trust Board were to 
agree. In April 1931 this Board also declined, pointing to the large area 
occupied by the Maasai as compared to other groups. The Central Board's only 
concession was that the Maasai could 'be allowed to continue to occupy the 
areas by grant of a lease or licence, renewable annually, until such time as 
adequate alternative grazing and water facilities be made available by boring or 
otherwise' (KLC 1934:1188/89). Buxton was fighting a losing battle. 'The 
policy of the government toward pastoralists was totally opposed to any 
extension of their land' (Spencer 1983:130). 
The Kenya Land Commission took notice of the above information and 
heard some more Government officials and settlers. The latter stressed the 
importance of the One Mile Zone as a means of controlling quarantine 
regulations. Moreover, Mr. Deck had tempered his demand for the inclusion of 
the zones by stating that land taken from the Maasai for the settlement of the 
Kikuyu should be compensated for by land from the Mile Zone and Chyulu 
Triangle. 
B. Railway 1/4 Mile Zone 
In October 1926, at the official gazetting of the Reserve boundaries, the 1/4 
Mile Zone on both sides along the centre line of the Magadi Railway was 
excluded from the Maasai Reserve. The Sub-Committee of the Executive 
Council advised the re-inclusion of this zone and this was approved by the 
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Governor in May 1930. 
С Exchanges 
Four major exchanges were discussed; the Mau Forest Exchange (14,000 
acres), the Kinangop Circumcision area exchange (19241 acres in the Kedong 
Valley given to the Maasai for 6,529 acres), the Ndeiya Exchange (4,740 
acres) and the Farm No. 410/1 (Colvile) Exchange (230 acres). All of them are 
located in the northern part of the Maasai Province between the Mau region of 
Narok District and the Kiserian area of the Kajiado District (see figure 5.4). 
5.4S Conclusions and Recommendations of the Carter Land Commission 
The final report of the Kenya Land Commission with reference to the Maasai 
area, started with a general remark concerning the Maasai need for land. In 
fact a real examination of this topic had hardly taken place. Maasai needs were 
mainly dealt with by comparing the Maasai population density of 3 persons per 
square mile with the population density in the Kikuyu Reserve (283/square 
mile) and the Kavirondo/Luo area (145/square mile). 
This led the Carter Commission to criticise the fact that not only Europeans, 
but even other African groups were precluded freon obtaining land in the 
Maasai Reserve on any reasonable security, unless the Maasai themselves 
would agree. 
'When we turn from the interests of the Masai and consider the interests 
of other tribes, it is clear that the permanent entail of a vast area of land 
for the benefit of a tribe which makes very little use of it and, left to 
itself, would certainly not be able to keep it, must appear unjust, 
especially when one, at least, of the neighbouring tribes is living in a 
state which borders on congestion. Nobody wishes to deprive the Masai 
of their land, but justification might arise for requiring them to lease 
unused portions of it to other tribes or to individual natives' (Carter 
1934:7). 
It is clear that the Maasai sympathizer Buxton had got nowhere. The view held 
by the Kikuyu officers was virtually accepted in full. The Commission foresaw 
an interaption in progress, and even a reversal, for the Maasai if they were to 
remain in isolation. Large areas of valuable agricultural land would remain 
unused for the benefit of poor quality livestock during only certain short 
periods of the year. With regard to the specific land claims the Carter 
Commission advised as follows: 
- The One Mile Zone and Chyulu Triangle were not included in the 
Agreement Boundaries of 1911 and thus cannot be claimed by the Maasai. 
However, if the Maasai desired, they should be given, at a reasonable rent 
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an annual lease, until equivalent watering facilities would be available 
within the Masai Reserve. The Chyulu Triangle could be added to the 
Reserve if the Maasai would cede some of their good agricultural land to 
other agricultural communities. 
- The 1/4 Mile Zone was included in the Reserve. 
- With reference to the exchanges of land discussed above, the Carter 
Commission approved the proposals and conditions agreed upon by the 
parties involved. However, the Commission advised regularizing the Ndeiya 
exchange by a formal lease as 'the Kikuyu are getting more and better land 
than they are giving up' (KLC 1934:niin.709). 
The Kenya Land Commission Report was, with regard to the main proposals, 
accepted by the Government. The leasing of land to other tribes, however, was 
not approved until the New Land Ordinance, which was to replace the 1915 
Ordinance and 1930 Native Lands Trust Ordinance, would come into full 
force. 
5.5 1946 · 1963: Late Colonial Period; Grazing Schemes, 
Infiltration, Emergency and Independence 
5.5.1 The African Land Crisis 
The growth of the economy which had begun after the ending of World War 
Π, brought with it a sharp, direct, and growing conflict with African (mainly 
Kikuyu) squatters in the Rift Valley who were now seen as a block, standing 
in the way of the expansion of modem agriculture, that is, white farm 
expansion. 'The White Highlands, which had previously served the function of 
helping to relieve population pressure in Central Province, now began to send 
people back into the Central Province Reserves, thus further exacerbating land 
pressure and social tension' (Gordon 1979:102). At the end of the War 
approximately 90,000 ex-soldiers or conscript servicemen of the King's African 
Rifles had already raised the number of jobless and/or landless Africans. 
The economic crisis in the African Reserves was perceived by the colonial 
regime as a crisis concerning African land. 
Firstly, it was decided that, from a legal point of view the best way to 
handle this was by a strengthening of the community control over land in the 
African Reserves to protect the weak against the strong. 
Secondly, the Government started 'a program of soil conservation intended 
eventually to mcrease the output in those areas. Since the alternative to 
increased productivity could only be the expansion of the African Areas - the 
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most obvious area of expansion being the Highlands - it was politically as well 
as economically important for soil conservation to succeed' (Gordon, 
1979:103). 
In 194S a new agency, the African Settlement Board, was created to deal 
with this problem. The Board consisted of the Chief Native commissioner and 
directors of agriculture and veterinary services. Besides acting as a financial 
corporation the Board had mainly an advisory, monitoring and evaluating 
function. The actual operations were carried out by Departments, especially at 
Provincial level. Although its initial focus was settlement of Africans returning 
from the War or those removed from the White Highlands, the ecological 
component gained more and more attention. Several adjustments in the Board's 
name -African Land Utilization and Settlement (ALUS 1947) and African Land 
Development Board (ALDEV 1953)- were made to illustrate this shift of 
concern. 'In the range country of Kenya between 1945 and 1962 the African 
Land Development Board was involved in constructing 1,020 seasonal dams, 
332 permanent dams, 308 sub-surface dams, 38 rock catchments, 40 masonry 
weirs; it installed 72 piping schemes, protected 54 springs, drilled 44 boreholes 
and over 200 wells and hand drilled boreholes' (Peberdy 1969:175). Besides 
this scheme others were initiated which (also) operated in the African Reserves 
(see chapter 6). 
Not just the (forced) migration of Africans but also the natural growth of 
the population augmented the problems in the small African Reserves. By 1945 
Kenya had a population of approximately 5.2 million people of which 
approximately 5 million were Africans. Between the censuses of 1948 and 
1962 the number of Africans increased from 5,251,120 to 8365,942. They far 
outnumbered the European and Asian population which by 1948 amounted to 
29,660 and 97,687 respectively, rising to 55,759 and 176,613 in 1962. This 
population increase resulted in an African labour surplus which triggered off 
rural-urban migration, especially towards Nairobi. Once a small resting camp 
for the IBEAC, Nairobi had grown from a population of some 11,500 in 1906 
to 65,000 by 1938. Within 10 more years this number had almost doubled. By 
1948 64397 Africans, 41,810 Asians, 10.830 Europeans and 1,939 others, 
totalling 118,976, inhabited the capital city of Kenya. In 1962 this figure had 
risen to 266,794, being 156,246 Africans, 86,453 Asians, 21,477 Europeans 
and 2,618 others.17 
In spite of their overwhelming majority it was 1944 bef от the first 
nominated African member appeared in the Legislative Council. By 1952 
The 1962 Cgure has in later years been modified to 343,500 inhabitants, because the 1962 
census restricted the Nairobi population to those people living in the city proper For 1969 the new 
1963 municipal district boundary, including the peri-urban area, was used. The percentage of 
Africans living in Nairobi (proper) compared to the total Afhcan population amounted lo 1 2 per 
cent m 1948 and 19 per cent in 1962 For Europeans these figures were 36.5 and 38.5 per cent 
respectively Asians ranked fust concerning the rate of urbanization with 42 8 per cent ш 1948 and 
4 8 9 per cent m 1962. 
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Afincan representation had increased to 8 members (or 15 per cent)." 
However, as real (economic) improvements were not occurring and were 
repeatedly slowed down by the European community, a radicalizatíon of 
African, mainly Kikuyu, politics occurred. This eventually escalated towards an 
armed struggle between the so-called Mau Mau movement and the Colonial 
Government19 In October 1952 a state of Emergency was declared, which 
lasted till June 1959. The Mau Mau did not spread to the rest of the territory, 
except for among the Embu and Mem and to some extent the Kamba, although 
the presence of troops and the enforcement of emergency measures certainly 
affected the overall political climate. 'The casualties among government forces, 
given as something less than 1,000 killed, were far outnumbered by those of 
their opponents, estimated at more than 11,000 - to which must be added the 
grim figure of more than 1,000 executions: but it is believed that the civilian 
victims of the latter numbered not much less than 2,000' (Bennett & Smith 
1976:132). 
Disunity among the settlers on how to respond to African grievances weakened 
their position. London was able to gain more influence. This time the Colonial 
Administration, through Governor Ph. Mitchell and E. Baring, who succeeded 
him in 1952, was less recalcitrant as had been before. Several visits were paid 
by British Members of Parliament and Advisory Commissions, resulting in a 
whole series of reform documents produced in the mid-1950s. 
Among the most influential were the Report of the East African Royal 
Commission 1953-1955 concerning the Government's policies in Kenya and 
the Plan to Intensify the Development of African Agriculture in Kenya of 1954 
by the assistant director for Agriculture R.J.M. Swynnerton. The former helped 
to pave the way for the latter, but its writing must mainly be seen as a reaction 
to the Mau Mau uprising and the problem of land in the densely populated 
Central Province. 
Initially the plan was only intended to be implemented in the Kikuyu 
Reserve but it was subsequently widened to include all Native Land Units in 
the other provinces of Kenya. Swynnerton stated that 'In general it may be said 
that any land naturally suited to settlement has already been occupied, often 
In total 54 seats were available on the Legislative Council European members amounted 
to 14 elected officials and 7 nominated officials or 39 per cett. In reality more Europeans were 
present as another 16 places were open for 8 Government officials and 8 nonunated persons from 
outside the public sector The remaining 11 places were divided between 8 Asians and 3 Arabs. 
The Executive Council of 1952 consisted of the Governor plus 12 members, 8 Govemmeat 
officials, 2 nominated Europeans, 1 nominated Asian and, for the fust time, 1 nominated African. 
19
 The Mau Mau uprising was a complex historical event which has several possible 
explanations and which is still being studied by historians The movement can be seen as 
everything bom "nationalistic freedom fighters" towards "anti-chnst tnbal barbarians" See for an 
analysis of these différent opinions the works of Buijtenhuis (1973) and Furley (1972). 
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very densely. There are certain exceptions, e.g. in Masai, Mau-Narok and 
Trans Mara, not fully or agriculturally occupied for political reasons. Of the 
remainder of the colony three-quarters is semi-arid and, except in limited areas, 
occupied by pastoral tribes' (Swynnerton 1955:7). In the Plan the African lands 
were divided into four categories, each having its own characteristics and 
needing a special approach: 
1. high-potential areas suited for mixed farming, specializing in high-yielding 
cash crops and livestock; 
2. medium-potential regions on which to intensify cultivation or which could 
be brought into new production by irrigation; 
3. semi-arid pastoral areas, 'which can never be developed intensively but in 
which some food requirements should normally be grown and from which, 
given adequate outlets for surplus stock, control of stock numbers, a 
planned grid of water supplies and sound grazing management, may be 
derived a constant and valuable flow of livestock and their products; 
without such control, large sums of money can be expended with no 
economic benefit whatsoever' (Swynnerton 1955:7); 
4. special areas and projects like eroded lands, horticultural development 
schemes, tsetse reclamation schemes, afforestation schemes. 
The British Government eventually provided £16 million for this Five-Year 
programme of land consolidation and registration. The idea of communal land 
ownership had been dropped unofficially as early as 1950 by the Department 
of Agriculture. Neither the Land Bank nor the commercial banks were 
interested in lending money to African fanners without individual security 
provided by way of a land title. Traditional land tenure had to be removed as it 
was considered as blocking the way towards the intensification of African 
agriculture. In future, the creation of a landless class was predicted, but 
considered to be a normal step in the evolution of a country. Together with a 
lifting of the ban on the growth of cash crops by African fanners, provision of 
security of tenure, technical assistance, water improvement, agricultural 
education, credit and marketing facilities, the income and standards of living of 
the people should be raised, while at the same time a substantial increase in the 
resources and economy of the Colony would take place. 
It was then that the semi-arid regions were "discovered" to be a potential 
asset to Kenya's economy. 'The bulk of the 6,000,000 cattle in Kenya lie in 
the pastoral areas, in the main semi-arid. If the value of the bulk of the 
necessary annual take-off of 650,000 head can be raised from £2 to £10-£15 
apiece, that gives some idea of the potential value of stock in these areas' 
(Swynnerton 1955:62). To improve the productivity of the semi-arid pastoral 
areas five measures had to be taken: 
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1. limitation of the number of livestock to the carrying capacity of the land 
2. provision of regular outlets for the absorption of all excess stock 
3. construction of an adequate system of permanent water supplies. 
4. maintenance of the grazing areas at a productive level 
5. eradication of tsetse 
Activities and finances of ALDEV were integrated into the Swynnerton Plan. 
The main concern remained the limitation of stock numbers, as it was thought 
that without this no satisfactory development could be achieved. Disease 
control had the lowest priority, marketing and grazing management the highest. 
Field abattoirs. Grazing Schemes based on groups using a certain borehole, 
creation of schoolfarms to teach the children modem practices of husbandry, 
and pasture research were the major means initiated to reach the above 
mentioned objectives. 
Although the Swynnerton Plan mentioned the high potential value of the 
pastoral areas, all in all only marginal attention was given to these areas as 
compared with the other more fertile areas on which the main and strongest 
opposition to the British Colonial Government was to be found. A commission 
was formed to inquire 'to what extent the pastoral tribes, wealthy in stock, 
should finance the preservation and development of their lands on a controlled 
basis, remembering that capital development will often be out of proportion to 
the economic value of the land' (Swynnerton 1955:33). Money invested in 
Grazing Schemes should be recoverable, so for the semi-arid areas loans were 
preferred above grants some of which were nevertheless provided. 
Within about six years the Swynnerton Plan had become a reality. In the 
Central Province the programme had been successful within this short period 
because extraordinary conditions existed then as a result of the Emergency: 
'the rural population had been forcibly grouped in newly established villages as 
a defense measure and this facilitated the reallocation of land in consolidated 
holdings in the surrounding rural areas' (Memon 1981:76). 'By mid-1962 
nearly 300,000 farms had been consolidated and enclosed, covering some 2.4 
million acres, and amounting to approximately 51 per cent of the high potential 
land in the African areas' (McWilliam 1976:264). The expanding small-holding 
cash-crop economy produced mainly for the domestic market 
5.5.2 Administrative Changes and Boundary Adjustments 
After the war the head of the Administration in Kajiado District regained the 
status of District Commissioner which had been lost as a war time economy in 
1942. Additionally the administration over the Ngong area was transferred to 
Kajiado. In 1948 section councils were formed for each section, mainly acting 
as advisory bodies for matters concerning them. That same year the Joint Local 
Native Councils of Narok and Kajiado were replaced by the Maasai Council. 
From 1951 to 1955 this council was given law-making and financial powers 
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and the Local Native Councils of each district simply turned into committees. 
'The members have been drawn more or less equally from Kajiado and Narok 
Districts and it is hoped that the more progressive Kajiado element will be able 
to influence their less amenable brothers from Narok' (KDAR 1951:11). 
Together with the Kamba of Kitui and Machakos District the two Maasai 
Districts formed the new Southern Province in 1953. During the latter half of 
the 1950s the Kajiado African District Council, which had replaced the Masai 
African District Council by 1956, administered the district in co-operation with 
the Provincial administration. The latter had expanded its staffing power a year 
before through the opening of a new substation at Loitokitok and the posting 
of a District Officer and a Livestock Officer. In fact, until the beginning of the 
1950s, the Maasai had hardly come across a technical officer in the interior of 
the district. The start of the Ten Year Development Plan and the Swynnerton 
Plan changed this situation. 
According to the District Commissioner P. Low, who took over from A. 
Simpson in 1956, the new Kajiado African District Council was extremely land 
conscious. They had every reason to be. Not only the internal land use 
developments such as grazing schemes, individual ranches and game 
conservation parks, but also the Kajiado District boundary were still under 
debate. During the drought of 1949, Loitokitok Maasai in the Oltilal region 
were given permission by the Kenya National Parks Trustees to graze across 
the Tsavo national park boundary up to Olarammi Hill. According to the local 
Maasai, this had been the boundary originally pointed out to them in the mid 
1930s, but later, when gazetted, it had been pushed back. When the newly 
Southern Province Boundaries were gazetted in 1953, an error had been made 
with regard to the demarcation of the "Oltilal-Njugini" area. Adjustments made 
in 1954, agreed upon by both parties, were overruled by the Minister of Forest 
Development, Game and Fisheries the following year, which meant that the 
Maasai were officially illegally watering their cattle at the Njugini river during 
the latter half of the 1950s. 
Finally, in 1960 the Oltilal and Njugini exchange was settled positively for 
the Maasai. An area of approximately 500 km2 located south of Rombo was 
added to Kajiado District in exchange for an area of similar size towards the 
north east of Rombo. In 1961 the lower western boundary of Kajiado District 
was slightly pushed to the west, running more or less parallel at a maximum of 
10 kilometres with the Euaso Ng'iro river.20 
That same year the Lancaster House Conference was held to discuss the 
handing over of colonial power to the African population. The Maasai, 
however, became worried as they feared that the old Maasai Treaties would be 
dissolved the moment a free and independent Kenya became reality. The 
Since 1954, Kajiado District was already admmistenng dus paît of (be Narok Loodokilani 
section. 
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Maasai Districts were still governed as closed areas and prohibited other 
African groups free entry. It was feared that this would change as soon as the 
Maasai became part of an independent Kenya. African Delegates from Nyanza 
and Nyeri, both densely populated areas, had protested as early as 1959 against 
the closed status of the Maasai districts and had called for the integration of 
the land and all the ethnic groups in Kenya. 'It was wrong to talk in terms of 
Masailand. "it is African land, Kenya land"' (EAS 05/09/59). Their appeal was 
not successful as it was by the late 1960s before the status of closed district 
was withdrawn. 
The 1960-1 disaster together with the threat of increasing settlement by 
outsiders which was very relevant in the Ngong area, resulted in the creation of 
the Kaputiei Development Committee in 1960. Its main initiators were the 
young educated Kaputiei of the junior elder and senior warrior age groups. 
According to Hedlund the Kaputiei elders had agreed to its formation and to it 
functioning as a spokesman for the efforts to secure the right to land in the 
future and the prevention of further foreign intrusion (see Hedlund 1979:30). 
To strengthen their politically weak position, Kenyan and Tanganyikan 
Maasai formed their own political body called the Masai United Front.21 They 
even thought of proclaiming their own independence, defended by the British 
army with Arusha becoming the capital city. With the support of a catholic 
priest this idea got as far as the United Nations. However, when British 
support failed, the request for independence was in vain. A claim for 
£5,800,000, to be paid by the British as compensation for the use of 
Maasailand since 1904 was also rejected. Referring to the anxiety of the 
Maasai people that neighbours living in areas with a large shortage of land 
would cast covetous eyes on Maasai land Sir Patrick Renison, Governor at the 
time, said 'This is inevitably so and cannot be altered until your land becomes 
so well-developed and intensively ranched that it becomes obvious to all that 
there is no room for others to enter and farm it' (EAS 30/07/60). 
A Regional Boundaries Commission was installed in July 1962 to divide 
Kenya into six Administrative Regions and a Nairobi area whilst granting to 
the wishes of people in any locality to be included in any particular Region. 
The Kamba and the Maasai both stressed their unwillingness to continue their 
Southern Province alliance. Thinking that the Regional Boundaries 
Commission was a new Carter Commission to deal with land disputes, both 
groups made additional claims for land. The Kamba even demanded large parts 
In fact (his party was the revival of (he "Group of Educated Maasai" which had existed 
between 1948 and 1955. Its members were recruited from among the junior elders of the Ilderito 
age-group, almost all of them working for die Government and was, besides being a place for 
discussing Important Issues to do with development, active in trying lo find suitable jobs for 
Maasai school-leavers (see Jacobs 1963:73/4). 
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of Kajiado District as far as Magadi. The Maasai restricted themselves to the 
Nairobi National Park and the Chyulu Hills. 
However, the Lancaster House Agreement precluded any change in the 
Maasai Treaty area affecting the Kamba-Maasai boundary. KANU, headed by 
the first president of the Republic of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta, expressed the 
view that the present provincial boundaries should be retained and simply 
renamed regions. 'Regionalism will promote tribalism and result in chaos. (...) 
There should be freedom of movement in the Kenya of the future and the 
people should not be insulated by tribes' (RBC 1962:45). The Masai United 
Front was incorporated into the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), a 
political party containing mainly the smaller ethnic groups of Kenya as 
opposed to the Kenya African National Union representing the influential 
Kikuyu, Luo and Kamba. KADU proposed the creation of one big Rift Valley 
Province which would enclude the Maasai, Kalenjin, Samburu, Turkana, Pokot 
and other mainly semi-nomadic groups. This proposal was honoured by the 
Commission. 
The Maasai politicians then started to combat each other, first the former 
secretary and founder of the MUF, John Keen, joined the Kikuyu and Luo 
dominated KANU, which led the former chairman of the MUF, Stanley 
Oloitipitip, to start a campaign among Maasai leaders to declare a vote of no-
confidence in Keen. The rivalry between these two men was to dominate 
Maasai politics for the next two decades to come. 
5.53 The Introduction of Grazing Schemes and Individual Ranches 
In the opinion of the British Administration, traditional grazing control had 
been inadequate and become even more difficult to implement with the 
abolition of section boundaries which allowed free grazing for the Maasai 
throughout the whole of Maasailand as had been decided by the Joint Local 
Native Councils in June 1946. This decision conflicted with the British aim to 
implement a grazing control plan for each section by restricting the movement 
of stock from one section to another so as to enforce an economic limit within 
the boundaries of each section. So far the Maasai had only agreed to allow a 
specific number of animals in the vicinity of a borehole. If this number was 
exceeded the borehole would be closed in order to give the area a "rest". A 
request by the Officer in Charge of Maasailand in 1947 to reintroduce the 
section boundaries was not honoured. Nevertheless, in 1948, the Kaputiei 
attempted to exclude the Maasai of other sections from grazing in their area.22 
Even the "right" and "left hand" of Keekonyokie ilmurran quarrelled over the 
grazing rights in their own section. It should be noted, however, that even in 
In July 1949 it was suggested lo the Puiko and Ildamal elders that they should leave 
Kajiado and join the main bodies of their Sections in Narok Distria. This suggestion was strongly 
opposed and the idea was subsequently dropped (see KDAR 1949:4). 
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1948 with a severe lack of rain, Mr. Colvile, a prominent rancher, after touring 
the district had reported that 'little or no harm had been done to the land by 
overstoddng' (KDAR 1948:15). 
The semi-drought conditions of 1948 continued into 1949 killing a huge 
number of animals. Tension between several sections grew over the rights to 
use certain grazing areas. The Matapalo versus the Dalalekutuk and the 
Loitokitok-Kisonko versus the Kapudei clashed over Nailumbe (in Mashuru) 
and Eselenkei, respectively. Despite opposition from the Loitokitok-Kisonko an 
agreement was reached in principle to reintroduce the section boundaries. 
However, in spite of intensive propaganda by the British Administration, they 
were never implemented. Throughout the first half of the 1950s, co-operation 
between different il-oshon was excellent. Even the Dalalekutuk and the 
Matapalo settled their quarrel over the Nailumbe area in 1955 after 6 years of 
disagreement.23 The above average rainfall of the 1950s, particularly of 1951, 
1954 and 1957, resulted in an abundance of grass and water all over the 
district and must have reduced tension between several sections. 
The Maasai did co-operate with the Colonial Administration by accepting 
more comprehensive grazing control measures. 'The adoption of Rules to 
control grazing and water is probably the most progressive step that this 
council has yet taken. It shows clearly that the Kajiado Masai are at last 
beginning to appreciate that the time has come to revise their ideas on cattle 
fanning and land management' (KDAR 1950:10). To guide this process it was 
decided to opt for a phased programme. Firstly, a selection was to be made of 
a limited number of stockowners who were allowed to water their cattle at 
each borehole. A maximum of 2,000 cattle were permitted around one 
borehole. Borehole permits were issued to stockowners selected by their 
section councils. Secondly 'with the number of stock using the boreholes 
limited and with the owners paying for the privilege of use by subscribing to a 
renewals fund, each area served by a borehole should, with guidance and 
control, eventually become a form of ranch unit' (KDAR 1952:1). A few years 
earlier the Maasai had already agreed to a ranching experiment. 
A. The Konza Grazing Experiment 
In November 1948 the Wheatlands near Kitengela were given up. The British 
proposed to transform the area and the adjoining pastures of up to 40 square 
miles to become a grazing control experiment by the African Land Use and 
Settlement Board (ALUS). The Maasai rejected this but, with reluctance, 
agreed to set apart another (waterless) area of 36 square miles near Konza. The 
23
 By 1936 an old dispule between the Kapuoei and Kisonko sections had revived The 
former feared (he expansion of the latter Into tbeir territory, the area of Mokotam, and they wanted 
a boundary. This was agreed upon by both sections in December 1957 A similar situation arose 
between the Loodolulani and the Keekonyokie. Nevertheless, by I960 relations between parties 
were fairly good again. 
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British considered this an important victory as they had been trying to 
implement a form of grazing control for a long time. 
In 1949, the pilot Konza grazing scheme finally went ahead with 12 
(selected) families entering the scheme, bringing along approximately 1,285 
head of cattle who had been in quarantine for some time. The 36 square miles 
area, completely fenced, was divided into 4 paddocks of 9 square miles each. 
Two boreholes were installed and a cattle dip and a manager and a veterinary 
assistant were posted to Konza. According to the DC's Annual Report the 
scheme proved to be an unqualified success in a year which had brought 
drought and rinderpest to Kajiado District 'Within a few miles of the fence 
cattle were dying in hundreds of disease and starvation and the Masai were 
going without milk whilst inside the scheme the cattle remained sleet and fit 
and their milk yield increased. This was quickly appreciated by the Masai and 
numerous applications were received to enter Konza' (KDAR 1949:16). The 
only problem seemed to be the maintenance of the 24 mile perimeter fence 
which had been broken into several times by game (especially zebra and larger 
buck). Again, 19S0 was a year with only a minimum of rainfall. This and the 
success of Konza had led the Kaputiei to make a request for a second ranch at 
Hpolosat adjacent to the Konza scheme. Also, the Kaputiei were the first to 
accept a Grazing Control scheme, although they still had some doubts. It was 
stated that: 'The real stumbling block to the rapid development of the scheme 
is that the Kaputei are well aware that if their country is divided into ranch 
units each holding only 2500 head of cattle, there will come a time when a 
large number of surplus stock will be left with nowhere to go. This of course, 
is perfectly true and is another illustration of the need for destocking' (KDAR 
1950:13). 
The abundant rains of 1951 led to a sudden transformation of the district 
into a land of plenty. This made the Maasai less receptive towards propaganda 
concerning the planned development of their land based on the reduction of 
stock and controlled ranching. Moreover, it had become clear that the better 
condition of the Konza stock in a favourable year had only been due to 
dipping. Grazing management which included fencing and other costly 
measures or restrictions did not therefore seem to be as necessary as had been 
propagated. The Konza experiment started to show the first signs of 
disagreement between the Maasai participants and the Official Staff. According 
to the latter, 300 head of cattle had to be sold to keep the stock down to 1 
head to 15 acres. The Konza elders were willing to effect this reduction 
immediately but not by selling but by passing the animals through to friends 
and relatives living in other parts of the district 'Such an agreement would, 
however, mean further overstocking in an already overstocked district and is 
not therefore acceptable, particularly to A.L.U.S. who insist that one of the 
primary objects of the scheme was the disposal by sale of surplus cattle. This, 
however, was certainly not made clear at the commencement of the scheme in 
1949 and was never made a condition of entry into the scheme' (KDAR 
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1951:13). In fact, there would never have been a Konza Grazing Scheme, as 
the Administration fully realized, if this condition had been mentioned. 
Finally, an arrangement was accepted by which the Konza members agreed 
to dispose of as many cattle as they themselves deemed fit at every bi-monthly 
auction at Mashuru. The problems experienced by the Konza also appeared in 
other parts of the district where the number of cattle using the boreholes 
exceeded the 2,000 head agreed upon in 1951. To keep a better eye on the 
number of cattle belonging to Konza participants and to keep other cattle out a 
branding operation was started in July 1952. At the end of the year the Masai 
African District Council took over the management of the scheme. Between 
1947 and 1952, the Konza Grazing Demonstration Scheme had cost the 
ALDEV programme £13,076 (see GoK/MAAHWR 1962:71). 
By late 1952 a drought had hit the whole of the district and it continued into 
1953 and resulted in the death of a considerable proportion of the Maasai 
stock. This experience affected a change in the ultimate objective of the 
Kajiado development plan which had originally envisaged the division of the 
district into ranch units. 'Further investigation has shown that whereas this 
may, in conjunction with heavy stock reduction, be feasible in the Kaputei 
Section south of the Mombasa railway line, a large area of the district is, by 
reason of climatic and geological conditions, unsuitable for a static form of 
ranching' (KDAR 1953:1). The 50 per cent cattle cull for the Kaputiei section 
which had been considered necessary by the Administration, was, of course, 
unacceptable to the Maasai. Moreover, even if the Maasai had been willing to 
sell such a large number of animals this would not have been possible. This 
was illustrated in 1954 when the Konza Scheme residents correctly stated that 
the proposed selling of the scheme's surplus of 300 cattle (or 15 per cent) was 
not possible due to the lack of sales facilities. Konza started to loose its glow 
of success. The Administration even thought of transforming the Scheme into a 
sectional beef fattening ranch. Because of the original, liberal "User 
Agreement", eviction of the residents would not have been easy, although the 
acceptance of the Masai Land Usage By-Laws were thought to give the 
necessary backing for such drastic and dramatic action. Nonetheless, 4 families 
decided to leave the Scheme. As a solution the Development Committee and 
the Residents reached an agreement in 1955 that further participation in the 
scheme would depend on the following of closely defined rules, the most 
important of which being the sale of the annual natural stock increase. 
Some improvements were made in 1956 such as the branding of animals 
ensuring individual identification, the construction of a dam and the removal of 
plains game off the ranch. However, the old problem of stock disposal 
continued. By the end of 1957 the number of cattle on the ranch had passed 
the permitted ceiling and by 1958 the number of cattle had increased to 2,419 
(see GoK/MAAHWR 1962:73). Matters became worse due to a drought in 
1959. Three participants decided to withdraw rather than to submit to stock 
208 Selling Wealth to Buy Poverty 
limitation. Three new residents were selected who accepted the Konza rules. 
Some 400 surplus cattle were disposed of. Three Sahiwal bulls were purchased 
and each stockowner selected heifers which were put to the bulls. This new 
start was only to last for a short period. In 1960 the rains failed. Grazing was 
non-existent in many areas and cattle were dying in large numbers. Matters 
became worse in 1961, leaving the Konza grazing area barren ground. 
By mid-1961 all residents had left the Scheme and the area was closed for 
grazing. The Konza Ranch was not to open again. The initial idea of dividing 
the area into 4 individual ranches of 2,000 acres each and setting aside the 
remaining 14,000 acres as a beef enterprise to be operated by the Kaputiei 
Section Council was dropped and the Scheme was subdivided into 8 individual 
ranches of varied sizes in 1964. 
B. Section Grazing Schemes 
Although the Konza Scheme failed in the end in the more than 10 years of its 
existence it had been an important factor in encouraging Maasai interest in 
modem methods of husbandry and range management such as dipping, 
inoculation, dam construction, etc. It also showed the disadvantages of 
permanent settlement such as the high operation and maintenance costs and the 
possible risks of overgrazing. All in all, it will certainly have stimulated other 
initiatives in the Held of grazing management 
Most important of these were the Grazing Schemes developed in Kajiado 
District Grazing schemes were established with funds released through the 
African Land Development Programme (ALDEV). 'More than £43,000 [of the 
£800,000 available for the whole of Kenya] has been spent in the Kajiado 
district on grazing scheme development since 1947, much of which has been 
raised by the Masai through self-tax levies' (Fallon 1962:22). 
The "Masai African District Council (Grazing Control) By-Laws, 1955" 
conferred broad powers upon the Livestock Officer in charge of a scheme, 
including: 1) determination of those approved to graze livestock in the scheme; 
2) the number of animals each is to be allowed to graze; 3) the area to be 
grazed (see Fallon 1962:25). These rules allowed the levying of fines up to Sh. 
1,000 and/or 6 months imprisonment. However, when setting up the Scheme it 
was agreed that co-operation should be on a voluntary basis and should be 
without recourse to the imposition of grazing fees for individual cattle. As with 
Konza, the alternative would have been to have had no scheme at all. 
The first scheme was established in the Kisonko area located in the eastern 
part of Kajiado District in 1954 and included three traditional clan areas 
making a total of 1,300,000 acres (5,265 km2). £25,000 was set aside by 
ALDEV of which £10,000 was a loan. Grazing principles were based on the 
traditional use of the area which was then extended by means of strict grazing 
controls enforced on a clan basis by Grazing Committees. FOT this the 
committees made detailed plans for the use of several areas as soon as the wet 
season started. The main aim of this scheme was the lengthening of the time in 
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which wet weather grazing areas could be used by staying as long as possible 
in the dry weather zone. Tanks and dams were constructed, a Livestock Officer 
installed to supervise grazing management and new roads were opened up in 
the section area. In trying to reduce the already overstocked area a special 
stock market was established in Ulasit to provide a destocking outlet 'From the 
start of the scheme the II Kisongo agreed to pay for the recurrent costs 
including the loan repayments by imposing a special annual rate of sh. 10/-
payable by each taxpayer' (GoK/MAAHWR 1962:75). 
The prolonged drought of 19S6 was a difficult challenge to the Grazing 
Committees. Areas which it had been agreed should be rested for a year or 
even longer had, in the end, to be reopened to grazing owing to force of 
circumstances and public opinion. It was proposed to give the 18 Grazing 
Elders powers under section 13 of the Masai Land Usage By-Laws to take 
cases of orders before the African Court in the hope that they would become 
more fully aware of their responsibilities. However, the Administration fully 
realized that 'owing to the vagaries of the rains it cannot be expected that an 
even pattern for grazing control will ever be achieved in Π Kisongo' (KDAR 
1957:16). This was proved in 1959 when any controls had to be abandoned as 
cattle based on the scheme had to go far afield in search of grazing even 
trespassing into Taveta, Tsavo and Tanganyika. 
Other Schemes started in the 1950s were the Matapalo Grazing Scheme 
(1957, 880,000 acres, £4,956 grant) and the Loodokilani Sectional Scheme 
(1959, 1,920.000 acres, £3,639 grant). Both schemes had a bad start due to 
drought and to a lack of officials. The Maasai raised money through the sale of 
cattle for water improvement works. 
In 1959 a Land Usage Committee was formed in the African District Council 
to enquire into the problem of overstocking into and the care of land. By 1960 
all Maasai sections had applied for better water supply schemes such as rock 
catchments, dams and sub-surface dams. Government officials, however, 
combined their possible approval of such schemes with the requirement of 
grazing control. Nonetheless, it should be realized that: 
'(...) much of the incentive for these new schemes was political in nature. 
Sensing the winds of change that would sweep independent African 
governments into power in a few years time (...) most of the schemes 
initiated in Maasailand during the 1950s were hastily conceived, poorly 
designed, improperly implemented, and, above all, essentially planned for 
rather with them. There generally was no provision in the plans for 
innovations in human organizations to accompany the introduction of 
new technology and grazing techniques. (...) And not surprisingly, 
virtually all of these schemes failed within a few years' (Jacobs 
1980:294). 
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Indeed by the end of 1961, the Kisonko Scheme had been suspended and was 
never re-activated. Among the positive achievements made the building of 22 
dams and tanks, the construction of a trench from the Noolturesh River near 
Loitokitok and the opening of a cattle export market to Tanganyika via Illasit 
which even attracted stock owners from outside the scheme should be 
mentioned. The Matapalo and Loodokilani were only able to construct 11 and 
14 dams, respectively. 
In addition to the huge Section Grazing Schemes some school farms were 
established at Maasai boarding schools in Loitokitok (150 acres), Bissel (1,000 
acres), Mashuru (1,000 acres) and Kajiado (acreage unknown). This 
programme was started in 1949 with the objective of teaching the students 
animal husbandry, range management and to supply schools with meat, milk 
and other food products. Funds for boreholes at each of these places were 
provided by the African Land Utilization and Settlement Board. 
C. Individual Ranches 
Finally, mention should be made of the first individual ranches which began 
appearing in Kajiado District in 1954. The Reverend Daudi Mokinyo, a 
progressively minded Maasai who had been working with the Ngong 
Veterinary Station, got permission from the Loodokilani section to start his 
own individual ranch, keeping cattle on modern lines under the strict 
supervision of the Veterinary Department. Permission was granted because of a 
recommendation by the Kajiado Development Committee. The 4,000 acre 
ranch, named Oloisur, was located approximately 10 kilometres south of 
Toroka Station on the Magadi branch railway. A loan of £1,000 was obtained 
to install a borehole and a handpump and for the acquisition of an improved 
bull from the Ngong Livestock Improvement Centre. However, water could not 
be found by boring on the Oloisur ranch and, in 1956, an alternative ranch of 
2,000 acres was offered, named Asembokeke, by the Loodokilani Section 
Council in the upper reaches of the Toroka river. 
In spite of this difficult start another application by Mr. Oladaru ole 
Kordede for an individual ranch of 800 acres in the neighbourhood of Kajiado 
Township was supported by the African District Council in December 1956. In 
1957, the Dalalekutuk section set aside twelve square miles of land near 
Kajiado for ranching by progressive Maasai, primarily from that section. 
However, the terms of entry, including the sale of stock to produce 50 per cent 
of the initial capital required for water restricted the number of applicants to 
only two. Meanwhile Reverend Daudi Mokinyo succeeded in finding water on 
his new ranch. He bought six more breeding animals from Ngong and put up a 
thorn barricade round the perimeter. 
By 1959 interest in individual ranching, especially in the Kajiado and 
Dalalekutuk area, had increased. The District Commissioner recorded that: 
'Amongst an enlightened few mainly consisting of chiefs and teachers, 
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there is an interest in improved stock and therefore an interest in 
individual ranches. Whilst this is an ideal to be aimed at and an 
inevitable development, a note of warning must be struck to avoid 
ranches being sought for purely as a means of land grabbing. (...) There 
is the danger that whilst some Masai genuinely wish to establish an 
individual ranch and improve their stock, others merely wish to jump on 
the bandwagon and grab land as a speculation. This is a very real danger 
and some time must be given to planning future ranch siting and 
development and to the choosing of progressive, sensible people as 
ranchers* (KDAR 1959:1/19). 
Two thousand acres were the maximum allowed for every individual ranch. By 
1960 it was even concluded that 'There will obviously have to be some re-
planning with regard to ranches. Few of the applicants have the desire or the 
capital to make any serious attempt to ranch' (KDAR 1960:20). 
Whatever the main reason for purchasing an individual ranch, one needed to 
be wealthy person to develop iL It was necessary to have an area with good 
grazing, trees and water, to fence it properly and put something back into the 
soil. It was estimated that at least £10,000 (or the sale of approximately 1,000 
cattle) per ranch would be required to make anything of the ranches near 
Kajiado. Nonetheless, by 1960, grazing schemes, individual ranchers and non 
incorporated Maasai were suffering alike from the severe drought. Although 
the Reverend Daudi Mokinyo's ranch was praised for loosing only 5 cattle out 
of 200 during the drought of 1960 and for selling some 12 gallons of milk a 
day at Sh. 2/80 a gallon, he had severe difficulties in meeting his loan 
repayments at a rent of 6.5 per cent per annum. Fallon writes: 
'I am unable to see how the settlers can meet high interest rate - short 
term loan requirements. (...) There appears to be little likelihood of 
success for the ranching program unless long term loans with low interest 
rates (2 to 3 per cent per annum) can be made available for necessary 
ranch and farm developments and livestock purchases (...) Individual 
ownership or control should be encouraged. It must be remembered, 
however, that individual ownership alone can not guarantee proper land 
use' (Fallon 1962:28). 
The Annual Report 1960 reveals how Reverend Mokinyo was able to meet the 
terms of his loan. 'The Rev Daudi Mokinyo has not made much progress but 
he is making a living though he tends to depend on charcoal burning and sale 
of zebra skins to make ends meet. The former is to be discouraged if he does 
not replace each tree cut down. He also wishes to open a butchery in Kajiado 
and a shop on his ranch' (KDAR 1960:21). These difficulties did not stop 
other, mostly young and educated, Kaputiei Maasai from obtaining individual 
ranches. 
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Initially it was the Kaputiei Development Committee who proposed 
registering the Kaputiei area under one title deed in possession of the Kaputiei 
section. This idea was not accepted by the authorities as it would not stimulate 
commercial changes. It seems as if the Kaputiei region in general and the high-
potential Ngong area in particular were thought to be suitable for commercial 
ranching purposes needing the prerequisite of individual or cooperative forms 
of land tenure. Advice given by various researchers such as Jacobs, Heady and 
Fallon in the early 1960s, however, pointed to the risk of subdivision leading 
to unviable small units. But in the high-potential Ngong area the phenomenon 
of individual landownership expanded rapidly. A programme of land 
consolidation, enabling the division of the area into individual ranches, was set 
up in the Ngong area in 1961. This development, though opposed by the 
elders, was favoured by the young and educated Kaputiei and backed by the 
Kajiado County Council. 
Several authors (Hedlund 1971 and 1979, Muranja 1973/74, Peron 1984) 
have mentioned a number of reasons for the acceptance and growth of 
individual landownership in the Kaputiei region: the formation of a buffer of 
individual ranches at the fringes of the Maasai area to stop the illegal intrusion; 
the strong position of young influential Kaputiei politicians who created a 
political clientele by handing out title deeds to supporters and who tried to 
reduce the social and economic dominance exerted in daily life by the elders; 
the wish to settle down and start commercial enterprises as shown by 
neighbouring groups; the group of Kikuyu-Maasai, who had been 
accommodating their landless brothers from Kikuyu land, also strongly 
supported the land consolidation programme. 
By 1963 approximately 24 individual ranches existed, located in all parts of 
the District, like Sultan Hamud, Loitokitok, Kajiado and Oltepesi. Some were 
selling cattle to obtain money for a borehole, for a water pump or to pay for a 
dam and wireless sets made their appearance. 
5.5.4 Other Land Use Developments in Kajiado District 
A. Infiltration and Cultivation by Other African Groups 
Although the semi-arid pastures were, in the eyes of the Administration, 
heavily overstocked which resulted in severe erosion of certain places, the most 
serious situation existed in the semi-arid areas used for cultivation. In the two 
Kikuyu settlements of Kor Kor and Oltesika on Namanga mountain, the 
ecological balance was threatened due to the cutting down of trees on too steep 
slopes or too near to the riverbed. 
The effect of cultivation practised in a marginal area had been shown before 
in Ndeiya, Kiambu District As a result of the transfer of the Kikuyu back to 
the Centra] Reserve and with many of them settling in Ndeiya, the agricultural 
situation had deteriorated rapidly. The soil became hopelessly ruined, despite a 
total ban on cultivation. Although Ndeiya was meant to be for the poor and 
Chapter 5: Pre-Independence History of Land Use and Land Policy 213 
landless, well-off Kikuyu were able to obtain a considerable portion of land in 
this region and this further exacerbated pressure on the land. Apparently, 
according to a statement made by the District Commissioner of Kiambu 
District, despite the fact that this situation was, in essence, a settler-created 
problem, the difficulty should be solved by another African group. '(...) there 
are many who find it hard to credit that there are insuperable difficulties in the 
adjustment of a treaty made many years ago with a tribe occupying an 
enormous area of country who show little signs of advancement whilst 
adjoining them is a progressive and virile tribe confined within an area of 380 
square miles which cannot possibly support it' (Postwar Development Plan, 
Kiambu District, 12 January, 1945 PC/CP 8/9/4 cf Bullock 1978:71). 
Definitely, this is a clear reference to the land belonging to the Maasai. The 
Kikuyu did not bother about the treaty or agreements made with the Maasai 
and again started trespassing in the Kibiko region, building huts and 
cultivating. In 1946 this was stopped and they were expelled from the region. 
In the following years the influx of aliens into Kajiado District remained a 
point of concern. After checking approximately one quarter of the infiltrated 
Ngong area SI Kikuyu were counted who had settled in the area within a 
period of two years. In an effort to control the ever increasing infiltration of 
aliens into the district a special Committee of the Kajiado Local Native 
Council was installed in August 1949 to examine individual applications and to 
check on the credentials of recent arrivals. The policy was that each 
prospective immigrant had to be approved by a Section Committee and by the 
Local Native Council before he could be permitted to reside in the District. 
The population census of 1948 gave a total of 28,234 inhabitants in Kajiado 
District: 25,748 Maasai and 2,486 non-Maasai. The majority of these 'aliens', 
however, were employed by the Magadi Soda Company, KMQ, the Railway 
Company and the Government. 
In addition to Namanga and Kibiko other high potential areas of Kajiado 
District, especially the Chyulu and Loitokitok Hills, were threatened by the 
cutting of trees on too steep slopes. Initially the Maasai disagreed with 
implementing strict rules but by 1949, another year with semi-drought 
conditions, some strict measures were introduced. A start was made with soil 
conservation measures -the terracing of steep slopes, the prohibition of 
cultivation near river beds- and an order issued prohibiting the cutting of trees 
in forest areas near Chyulu, Namanga, Ngong and Loitokitok. A survey team 
of the African Land Utilization and Settlement Board demarcated several 
forested areas in Kajiado District 
To provide a legislative framework, the newly established Maasai Council, 
which had replaced the former Joint Local Native Councils in 1951, decided to 
adopt extremely comprehensive recommendations, produced by a special 
committee of the Council, governing the problem of cultivation and land tenure 
in the Maasai districts. In 1951 the Maasai Council passed these 
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recommendations as the Land Usage By-Laws empowering section councils to 
control the spread of cultivation in their areas. 'It has been obvious for some 
years that legislation of this sort was urgently required in Masailand in order to 
protect the interests of the cattle owners from the gradual encroachment of the 
relatively few agriculturalists. Section Councils may now lay down definite 
boundaries between cultivation and grazing and may prohibit the extension of 
existing shambas or the establishment of new ones' (KDAR 1951:12). 
This and the Local Native Council Immigration Committee resulted in the 
reduction of agricultural activity in Kajiado District, especially near Loitokitok 
and Namanga, by 1952. At Rombo the number of shambas dwindled from 15 
to 3 and at Kor Kor only 5 were left The major driving force behind the 
setback in farming was the result of the Emergency measures. The total area 
under cultivation around Ngong was reduced by at least 10 per cent due to the 
eviction of 14 Kikuyu families who had been connected with the Mau Mau. 
Kikuyu who had settled in Tanganyika were also transferred back to Central 
Province. 'There has been a considerable movement northwards through the 
district of Kikuyu either expelled from Tanganyika in which case they have 
travelled escorted, or intimidated into leaving. The most spectacular exodus 
was in January when over a thousand Forest squatters from Rongai arrived in 
Loitokitok one day (...). A few managed to remain hidden in the forest on the 
inter-territorial border and these were eventually unearthed and rounded up in 
November' (KDAR 1953:2). 
During the Emergency, the only possible way to enter Kajiado District was 
by acceptance of the Maasai Committee or by the acquisition of a special pass 
for residence in the district issued by the local authorities. Nonetheless, in a 
letter from the District Officer Ngong addressed to the Provincial 
Commissioner Southern Province, 6th June 1954, it was concluded that 'The 
area is fast becoming "defacto" a Kikuyu reserve. The Masai must consider 
who are allowed to bring aliens into the area. The temi "accepted by the 
Masai" is far too loosely interpreted' (KNA PC/Ngong/1/1/16 26/06/54). That 
year a total of 416 Kikuyu were counted in Ngong Town and its surrounding 
area alone. Only 82 Kikuyu had been bom or were resident since 1930 in the 
area. 
Having small shambas of 1.5 acres each, the total area under cultivation 
would have been approximately 180 acres. This source of agricultural produce 
rather than a possible sympathy of the Maasai towards the Mau Mau 
movement will have contributed to the willingness of the Maasai to allow the 
Kikuyu to remain in the district Except for in the Ngong area with its mixed 
Kikuyu/Maasai population, the Mau Mau did not flourish in Kajiado District 
According to the District Annual Report of 1954 Maasai apathy to the 
activities of the Mau Mau movement changed abruptly, in a negative way, 
when a Mau Mau gang was stopped near Mile 46, one of its members being a 
Maasai/Kikuyu from Matapalo. 'At a large meeting of Chiefs and Elders, a 
demand was made for the instant removal of the agricultural settlements on the 
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top of the forest covered Namanga Mountain. (...) By the end of June the old 
established villages of Oltesika and Kor Kor had been razed to the ground, the 
crops destroyed and the inhabitants moved' (KDAR 1954:3). The Kikuyu and 
half Kikuyu cultivators were removed to Narede. It should be noted, however, 
that the resettlement of Kikuyu from Oltesika (towards an area to be placed 
under irrigation north of Namanga) was an old plan anyway. Moreover, Kor 
Kor had almost ceased to be a place for cultivation. In 1956 a limited number 
of Maasai received permission to start cultivating again, but the scheme was 
closed down the following year. 
For the Loitokitok area more successful developments were reported in the 
1950s with people starting irrigated cultivation. River and local spring water 
was diverted to irrigated plots by making use of trenches. 
At Kimana and Tikondo, just north of Loitokitok, a few mostly stockless 
Maasai had taken to arable fanning. Use was made of the Noolturesh river and 
the Tikondo spring to irrigate the plots. Information about irrigation was 
provided by those from Taveta who had been working on an irrigation project 
initiated during the 1940s with the aim of feeding Italian prisoners of war (see 
Kimani 1988:Appendix ΠΙΒ). Other irrigation activities were reported to have 
started in the 1950s at Sinnet, north of Kimana, and Rombo (Campi ya 
Mwuruba). Two Maasai, of mixed Chagga origin having had agricultural 
experience from Indians in raising Asian vegetables, were said to have been 
the main promotors of irrigated cultivation. The very good rains of 1957 
brought in more Chagga labourers into the Loitokitok area expanding the area 
under cultivation. 
During 1954 a total of 83 Kikuyu, some infiltrators from Tanganyika and 
others accepted over the years by the Maasai were detained under delegated 
Detention Orders. In spite of the removal of part of the Kikuyu population 
from Kajiado District the total number of non-Maasai in the Ngong area alone 
had risen to 3,253 in 1954 as compared to 2,486 non-Maasai for the whole of 
the district by 1948. In order to enlarge control over this group of people the 
area was declared a Passbook Area in 1955. Moreover, village units were 
established under the close supervision of a District Officer in order to prevent 
Mau Mau gangs from neighbouring Kiambu district seeking sanctuary in the 
Ngong area. That year 90 more Maasai/Kikuyu were arrested and detained. By 
1956 conditions had returned to normal. As for the Kikuyu villages, however, 
the Government intended them to be a permanent feature of the post-
Emergency set-up. A start was made with laying out planned holdings and 
allocating 67 one acre plots to non-Maasai fanners. 
In 1957 it was recorded that the Kikuyu continued to come into Kajiado 
District without legal documents and despite the imposition of heavy fines. 
When, by 1959, the Emergency was ended, administrative action had to be 
undertaken to control the huge influx of Kikuyu into the Ngong area in 
particular. 
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In 1960 1Д00 acres were surveyed and distributed to twenty selected 
Maasai farmers. Pressure had arisen among the Kaputiei to start land 
consolidation along the line of individual ownership (see above). This 
development was warmly welcomed by the Kikuyu, who 'had learned through 
experience that once land is consolidated and land titles issued it was possible 
to carry out land transactions through the instituted Land Boards' (Muranja 
1973/74:58). Supported by a £3,000 grant from ALDEV land consolidation 
began in Ngong in August 1961. In the same year Ngong was gazetted under 
the Land Registration (Special Areas) Ordinance. This measure was taken to 
prevent people from outside the area coming to claim land. The 1962 
population census of Kajiado District showed 53,219 Maasai and 15,192 non-
Maasai of which 6,233 were Kikuyu, most of them living in the Ngong region. 
In the Nguruman area a large number of alien squatters who had destroyed 
several hundred large trees were removed and the area was declared closed for 
cultivation by I960. In fact, throughout the 1950s, other protected areas like 
the forested areas of Ngong, Namanga, Loitokitok and Chyulu also suffered 
from the practice of charcoal burning and forest clearing. 
B. Wildlife and the Creation of Game Reserves and Nairobi National Park 
Besides the increasing area of land under cultivation, another form of land use 
gained importance at the cost of Maasai freedom of movement 
The Southern Game Reserve, declared shortly after the establishment of 
British Rule and being the earliest effort at conservation in Maasailand, was 
mainly intended to protect wildlife from hunting.24 The Maasai were not 
restricted in their movements in any direction. This freedom was threatened as 
early as 1933 when the Game Warden of Kenya had recommended that the 
Nairobi Commonage be made a National Park. The Kenya Land Commission 
approved the idea although the realization of this plan was postponed due to 
the outbreak of the Second World War and the establishment of a military 
camp in the Commonage area. 'With the rising publicity regarding East 
African wildlife and the strong conservation lobby, particularly after the 
Second World War, more protection was sought for the rights of game in 
Maasai areas. The solution was to create game reserves and national parks, and 
the government was empowered to alienate resources to that end by the 
National Parks Ordinance of 1945' (Kituyi 1990:46). 
By December 1946 Nairobi National Park (117 km2) was officially 
proclaimed and the Maasai totally lost access to iL In 1947 the 3,260 km2 
Amboseli National Reserve was created, the boundaries being arbitrary and not 
prohibiting Maasai movement In later years Ngong National Reserve 
(1949/512 km2) was gazetted, while West Chyulu (1961/373 km2) and 
It has been reponed, however, dui settlers and visitors openly shot game on (be Athi 
Kapiu Plains m an area located south west of Nairobi called the Nairobi Commonage (see 
Ecosystems 1982 65) 
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Kitengela (196S/S30 km2) became Game Conservation Areas where hunting 
was prohibited.23 West Tsavo, though located outside Kajiado District and 
providing important traditional dry season water sources and pastures, had 
already been declared a National Park in 1948. 
The Southern Game Reserve, enclosing a large part of Kajiado District, was 
degazetted in July 1952 and turned into a Controlled Area in which shooting 
was allowed by special permit. The reason behind this move was the abundant 
amount of wildlife in the area, which was damaging grazing and cultivation. In 
addition and as a result of hunting parties paying fees, it provided some 
resources for the African District Council. 
The Loitokitok Maasai saw an increasing number of visitors spending their 
once in a lifetime safari at the Amboseli area, one of the sections' best 
permanent water points and dry season grazing pastures. They feared the loss 
of this area. From a very early stage hopes were expressed by the Amboseli 
National Reserve administrators that the Maasai could be moved away from 
the 01 Tukai swamps of the Amboseli area. To this end it was realized that an 
alternative water source had to be provided by the authorities.26 In 1958 a 
first agreement was reached whereby the Maasai agreed to restrict human 
beings and cattle numbers from 20,000 to 7,000 head of cattle only. To 
compensate the Maasai alternative water supplies consisting of four boreholes 
and two cattle troughs were provided away from the principal game areas. By 
1959 Governor Baring had to assure the worried Maasai that the land at Ol 
Tukai was theirs and would not be taken from them (see KD AR 1959:4). 
Besides the financial benefit resulting from controlled hunting, it was 
thought that the shooting of game would take away one of the Maasai's main 
arguments against the reduction of their herds. The Maasai had lived with 
game and tolerated it for many years. Nevertheless, Maasai livestock must 
compete with wildlife for range resources, predators attacked their herds and 
flocks and diseases were spread by game preventing good grazing areas being 
used or directly causing the death of many animals. For example, cattle 
contract the malignant catarrh virus when they graze pastures on which 
wildebeests have calved, it being the foetal remains that transmit the virus. In 
1957 official losses of cattle due to game was placed at some 500. The Ngong 
and Loitokitok cultivated areas also suffered from damage done by game. 
In 1961 the administration of Amboseli was handed over to the Kajiado 
County Council. It was hoped that local responsibility would create greater 
sympathy for the reserve. Soon afterwards the Kajiado Council negotiated with 
Ngong National Reserve no longer exists. Kitengela Game Conservation Area was never 
declared officially although it had appeared on several maps since the mjd-1960s. Both areas 
overlap each other at their northern fringes (see Ecosystems 1982:67; UNDP/FAO 1978:106). 
26
 In 1958 25 shallow boreholes were drilled outside Ol Tukai swamp and two small dams 
built resulting in a general rise ш the swanç water level (see Ecosystems 1982:60). 
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the Maasai of Amboseli to set aside a 78 km2 stock-free area which would 
protect the council's wildlife assets (see Western 1982a:304). Amboseli 
National Reserve was renamed Masai Amboseli Game Reserve. 
5.6 Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter we have considered the history of land use and land policy in 
Kenya and of Kajiado District in particular since the end of the 19th century 
until the time of Kenya's Independence in 1963. 
We started our journey in the 1880s with the arrival of the British and 
German colonizers scrambling for the interior of this, until then unknown, part 
of Africa. The Europeans found an African population facing a very harsh 
time; rinderpest, smallpox and inter as well as intra-tribal wars had devastated 
the economy of the people. The Maasai pastoralists in particular had suffered 
tremendously and lost an estimated 90 per cent of all their livestock and half 
of their human population. 
The Europeans were thus able to take control over the area relatively easily. 
In 1895 the group of Maasai was split into two halves after the creation of the 
East Africa Protectorate and Tanganyika ruled by the British and Germans, 
respectively. The former were not so much interested in this newly created 
territory itself but more for its strategic position vis-à-vis Egypt and Uganda. 
For this purpose the British Government decided to construct the "Uganda 
Railway" connecting the port of Mombasa at the Indian Ocean with Lake 
Victoria. To recover part of the high cost involved and to further develop the 
area it was tried to interest settlers in coming to the new Protectorate by 
offering large grants of land up to 1,000 acres per lot initially on 99 year 
leases at extremely low prices. Settlers, free to look for attractive holdings on 
their own, violated African land rights in every respect. As non-Europeans 
were prevented from buying land the high-potential areas north of Nairobi 
became known as the "White Highlands". 
By 1903 leases of pastoral land could also be obtained. Some large 
concessions of pasture land in the Naivasha area, north of Nairobi, in the heart 
of Maasailand were obtained by British settlers. It was decided that the Maasai 
should be "given" an area of their own. In fact, two reserves were set aside for 
the Maasai outside the Rift Valley: the Laikipia plateau in the north and 
another reserve south of Ngong and the railway. In fact, the Maasai were 
simply deprived of their best pastures near Naivasha as both reserves were 
traditional Maasai pastures. A treaty was signed in 1904 (stated to endure "as 
long as the Maasai as a race would exist") whereby some sections of the 
Maasai agreed to move to the northern reserve, while others remained in the 
south. The new Maasai reserves (totalling some 24,000 km2) comprised only 
some 35-40 per cent of their former territory. 
The Maasai, once feared by the British, had become their allies in the 
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following years to the benefit of both groups. However, the Maasai started to 
feel rather uncomfortable about this pact when the northern Maasai Reserve 
turned out to be inadequate and other promises made by the British did not 
materialize. Renewed calls by settlers to take away more pasture land from the 
Maasai created suspicion. In April 1911 the Second Maasai Treaty was signed 
which required the removal of the Maasai from the northern reserve and a 
regrouping in an extended southern reserve. This exercise took two years to 
complete. After minor modifications made in the following years the Maasai 
Reserve District was gazetted in 1918 and comprised of almost 38,000 km2. 
In 1920 the Kenya Colony and Protectorate was proclaimed. More settlers 
now moved in. The British sent a huge number of commissions to analyze the 
situation of the new Colony regarding land, labour, economic performance and 
potential. One of the main results was the creation of African Reserves, which 
should prevent land grabbing by settlers in the African occupied areas. In 1924 
the Maasai Reserve was first renamed Maasai Province and in 1933 renamed 
yet again as Maasai Extra provincial District following the recommendations of 
the Kenya (Carter) Land Commission which reviewed all land issues of the 
Kenya Colony in 1932. 
In the Maasai area the One Mile Zone south of the Uganda Railway, the 
Chyulu Triangle and the 1/4 Mile Zone flanking the Magadi railway branch on 
both sides, together totalling an area of some 720 km2, were in dispute. Four 
major exchanges of land were also discussed. In addition, the Maasai requested 
the removal of the artificial boundary dividing the Kenya and Tanganyika 
Maasai and the return of the Laikipia area. These last matters, however, were 
not considered at all by the Carter Commission. Concerning the other issues 
the commission advised to rent the One Mile Zone and Chyulu Triangle to the 
Maasai until equivalent watering facilities found in these areas were provided 
elsewhere. Only if good agricultural land within the Maasai territory were 
handed over to non-Maasai agriculturalists could the Chyulu Triangle be added 
to the Maasai Reserve. The 1/4 Mile Zone was included unconditionally. The 
commission reacted positively to these exchanges. 
Though the African groups may have profited somehow from these 
arrangements it was noted by the late 1930s that the settlers who comprised 
less than 0.2 per cent of the total estimated population, owned S.5 per cent of 
the total and 18 per cent of Kenya's best agricultural land area. This was the 
real cause for the economic crisis in the African Reserves. Forced migration 
from European-owned farms back to these reserves added to the natural growth 
in these small territories. The authorities, however, mainly pointed out the legal 
and the afore mentioned poor ecological condition of the African Reserves. 
Programmes were started for dealing with soil conservation, and water 
availability improvement Real economic improvements did not occur. 
Ultimately, some groups of the African population took up armed struggle 
against the Colonial Government. 
More visits were made by British Commissions to deal with the situation. 
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Most influential was the "Swynnerton Plan" of 1954 which was intended to 
intensify the development of African agriculture and included a major 
programme of land consolidation in the high-potential regions. 
Marginal measures for improving the semi-arid pastoral areas were also 
introduced. Marketing and grazing management in order to achieve a 
destocking of these areas was the main concern. The Maasai, who had joined 
the Kamba of Kitui and Machakos District in a new Southern Province in 
19S3, had already been co-operating with the Colonial Administration in 
accepting more comprehensive grazing control measures for some time. By 
1949 the Konza grazing experiment had started. Sectional Grazing Schemes 
followed in the mid and late-1950s in the Kisonko, Matapalo and Loodokilani 
areas. 
Individual ranches also started to appear in Kajiado District during this time. 
Interest increased rapidly as large tracts of land of up to 2,000 acres could be 
obtained. Severe difficulties in developing these ranches existed as large 
amounts of capital were needed to invest in water development and the like. 
High interest rates placed a heavy burden on those who attempted. Most 
ranchers' motives for acquiring an individual ranch, however, were questioned 
by the authorities. By 1963 some 24 individual ranches existed in Kajiado 
District 
Besides keeping livestock, cultivation and herds of wildlife also claimed access 
to land in the Maasai regions. Cultivation concentrated mainly in the high-
potential zones and was practised predominantly by non-Maasai. During this 
century the intension of these agricultural practices was foremost correlated to 
the infiltration by non-Maasai into the better-watered areas of Kajiado District 
and the need for the Maasai to engage in this activity (e.g. after a major 
drought). Once in a while the infiltrators were chased away from the district, 
as happened specifically during the time of the Emergency after the eviction of 
Kikuyu thought to be the driving force behind the Mau Mau movement 
Special land Usage By-Laws empowered section councils to control the spread 
of cultivation in their localities. In earlier decades, however, the Government's 
attitude towards non-Maasai entering the district had been ambiguous. In fact 
the Maasai too profited from the presence of non-Maasai labour in cultivating 
minor plots under leasehold arrangements. Once non-Maasai concentrations 
became too numerous and started to interfere with access to dry season grazing 
areas or if they destroyed the Maasai forests these cultivators were removed. 
Access to land for the Maasai was also lost due to the proclamation of 
Nairobi National Parie. Otherwise gazetted game reserves did not interfere with 
Maasai livestock movements so much. Only the Loitokitok Maasai saw an 
increasing number of tourists coming to the Amboseli area which resulted in 
the excavation of the 01 Tukai swamps. In the next chapter, we will 
concentrate on economic developments as they occurred in Kajiado District 
from the arrival of the British until the time of Independence. 
CHAPTER б 
PRE-INDEPENDENCE HISTORY OF THE ECONOMY AND 
OF DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN KAJIADO DISTRICT 
6.1 The Maasai Economy and Early Colonial Economic 
Development Policy in Kenyan Maasailand: 1895 -1919 
In section 5.2 we described how the economy of the Maasai collapsed at the 
end of the 19th century due to drought and diseases. The Maasai subsistence 
economy was turned into a struggle for survival. Among the strategies used 
were seeking refuge among neighbouring African Groups or British (Fort 
Smith), hunting and cultivation, raiding of cattle even between different Maasai 
il-oshon or, in co-operation with the Imperial British East Africa Company, 
during punitive expeditions against other African groups. By the first decade of 
the 20th century the Maasai had more or less overcome this dark period in 
their history and once again were able to rely on nomadic pastoralism as the 
main stay of their economy. 
Commissioner Eliot had welcomed the change from pastoralism to sedentary 
agriculture as practised by the Kaputiei and Kisonko Maasai in the fertile areas 
of Ngong and Loitokitok, respectively. 
'The policy of the Government in dealing with the native tribes in the 
East African Protectorate has been to develop their agricultural instincts 
and industry and to discourage tendencies towards pastoralism. This 
policy has been pursued with success among the Kavirondo, Kikuyu and 
other tribes who, when encountered by the administration, were under the 
necessity of engaging in agriculture and has been introduced with fair 
results into the system of such pastoral tribes as the Nandi and Lumbwa 
[Kipsigis]' (Sandford 1919:55). 
However, according to Maasai ideals, cultivation is a sign of 'degeneration', 
usually a result of the loss of catde. 'The Masai near Nairobi were either half 
Kikuyu or had Kikuyu wives; it was probably their wives responsible for the 
cultivation. With the adoption of a Masai Reserves policy, any trend towards 
agriculture was reversed' (Sorrenson 1968:277).' And because the Maasai 
herds increased rapidly during the first decade of the 20th century, the impetus 
to continue fanning dwindled. 
In fact, the major concern of the Colonial Administration was to provide all 
1
 The late Jomo Kenyalta, the first president of independent Kenya and a Kikuyu himself, 
reported thai the role of intermairiage between Maasai and Kikuyu people was an important form 
of peace-making. An aunt of Kenyatta was mairied to Sendeu the betrayed brother of Olonana 
(see Kenyatta 1965:202). 
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possible means of stimulating the European settler economy. According to 
Zwanenberg and King (1975:95) approximately 20 percent had gone in for 
herding and dairy farming. 'Pedigree bulls were imported from England and 
crossed with African cattle. The crossing of European and African cattle 
resulted in a breed that was hardier and more resistant to disease, but that was 
by no means immune' (Spencer 1983:114). In spite of the free treatment of 
infected animals the European owners lost huge numbers. This was believed to 
be the result of the contact between their herds and those of surrounding 
pastoralists. Several measures were taken to prevent the mixing of African 
cattle with those of the European settlers; quarantine rules were issued under 
the Cattle Diseases Ordinance of 1902, an ambitious programme of fencing, 
designed to create a barrier between European farms and the reserves was 
started in 1907 and a quarantine board, composed of settlers and members of 
the administrative staff, was established in 1909 to advise the Veterinary 
Service. 
Until World War I the Veterinary Department showed little activity in the 
African areas.2 The protection of the settlers' livestock industry not only 
prohibited the introduction among the Maasai of European bulls for breeding 
but also denied them their traditional form of selective breeding.3 'Boran bulls 
had always been selected with great care to produce animals adapted to dry 
conditions. The supply of such bulls came from Samburu and Somalia; with 
their fixed Reserve boundaries and the European-settled lands forming a block 
to the north, the Maasai were completely cut off from new Boran stock' 
(Zwanenberg & King 1975:94). 
In fact, the Colonial "development policy" among African pastoralists was 
mainly directed at the "pacification" of the population and to maintaining law 
and order. The British were especially concerned about the raiding propensities 
of the Maasai ilmurran and ceased to use them in their punitive expeditions in 
order not to strengthen the Maasai penchant for engaging in raids. Due to their 
raiding activities, military-like organization and the difficulty in controlling the 
Maasai warriors they were considered to be a significant element in the 
blocking of colonial change. Mr. R.W. Hemsted, Officer-in-Charge Maasai 
Reserve since 1912, attempted to break the organization and power of the 
ilmurran. The Stock Theft Ordinance of 1913 gave him the instrument for 
levying heavy fines (up to ten times the value of the livestock stolen) on a 
2
 Unul 1912 efforts by (he settlers to make a profit out of temperate famine ю expon 
commodities -wheat, wool, meat and dairy products- had failed, despite all the support obtained 
from the Administration. By 1914, it was clear that tropical plantation agriculture -coffee, sisal, 
cotton- was showing the most promising returns By the beginning of the 1920s this started to 
show fnuL 
Ironically, the settlers were in need of African cattle to start their farms. Animals, 
confiscated m punitive expeditions during the penod of 'pacification', were sold at private 
auctions to settlers. 
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family, a section or even the whole tribe. 'In 1913, for example, a moran raid 
against the Lumbwa, the Kavirondo, and Africans in German East Africa 
resulted in a fine of 500 head of cattle on 4 villages. The next year a 
communal fine of 250 head of cattle was imposed for a further raid into 
German East Africa' (Tignor 1976:75). 
The fines were used to create a special Maasai Fund (the Maasai Suspense 
Account) by which small projects, initiated by the British and not the Maasai, 
could be financed. In spite of these fines and other measures like the 
abandonment of certain ceremonies and the shortening of the period of 
warriorhood, the Maasai ilmurran' opposition was not broken. In contrast with 
other Afncan groups they only sent a few recruits to assist the British in their 
fight against the Germans in World War I. The major contribution of the 
Maasai was by the provision to the Army of 'an estimated 30,000 cattle and 
300,000 sheep, which although supposed to have been given voluntarily were 
no doubt provided under considerable pressure' (Tignor 1976:78/9).4 
Despite the generosity of the Maasai, Belfield wanted to halt "the pernicious 
pastoral proclivities" of the pastoral tribes and to encourage peasant agriculture 
as a first step towards "civilized" forms of land tenure and usage. Apart from 
preventing the extension of reserves he did nothing. The Magadi Soda 
Company, however, obtained full assistance from the Administration. Although 
the area surrounding Lake Magadi was one of the worst parts in the Reserve, 
the impact of this concession was noticed in other parts of Kenya Maasailand. 
In 1913, the Maasai came to know of the granting of permission to the Magadi 
Soda Company to extract water from the Ngong Hills and other sources of 
water within the area along the Magadi railway. Although the company, on 
order of the Administration, made some long troughs as compensation, access 
for the Maasai to some of the permanent springs was lost The company 
constructed a pipeline from Ngong Hills to Kajiado Town then, following the 
railway, towards the lake. By 1915 the exportation of raw soda started, 
followed in 1919 by the production of soda ash. 
The loss of dry season grazing areas was felt in 1915 and 1916 when, due to a 
lack of rains, the Maasai had to be allowed to use both Crown and private 
land. Early 1915 'a determined attempt was made to return to Laikipia in 
defiance of Government orders. Indian troops were sent, but Legalishu [Ole 
Gilisho] and other elders persuaded the wanderers to return without the use of 
force' (Leys 1924, repr. 1973:131). 
Towards the end of World War I, Hemsted formulated some reform 
programmes. These were part of the 1917-1919 First Development Plan for the 
African Reserves, which had the objective of raising the productiveness of 
these areas. 
Spencer even suies Uut 'Hemsted told the Economic Commission that the Maasai had 
parted with around one hundred thousand cattle during the war yean' (Spencer 1983:137). 
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'Hemsted estimated that, as owners of not less than 600,000 cattle, 2 
million sheep, and 10,000 donkeys, valued at approximately Rs ISO 
million, the Maasai were among the richest people in the world. Their 
beasts enjoyed a minimum natural increase of IS percent per annum, but, 
as the reserve was fully stocked, they were unable to benefit from this 
productivity' (Spencer 1983:120). 
In order to avoid waste the Maasai Reserve should be turned into a big ranch 
disposing of at least 50,000 head of cattle per year. Because it was recognized 
that the Maasai had no incentive to sell their animals for cash, as their wants 
were minimal, Hemsted proposed to improve taxation by the introduction of a 
poll tax of Rs. 30 per person per annum.5 Half of the revenue (approximately 
£50,000) should be used for developments projects in the Maasai Reserve. 
'Hemsted was trying to balance the government's desire for additional 
revenue, and the Maasai's ability to pay, with his desire that the Maasai 
should benefit from European rule. In the past, he felt, the administration 
had done very little for them "Beyond safeguarding the lives and 
property of the Natives, it cannot be said that the State does much to 
bestow the ordinary blessings of civilisation and responsible Government 
Although the Reserve comprises 14,000 square miles of territory, no 
Doctor, Veterinary Officer, or educational facilities exist, and beyond 
some spasmodic and not very successful efforts to conserve water in 
earth work dams, we do nothing to change the country for the better, to 
improve the stock or to prevent disease. It has in fact been said that 
disease is welcome as it serves to impede the increase of stock, but 
surely our policy should be to make use of the surplus stock instead of 
allowing it to die"'(Spencer 1983:120/1). 
Belfields' successor, Mr. E. Northey, was more convinced of the need to assist 
the pastoral Maasai and accepted Hemsted's proposals. But the impetus to do 
so was mainly because the Maasai had started raids into Tanganyika to 
compensate cattle losses due to disease and drought of 1918. Northey feared 
for the security and the cattle of the settlers located close to the Maasai 
borders. By improving the Maasai Reserve, the Maasai could be concentrated 
into smaller areas, enabling easier control. Hemsted's economic initiatives 
centred mainly around the livestock sector. In Narok a creamery was set up for 
the production of ghee; a special selected herd of 2,000 animals was brought 
together trying to improve the local breeds; a veterinary officer and veterinary 
bacteriologist were appointed for the Reserve; some minor irrigation work was 
undertaken; trading centres established, etc. Hemsted also wanted to open a 
In 1901 a hut tax bad been introduced but it was difficult to implement in the Maasai 
setting 
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Government school at Narok, and he pressured elders to send children to 
school. The school at Narok was opened in 1919. 
The collection of tax, however, remained a major problem and the market 
for livestock, be it for meat or live animals, was too small. To absorb the 
remainder it was necessary to build a canning factory. In 1919 Northey called 
for tenders. He offered a location near Sultan Hamud, which would be able to 
obtain animals from the Maasai and Kamba areas. No firms were, however, 
interested as the Government demanded the right to fix a minimum price, 
while it refused to guarantee a minimum supply of animals to the factory. As a 
result of widespread diseases and insufficient staff the Government was 
reluctant to sign an agreement that could result in forced cattle sales. 
To check the spread of diseases, quarantine regulations had been imposed as 
early as 1917, which prohibited the legal movement of cattle from the Maasai 
Reserve to settled areas. Nonetheless, in the immediate postwar period demand 
from European farmers for African cattle was high. Approximately 1,500 new 
settlers had arrived, most of them ex-soldiers. It was estimated that, in the 
coming years, some 500,000 cattle would be needed while only 30,000 a year 
could be provided due to an inadequate number of quarantine stations between 
the African Reserves and the White Highlands. The "Quarantine Policy" failed 
and by 1919 white-owned farms were facing more frequent outbreaks of 
diseases among their cattle. Combating diseases within the African Reserves 
would be the best solution. However, the Veterinary Staff in the Colony 
consisted of only 16 people in 1919 and it was not able to do so. 
The majority of the Maasai reacted to the new developments mainly by 
ignoring them. Native tribunals, local native councils and local chiefs had been 
introduced but without much success. Some open resistance was shown 
towards the evangelical and educational efforts of the missionaries. At the end 
of the 19th century Protestants and Catholics had entered the interior of the 
Protectorate in the wake of the IBEAC. In 1901 the Africa Inland Mission 
(AIM) established its main headquarters at Kijabe, located approximately 40 
km south east of Nairobi. In dividing their spheres of influence the AIM 
"obtained" the Maasai area. John Stauffacher was appointed by the AIM to 
work with the Maasai in 1903. By preaching the gospel combined with a little 
education his major aim was to make as many converts as possible. These 
seeds were sown, however, in semi-arid soil. Presumably the lack of support 
or rather missionary assistance provided to the Colonial Government during the 
time of the Maasai moves, will also have contributed to this less than receptive 
attitude.6 
No missionary had opposed the removal of the Maasai from their traditional grazing 
grounds. Moreover, dunng the time of the Court Case to fight the Second Treaty the Afncan 
Inland Mission, an American evangelical society which had been given a monopoly over the 
Maasai area, prohibited the attendance of a literate Maasai pupil to be a witness for the Maasai 
case (see Sorrenson 1968-266). 
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62 Economic Activities and Development Policy in Kajiado 
District: 1920 - 1945 
6.2.1 Introduction 
Economic problems in Kenya at the beginning of the 1920s were the result of 
a collapse of export-commodity prices. 'Kenya coffee, which had been fetching 
about £150 a ton in London in the early months of 1920, was worth only about 
£60 a year later. Sisal fell from a peak of £96 to £12. 10i. a ton. The worst 
disaster of all, however, was suffered by those who were growing, or had been 
preparing to grow, flax. (...) Unlike those of coffee and sisal, the price of flax 
never again recovered sufficiently to make export from Kenya practicable' 
(Wrigley 1965:234/5). 
The situation was worsened by a monetary issue. The value of the East 
African rupee currency increased from Is. 4d. to 2s. lOd. at the beginning of 
the 1920s. Hence goods sold by Kenyan producers in London, priced in 
shillings, were making less than half the number of rupees than before. The 
debts owed by almost all farmers to Nairobi financiers, however, remained to 
be paid back in rupees. By March 1920 the rupee was fixed at 2s., followed 
shortly afterwards by a change to the sterling currency. Settlers and the 
Government alike were facing a financial crisis. The growing of maize, the 
revival of coffee and sisal prices as well as the imposition of duties to protect 
the local market for wheat and dairy products -mainly for the European urban 
population-, helped the settlers to overcome these difficult years, though at 
high cost It will be clear that it was primarily political forces rather than 
economic ones which were responsible for the protection and support given to 
the European producers. 
The latter half of the 1920s saw a booming Kenyan economy which also 
enabled the Colonial Government, supported by British loans, to increase 
expenditure on public works. Mombasa harbour and the road and railway 
network were improved. Things went smoothly for the settlers. 'The average 
output of coffee in the years 1920-2 was 3,500 tons, and that of sisal 5,300 
tons. In 1927-9 the figures were 7,900 and 15,200 tons* (Wrigley 1965:242). 
At the end of the 1920s these two products were responsible for more than half 
of the total value of Kenya's domestic exports, other important items being 
maize (12.5 per cent), hides and skins (11 per cent), and sodium carbonate 
from Magadi, still the only significant mineral product (8.5 per cent). Despite 
the declaration of the dual policy, coffee and sisal were grown by the settler 
community exclusively as Africans were forbidden from growing them. 
The beginning of the 1930s heralded a decline in the settlers fortune due to 
a combination of drought and a collapse in the world commodity markets. 
Most of the small-scale farmers incuired heavy debts to the banks. 'Twenty 
percent or about four hundred of these fanners gave up altogether and 
abandoned their farms. But for aid amounting to nearly £1,000,000 which was 
Chapter 6: Pre-Independence History of the Economy and of Development Policy 227 
pumped into white agriculture through the agencies of the colonial government, 
it is quite probable that white settlement would not have survived' 
(Zwanenberg & King 1975:39). 
The African population, especially those employed as labourers on European 
farms, suffered similarly if not more. Wages were reduced from Sh. 14/- to Sh. 
8/- a month. From 1935 onwards the importance of maize on the European 
farms declined and that of dairy fanning, the mining of gold and the growing 
of two new crops, pyrethnim and tea, increased. Not until the late 1930s, when 
trying to expand the volume of Kenya's export, were bans on the growing of 
cash crops by Africans lifted. The above gives a picture of the Kenyan 
economy of those days. Let us now turn to the situation in Kajiado District 
6.2.2 Economic Activities and Development Efforts in Kajiado District; 
1920-45 
In the early 1920s almost every Pastoral Reserve was placed under quarantine. 
For the European settlers this had a negative as well as a positive effect. 
Firstly, their need for African cattle for breeding, slaughter or draught 
purposes was hard to meet. To overcome this deficiency it was decided to 
build nine more quarantine stations to speed the flow of African cattle to 
European ranchers and, by the end of 1921, demand for African cattle by 
European farmers had been chiefly fulfilled and dropped considerably. 
Secondly, the quarantine restrictions were a barrier for Africans willing to 
sell their animals on the domestic market, resulting in a high price for 
slaughter cattle, which was at the advantage of the European producers. 
'Africans were even restricted from buying or selling cattle at official auctions 
in order to stop the price dropping too far and to protect European sales' 
(Zwanenberg & King 1975:97). 
This is just one example of the consequences of the Colonial Government's 
policy which favoured the European settlers at the cost of the African 
population. The former were thought to be the best and only motor for pushing 
the Kenyan economy ahead. Whenever development efforts were headed in the 
African areas they should not interfere with the (economic) wellbeing of the 
settler community. Moreover, finance for these developments was, in most 
cases, provided for by the African population themselves. This section will 
examine the impact of this policy, with special consideration of its effects on 
the Maasai pastoralists of Kajiado District. Attention will also be paid to the 
district's economy as it developed during the 1920-45 period. 
In 1941 oloiboni Seggie ole Lonana died, ending a period of influential 
iloibonok. A new wind would start to blow through Maasailand. In 1944 
District Commissioner E.H. Windley brought forward a more tolerant opinion 
than Commissioner Eliot who had dealt with Seggie's father about 40 years 
before: 
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'The next decade with the expanding possibilities of the Post-War years 
should lead to a great change in the development of Masailand and the 
outlook of its people and if thereafter there are any grounds left for 
regarding them as decadent anthropological exhibits I am inclined to 
think the fault will lie in the Administration from which they have a right 
to expect the necessary stimulus and guidance. Hence the urge to 
progress should in time grow stronger within the tribe itself and the fact 
that they are governed by the conservatism common to most pastoral 
tribes may well be of value to their development in the long run by 
regulating their assimilation of our culture to a digestible rate and the 
rejection of spurious elements' (KDAR 1944:2). 
It was the Maasai themselves who had to pay for the modernization urged 
upon them by the Government. Assimilation, guidance and stimulus, without 
financial obligations were the best that could be hoped for from the Colonial 
Government in the interwar period. 
The newly installed Kajiado Local Native Council was the main 
administrative body responsible for development ventures in Kajiado District in 
this period. Colonial Goveniment exercised law and order leaving development 
efforts to the Kajiado Local Native Council. These attempts centred mainly 
towards water development and education. Revenue, amounting to Sh. 27,730/-
in 1932, was mainly obtained from landrents (Sh. 15,040/-), grazing fees (Sh. 
5,654/-) and royalties (Sh. 3,512/-). Expenditure (Sh. 31,507/- for 1932) was 
spent mostly on the Kajiado and Loitokitok schools (Sh. 13,927/-) and water 
supply: borehole maintenance mainly (Sh. 14,661/-). In spite of this deficit they 
still had a positive balance of Sh. 1,500/- by 1933 which had accumulated to £ 
10,444 by the end of 1944. 
The lack of a real improvement was brought forward in the early 1930s by 
the District Commissioner of Kajiado District, who stated that 'a comparison 
between the state of the district in 1926 and that in 1931 makes it abundantly 
clear that there has been little or no progress in a forward direction in the 
period. The Maasai (...) have no real desire for anything more. All they want is 
to be left alone' (KDAR 1931:3). It was thought that the Maasai only 
remembered the restrictions put on them and forgot about all the "benefits 
received". 
A highly sensitive issue was the taxation laid upon the Maasai. In 1923 this 
had been raised to Sh. 20/- in contrast with Sh. 12/- paid by other African 
groups due to their supposed greater wealth. By 1927 Sh. 94,300/- out of a 
total revenue of Sh. 119,405/- for Kajiado District was received by the hut & 
poll tax placed upon the Maasai. However, by the beginning of the 1930s it 
was recognized that the Maasai had severe difficulties in meeting their tax 
payments. Revenue collected by the Government in 1932 totalled Sh. 137,601/-
(excluding Ngong), hut & poll tax (Sh. 119,360/-) and fines (Sh. 6.258/-) being 
the main sources. Goveniment expenditure was Sh. 23,042/- of which Sh. 
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17,039/- was used for the salaries of chiefs, headmen and tribal police as well 
as transport and travelling costs. By 1944 Government revenue stood at Sh. 
99,160/- and expenditure at Sh. 28380/-. So, we may conclude that in all the 
Maasai made a heavy contribution to the national economy whilst they 
received the least benefit 
Moreover, most measures initiated by the Colonial Government in the name 
of law and order triggered off bad feelings as these not seldom interfered with 
Maasai social customs and pastoral economic practices. FOT example, during 
the 1920s much effort was put into the continuing struggle to discipline the 
ilmurran. In 1921 consent was given to a forcible abolition of the emurrano 
system. 
'The goal of Hems ted's program was to limit the military capabilities of the 
junior warriors; this was to be done by disarming them, hastening the E-
Unoto ceremony, at which time they settled down and became senior 
warriors, and disbanding warrior manyattas, where, according to Hemsted, 
young men lived free from the control of elders and conceived their plans of 
raiding and opposing government policies. It was part and parcel of a larger 
plan to strengthen the authority of the elders, who, unlike the warriors 
showed a willingness to assist the government in transforming Maasai 
society' (Tignor 1976:80). 
As an alternative ilmurran were trained as tribal police, recruited (with less 
success) for the King's African Rifles, employed on Public Works like dam 
and road making. Besides, sports events were organized for the ilmurran to 
compete against their peers in other il-oshon. The co-operative attitude by the 
elders was not seldom forced by way of heavy stock fines laid upon the total 
section. The Purko, for example, had to pay a collective fine of 10,000 head of 
cattle in 1922, because young warriors had stolen cattle and killed some 
people. They also tried to stop the Government forcibly recruiting children for 
the Narok school. 
In 1932 the Kajiado Local Native Council passed an anü-emurrano 
resolution in a final attempt to discipline the young warriors. Stock theft was 
still a major problem for the Administration as well as the Maasai elders who 
were forced to pay the collective punishment fines. Among the measures taken 
were the breaking up of imanyat, the shortening of the warrior period and the 
shaving off of hair. 
Finally, among the causes responsible for the less than enthusiastic Maasai 
attitude towards British development efforts will have been the measures 
(forced destocking) taken against their neighbouring pastoralists of the Kamba 
ethnic group. The Maasai, however, did not suffer from this measure despite 
the wish of Lord Delamere that they do so. 
In the following section economic performance and development efforts 
with respect to the Kajiado District between 1920 and 1945 will be discussed. 
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1. Livestock economy and development policy 
In the beginning of the 1920s almost all Reserves and the settled areas suffered 
from livestock diseases. The entire Maasai Reserve was infected with 
rinderpest The growth of the herds during the previous decade turned into a 
gradually decline of the cattle population. Veterinary officers from Uganda, 
Tanganyika and Kenya together formulated a three year programme of 
inoculation to eradicate the diseases. Financial problems prohibited the 
implementation of their intention. Moreover, there was a serious disagreement 
within the Administration concerning economic development policy for the 
Afncan Reserves. 
Montgomery (veterinary advisor to the East Afncan governments) with 
some support from the Native Affairs Department and the Colonial Office was 
opposed by Mr. A. Holm (Director of Agriculture), Governor Northey and the 
settlers. As the need for African cattle had dropped by 1922 it was decided to 
continue the quarantine policy. Montgomery and several administrative officers 
who experienced a decline in tax incomes because the African population was 
no longer able to sell their animals, had favoured the abolition of this policy. 
'By the end of 1922, the price of Afncan breeding stock had fallen from a 
peak of ninety-to-one-hundred shillings to thirty-to-forty shillings' (Spencer 
1983:138). The only concession done by Holm cs was the transfer of three 
Veterinary Officers and nine stock inspectors towards the African Reserves. 
Robert Coryndon, the new Governor, supported this initiative as it was in 
line with the newly proclaimed "Dual Policy" of developing European and 
African agriculture each in its own area. Nevertheless, despite a special budget 
of £10,374 set aside by the Veterinary Department, the African cattle-owners 
themselves also had to contribute to the cost of rinderpest injections. The 
officers in the Maasai area also had to be self-supporting. Montgomery 
continued his fight for a comprehensive approach to livestock development in 
the African Reserves including the eradication of disease, the lifting of 
quarantine and the establishment of a meat-canning factory to deal with the 
huge numbers of cattle saved by his schemes. At a rate of ten shillings per 100 
pounds live weight African cattle would be very well able to compete on the 
world market where prices were two to four times higher. The revenue of these 
sales could be used for the improvement of the African herds and the 
conservation of the pastures. 
Again, the meat-canning factory turned out to be a problem. Private Arms 
were not interested and the Colonial Office was not interested in subsidising 
the experiment He favoured a policy directed at increased sales of ghee and 
hides.7 
Momgomery's view was also known as (he 'ranching proposition' as opposed to the 'dairy 
proposition' favoured by others In this last group some veterinary officials were also included. 
Holms' proposition was a meagre variation of the latter 
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'Montgomery's failure to find money for a factory from either prívate 
enterprise or from the government was of central importance to the 
failure of his larger scheme to eradicate cattle disease and build up 
African herds. The opposition of Holm effectively carried the day 
through the important debates of 1923 and 1924 on the future of herds. 
Holm argued that no foreseeable return from the cattle sales, or from the 
sale of their products, could possibly justify such huge expenditure' 
(Spencer 1983:128). 
In Kajiado District Holm's position effected some assistance offered in this 
respect by the beginning of 1925 resulting in 6 dairies operating by 1926 
realising a net return of Sh. 9,000/- rising to 11 dairies operating by 1927 
making a profit of Sh. 35,412/- from the sale of 27360 lbs of ghee. Finance 
came from loans provided by the Maasai themselves. In 1928 the number of 
operating dairies had risen to 17 producing 19,476 lbs resulting in a reduction 
of the net income to Sh. 31,917/- despite a rise in the price of ghee from 55 to 
66 shilling per tin of 36 lbs. In 1929 Kajiado District was hit by a severe 
drought "The cattle of all sections were mixed up in the search of such grazing 
as remained and gradually concentrated on Ngong until even that rich 
pasturage was exhausted. In certain areas famine relief had to be provided' 
(KDAR 1929:2). The production of ghee dropped to a figure of 1,566 lbs, 
fetching Sh. 2,444/- only. By 1930 the production had collapsed completely 
and all dairies were closed in 1932. 
In contrast the trade in hides in 1929 was considerable. Between 100,000 
and 120,000 hides must have passed through Kajiado and other stations. 
Average prices ranged between Sh. 15/- in 1927 to Sh. 12/- in 1933. In later 
years attempts to control the hide trade engendered strong protest from mostly 
Indian traders. 'Under the Masai Hides & Skin Rules and the marketing of 
native produce rules no sundried hides may be exported from the district and 
no shadedried hide may be exported except by permit after inspection' (KDAR 
1939:42). Hide exports came to a standstill by the beginning of the 1940s. 
Experiments were started to improve the hide and skin drying. By 1944 an 
official figure estimated the number of prepared and exported hide and skins to 
be only about 1,000. 
As noted by Montgomery, the trade in livestock was of more importance for 
the Maasai pastoralists. According to the Kajiado Annual Report there was a 
considerable trade in slaughter stock in 1927 to Ngong and Nairobi. About 500 
oxen were slaughtered in Kajiado itself, mainly (80 per cent) for transportation 
to Magadi (see KDAR 1927:6/7). As these outlets were insufficient to meet 
Maasai supply, it was decided by 1928 to organize auctions in areas bordering 
other African Reserves as inter-tribal trade would not interfere with the 
European cattle trade. By 1929, however, auctions of stock were disappointing. 
'Over 500 head were brought to Kajiado in June of which 200 head were sold 
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for 9781/- [MR: Sh. 49/- ph]. At Loitokitok only 130 head were sold out of 
about 4S0, the price averaging 37/- a beast A number of Moshi and Arusha 
buyers [from Tanganyika] with between 30,000/- and 50,000/- attended the 
Namanga auction which had to be abandoned altogether on account of 
quarantine difficulties' (KDAR 1929 S). 
These quarantine regulations were once again under much debate as they 
interfered with grazing management of the pastoralists. During the drought of 
1929, for example, concessions had to be granted to the Kisonko Maasai to 
water at the Namanga river and to the Maasai from Kajiado to water at 
Rombo, in the mile zone and Simba and across the Mbagathi river. 
Nonetheless, the acceptance of compulsory quarantine regulations was made a 
prerequisite by the Veterinary Officer posted in the district in 1929, to start a 
scheme of inoculation as welcomed by the Maasai.' An incident by which a 
Maasai was killed by the police resulted in a temporary freezing of the 
arrangement 
During 1930 rinderpest spread to Loitokitok and the Maasai elders 
expressed themselves ready to accept any treatment ordered by the 
Government However, the Veterinary Officer had been withdrawn by January 
1930 and only by 1931 was a campaign started to eradicate rinderpest as well 
as bovine pleuro-pneumonia. This initiative caused the Kajiado District 
Commissioner to state that 
'We can now look forward to some term being set to the cattle 
quarantine from which the Masai have so long suffered. It is true that the 
Masai are an unprogressive tribe, but they have hitherto been debarred 
from economic progress by being forbidden to sell their produce, which 
consists chiefly of slaughter oxen, this has inevitably resulted in over-
stocking which has only been mitigated by periodic droughts in which 
large numbers of cattle have died of starvation' (KDAR 1931:6). 
Only the stock traders, mostly Somali, were able to fetch a good trade owing 
to the glut of cattle on the market and the low prices which they realised.9 
Fortunately, some competition became possible by 1932 when the Veterinary 
Department opened the Southern end of the District since it was believed to be 
free of Rinderpest. The Loitokitok area was declared free from Rinderpest and 
Contagious Bovine Pleuro Pneumonia by Proclamation No. 52 of 5th July 
In tbe mKH920s the Maasai had already expressed a desire to have (heir cattle double-
inoculated against nndopest and were prepared to sell some of their animals to pay for the 
treatircnl (see Spencer 1983.119) 
9
 In 1931 the pnces per head dropped from about Sh 30/- in April to less than Sh 20/- in 
November By 1932 cattle were selling for sh 18/- per head. The 1928 exports from the Maasai 
Reserve amounted lo over £95,000 In 1932, the sum had fallen to £40,000 The trade in bides 
was minimal, owing to the poor pnces 
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1933. This freed the opening of another outlet, besides Ngong, for cattle in the 
district Via Loitokitok cattle was transported to Tanganyika. Prices offered at 
this market were slightly better.10 
Nonetheless, at the beginning of the 1930s the Maasai were thought to be 
'richer in stock than at any other time since the advent of British 
Administration' (KDAR 1931:3). The average wealth per household of five, 
based on the official estimate, was estimated to be 74 cattle, 85 sheep or goats 
and 18 donkeys, but was, in all probability, considerably more." Moreover, 
the Maasai despite being considered "useless and unproductive" reached a 
comparatively high per capita export figure of about £2 in 1928 (see James 
1939:59). 
By 1933 things had worsened again. Kajiado District suffered from a drought 
which became a disaster by 1934. Rainfall figures were 16.73 and 10.66 inches 
respectively as opposed to 29.01 inches in 1930. Estimates state that the cattle 
population of 300,000 head had substantially declined by approximately 
100,000 due to the drought which continued even into 1935. This must have 
placed a heavy burden on the Maasai. Local Administration, however, was of 
the opinion that 'The periodic disappearance of old and weak animals kept to 
swell the numbers of the herds and the importance of their owners is a blessing 
without which existence in the Masai Reserve would long ago have become 
impossible' (KDAR 1933:1/2). To speed up destocking the Government bought 
a 1,000 head of so-called scrub cattle (Sh. 7/- per beast) for producing manure 
and other byproducts at the Nairobi Municipal plant. The need for destocking 
was a much debated issue at the Local Native Council. 
The Maasai rejected the Government's view that they kept too many 
animals. They criticized the reduction of their grazing area and especially the 
loss of dry season pastures. Instead they proposed a water programme which 
would support individuals or small groups finance small water schemes such as 
dams. By the beginning of the 1930s water development mainly restricted itself 
to the maintenance of the 6 boreholes available in the District. On the request 
of the Administration the Maasai gave an area at Kajiado on which to start a 
small supervised experimental depot to illustrate to the Maasai some of the 
methods of improved husbandry taught at the Ngong training school and which 
In 1932, 11,168 head of cattle were exported to Nairobi from Ngong for slaughter and 3S8 
head to the Kiloiyu reserve for slaughter. 196 head of caule and 22 sheep were slaughtered by 
Kajiado Butchers. 1,813 head of sheep and goats passed through Ngong for export. As a result of 
two sales organized by the Government 648 head of cattle were exported to Tanganyika via 
Loitokitok. 
11
 For 1930 the official number of caule in the total Maasai Reserve, available for a total 
Maasai population of 48,381 people, was set at 720,000 cattle, 820,450 sheep and goats and 
171,800 donkeys. An actual account made by the veterinary depanmenl in the Kajiado District 
placed the total figure for cattle to be over one million (see Carter 1934:min. 658). 
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could be capable of general application. Neither proposal was implemented. 
Before the Carter Land Commission the Maasai repeated their grievances 
concerning the loss of (dry grazing) pastures (see for a detailed account section 
5.4.4). The northern boundary of the Maasai Reserve 'was so drawn as to 
exclude the most valuable water supplies, which are included in the land 
alienated to Europeans' (James 1939*60). Conservation of the more low-lying 
wet season pastures became increasingly hampered. The Maasai were forced 
'to overwork the more arid southern reserve, resulting in loss of vegetation, 
soil erosion, and overall decline in grazing. In the twentieth century the reserve 
became progressively less able to support its livestock' (Tignor 1976:38). 'The 
extent to which soil erosion has proceeded in the Reserve has doubtless been 
in part due to overstocking, but the Pirn Report considers that "the vast 
numbers of game are probably even more responsible than the Masai stock". It 
is clear that the claims of the region to be both a Game Reserve and a Reserve 
for the Masai are incompatible' (James 1939:61 ).12 In 1934 a report was 
published on the Maasai Reserve which stated that, of the total area of 10 
million acres, more than 4 million were useless due to the lack of water and/or 
the presence of tsetse fly. East Coast Fever, etc. 
Besides these fundamental statements concerning the quality of their land, 
the Maasai also reminded the Carter Land Commission of the drop in prices 
offered for their cattle, smallstock, hides and ghee.13 Furthermore, they stated 
that views expressed by Government officials concerning their customary diet 
of meat, milk and blood and their dislike of agriculture were outdated. 'There 
are the circumstances the force of which compel us to submit to your 
Committee that an area suitable for agriculture should now be added to our 
reserve which should be sufficient not only for our present requirements but 
also for our expansion for the future increase of population' (KLC 1934:1226). 
Of course, this was a futile request. 
The Administration continued its intention to destock the pastoral areas in 
order to prevent erosion. 'The numbers of livestock sold officially after the end 
of the drought of 1935 up to the beginning of the Second World War remained 
low however, at about 2000 per annum, partly due to the fact that the Somali 
traders offered better prices' (Campbell 1981a-217). Official prices had risen to 
Sh. 38/- per head by 1936. Sales to the Kikuyu area, through the Dagoretti 
market, were in the hands of the Somali traders. 
This interfered with the Government's wish to find a large enough supply 
Even before the Maasai were moved into their present home, the greater part of the 
Reserve was gazetted a Game Reserve It was the Chief Game area of East Africa In Kajiado 
District the fitst tounst rest camps were opened m Kajiado Town and Namanga by 1932 Game in 
the District was in such abundance that in 1941 1,600 Wildebeests and 160 zebra had to be shot 
13
 Pnces for slaughter cattle had dropped from Sh 55/- to Sh. 16/- a head Pnces for sheep 
had fallen from Sh 6/- to Sh 3/- Pnces for hides had dropped from Sh 3(V- per frisila (36 lbs) 
to Sh. 6/- and for ghee from Sh 60/- to Sh 20/- per firasila (see KLC 1934 122S) 
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for a meat-canning factory which had been started by a British commercial 
fiim called Liebig's Ltd. in 1937 near Athi River.14 Supplies were arranged 
with a government guarantee for a minimum number of animals every year at 
a fixed price. 'The factory would create a market for the pastoral peoples to 
sell their animals, thus destocking could be enforced and the European stock 
industry would be protected as the price offered by the factory for the beasts 
would be well below the price demanded by European stockowners' 
(Zwanenberg & King 1975:100). The factory had cost £120,000 and needed an 
input of about 30,000 animals in order to break even and this was guaranteed 
by the Government 
Furthermore, it was agreed that the Government would allow the import of 
cattle from Tanganyika and Uganda, that they would provide a free-of-charge-
veterinary services as may be required for meat inspection and meat export, 
exempt the Company from paying any cess or levy for the slaughtering of 
stock, and would not support another factory engaged in the production of 
canned meats or extract Liebig's obligations were mainly restricted to the 
payment of a yearly rental of Sh. 500/- for a lease of 10,000 acres of land in 
Kajiado District to be used as a holding ground and an annual rent of Sh. 40/-
only to be paid for the factory's location and its direct surroundings comprising 
almost 11,000 acres (see KNA DC/Kaj/2/3/15 1936)." 
Stock routes were created in order to enable the transportation of cattle from 
the main stock-holding areas of Kajiado, Narok and Kitui to supply the factory 
at Athi River. 
'Liebig began buying operations from the latter half of 1937 "without any 
success at all", as the prices they offered were very low. The highest 
price they offered was 15 Shs for a full-grown animal, while they were 
offering 2 or 3 shillings for a goat or sheep. The prices outside the Liebig 
market at this time were in the region of 60 to 100 shillings for a bullock 
down to 10 shillings for a goat. Liebig had clearly hoped to take the full 
advantage of the semi-monopoly they had been offered by the colonial 
government' (Zwanenberg & King 1975:101). 
As a solution the Kamba region, considered to be severely eroded due to 
overstocking, was compulsorily destocked. Approximately 20,000 cattle were 
Liebig's Extract of Meat Company Limited was a Bnush public company, incorporaied m 
London ш 1865. which developed the production of meal extract and of canned and frozen meat 
in Argentina, Paraguay, South West Afnca, Rhodesia, Sudan, Tanzania, Nigeria, Botswana, 
Uganda and Kenya as well as other manufacturing or selling operations in many other countries of 
the world (see Carlisle & Randag 1970 229) 
19
 Spencer slates that the Government also paid a subsidy of £3,000 per year (see Spencer 
1983 132) 
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branded and purchased at very low prices." This brutal action, however, 
ended in political protest from the Kamba and was stopped by the interference 
of the British parliament in 1938. 
By 1939, some success in increasing Government control of the livestock 
trade in Kajiado District was obtained with the change to markets as opposed 
to itinerant traders as the channels for stock export There had been a lot of 
smuggling especially to the Machakos District. From now on grazing fees had 
to be paid for cattle offered at the market Most Somali traders left Kajiado 
district and went to Tanganyika. The veterinary department was mainly 
involved in establishing a stock route from Tanganyika to Liebig's Ltd. at Athi 
River. A stock inspector was stationed at Kajiado. Thousands of stock came 
through this route and checks were needed on the spread of disease. However, 
prices in Ngong were higher than those offered at other locations like Kajiado 
Town which were consequently bypassed. The same occurred, but in the 
reverse direction, in Loitokitok where all animals offered by Kenya Maasai 
went to Tanganyika as prices offered by traders from the Kilimanjaro region 
were prohibitive for Liebig. 
With the outbreak of World War II, Europe had advanced into another war. 
This time the Maasai were not part of it directly as Tanganyika was no longer 
a German Colony. However, with the entry of Italy into the war military 
activity in Kenya near its eastern border with Somalia increased. As during 
World War I, the Maasai donated cattle and money to the Central War Fund, 
the British Red Cross and other special War Funds. And to further assist food 
production the Maasai agreed, for the duration of World War Π, to the 
ploughing of approximately 1,000 acres near Kitengela to plant wheat In later 
years the area was extended to 15,000 acres (fenced). 
Of more importance was the arrangement made between the Maasai from 
Kajiado as well as Narok and the Meat Control Board to provide 
approximately 2,000 head of animals per month to meet the increased demand 
for meat.17 Alternating between the two Maasai Districts animals were 
provided at fixed locations (Kajiado, Loitokitok, Mashuni and Bissei) and on 
fixed dates. Prices were fixed (Sh. 28/- to Sh. 46/-) depending on the live 
weight grade and year of sale with cash being paid on the spot18 
'(·••) prices paid may be regarded as adequate to the African producer 
In 1926 Governor Gngg had announced the Crop Production and Livestock Ordinance, 
which could be used to regulate the number and type of caule in every African Reserve 
Besides this supply the Maasai officially exported about 700 head of cattle to the Kikuyu 
areas (especially Kiambu) every year and provided approximately 800 head of cattle for (official) 
local slaughter at Kajiado Town, the Magadi Soda Company and KMQ 
1st grade' 10 cents/lb live weight, 2nd grade 7 cents; 3rd grade 4 cents. 
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although it seems that even after carrying all the expenses of the Meat 
Control Board (which also buys European Farmers' cattle) the profits 
made by them from the sale of the Native Cattle have been very large. It 
is fairly arguable that a proportion of these profits should be refunded to 
be spent on beneficial development in Masailand' (KDAR 1941:2). 
Table 6.1 Kajiado Maasai Cattle Sales to the Meat Control Board 1941-45 
Section Î94Ï 1942 1943 1944 1945 
Kisonko 
Matapalo 
Kaputiei 
Keekonyokie 
Minor sections 
Miscellaneous 
2.289 
2.520 
2,431 
1.305 
1,979 
2306 
2,493 
2,739 
2,366 
2,234 
34 
3,311 
3.351 
3,232 
1,167 
2,562 
63 
2.967 
3,245 
3.016 
1.094 
2,477 
293 
2,422 
2.674 
2.533 
540 
2,011 
Total 10,524 12,372 13,196 13.092 10,180 
Source: compiled trom KUAKs 1У41-1У45 
At each of the locations the various il-oshon produced their quota for sale. 
Table 6.1 summarises the quantity of cattle sold at the Kajiado auctions for the 
Meat Control Board.19 Shop ownen were encouraged to sell their goods at 
these sales, medical assistance was provided, tax collected and administrative 
affairs settled. It should be clear that the arrangement made whilst said to be 
voluntary was in essence imposed upon the Maasai by the Administration. 
Cattle were collected by elders who were assisted by Tribal Police at the 
buying centres. This continued until 1943 when the Maasai suffered from a 
serious drought which lasted until 1946. Since other pastoral areas were having 
difficulties in meeting their quotas during these years of drought and because 
of the distances involved, the Maasai were even compelled to raise theirs. At 
the same time the Maasai had to slaughter a considerable number of their stock 
for home consumption due to shortages of milk and blood. Alternative food 
items were scarce. 'Mixed meal has been in short supply and none was 
supplied from the Kenya Control until September when 200 bags were 
received' (KDAR 1943:2). The monthly allocation of mixed meal never 
exceeded 500 bags, which was approximately 2 kg per head of the population 
per month. To make things worse widespread hopper infestations occurred on a 
large scale in March, April and May of 1944. 
As well as the total number of 59,364 head of cattle supplied to the Meat 
Control Board, the Maasai from Kajiado District donated £3,252 to several 
British War Funds. This support was highly appreciated by the Administration 
as can be seen from the following statement made by DC Windley in 1944: 
19
 In 1941, 560 head of these caule were purchased for supply to Liebig's at Liebig's prices. 
The Meat Control Board also started to purchase small stock from the Loodokilani, but after the 
fust batch of 332 this was stopped as the quality was not considered good enough (see KDAR 
1941). 
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'The Masai rank as a backward tribe in Kenya but I have been led in my 
experience to believe that they possess a natural intelligence and 
character which if properly guided and consistently handled should lead 
them to play a useful part in the synthesis of tribal life in Kenya both as 
a factor for stability in political development and in the economic sphere 
as ranchers of cattle for the meat market The impetus and inspiration 
must come from us and we cannot afford the neglect evident in long 
periods in the past' (KDAR 1944 2). 
The other party in need of meat, Liebig's Ltd., had also been able to get 
assistance from the Maasai. In 1940 Maasai from Tanganyika had agreed to 
sell 6,000 head of cattle to Liebigs per annum, one third of the proceeds was 
to be donated to the War Fund, one third to be lent free of interest towards war 
expenditure and one third for their own development. This number soon 
increased and by 1941 approximately 8,000 animals were passing through to 
Liebig almost every month. By the end of the year 67,000 head of cattle had 
been obtained from Tanganyika. The Veterinary Department assisted, as agreed 
in 1936, in the supervision of dips in Namanga and Kajiado and by giving 
free (anthrax) inoculations to cattle from Tanganyika destined for Athi River. 
Despite all these measures Liebig's cattle suffered heavy losses at times. In 
1941 approximately 11,000 animals died. This was a threat to the animals of 
the Kenya Maasai as Liebig's cattle had infected many kilometres of good 
grazing. Liebig had to stop buying from Tanganyika temporarily by the end of 
1944 due to the drought resulting in the closure of the Stock Route. 
As well as the building of crushes, experiments in crossbreeding by 
importing two Indian Kankrij bulls and two S ahi wal crossbreeds and 
experiments in haymaking, the Veterinary Department was especially active 
with respect to the eradication of disease in the District.20 This was warmly 
welcomed by the Maasai. 'Many more inoculations could have been given if 
the staff and vaccine had been available' (KDAR 1945:4). The campaigns were 
mainly directed against Rinderpest, Pleuro Pneumonia, Black Quarter and 
Anthrax. The total of animals inoculated in 1942 against these diseases 
numbered to 65,600, 80,000, 33,750 and 1,300, respectively. 
The 1943 rinderpest campaign was carried out in combination with a cattle 
census which was the first reliable one in years. It calculated the total number 
of cattle, including calves, at 360,000. The inoculation figures showed a 
prevalence of 68 per cent for female cattle in Maasai herds of those days. 
Table 6.2 shows the result by section. 
Most efforts were still on a limited scale and faced great difficulties 'Experiments in 
Haymaking were earned out after the Long Rams but they were somewhat hnnled with unskilled 
staff and oxen and breakages in the machinery The period between the end of the rain and the 
drying off of the grass seemed to be very short It is probably unlikely that the Masai will take to 
using it for many years or that an adequate supply could be made without tractors' (KDAR 
19416) 
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Table 62 Kajiado District 1943 Census of Adult Cattle 
Section Adult Cattle 
Dalalekutuk 19.43S 
Keekonyokie 8,016 
Loodokilani 22,164 
Kisonko 73,144 
Kapuüeí 62358 
Puiko 9,039 
Ildamat 3,060 
Sikirari 7,310 
Matapalo 78,646 
Matapalo (not inoculated in Meto) 4,000 
Non-Maasai 788_ 
Total 287.683 
Source: KUAK 1У43 
2. Water development 
By late 192S, the Government asked A.D. Lewis, the director of irrigation for 
South Africa, to advise on irrigation prospects in the Kamba and Maasai 
Reserves. By improving the water supply it was hoped to raise the carrying 
capacity of the area, in order to prevent erosion due to overstocking. Lewis, 
however, stated that it was doubtful if large sums of money should be spent to 
improve the availability of water in the African Reserves, 'especially in view 
of the fact that there are considerable and growing demands for the labour of 
the natives in various other directions in the country' (Lewis cf Spencer 
1983:130). This argument would apply to the Kamba but not so much to the 
Maasai. Moreover, in 1927 the District Commissioner reported that the number 
of cattle in the Kajiado District had been stable over the last 10 years because 
there was not enough food and water in the dry season to support an increase. 
In 1928 the Council voted £2,000 for the building of pipelines and the boring 
of water holes intended to open up 30,000 acres of arid land. 
By 1929 water-boring operations were at last begun in the Simba area with 
funds provided by the Government. During this year the Ngong pipeline and 
Surei water agreement were signed. The Maasai were entitled to merely 18,000 
gallons of water per day between Ngong and Cairn hill and 2,000 gallons at 
Toroka. A 6,000 gallon tank had been constructed at Caim hill before the end 
of 1929. Sites at Olooloitikoishi and Engirigiri were selected for another two 
troughs and tanks, where similar quantities would be delivered daily. 
Water improvement was mainly restricted to the provision of wells and 
storage tanks along the Tanganyika stock route and at the auction locations. 
Finance was provided by the Government out of the Stock Route Water 
Supplies fund with assistance from Tanganyika. With money earned by the 
Matapalo for the digging of a trench from the Namanga river two boreholes 
were drilled one of which met with success. The building of an earth dam near 
Oloyiangalani and a well near Isinya were financed by the Kajiado Local 
Native Council. In fact until the end of the 1930s this body was the main 
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supplier of money for development projects. 
3. Education 
Opposition towards education delayed the opening of the Government African 
School in Kajiado until 1927. By the end of 1928 the school had 96 pupils 
who were receiving an education in Swahili, carpentry and the dairy industry. 
Maasai education was to be instrumental in providing a commercial alternative 
to nomadic pastoralism within their own Reserve. As soon as the ability to 
read and write had been reached formal education was reduced to 5 hours a 
week (see King 1970:215). In August 1929 another primary school was started 
in Loitokitok. By 1930 the number of educated Maasai in Kajiado District was 
estimated to be approximately 40. Other young Maasai were sent for training 
at the Ngong Veterinary Training Depot whose curriculum was said by the 
District Commissioner to be 'unrelated to the conditions in the Masai Reserve 
and of little, if any, benefit to the Masai except as a general demonstration of 
the value of native stock' (KDAR 1929:11). In fact, this curriculum suffered 
the same difficulties as the "formal" schools. According to King the 'basic 
obstacle to success of these early ventures in student commercialism is 
precisely that the school was preparing its charges to enter a modern sector 
that did not exist within the reserve, and discouraging them by the elementary 
standard of their general education from seeking work outside the reserve' 
(King 1970:216). Failure to reap a harvest from the school gardens most years 
meant that the schools were perceived as being a waste of time whilst at the 
same time the Maasai risked losing their traditions. 
This fear had even more validity with regard to missionary education. The 
African Inland Mission, an American non-denominational organization, was not 
much interested in education except for the teaching of the catechism. 
Moreover, a struggle was fought over female circumcision, African dancing, 
dress and other Maasai customs, resulting in the temporary abandonment of the 
AIM school at Siyabei, Narok District. By 1932 the AIM opened a branch at 
Dlasit (near Loitokitok), where they obtained a plot of 40 acres rent free for a 
period of S years. That same year the monopoly for the Maasai area was 
broken by the entrance of the Roman Catholic Mission and the Church 
Missionary Society (CMS). They both opened an out-school in Kajiado Town. 
The Government introduced a quota system obliging every section to submit 
a minimum number of Maasai (boys) for without this quota there might have 
been almost no schools at all. Those interested in schooling had mostly been 
influenced from the outside by missionaries or Kikuyu mothers for instance. 
Other boys were characterized as coming from poor families, or being the least 
favoured at home. In this, however, the Maasai did not react much different 
from other African groups twenty years earlier towards a new development 
which had yet to prove itself. With a lack of jobs it was no surprise that 
students left school the moment they were circumcised and became ilmurran. 
By the end of 1944 new out-schools had been established at Namanga, 
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Mashuru and Bissel, followed in 194S by Oloyiangalani. Total enrolment in the 
district was 1S8 pupils. 
4. Health 
At Loitokitok and Dlasit (Missicm) small dispensaries had been built and in 
1944 the first grant of £800 was received from the Government for the 
improvement of hospital accommodation at Kajiado. By 1941 enough facilities 
had been erected and paid for by the Local Native Council to allow the 
qualification "small hospital". 
5. Infrastructure 
Mention should be made of the widening of the Athi River-Namanga road in 
1940 and the construction of houses and bridges by Italian prisoners of war. 
Also other feeder routes were improved during this period. 
6. Cultivation 
Agriculture in the 1920s was still confined to those whose poverty drove them 
to cultivation. In the Ngong area partially de-tribalized members and Maasai 
wives of Kikuyu origin had shown some interest in cultivating the pastures 
vacated because of the prevalence of East Coast Fever. By the beginning of the 
1930s, their number was estimated to be some 300 and their cattle about 2,000. 
Wealthy pastoralists employed Kikuyu to cultivate for them. In the Loitokitok 
area cultivation had increased due to the 1929 drought and to the example 
made by pupils of the Loitokitok school. Here, experimental agriculture was 
also adopted by well-off Maasai. Despite all this in 1931 it was estimated that 
less than 1,000 acres of the total Maasai Reserve were under cultivation. 
During the 1930s and 1940s cultivation in Kajiado District remained an 
activity chiefly undertaken by outsiders. Kikuyu and Chagga continued their 
illegal trespass into the district Both groups were employed by Maasai 
interested in agriculture. During the war the Government established 
Wheatlands near Kitengela. In 1943, having been fortunate with the rains, 
4,000 bags were reaped from 1,180 acres, but the next year the rains failed and 
not even the seed was recovered. Increased agricultural activity in various parts 
of the Loitokitok area by 1943 was thought to be the result of the shortage of 
maizemeal in the shops (see KDAR 1944:8). 
7. Mining 
The mineral sector saw a considerable increase in its productivity. By 1930 
44,340 tons of soda ash and 1,800 tons of lime were exported from the district 
Besides the exploitation of soda ash and lime great quantities of sand and fuel 
(wood) were taken from the mile zone between Athi River and Sultan Hamud 
as well as other locations in the district The Magadi Soda Company and the 
Kenya Marble Quarries were the main providers of wage labour. By 1927 the 
former's management was in the hands of a small group of approximately 25 
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Europeans assisted by 80 Indians. The labour force of 960 Africans was 
dominated by Luo (350) and Kamba (250). A top salary for a "native" was Sh. 
3/- a day, the average being £1 a month. The KMQ employed some 140 
people. Less than 100 Maasai were employed in wage labour, mainly by the 
Government as chiefs, headmen, tribal police or interpreters. 
In Kajiado District the Magadi Soda Company had also suffered from the 
early 1930s world-wide economic depression. In 1931, it was about to close 
but was saved by an order received in December of that year. Their labour 
force dropped to an average of only 463. The number of KMQ-employees fell 
to 109. By 1933 these figures had fallen even further to 396 and 64, 
respectively. Still, by starting the production of common salt and bath salts the 
total production of the Magadi Soda Company had recovered to 37,172 tons. 
As a result of World War II Europe faced severe shortages and Magadi was 
called to step up production. Sales more than doubled during the war years. By 
1944 the Company was employing almost 1,500 people, mostly Kamba (700) 
and Luo/Luhya (550). KMQ was less successful with only 80 employees. 
8. Trade 
Other non-Maasai (mostly Indians and Somali) had established themselves in 
the trading centres, which had shown a rapid growth by the middle of the 
1920s Excluding Ngong the number of trade centres had risen from 9 
comprising 27 shops in 1926 to 15 centres and 51 shops by 1930. Besides 
exporting livestock products (hides and ghee) from the district, these traders 
provided household utensils and foodstuffs for the growing number of non-
Maasai. Moreover, the Maasai also used part of their income from the sale of 
animals, hides and ghee to buy maize from these shops especially during the 
dry season when milk was short 'No doubt women and children eat most of it, 
but it certainly seems that the Masai menfolk are also taking to it and have 
abandoned or rather modified their traditional diet of meat, milk and blood. 
They do not like porridge or 'ugi' but meal bread they seem to eat freely and a 
very rough calculation of the meal imported suggests the Masai now consume 
some 2 lbs of meal a week per adult besides their traditional food' (KDAR 
1927:7). The Indian shopkeepers also suffered from the early 1930s crisis. 
Kamba, Kikuyu, Luo and Luhya had lost their jobs at the Magadi Soda 
Company or KMQ. By 1933 the number of Kajiado District trading centres 
and shops, excluding Ngong, had declined to 10 and 29, respectively.21 
The Admuusmtion med to stop this development by reducing plot rents to Sh. 16/- per 
month in trading centres and Sh 20/- a monlb in townships of Kajiado and Ngong, the fomer rate 
having been Sh TAI- ш both townships and trading centres In comparison the Macbakos rental 
wasSb 12/- only. 
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6.3 Economic Activities and Development Policy in Kajiado 
District: 1946 - 1963 
63.1 Introduction 
In the Post World War Π period Great Britain's economic power started to 
decline, especially due to the competition from the United States of America 
and Japan. During the War, British Colonies such as Kenya had supported the 
war effort by supplying food. Post-war British colonial policy was based on 
this same principle of economic opportunities available in the colonies which 
could be used to regain a strong position for Great Britain's economy. British 
manufacturers were encouraged to invest in overseas British colonial territory. 
The policy of economic laissez-faire embedded within the self-sufficiency of 
the colonies was transformed into a more planned economic and development 
oriented approach. The 1945 Colonial Development and Welfare Act obliged 
the governments of colonial territories to draw up ten year development plans. 
In Kenya a Development Committee of settlers and Government officials 
produced the "Ten Year Plan 1946-1955". Besides having a major agricultural 
component, the plan also covered other aspects of development such as social 
services and communications. It was not the several Departments but a special 
agency, the Development and Reconstruction Authority (DARÀ), which was 
entrusted with the implementation of the Ten Year-Plan. Nevertheless, the 
Provincial Administration underwent a modification in scope and volume. 
Before the War its main tasks had mainly included collecting tax, and 
maintaining law and order. After the War a policy of "development" was 
adopted. The number of administrative posts increased, chiefly by extending 
the numbers of technical advisors. Economic expansion was mainly directed at 
the development of the European agricultural sector. European settlers had 
been highly involved in the management of the economy during the war, 
greatly strengthening their position in practice. 
'As members of the Agricultural Production and Settlement Boards, they 
had contributed largely to the great boost in agricultural output. Their 
hold on the reserved 'White Highlands' seemed unchallengeable, and in 
the three years following the end of the war some 8,000 white 
immigrants came out to join them, actively encouraged by the British 
Government' (Bennett & Smith 1976:112). 
In the wake of this development, agricultural processing and construction 
industries started to flourish. Multi-national firms also appeared on the scene 
and soon overwhelmed local capital. As a result of the War and the good 
prices for its products (mainly coffee and tea) on the world markets in the 
period thereafter, Kenya's financial position was healthy. Very substantial 
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funds could be expended to finance the Development Plan. The 'original 
expenditure allocation of £17.5 million was increased progressively to over £40 
million. £29 million had actually been spent by the time the plan was 
terminated at the end of 1953, after eight years' (McWilliam 1976:2Ъ2).п 
Total Kenyan public expenditure had risen from £9.8 million in 1946 to £29 
million in 1953. Over that same period total revenue had increased from £12.3 
million to £29.6 million, respectively (see Low & Smith 1976:599). 
In chapter 5 we have considered the post war development policy in the 
African areas which had mainly been directed towards the conservation of the 
soil and the consolidation of land. In addition, other schemes were initiated in 
the African Reserves such as the Agricultural Research and Investigation 
Scheme, the Livestock Improvement Scheme and Tsetse Survey and Control 
Scheme, all part of the 1946-1955 Development Plan under the control of 
DARÀ. This lasted until 1953 when, due to rapid economic change, the Ten-
Year Plan was replaced by a pattern of three year development programmes. 
In contrast, the Emergency had a negative effect on the marketing of livestock 
from the semi-arid areas in the meat markets of Nyanza and Central Province; 
Kikuyu traders were banned from auctions, prices offered by the Government 
were far too low and distribution arrangements were poor. Official trade was 
limited but it is known that considerable illegal trade developed during these 
years as the prices offered in Central Province were much higher. In the 
following sections we will look more closely at the development activities 
initiated in Kajiado District in the post-war period upto Independence in 1963. 
63.2 Late Colonial Economic Development Policy and Activities in 
Kajiado District, 1946-1963 
We have seen how, in the pre-1946 period. Colonial Government development 
policy in Kajiado District and, to some extent missionary involvement as well, 
was characterized by a package of mainly restrictive measures affecting the 
economic as well as the cultural way of life of the Maasai people. Among 
these were restrictions for controlling stock movements by the imposition of 
quarantine regulations, the pacification of the pastoral people by abandoning 
"murranhood" in order to stop stock thefts and keep law and order, heavy 
taxation which was only partly reinvested - dairies for ghee production, hide 
improvement, minor irrigation and drilling of a few boreholes, veterinary 
assistance through building of a few dips and inoculation campaigns, the 
'Some 20 per cent of DARA's total resources was accounted for by special funds that had 
been built up during the war and were then transferred for development These balances were 
largely used up by 1954, meanwhile the government was able to make important contributions 
from its current revenue surpluses, which in tum accounted for some 27 per cent of the 
programme' (McWilliam 1976 283). 
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establishment of a canning factory, cattle auctions for inter-tribal trade, the 
establishment of some infrastructural, educational and health facilities - and the 
Government's persistent efforts to destock the Maasai grazing areas and 
attempts to stop the "conservative and damaging pastoral practices". In most 
cases these efforts were only half-hearted and not successful. Part of this can 
be explained by the wish of most of the members of the Colonial Government 
to protect the European settlers. There was no priority given to developing any 
of the African areas, besides imposition of the restrictions mentioned above. 
There was a lack of development funds and technical staff. 
Whenever the Maasai themselves demanded new initiatives as was the case 
in the agriculture proposal submitted to the Carter Land Commission and water 
development, veterinary assistance or higher livestock prices, they often 
received either a negative response or they were forced into conditional 
arrangements which were unfavourable to them. 
On the other hand the Maasai assisted the British during both World Wars 
by providing gifts to the Central War Fund and more importantly the selling of 
large numbers of cattle to the Meat Control Board -which had allowed the 
latter to make huge profits- and giving permission to plant wheat near 
Kitengela. Some Government officials had noticed this. They (e.g Norman 
Leys and District Commissioners Windley and Buxton) realised that in most 
cases the Maasai had been loyal to the Colonial Government but that they had 
been rewarded by the loss of their best grazing areas, the prohibition of sellmg 
and improving their produce, mainly cattle, due to the quarantine restrictions 
resulting in the over-stocking of an already game-abundant district, leading to 
severe difficulties in times of drought. No wonder the Maasai eventually 
wanted to be left alone and at times adopted an attitude of nonchalance or even 
passive resistance. 
Funds from DARÀ, ALDEV and the Swynnerton Plan did reach Kajiado 
District to some extent as we have seen before. The (Colonial) Provincial 
Administration over the years had continued to keep expenditure at 
approximately half of the revenue collected in Kajiado District but by 19S3 
this situation had changed. Although income from revenues increased between 
1949 to 1953 from Sh. 158,423/- to Sh. 196,458/-, expenditure increased 
sharply from Sh. 81,065/- to Sh. 249,153/-. This growth was mainly the result 
of a doubling of personnel emoluments due to Emergency measures in addition 
to the development funds provided by DARÀ and ALDEV as part of the Ten 
Year Development Plan 1946-1955. 
In addition, local finance provided by the Local Native Council and its 
successors the Masai African District Council and the Kajiado African District 
Council, was also of major importance whenever a project was expanded. 
Among the main sources of revenue were royalties for sand, wood, limestone 
and the like. Other sources of revenue for the Local Councils were fees and 
fines, Government grants and the Local Native Council rate of Sh. 4/-. In latter 
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years this taxation, collected in addition to the Government native poll tax, was 
raised to Sh. 20/- realising some £7,500 annually. The Maasai continued to be 
the highest taxed group in Kenya.23 Expenditure, especially for water 
development, education, medical and infrastructural purposes, through the 
Kajiado African District Council averaged approximately Sh. 300,000/- per 
year by the late 1950s. 
Mention should also be made of the increased role of missionaries in 
Kajiado District. The AIM monopoly was definitely broken by the end of the 
1950s. The African Anglican Church took over the CMS plot in Kajiado by 
1951 and a church was opened by their Reverend Daudi Mokinyo in 1953. The 
Catholic Mill Hill Mission was granted a plot for a church and school in 
Kajiado Town by 1960 and another plot was obtained in Rombo by 1962. 
Their main area of activity, however, was Ngong where the Prefecture 
Apostolic was established in 1959. 
Besides preaching Christianity these groups were also active in the spheres 
of health care, education and water development This forced the AIM to take 
their educational efforts more seriously and resulted in the opening of the AIM 
girls' school in Kajiado Town in 1959. The Isinya Maasai Rural Training 
Centre sponsored by the National Christian Council of Kenya and the Anglican 
Diocese of Nairobi was started in 1961 (see Schlueter & Schlueter 1975:4). In 
fact by the beginning of the 1960s there was a scramble for areas of influence 
by Catholics and Protestants alike. However, education did not prove to be an 
effective way to make contact with the Maasai as they were not very 
interested. Hence, it has been argued by Voshaar, once a missionary himself, 
that early missionary development activities should 'not [be] seen as 
"missionary means" to conversion, but as a Christian contribution towards the 
amelioration of life' (Voshaar 1979:275). In any case the AIM had not made 
Christianity a popular religion among the Maasai. Traditional Maasai religion 
remained their mainstay. 
Let us tum to a review of the major economic development efforts and the 
state of the Kajiado District economy as these developed since World War Π 
until Independence in 1963. We have already dealt with the cultivation and 
tourism sectors concerning the use of land in Kajiado District and will 
therefore only deal with them here in brief. 
/. Livestock economy and development policy 
After World War II, as shown above, colonial economic development policy 
turned its attention with more vigour to the African areas without any major 
change in its overall conception of conservative pastoralists all of whom they 
believed wished to overstock their pastures at the cost of severely eroded 
plains. In Kajiado District, in addition to the Grazing Schemes, the 
Government tried to destock the area by introducting an organized outlet for 
Native poll tax was raised from Sh. 17/- in 1949 to Sh. 21/- by 1960. 
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Maasai cattle. It was intended to continue the bi-monthly auctions that had 
obtained during the war. 
Initially, Kajiado, Bissel and Mashuni were the three major locations for the 
official cattle auctions. Once in a while Loitokitok (Illasit) and Mile 46 were 
also included. In latter years other markets such as Merueshi and Namanga 
were opened. The Athi River factory of Liebig's Ltd., on a more regular basis, 
and the Magadi Soda Company, through an agent, were the main official 
buyers outside the auction circuit Finally, two outlets, Ngong and Illasit, could 
be used to market and export cattle from Kajiado District The latter had a 
cattle dip and became a legal outlet by as late as July 1955. 
At the end of World War II the Maasai said that they were not able to 
continue providing as many animals as they had done during the war years. 
Nevertheless, in 1946, they offered a considerable number. Partly in response 
to higher prices a total of 8,274 head were sold. This almost reached the 
reduced, but still compulsory, quota of 8,600 for 1946. The resistance to 
selling at public auctions will have partly come from the high off take ratios 
during the war years and the drought conditions which had reduced the Maasai 
herds of Kajiado District to a minimum level of an estimated 335,000 head of 
cattle. Nonetheless, at the same time 'it was evident that considerable numbers 
of bullocks were being illegally exported to the Kikuyu and Nairobi and to the 
Chagga country where prices up to twice and three times as great as those 
given by the Livestock Control were obtainable' (KDAR 1946:10). Up until 
the mid-1950s 'unofficial sales were estimated at about double the official 
sales and unofficial prices were about twenty percent higher than the official 
prices' (Campbell ШІкІІІ)?* 
Table 6.3 shows the amount of livestock sold and the average price paid at the 
official cattle auctions held in Kajiado District between 1947 and 1960. 
Although the data are incomplete and should be handled with great care, the 
principle events of the livestock marketing business in Kajiado District during 
the late 1940s, and the 1950s are reflected. Reliable data were not available for 
Ngong as it often included sales from Narok District. This and the resale of 
cattle bought at the Kajiado District auctions has been taken into account in the 
total official livestock trade for Kajiado District 
In 1947, compulsory sales were replaced by voluntary auctions resulting in a 
huge reduction in the number of animals offered. Despite a further increase in 
the average price from Sh. 56/- to Sh. 121/- by the end of the year, only 1,292 
head of cattle were voluntarily sold at these auctions. Another 1,632 had been 
produced in January as part of the 1946 compulsory quotas. 
The competition from Nairobi and Central Province was also felt by the Magadi Soda 
Company as the Loodokilani no longer wanted to provide the Company with their animals as done 
under the compulsory arrangements during wartime. Prices ofTered by the Company were far too 
low to purchase enough cattle. 
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Table 63 Kajiado District Cattle Sales and Average Price 1947-60 
YEAR Distila Other Ngong Hlasit Total Pnce Cattle 
Auction Official Outlet Outlet Legal Population 
Sale Offtake (Sh ) ©_ 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
Source· KUAHs 1Ш-19Ы), ballon 1%2; Bekure et al. 1Ш, Hrole 1967 
Note: * six months only, # Kajiado Distnct Livestock Census, @ author's estimate based on data 
from KDARs 1947-60. Prole 1967, Bekure et al. 1987 and White & Meadows 1981. 
The increase in cattle prices could not stop black-market trade. An increasing 
number of Maasai, mainly with some Kikuyu blood, became itinerant traders 
replacing the Somali who had been banned from these practices in the districL 
In trying to stop the illegal trade an Order was promulgated that stated that 
the new Meat Marketing Board was the sole official buyer and exporter of 
slaughter stock in the district Other traders had to obtain permission from the 
Board, before starting their business. These traders had to introduce an element 
of competition, but all stock purchased by them had to be resold to the Meat 
Marketing Board over scales with varying prices for distinct qualities at Athi 
River. This turned out to be un-profitable for most of the individual traders. 
Later in the year, after a request from the Maasai to allow outside traders to 
join the auctions, prices reached a peak making sales to the Meat Marketing 
Board and Liebig unprofitable. Most cattle were purchased by local traders. 
However, they were not allowed to export these animals from the district, 
despite a request from the District Commissioners of Central Province to relax 
this prohibition. The Veterinary Department stated that private trading between 
Maasai and other districts could not be allowed due to the incidence of pleuro­
pneumonia in Maasai cattle. 
In 1948 Kikuyu traders from Kiambu were allowed to attend the auction 
sales. After testing for pleuro-pneumonia at Ngong, the animals purchased 
could be transported out of the district. At three sales in April, 
August/September and November, 3,350 head of cattle were offered of which 
3,204 were sold. Over the year prices dropped from Sh. 102/- to Sh. 76/- due 
to the lack of grazing as a result of poor rains and an invasion of army worms 
which devoured most of the grass over half the district. The Meat Marketing 
Board, using the weight and grade system, purchased 2,152 head at these 
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auctions; Kikuyu traders bought 435; local traders 308; Sayed Omer & Bros, a 
company mainly acting as a buying agent for the Magadi Soda Company, 
obtained 309 head of cattle. At Loitokitok Chagga buyers from Tanganyika 
purchased some 316 animals. Liebig's Ltd. did not buy at the auctions but was 
able to purchase 3,708 head of cattle at their factory at Athi River offering an 
average price of Sh. 81/- slightly below the annual average of Sh. 86/- per 
head of cattle. In total the Maasai sold 7,228 animals for Sh. 627,070/- at these 
official markets in 1948. 
The following year a rinderpest epidemic prohibited the holding of sales 
during a long period of the year, owing to the Veterinary Department ban on 
the export of cattle from the district. Nevertheless, four auctions could be held 
at which 2,025 cattle were sold at an average price of Sh. 79/-. The principal 
buyers were Somali, Kikuyu and other African traders who purchased a total of 
1,291 head. The Meat Marketing Board was unable to compete with the prices 
offered by these traders and purchased only 606 head of somewhat inferior 
cattle. 'The sale of cattle direct to Liebig's at Athi River continued to be 
extremely popular and the Masai were very sorry to see the Company close 
down in September. During the period 1-1-1949 to 5-9-1949 a total of 4,913 
head were sold to Liebig's at an average price of Shs 85/73' (KDAR 1949:18). 
Another 400 head of cattle were sold at cattle auctions held in Ngong. 
A goat and sheep market was started in Ngong in October 1949. During the 
last two months of the year a total of 3,127 goats and sheep were sold. The 
total number of stock sold officially in the district during 1949 was therefore 
7,892 head of cattle and 3,127 sheep and goats. The Local Native Council 
received a total cess of only £605 from these sales. Cattle directly sold to 
Liebig' Ltd. as all cattle distributed illegally to Kikuyu and Chagga buyers 
were not levied. Had they been this would have provided an increase of 
approximately 400 per cent in cess revenues. 
In 1950 the Kenya Meat Commission (KMC) was established. It replaced the 
Meat Marketing Board and also took over the Liebig's Ltd. factory at Athi 
River. It was hoped that an expanding outlet could be established for the 
disposal of stock from the African pastoral areas. However, being a strictly 
commercial enterprise, the KMC applied a differential pricing policy. It sought 
to create a great margin between producer and consumer prices in order to 
offset its large capital and overhead costs. The outcome was a reduction of 
prices offered to African livestock producers. 
In 1950 the KMC bought only 750 head of cattle in Kajiado District By 
1951 this had dropped to only 76 head. The remaining official sales were 
purchased mainly by Somali, Kikuyu and Maasai traders offering much higher 
prices. For instance, while the KMC offered an average price of Sh. 94/- per 
head of cattle, the Chagga buyers at Illasit paid an average price of Sh. 216/-. 
Moreover, the lack of sufficient outlets resulted in large numbers of cattle 
being sold illegally to Kikuyu and Chagga buyers. Maasai traders acted as 
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middlemen by visiting the potential seller at home, saving the latter the trouble 
of trekking their animals to an authorised sale centre. This guaranteed a 
continuous flow of livestock, whereas official sales were very often cancelled 
due to the outbreak of livestock diseases. In 1952, for example, Kikuyu and 
Chagga official traders were no longer allowed to attend the auctions from 
August onwards as a result of Foot & Mouth disease. This meant a loss in 
competition and a severe drop in the average price of cattle. African livestock 
marketing facilities in Kenya had been neglected for many years in favour of 
the development of European marketing facilities. 
This lack of interest from the KMC caused much frustration among the 
Maasai and other African people. To overcome this, the African Livestock 
Marketing Organization (ALMO) was set up in mid-1952 to purchase stock 
directly from Africans, to encourage local cattle sales, particularly for local 
consumption and to employ licensed traders, under controls, to buy in the more 
remote districts' (see Swynnerton 1955:31). Initially ALMO succeeded in 
obtaining a reasonable share of approximately 30 to 40 percent of the official 
auction sales. However, by 1956 their share had dropped to only some 10 per 
cent 'ALMO proved no more successful than had been KMC in competing 
with private traders in the African areas. Two livestock marketing systems 
emerged, with private traders purchasing African stock on-the-hoof, and KMC 
buying the stock of Europeans at controlled prices, paying producers on a 
quality and dressed-weight basis' (Evangelou 1984:44). 
A drought which had hit the district hard in 1953, increased the need for 
markets. Constant propaganda to the Maasai that they should destock their area 
was not matched with deeds at the time that it was the most vital to act. This 
made the illegal trade even more popular among Maasai as far away as Narok. 
Even Kamba sent their cattle to lllasit Approximately 4,000 head of cattle 
followed this Tanganyika route. By 1954 the figure was estimated to be at least 
6,000. 
Throughout the 1950s the competition from individual traders, legal or 
illegal, was too strong for the KMC. 
'The price paid for Masai cattle by the monopolistic Kenya Meat 
Commission is still in the order of one-half of what is generally paid for 
comparable Masai cattle in Tanganyika. (...) there has flourished for years 
now an illegal market trade across the border, to which many Kajiado 
Administrators have deliberately turned a blind eye because it is an 
important source from which Masai can secure monies to pay their poll 
tax, as well as relief overstocking, in the absence of adequate or fair 
marketing conditions in their district' (Jacobs 1963:71). 
Nonetheless, to canalise and control at least part of this illegal trade Dlasit was 
made an official outlet by July 1955. Moreover, cess income for the Kajiado 
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District Council was an important source to finance several development 
projects. Sales were held weekly and the average prices paid were Sh. 195/- in 
comparison to Sh. 127/- being the average official auction price paid for cattle. 
'Estimating the number sold illegally to Chagga in the first 6 months of the 
year at 3,500 and a similar number sold throughout the year along the border 
from Loitokitok to Shombole, we get a total of 19,876 which is within sight of 
the 1956 target of 25,000' (KDAR 1955:16). To relieve pressure on Illasit, 
Namanga was made a third outlet 
In the latter half of the 1950s total cattle sales from Kajiado District were 
estimated to be approximately 50,000 head of cattle per year. Only 1959 
showed a drop to 30,000 total cattle sales due to the closure of the sale yards 
during the first months of the year because of F&M and Pleura Pneumonia 
quarantine regulations. At the official sale yards, including Kisamis from 1959 
onwards, only some 14,000 animals were marketed. This seriously affected the 
finances of the African District and Section Councils who derived much of 
their revenue from auction fees of Sh. 2/- per animal sold. 
But worse was still to come. In 1960 the rains failed totally resulting in the 
most severe drought in the previous 25 years. 'By roadsides in all parts of the 
District can be seen skeletons of dead beasts and recently a complaint was 
received from a fanner at Sultan Hamud asking that the carcases should be 
buried as there were so many [that] even the hyena, jackals and vultures were 
not able to eat [them] fast enough' (KDAR 1960:14/5). Various estimates 
concerning the number of cattle deaths range from 300,000 (Fallon 1962) to 
400,000 (Jacobs 1980) or 65-80 per cent of the pre-drought herd size. Famine 
was widespread. 'More than six million pounds of posho and over one half 
million pounds of dried milk, as well as edible oil, meat powder, vitamins and 
other foods were distributed to Kajiado Masai free of charge during the 16-
month period from February 1, 1961 to June 1, 1962' (Fallon 1962:9). Other 
districts in Kenya were also suffering from the drought. In total an estimated 
450,000 people, of whom 38,000 Kajiado Maasai, received food aid. 
Cattle sales were cancelled in most areas for three quarters of the year 
because of the still prevalent diseases mentioned above as well as outbreaks of 
malignant catarrh and localized trypanosomiasis. Tax collections were poor 
and, as a result, many development schemes had to be postponed. Because 
Tanganyika also suffered from drought conditions the market to dispose of 
livestock was rather limited. Alternatives were sought without success, in the 
Kikuyu region. According to Fallon the Maasai were also to be blamed. "The 
Masai had waited too long. Little demand existed for animals in a starved 
condition. At the Namanga sale only 2 buyers appeared although the sale had 
been publicized days in advance. They bought less than 25 animals at an 
average price of shs 60/= each from the more than 300 offered' (Fallon 
1962:3). 
On the other hand Jacobs, at the time conducting his research among 
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Tanganyika and Kenya Maasai, informs us that 
'the Kenya Meat Commission was paying on the average of Sh. 30/- for 
premortal Masai beasts (of which Sh. 20/- could be recovered from the 
sale of their hides alone), but only accepting about one hundred beasts 
per month at the Athi River Factory because they were not equipped to 
handle more. Yet I was told, in no special confidence, by a well-known 
employee and buyer for Tanganyika Packers in Arusha, that a request 
from them for permission to buy cattle in Kajiado District at this time, at 
approximately Sh. 90/- to Sh. 120/- per beast, was refused - allegedly on 
the grounds that Tanganyika Packers would flood the world market with 
Masai tinned beef at a time when the Kenya Meat Commission was first 
attempting to expand into this market It was also said that Masai of 
Kajiado would have profited by an estimated £500,000 at this time if 
permission to buy had been given' (Jacobs 1963:72). 
Indeed, if we take into account the inadequate official marketing facilities 
and/or prices in combination with the prohibition from importing high quality 
Boran stock to improve the Maasai herds, which was only relaxed in 1961, it 
is a rather onesided if not inaccurate statement to suggest that the "enormous" 
quantity and "poor" quality of Maasai cattle should be considered to be 
primarily responsible for the 1960/61 disaster. 
The KMC was mainly interested in first grade cattle from the European 
areas for fresh meat production as, until 1958 when the canning plant at Athi 
River was opened, it was not able to deal with tinned meat as the Tanganyika 
Packers Ltd. were able to already for a long time. 'Masai have been restricted 
from selling cattle on a truly competitive open-market and, like keen 
businessmen everywhere, the only reason which has prevented them from 
selling more cattle than indeed they do has been the lack of what they consider 
fair prices' (Jacobs 1963:70). 
Heavy rains finally came by November 1961 and the land once again 
became a vivid green. By mid 1962 the number of destitutes had dropped to 
some 10,000 people. Food-for-Work projects were initiated such as the 
repairing of roads and dams and the clearing of bush. But it was not until 1965 
that all of them had fully recovered from the 1960/61 disaster. 
The export of hides and skins, which had almost come to a standstill during 
the war years increased sharply thereafter. 'The buying of hides and skins by 
the Bata Shoe Co. at Loitokitok has been a great success. The excellent prices 
paid by this firm have caused a general rise in prices paid by Indian traders in 
the area' (KDAR 1950:18). In 1947 4,044 hides and 1.356 skins were officially 
exported. By 1953 no less than 20,982 hides and 17,785 skins were transported 
from Kajiado District An estimated extra 20 per cent left the district illegally 
in order to avoid the payment of a cess of 75 cents per hide and 25 cents per 
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skin to the Kajiado African District Council. Despite the posting of 12 
instructors sent out to teach the Maasai the principles of suspension drying and 
the correct way of flaying and cleaning hides, no noticeable improvement in 
the quality of the product was achieved. Nonetheless, some success was 
achieved in organizing the hide and skin trade. Traders were obliged to have 
suitable hide stores and the clerical ability to maintain detailed records of all 
transactions. In 1956 new hide drying bandas were built. 
In accordance with the periods of starvation among cattle the number of 
officially exported hides and skins fluctuated between some 10,000 to 20,000 
during the 1950s. By 1959, as a result of the drought, a record number of 
35,380 skins and 23,682 hides were marketed. For 1960 these figures stood at 
28,399 skins and 31,671 hides. Prices received were as low as Sh. 5/- to Sh. 
7/- per hide. 
2. Veterinary assistance 
After World War Π veterinary activities in Kajiado District were improved by 
the establishment of 7 centres spread over the area. Contagious Bovine Pleuro 
Pneumonia (CBPP), East Coast Fever (ECF) and Rinderpest were the main 
diseases by the late 1940s. Appearance of the latter was in fact caused by a 
mistake made by the Veterinary Department They had inoculated Maasai 
cattle with a faulty vaccine. As a result, approximately 10,000 cattle, mainly 
belonging to Kaputiei Maasai, died in 1949. 
In the early 1950s quarantine regulations were still in force in about 6 areas 
of Kajiado District because of CBPP. The whole of the district was placed 
under quarantine in 1952 due to an outbreak of Foot & Mouth disease. In 1953 
the Rombo and Loitokitok areas suffered from ECF resulting in livestock 
losses as high as 75 per cent. With a newly developed vaccine to attack CBPP 
an inoculation scheme was launched in June 1957 with the object of 
eradicating the disease throughout the district. Unfortunately, the stock in the 
Loitokitok area reacted badly and hundreds of cattle died. Other areas did not 
suffer from this but, by the end of 1959, CBPP was showing itself again. The 
weakened situation gave several other diseases a chance. By May 1960 all 
Veterinary staff were concentrated along the Machakos border, not in order to 
protect Maasai cattle but to protect those belonging to the European farmers in 
the settled areas. The annual rinderpest campaign had to be curtailed and cattle 
sales were suspended for six months. 
By 1960 three dips (Illasit, Konza, Kajiado) were available to prevent tick-
bome diseases, a fourth being constructed in Loitokitok. The Kajiado township 
dip was used by about 600 head a week, most of the animals belonging to the 
school farm and local ranchers. 
3. Water development 
Water development was initially still an activity mainly undertaken by the 
Kajiado Local Native Council. A new Township water supply was installed for 
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Kajiado Town in 1947. The next year £3,000 was provided to (partly) cover 
the costs of the drilling of S new boreholes for as many sections. Two 
boreholes in favour of school farms were financed by the DARÀ. Three 
sections produced the finances for a borehole themselves. 'It has become 
increasingly evident that the Masai themselves are anxious to play their part in 
this programme. During the year, and a very hard year at that, over £300 was 
collected by voluntary contribution and deposited with the District 
Commissioner for the construction of various water supplies' (KDAR 
1949:14). Unfortunately the results of the boreholes drilled were disappointing. 
Of the five LNC boreholes three were complete failures and the other two 
produced only small quantities. The two school boreholes were successful, but 
of the three private Maasai boreholes only one turned out to be productive. 
In spite of these difficulties new plans were made for the drilling of 20 
boreholes to be financed by a DARÀ grant. A proposal to collect money for 
the maintenance of the LNC boreholes was, after an earlier rejection accepted 
by 1949 and a Sh. 6/- Maintenance of Water Supplies Rate, as part of the 
annual Native Council taxation, was introduced in 1950. Recurrent expenditure 
for Water supplies was £2,366 in 1951 rising to £6,824 by 1955. 
In 1950 the African Settlement Board had provided additional DARÀ funds 
for the establishment of a Dam Construction Unit, with the object of showing 
the Maasai how to make earth dams for themselves using their own labour and 
oxen. In the first year a total of 8 dams was constructed, in Kaputiei, 
Matapalo, Konza and Kajiado, with the help of 60 Maasai ilmurran and 56 
oxen trained to draw scoops. Only two dams had water by the end of the year 
but in later years more dams were built 
Another way for the Maasai to obtain water was by agreements made with 
companies which applied for mining concessions in Kajiado District As a 
result 2 boreholes were drilled in the Sultan Hamud area. The Magadi Soda 
Company, having obtained approval for the construction of a 200,000 gallons 
per day pipeline from the Oloibortoto River on the Nguruman Escarpment to 
their factory at Magadi, agreed to provide 10,000 gallons of water a day to the 
Loodokilani living along the pipeline. This arrangement was also made with 
the Railway Company who constructed a 100 km pipeline from Noolturesh 
near Loitokitok to supply a 3,000,000 gallons reservoir near the main railway 
line at Sultan Hamud. Along the new pipeline, completed by 1956 and 
transporting 500,000 gallons a day, 5 take-off points were created for the 
Maasai providing 50,000 gallons a day. By 1960 38 boreholes and over 50 
dams were operating in Kajiado District belonging either to the African District 
Council, the Central Government or to individual Maasai. 
4. Education 
Other fields of development in the period before Independence were education, 
health and infrastructure. As compared to the pre-war years some progress was 
made, but it should be realized that, compared to other districts, the Maasai 
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were in a less favourable position. 
In 1946 Kajiado District had five Government primary schools in Kajiado, 
Loitokitok, Mashuru, Bissel and Oloyiangalanì, plus two missionary schools at 
Ngong. The Kajiado and Loitokitok Secondary schools had long been closed 
due to insufficient pupils. In 1945 the first two Maasai students at Makerere 
University pleaded for the use of sanctions, if needed, to bring about social 
change through education. One of their proposals was to enrol girls in the 
schools. In 1948 there were only 15 girls as opposed to 279 boys on the school 
registers and a total of 11 teachers. The quota system was still in use.25 
According to the District Annual Report of 1948 education remained 
unpopular with the bulk of the Maasai primarily because of the 'necessity for 
the mother and a sufficient number of cattle to accompany the child to school, 
but others maintained that it was merely because children were wanted for 
herding' (KDAR 1948:18). An attempt had been made to overcome a former 
important complaint, concerning the non-relevant curriculum used in the 
schools. It was stated that education 'paid no attention to the priority of cattle 
in Maasai life, and did not attempt to inspire any reforms in land use or animal 
husbandly' (King 1970:226). However, the emphasis of training Maasai youths 
to become veterinary officers was not appreciated either. 
By 1949 a primary boarding school was opened at Kajiado. This turned out 
to be a success as there was no longer a need to send a wife and cattle to the 
schools to accompany a child. The Maasai asked for all the other out-schools 
to be turned into boarding schools. The Kajiado Intermediate School was 
opened in 1953 with 36 pupils in Standard V. The following year the school 
totalled 104 boys and 14 girls, 80 per cent being pure Maasai.26 School fees 
were raised to Sh. 80/- in 1954 covering approximately 20 per cent of the 
recurrent expenditure for boarding schools. By 1957 the District Education 
Board schools numbered 442 boys and 104 girls. The Kajiado Government 
school had 153 (primary) pupils. That same year two Intermediate Schools 
were opened in the Ngong area, one under PCEA and the other under the 
(Catholic) Holy Ghost mission. The AIM Girls' school at Kajiado made the 
most spectacular progress. The school started in May 1959 with 53 girls and a 
year later had 150 pupils, mostly from nomadic homes. A primary school was 
opened at Mile 46. By 1959 Kajiado District had 15 primary and 4 
intermediate schools. 
Still, school attendere as a percentage of school-age youth would only have 
been in the order of 5 to 10 per cent. In addition, the number of drop-outs, 
especially among girls, was very high. Moreover, it should be realized that the 
The quota settled, however, was very low. For example the Loitokitok Section, with some 
2,500 school-age children by 1959, was supposed to send only 27 pupils every year. 
26
 Intermediate schools included standards V to Ш. Until 1966 they acted as an 
intermediate between the 4 years primary and the secondary schools. 
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increase in schools and pupils was partly the result of the influx of non-Maasai 
into the distnct. For example, out of the 15 primary schools in Kajiado by 
1959, 8 were located at Ngong and almost exclusively used by the agricultural 
Kikuyu. The wind of change that swept through the district in the beginning of 
the 1960s resulted in greater emphasis being laid on the efforts to increase 
literacy among the Maasai. Plans were made to raise the number of schools in 
the District to 41 by 1963. 'Of these, board day primary schools for the 
pastoral Masai are expected to be built at the rate of four in 1961, three in 
1962 and two in 1963. The other schools are for the more static agricultural 
groups who are very keen on education' (EAS 28/08/59). The Maasai realized 
that they had been placed in a disadvantaged position and had to change as 
quickly as possible. 
Education received a big impulse from the arrival of more missionary 
societies. The Mill Hill Mission took over from the Holy Ghost Mission and 
promoted three new schools in the Kisonko and Kajiado areas. Loitokitok and 
Bissel opened an Intermediate School in 1960. 'Desertion by pupils from 
intermediate schools has also become a rarity and almost all pupils now show 
determination to finish the school course' (KDAR 1960:26). Despite the 
intentions to increase the number of primary schools to 41, only 22 
Government aided schools, nine of them being intermediate, were available by 
1963. The number of pupils, however, had increased to just under 3,000 or 
approximately 15 per cent of the eligible age group of 7-15 year olds (see 
Gorham 1977:5). Again, children of agricultural groups like the Kikuyu and 
Kamba and young Maasai of mixed parents were mainly responsible for this 
expansion. 'In 1965, for instance, it was noted with concern that the recently 
established AIM girls' boarding school at Kajiado had changed to being non-
Maasai' (King 1970:229). 
Also the geographical distribution of these 22 schools favoured the non-
Maasai population of Kajiado District. Ngong Division was served by 9 
schools, Loitokitok by 6 and the remaining 7 were located in Central Division. 
Moreover, most schools were present in the small, non-Maasai dominated, 
towns of the District. Sections like the Loodokilani, Dalalekutuk, Ildamat and 
Purko had no primary school at all. 'Clearly then, in 1963, the majority of 
Kajiado District schools were located either in areas where there were very few 
Maasai at all (i.e. Township) or in those rural parts of the district where 
Maasai were well outnumbered by other ethnic groups' (Gorham 1977:9). 
Finally, mention should be made of the start of two adult literacy classes at 
Ngong and Kajiado in 1960. 
5. Health 
By 1948 the Kajiado District Health sector was made up of two hospitals at 
Kajiado and Magadi, and 3 dispensaries at Namanga, Mashuru and Loitokitok. 
By 1960 the number of dispensaries had increased to 7 (Namanga, Mashuru, 
Shompole, Bissel, Euaso Kedong', Meto and Zebra (near Amboseli National 
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Park) and Health Centres present in Mashuru, Loitokitok, Ngong and Bissel. A 
mobile unit was also operative in the District 
6. Infrastructure 
In 1948 the Kajiado-Namanga track was resurveyed in preparation for 
rebuilding and tarmac surfacing of the Athi river-Namanga road. Funds from 
DARÀ were provided for road improvement in the district Still, by the 
beginning of the 1960s large parts of Kajiado District were almost inaccessible 
to motorized transport Air transport to Loitokitok became possible in 19S4. 
Buildings constructed were mainly for educational, medical and administrative 
purposes. 
In addition an "Improved Housing Scheme" costing £200,000 was started in 
1953. Птиггап were often used as labourers for the Public Works Department 
Courses were once in a while held in instructing the llmurran in animal 
husbandry, hygiene and Government affairs. Most importantly attempts were 
made through these contacts to control the Maasai warriors as they were often 
engaged in raiding the stocks of neighbouring groups. In 1948 a special 
¡Imurran-Ofñctr was appointed to deal with these issues. Discussions over the 
abolision of the Emurrano System and/or a reduction in the warrior period 
continued all through the years now under review. 
7. Cultivation 
Agricultural activities in Kajiado District fluctuated over the years as a result 
of land use legislation, weather conditions and the availability of non-Maasai 
labour. This last had been affected by the Emergency and by the resultant 
immigration restrictions (see section 5.5.4). As far as the Kajiado Kikuyu are 
concerned it should be noted that eviction was mainly a measure to control and 
destroy the Mau Mau movement rather than to safeguard the Maasai grazing 
grounds. The Government and individual Maasai alike welcomed the increase 
of agricultural activities. For example, during the drought of 1953 the eastern 
portion of the district had obtained maizemeal produced at the gardens located 
near Loitokitok along the Tanganyika border. The rest of the district had to 
rely on maize released by the Nairobi controller. So "absentee landlordism" 
with Chagga, Kamba, Kikuyu and Sonjo wives and/or labourers working for 
the Maasai remained the primary arrangement in most areas. 
Irrigated agriculture which had come to Kimana, Sinnet and Rombo parts of 
the Loitokitok area was initiated by Maasai with mixed blood and by illegal 
non-Maasai cultivators. In the Ngong area, even under the difficult conditions 
of the mid-1950s, 3,299 bags of maize and 4,635 bags of potatoes could be 
exported to the Nairobi markets by 1955. That same year a District 
Agricultural Committee was gazetted. Loans for farm improvement were 
provided to some Maasai cultivators. Cash crops made their appearance in 
Ngong by 1961 when 20 acres came under pyrethrum and another 19 acres 
were planted with coffee. Some fanners' co-operatives were started in that 
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same year (see Muranja 1973/74:59). Irrigated agriculture at Nguruman by 
Sonjo and Maasai was slightly expanded. 
8. Wildlife and Tourism 
The abundant availability of wildlife sharing the Maasai pastures started to 
become a major source of revenue for the local Administration through the 
licensing of controlled hunting parties and the development of a tourist 
industry. '130 hunting parties, of which 30 came to shoot birds only or to 
photograph, entered the district in 1953 and accounted for 4 lion, 1 leopard and 
202 'hoofed' game for which the African District Council received revenue of 
Shs 2,300/-' (KDAR 1953:16). Furthermore, the 50 acre Ol Tukai Camp Site 
in the Amboseli Reserve was leased to Kenya National Parks who administered 
the Reserve. A proportion of the entrance fees and accommodation charges 
was also to benefit the District Council. 
During the 1950s the number of visitors to Amboseli Game Reserve had 
risen from less than 1,000 by 1952 to just over 10,000 by 1962. The transfer of 
the Amboseli Game Reserve and the difficulties of collecting taxes during the 
drought of the early 1960s suddenly made tourism the foremost supplier of 
revenue for the Kajiado District Council. 
9. Mining 
In the late 1940s, the Local Native Council agreed to some land concessions 
requested by companies in various parts of the District (e.g. near Sultan 
Hamud and near Elang'ata Wuas). Most of the enterprises were seeking 
magnesium free limestone for the manufacture of cement. Other concessions 
included the KMQ area near Mile 38 (Magadi Line) (176 acres), a Military 
Camp near Athi River (600 acres), a tourist rest camp near Loitokitok (2 acres) 
as well as fuel (charcoal) and sand concessions for Indian traders, KMQ and 
the Magadi Soda Company. 
The decade following the war saw business increasing steadily for the 
Magadi Soda Company. In 1948 it produced 116,350 tons of soda ash which, 
in cash terms made this the third most important Kenyan export During the 
1950s total production had risen to 182,500 tons by 1959. South Africa, India, 
New Zealand and the Belgian Congo were among the main importers of 
Magadi Soda Ash. Other products made by the Magadi Soda Company were 
salt, household soda and cattle salt. 
KMQ's production of limestone, chips and marble rose from some 3,700 
tons in 1952 to 5,000 tons by 1957. Over this period the number of labourers 
increased from 103 to 155. Towards Independence KMQ's production and 
labour force declined to the level of the early 1950s. 
After years of standstill the East Africa Portland Cement Company took 
over the dormant Sultan Hamud limestone project. A total of 900 acres located 
in the Kibini Hill limestone area were leased to the company. A branch railway 
line was laid to Sultan Hamud in 1955 as the production of cement was to take 
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place at Athi River. By 1959 production was started. Over 80,000 tons of 
limestone were extracted. 
Indian traders exploited sand taken at various centres from rivers adjacent to 
the Mombasa Railway Line for building and other construction work in 
Nairobi. A parallel trade in boma manure also existed and most of the sand 
exporters also exported manure. Royalties had to be paid to the Local Native 
Council. In 1949 55,000 tons of sand and 7,300 tons of manure were exported 
from the district Royalties paid per ton were 50 cents and Sh. 1/-, respectively. 
Wood fuel royalties, at Sh. 21- per ton, stood at £1,680 for 16,800 tons of 
fuel. This resulted mainly from the concession granted to the Magadi Soda 
Company to cut trees in the area between the Euaso Ng'iro River and the 
Nguruman Escarpment 
In 1952 the export of manure came to a standstill owing to the ban on its 
movement caused by Foot & Mouth disease. This lasted until 1955. Sand and 
wood fuel continued to leave the district and a total of 54,876 tons exported 
brought in £4,860 revenue to the African District Council. In latter years, with 
slightly raised royalty rates, revenues for the ADC from these sand, manure 
and wood fuel concessions ranged between £4,000 and £6,000 annually. 
10. Trade 
Imports into Kajiado District of mainly sugar, maizemeal and cotton piece 
goods, remained firmly in the hands of Indian and Somali traders, despite the 
establishment of the Kajiado Joint Loans Board in 1956 for the purpose of 
issuing and administering loans of between £50 and £100, to selected African 
traders. In 1955 Somali traders had tried to obtain import licences for goats but 
their attempts were unsuccessful. In an attempt to get Maasai traders 
established in areas free from competition by Indians and Somali, markets 
were set up where no plot rents were payable and only an ADC licence of Sh. 
15/- was required. A few cashed in on this, "renting" their plots to alien 
traders. By the end of the 1950s more Maasai had applied for loans to venture 
into local business, mainly livestock trading. 
6.4 Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter we focused our attention on the Maasai economy and its 
development since the late 19th century until 1963, the year Kenya gained 
Independence. We also reviewed the development policy conducted by the 
former British colonizers in Kenya and Maasailand in particular and we looked 
at three distinct periods. 
In the first period 1895-1919, the Colonial Administration tried to stimulate the 
European settler economy by every possible means. Huge tracts of land were 
offered at low prices and concessions granted to The Maasai, whose economy 
was in disarray due to the 1890/91 outbreak of rinderpest and smallpox and 
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who had lost their best grazing areas. As a strategy of survival some Maasai 
settled in the fertile Ngong and Loitokitok areas and commenced cultivation. 
This move was warmly welcomed by an Administration striving to hold back 
"the pernicious pastoral proclivities" and encourage peasant agriculture as a 
first step towards "civilized" forms of land tenure and usage. 
However, this switch was only of a temporary nature as by the beginning of 
the 20th century Maasai herds had recovered and nomadic pastoralism became 
the mainstay for all of the Maasai once again. This building up of the herds 
again had been actively speeded up by young Maasai ilmurran involvement in 
raiding expeditions undertaken by British against other African groups. In 
return for their assistance they received a share of the loot A negative aspect 
of British pressure was the declaration of quarantine regulations in 1917 to 
protect the settlers' livestock industry. This put an end to the Maasai tradition 
of selective breeding using Boran bulls from Samburu and Somalia. 
Within the Maasai territory the colonial development policy was mainly 
directed at the "pacification" of the population and to maintaining law and 
order. For this purpose heavy fines were levied now and then upon the Maasai. 
Some minor projects were funded from the proceeds. Another interest was the 
supply of Maasai cattle to newly arriving settlers. Only towards the end of 
World War I were the first plans formulated to raise the productivity of these 
areas. 
By this time colonial officials considered the Maasai to be among the 
richest peoples in the world, their owning some 600,000 cattle, 2 million 
smallstock and 10,000 donkeys. Taxation was proposed but difficult to employ. 
Understaffed departments meant that the assistance offered was restricted to 
some small attempts in the commercialization of ghee for instance, in offering 
veterinary care to intensify the cattle farming and in various constructions such 
as irrigation works to diversify the Maasai economy. 
A second distinct period is the 1920-1945 timespan. The Kenyan economy 
went through a series of rises and falls in its economy and in some years 
several settlers were forced to abandon their fanning enterprises. Economic 
activities in Kajiado District suffered less from these developments as, since 
the early 1920s, the Maasai had become even more restricted from trading 
livestock in order to protect European sales. Moreover, settlers demand for 
cattle had been fulfilled by this time. Maasai did have problems, though, as 
livestock diseases killed many animals by the early 1920s. 
Education (opening of the Government school in 1927 in Kajiado Town), 
the provision of water (e.g. borehole construction near Simba, earth dam near 
Oloyiangalani, troughs and tanks along stock routes) and veterinary care 
(inoculation and experimental crossbreeding), were the most important efforts 
to develop the Maasai of Kajiado District by the middle and late 1920s. The 
Maasai often openly asked for this kind of assistance but frequently without 
success. The funds for these kind of projects were, in fact, provided by the 
Chapter б: Рте-Independence History of the Economy and of Development Policy 261 
Maasai themselves. Being the highest taxed group in the country, the Colonial 
Government received three to five times as much money than it actually used 
for (development and recurrent) expenditure in the area. Increased interest in 
the Maasai had been the result of the 1923 declaration of the "Dual Policy"; 
European and African areas should develop alongside one another. 
Disagreement appeared to exist, however, between the kind of development 
needed in the Maasai reserve; meat or dairy-oriented. A major problem for the 
first option which had the support of the Department of Livestock, was the 
lack of a meat-canning factory. Thus the second option, promoted by the 
Department of Agriculture, was adopted and attention was concentrated on the 
processing of ghee. After some successful years the production of ghee 
collapsed due to the 1929 drought and by 1932 all dairies had been closed. The 
trade in hides and skins was more successful but also came to a standstill by 
the 1940s. Other measures initiated by the Colonial Government interfered 
with Maasai customs and pastoral economic practices (e.g. the attempt to 
abolish the ilmurran system and heavy stock fines). 
The most important for the Maasai was the trade in livestock. Some 
livestock auctions organized by the late 1920s failed, because of the low prices 
offered and because of quarantine restrictions. After eradicating livestock 
diseases and establishing more livestock outlets (e.g. Loitokitok for sale to 
Tanganyika) prices increased slightly. This increase was brought to a standstill 
as a result of the 1933 drought. The Colonial Administration blamed the 
Maasai for having too many animals. The Maasai responded by reminding that 
they had lost large tracts of their best grazing pastures. The Maasai gained 
support from an official report stating that some 40 per cent of the Maasai 
pastures were now useless, either due to the presence of livestock diseases or 
as a result of lack of water. 
By 1937 the Liebig's meat processing factory was in production in Athi 
River. Though started under favourable conditions the Company could not 
compete with individual traders due to the too low prices (25-50 per cent of 
private trader's prices) offered. Illegal trade to Ngong and Tanganyika by 
contrast was flourishing. 
The Maasai contributed to the finances of the Colonial Administration by 
giving "donations" of cattle during World War II. Alternately Narok and 
Kajiado District provided some 2,000 cattle at fixed prices every month. 
Though the price was fair the Government made a huge profit from this 
arrangement. During the war Kajiado District supplied between 10,000 to 
13,000 head of cattle annually, or almost 60,000 in total. 
Developments in other sectors of the district's economy (e.g. mining and 
cultivation) showed that the Magadi Soda Company suffered from the collapse 
in the world economy in the 1930s. Production and employment fell 
significantly for non-Maasai in the main. Cultivation was of minor importance. 
In 1931 an area of less than 1,000 acres was under the plough in the whole of 
the Maasai Reserve. During the 1930s and 1940s it remained an activity 
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mainly performed by Maasai stricken by drought and by immigrants. Trade 
was in the hands of Indians and Somali. 
The third period 1946-1963, is foremost characterized by an increased 
concentration of interest in the African areas. This commenced after World 
War II at the instigation of the British Government, at least partly to benefit 
the British economy and to replace the laissez-fair attitude by an approach 
oriented at a kind of planned economic development. Special agencies were 
created to produce and implement a 1946-55 Ten Year Development Plan. 
Veterinary assistance, hides and skins drying training, livestock marketing 
organizations, education and water development (e.g. boreholes and dams) 
were some of the major projects implemented. The scope and volume of the 
Provincial Administration changed from one of only collecting taxes and 
maintaining law and order into a more active one. This process was speeded up 
as a result of growing tension among agricultural groups (mainly Kikuyu). 
Over the years the revenues collected in Kajiado District had been 
approximately twice that of the expenditure. By 1953 this situation had 
changed as a result of a threefold increase from 1949 to 1953 (Sh. 250,000/-). 
Emergency measures and development funds were the main causes of this rise. 
Revenue from taxation rose to some Sh. 200,000/-. In addition, the Local 
Native Councils had become involved in development-oriented projects (water, 
education, health and infrastructural developments mainly) averaging some Sh. 
300,000/- annually. Finances were derived from a Local Native Council tax, 
fees, fines, grants and sand, wood and limestone royalties. The Maasai 
continued to be the highest taxed group in Kenya. 
Finally mention should be made of missionary activities that had gained in 
importance by the end of the 1950s. Most of their efforts were in the field of 
education, health care and water development. 
The Maasai pastoral economy in the post-war period was characterized by both 
an initial drop in livestock numbers to some 335,000 head of cattle and an 
increased (legal) off-take, partly in response to increased livestock prices. Until 
the mid-1950s black market sales (to Nairobi, Central Province and 
Tanganyika in particular) doubled official sales with the former receiving 
prices some 20 per cent higher than the latter. Auctions organized on a 
voluntary basis were a failure even after when official livestock prices were 
raised. The prohibition of private trading between districts, only relaxed in 
1961, also made buying cattle at official auctions unattractive. Liebig's also ran 
into trouble and closed down in 1949. The next year the Kenya Meat 
Commission (KMC) was established which took over the Liebig's factory. 
Now official producer prices became even less lucrative with private traders 
paying more than double the KMC prices. Illegal trade towards Tanganyika via 
Illasit became very popular. Kajiado Administrators were said to have 
prolonged this practice deliberately as it was an important source of money for 
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the Maasai and therefore by way of taxes also for the Administration. Still, by 
195S niasit was made an official outlet and official sales increased 
dramatically to some 25,000 annually. 
By 1960 the Maasai livestock economy had collapsed as result of a severe 
drought Livestock numbers had decreased by some 65-80 per cent Food aid 
had had to be provided to some half of the Kajiado District population. The 
KMC was paying very low prices and could not handle the huge numbers of 
cattle offered. Outside assistance from Tanganyika was refused for commercial 
and strategic reasons. As with the cattle sales the marketing of hides and skins 
increased sharply in the mid-1950s. 
Cultivation in Kajiado District fluctuated over the years as a result of land 
use legislation, weather conditions and the legal or illegal availability of non-
Maasai labour. Irrigated agriculture was started in the Loitokitok locations of 
Kimana, Sinnet and Rombo. In the Ngong area some cash crops such as coffee 
and pyrethrum were introduced and also tourism gained importance. Within a 
decade the number of visitors to the Amboseli Game Reserve had increased 
tenfold, making tourism the main source of revenue for the Kajiado County 
Council. The mining of limestone, marble and soda ash all increased 
considerably. In the next chapter the creation, performance and subdivision of 
group ranches will be discussed. 
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Figure 7.1 Kajiado District Group Ranches 
CHAPTER 7 
KAJIADO GROUP RANCHES: CREATION, 
PERFORMANCE AND SUBDIVISION 
7.1 Introduction 
In chapter 5 we outlined the history of land use and land use policy in colonial 
Kenya and the position of the Maasai pastoralists in this respect. In chapter 2, 
we had already highlighted the Kenyan land issue in the humid and semi-
humid areas. We concluded that a huge shortage of land, partly the result of a 
large population, but even more due to an unequal distribution of land among 
the population of this zone had pushed farmers away to the best agricultural 
areas within the semi-arid zones of Kenya. As a result, and in addition to the 
natural growth of the pastoral population, competition about land in the dry 
regions of Kenya increased. 
In the following an analysis of post-colonial land policy and the state of 
affairs in Kajiado District will be presented. Pressure on ranging land in 
Kajiado District shows itself mainly by way of loss of pastures to other land 
use activities such as cultivation and National Parks and through a process of 
privatization and individualization of land use and ownership. The growing 
importance of agriculture and immigration to the relatively high-potential zones 
of Kajiado District and of wildlife conservation activities have been intensively 
studied by Campbell (1979a. 1981b), Muranja (1973/74), UNDP/FAO (1978), 
Western (1982a) and Ecosystems (1982). 
In the last section of this chapter an updated overview of these developments 
will be presented. First and foremost, however, we will address ourselves to 
the creation, performance and, most specifically, to the process of the 
subdivision of group ranches into small individual ranches in Kajiado District. 
This is the most hotly debated item in Kajiado District today. 
72 The Creation of Group Ranches in Kajiado District 
7.2.1 Diminishing Opportunities for Nomadic Pastoralism Around 
Independence 
We ended our description of land use in the late colonial period in Kajiado 
District by concluding that a process of setting aside individual ranches had 
started by the early 1950s, and this had resulted in the creation of 24 individual 
ranches by 1963. This development had worried Colonial Government officials, 
because they feared a land grab by rich, influential and educated Maasai at the 
expense of the majority of the Maasai people. Still, as the Administration 
favoured an eventual transition to freehold land tenure, it declined to register 
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the Kaputiei section as one unit having one title deed as had been proposed by 
the newly created Kaputiei Development Committee. With the consent of the 
Kaputiei senior elders this committee had been formed by a few formally 
educated members of both junior elders and senior warriors. According to 
Hedlund (1979:31) the one title deed option was rejected by the colonial 
authorities 'as it would only preserve the present economic structure and 
circumscribe expected commercial changes'. Not surprisingly, a new proposal 
made by a few members of the Kaputiei Development Committee to allocate a 
limited number of private ranches was accepted by the Authorities. However, 
elderly Maasai were opposed to the creation of individual ranches, thought to 
be too small and not viable. 
Those in favour of individual tenure mentioned the possibility of forming a 
buffer of individual ranches on the fringes of Maasailand to stop illegal 
intrusion. In chapter S we reported on the fear among the Maasai at the time of 
Independence concerning the dissolution of the old Maasai Treaties which had 
resulted in the removal of the status of closed district, enabling other groups to 
enter the Maasai Districts freely.' As early as 1966 the Lawrence Mission on 
Land Consolidation and Registration quite boldly stated that securing tribal 
lands against infiltration by members of other ethnic groups through a process 
of registration would tum out to be an illusion. To underline their statement the 
Mission pointed to the Ngong area where 'registration of land to individual 
Masai has resulted in immediate sale to Kikuyu farmers and consequent loss of 
the land to the Masai tribe, probably for ever' (Lawrence et al. 1966:25). 
By 1964 over 8,000 ha, or more than half of the best dry season grazing 
areas round Ngong had been allocated to small individual farms (see Bekure et 
al. 1987:92). By inid-1968 this had increased to over 10,000 ha in the Ngong 
Division alone (see EAS 07/06/68). Indeed, increasingly these small plots were 
sold to Kikuyu holders either for agricultural or speculative purposes. The 
Kajiado District Annual Report for 1967 reports 'While some plot holders have 
endeavoured to get money for development, others have spent their time 
searching for rich people who could buy their land at high prices' (KDAR 
1967:4). Land was turning out to be a very valuable investment In 1963 land 
in the Ngong area could be bought for as little as fifty shillings per acre, but 
the price for an acre had risen to four to five thousand shillings by 1972. In 
that year alone, some 431 hectares (almost 3 per cent of the total Ngong area) 
was sold and 188 land transfers carried out (see KDAR 1972:38). According to 
Muranja: 
'The infiltration of the Kikuyu in this Region has completely destroyed the 
Tobiko (1989a.58) dismisses (he idea (hat the acceptance of land regisbalion was connected 
with a fear among (he Maasai concerning (he expinng of (he Maasai Treaty of 1911 However, he 
agrees (hal (be Maasai were looking for means to slop infiltration by non-Maasai and Game 
Reserves In my view (he (wo are definitely linked as explained above 
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Masai economic system and the Region is now like any other Kikuyu area 
in the Central province. Kikuyu being agricultural people (...) were obliged 
to fence their acquired plots to protect their crops. This process of land 
enclosure has reduced the area of grazing land and has left no room for 
pastoralism. (...) All that land consolidation has done for Masai in this area 
is to render them landless' (Muranja 1973/74:58). 
By January 1967, the then Minister for Land and Settlements, Mr. Angaine, 
assured Maasai representatives that no newcomer would be allowed to settle in 
their areas without their consent, as the areas were owned by the Maasai 
people and not by the County Council. The latter's task was only to protect the 
existing rights and interests under customary law. The Government would 
ensure that the selling of land as had happened in the Ngong area would not be 
repeated. He urged the Maasai to set up group organizations and register their 
land (see EAS 13/01/67). 
However, the influx of non-Maasai continued especially in the Loitokitok 
area on the higher-potential slopes of Mt. Kilimanjaro. Between 1966-1969 
over 16,000 ha were allocated there to individual holdings. 'The original land 
owners were Maasai leaders, government officers and others who realised the 
value of obtaining title to land, and many acquired large tracts' (Campbell 
1979b:4).2 Once the monetary value of these lands had become apparent when 
immigrant fanners from other districts offered to buy or rent them, subdivision 
into small faims took place. 
From the early 1960s onwards the initial idea of individual ranches had been 
backed by the Kajiado County Council. They also acted as a guarantor to the 
Agricultural Finance Company (AFC) when loans were provided to individual 
owners (see S adera 1986:21). Peron (1984.53) sees the role of a political 
element setting the tone for the pro-individual land tenure position of the 
Kajiado County Council; two opposing influential politicians, both candidates 
in the 1963 general elections for the position of Member of Parliament, 
rewarded their supporters by granting them title deeds.3 Some of the recipients 
were members of the sectional development committee in the Kaputiei area. 
Although a process of land adjudication was started in Kajiado District in 
1961 under the Land Consolidation Act, the Lawrance Mission stated that this 
act and the procedure followed by the County Council was not suited to and 
According to Fallon in addition to requests made for 2,000 acre ranches in the plains, a 
number of Maasai had earlier made applications for farms varying in size Erom 30 to 180 acres m 
the high- potenüal areas on the slopes of Kilimanjaro on which they planned to establish mined 
farming enterprises (see Fallon 1962 26). 
3
 Over the years until the early 1980s, one of the candidates managed to acquire a vast 
temtory of 15,000 hectares for his own purpose with the help of the County Counal (see Peron 
1984 45). 
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was in principle illegal for the Kaputiei area. The report did not rule out 
individual ownership entirely, but warned that it required urgent and firm 
control. Most of Maasailand was considered unsuitable for mixed or arable 
fanning and the report opposed the haphazard approach of the Government 
towards the land issue in Maasailand (see Lawrance et al. 1966:31 and EAS 
22/08/67). 
By 196S, 22,000 ha (out of 322,000 ha) in Kaputiei Section alone had been 
allocated to 28 families out of a total of approximately 8,400 people (see 
Hedlund 1971:3).'' In the whole of Kajiado District the number of individual 
ranches was 82, the average size being 1,630 acres. This means that by 1965 
some 53,475 ha or 2.5 per cent of Kajiado District was set aside under 
individual ownership. Yet it was estimated by the Lawrance Commission that 
if the whole of Maasailand was divided between Maasai adult males each one 
would only get about 200 acres, which was not considered viable for a single 
person let alone for a family (see Lawrance et al. 1966:31).5 This development 
created growing opposition to the allocation of individual ranches and had to 
be brought to an end for three main reasons: 
1. Fear that people in the Kaputiei area would be left landless if land 
continued to be distributed in parcels of 2,000 acres. The alternative would 
be the creation of small non-viable units; 
2. Risk of losing land to non-Maasai (e.g. Kikuyu and Kamba) wishing to 
start cultivation in the area or engage themselves in speculation with land 
bought from the individual Maasai owners; 
3 . The Lawrance Miss ion on Land Consolidation and Registration declared in 
1966 that "approval" by the Kajiado County Council in the case of the 
individual ranches had no legal authority. 
According to information provided by (be Office of (he Central Bureau of Stalisucs m 
Kajiado, the Kaputiei area amounted up to 264,900 ha with a population of 6.674 people in 1962 
By 1969 the Kaputiei area measured 280,600 ha and supported 9,328 people Perhaps the 
difference between Hedlund's total Kaputiei area and these figures stems from the inclusion of the 
Kitengela Game Conservation Area totalling 54,130 ha and populated by 949 and 1,759 people for 
the respective years Including these people and averaging the resulting population figures for 
1962 and 1969 gives a total population of some 9,355 people If we presume 10 per cent to be 
non-Maasai (distnct-wide this was 31 per cent) and the Maasai family size to be 10 persons, we 
can calculate that 280 people (3 3 per cent of all Maasai m Kaputiei area) had obtained 6 8 per 
cent of the total area as their own ranch 
For the Kaputiei area, Halderman (1972b 1) esumated a potential average ranch size of 471 
acres by 1968/9 
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7.2.2 The Group Ranch Concept: Objectives and the Search for 
Traditional Land Units 
It was now time to search for an alternative. According to Davis (1970:13) the 
birth of the group ranch concept should be placed in time between the East 
African Royal Commission of 19SS favouring individual tenure in the whole of 
Kenya and the Lawrence Mission in 1965-66 preferring the establishment and 
registration of group ranches in the semi-arid regions. Grandin refers to the 
Range Management Division (RMD) and a report written by L.H. Brown in 
1963 entitled 'Development of the Semi-Arid Areas of Kenya' as an important 
marker in the start of the land tenure changes in Maasailand.6 From 1963 to 
1967 RMD laid the groundwork for the Kenya Livestock Development Project 
Phase I (KLDP I) by recruiting and training staff; designing ranch structures 
and pilot projects; promoting legislation for the allocation of communal 
pastoral lands; introducing ranch research and drafting a credit request for the 
necessary funding (see Grandin 1981:1). Another plan for the development of 
Maasailand, the "Lewis Document" of 1965 divided the area into three 
ecological zones of high, medium and low-potential areas. It recommended 
mixed farming in smallholdings for the high-potential areas, commercial dairy 
and beef ranching for medium-potential areas whilst low-potential rangelands 
were to be adjudicated for group ranch development (see Njoka 1983:56). 
After consulting with educated Maasai the RMD held meetings throughout the 
Kaputiei area to inform people of the group ranch concept. In brief this 
concept involved the setting aside of a certain piece of land, communally 
owned by a group of people and recorded and registered as the legal owners 
through membership of the particular ranch. Livestock movements would be 
restricted within the boundaries and outsiders not allowed to enter with their 
stock. Development capital loans were to be provided for infrastructural 
development such as water facilities, dips and firebreaks. In addition, by 
* In my opinion, a report written in early 1962 by Leland Fallon, range management advisor 
of the United Slates Agency for International Development for the Kenyan Government Mimslry 
of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry has also been of importance m this respect. Fallon 
(1962:47) recommended that 'the era of unregulated and free use of the land resources in the 
Kajiado District should be terminated as soon as possible through the formation of Land Use 
Commissions, Co-operatives or Corporations under proper legal authority'. These new legal bodies 
should preferably be established at the enhilólo level. A Commission of 6-12 elected members 
should be appointed responsible for the management and development of resources including all 
administrative functions and the collection, boirowing and expenditure of funds and the ownership 
of property. These administrative organizations should be subdivided as soon as possible into 
individually and family owned ranches 'where water and other conditions permit' (see Fallon 
1962:46)! Fallon further proposed an annual development fee (Sh. V- for cattle and donkeys and 
Sb. (V20 for small stock) to be paid by each family for the use of the grazing resources based on 
the number of livestock owned or controlled In addition, a range management system based on 4-
paddock rotational grazing combined with a three-month grazing period should be introduced. 
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providing working capital loans, young animals could be purchased, fattened 
and afterwards sold on the Nairobi meat market to repay these loans. This new 
approach to pastoral development was conceived as a first step in the radical 
transformation of nomadic subsistence production systems into sedentary, more 
commercially oriented systems. We will now summarise the targets set by the 
Government authorities concerning the introduction of the group ranch 
concept7 
1. Reduction of the total number of livestock from the pastoral areas who 
were thought to be responsible for pasture degradation. The 1960/61 
drought had turned the arid and semi-arid zones into a deplorable area. 
Free access to land, in combination with private herd ownership was 
thought to be the wrong basis for a sound ranch management strategy. 
Small ranches restricted to the livestock only of registered members should 
promote strict grazing controls and "create a feeling of responsibility"; 
2. Production of meat for the national market. A report by the East African 
Livestock Survey of the mid 1960s had warned that, unless something was 
done to commercialise the pastoral areas, Kenya would have to import 
meat by the 1970s (see Tobiko 1989a:59); 
3. Prevention of the spread of livestock diseases by dipping, vaccination and 
quarantine. In addition, stock should be improved and water provided. 
Loans could be provided with the group's title deed as security; 
4. Settlement of pastoralists in group ranches would considerably ease in 
meeting basic needs such as education, health and infrastmctural facilities. 
Implications of the introduction of the group ranch lay in the organisational, 
juridical and economical sphere. In the remaining of this and in the next 
section these consequences will be discussed. 
One of the most important organisational adjustments was the formation of 
specific groups of Maasai whose area was, in future, to be confined to strict 
boundaries. FAO experts stated that group ranch boundaries had been based on 
"sociological groupings of the population". It was assumed that the Maasai 
group was made up of several sections, each of these made up of smaller 
political units, known as elatia. Group ranches, it was believed, could be 
formed by subdividing these elatia. Unfortunately, this analysis of Maasai 
society was essentially faulty. Elatia can be translated as 'neighbourhood'. 
Depending on a specific region within Maasailand and upon a time in history 
this refers to all members of a boma. As early as 1970 Davis reported that, 
Cbapters 9 and 10 will go into more detail concerning pastoral production strategies and 
commercial systems of livestock production. 
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after consultation with a large number of Maasai, the term elatia referred to 
the members of a single boma. Jacobs used the same definition. Later, some 
authors (e.g. Bekure et al. 1987:126) included one or more adjacent bornas as 
making up a neighbourhood. In all probability this was due to the fact that, 
since the early 1970s, the size of bornas had decreased considerably, resulting 
in the dispersal of the elatia over a larger area. As a result, today elatia refers 
to the members of one large or a number of adjacent small camps. In any case 
it will be clear that a group ranch could never have been formed by 
subdividing an etoia. Jacobs explained that the group ranch identification 
exercise had not been done by an anthropologist or a sociologist but rather by 
a grassland botanist (see Halderman 1972a: 17). 
Another confusion exists concerning the term enkutoto. According to Jacobs 
(1963:48-9) each Maasai section is further subdivided into a number of named 
localities {enkutoto), in which adequate water and pasture to support local 
concentrations of kraal camps throughout the dry season may be found. Each 
such locality is a self contained ecological unit with contiguous areas of wet 
season pasture, to which camps disperse in the rains on locally scattered 
temporary water. A typical locality of the sort described by Jacobs is rarely 
more than 200-300 square miles and contains some 600-700 people divided 
amongst twelve to fourteen kraal camps. The average cattle population for the 
area would be of 8,000-9,000 head, with roughly fourteen to twenty-four acres 
per beast Individual kraal camps always tended to move within the same 
locality from year to year. In addition each locality had their own council of 
elders and warrior group. The self-contained ecological unit enabled the 
council of elders to manage the affairs of the area as if they "owned" the land. 
However, as Hedlund and Tobiko pointed out, Jacobs' enkutoto concept is 
wrongly applied. According to Tobiko (1989a:77) enkutoto as a subdivision of 
the Maasai section is simply unknown. Enkutoto, in fact, means something 
quite different from Jacobs assertion. It is a flat area of land which encroaches 
into the hillside particularly in arid areas where good forage exists as a result 
of fertile soil deposits coming from erosion of the hills. Apart from this 
geographical perspective, it bears no socio-political characteristics. It 
constitutes a small area of land, normally used for grazing, but which is neither 
self-contained ecologically nor capable of being the basis of a group ranch. In 
fact, a group ranch might have several inkutot or might contain none at all. For 
Kiboko group ranch Hedlund found 21 such areas. He further reports that the 
word enkutoto is normally not used by the Kaputiei, but in the rare instances 
when it is used, it defines an area where people have settled down more 
permanently (see Hedlund 1971:5). 
In fact this brings us to the concept of "empamat", meaning permanent boma 
or home area. It is an area in which the family's patriline has stayed for a long 
time, one to which it belongs and in which it has a right to live. So indeed, 
despite frequent movement, each Maasai household has a place to which it has 
a unique sense of belonging (see Bekure et al. 1987:69). This residential 
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association normally referred to as emparnat, sometimes called enkutoto, is of 
a much smaller scale, however, than a group ranch territory. For now, the most 
important point to be made is that we can conclude that group ranches had 
nothing to do with traditional land units. 
Why then, did the Maasai accept the group ranch concept? Part of this question 
has already been answered in our discussion of the increase in the number of 
individual ranches and encroachment of non-Maasai into the district. Also, the 
fear that more land would be lost to Game Reserves or National Parks can be 
seen in this light (see Western 1982a:304). In addition, it is mentioned that the 
Kaputiei especially, whose area was the first to be placed under the group 
ranch programme, were willing to accept the group ranch concept because their 
area was closest to the neighbouring groups of Kikuyu and Kamba to the 
north.8 Towards the south the Kaputiei feared the Maasai of the Kisonko 
section. Several disagreements mostly over water and land resources had 
occurred between the two sections. For example, Mr. Stanley Oloitipitip, a 
Kisonko Maasai who had become a Member of Parliament (MP) for Kajiado 
South in 1963, employed his position to deprive the Kaputiei of their water 
point at Eselenkei river and transfer it to his own section. This situation 
obtained until 1988 and required a series of violent confrontations before it 
was handed back to the Kaputiei. 
Furthermore, the disaster of the early 1960s is said to have been responsible 
for making the minds of many Maasai "development oriented". However, as 
we have seen before, Maasai pastoralists have always been interested in new 
opportunities. This desire for improvements in water facilities and veterinary 
assistance could be obtained by the provision of loans using the group title 
deed as collateral. Grandin (1981:6) reports 'The average Maasai seems to 
have accepted the group ranch concept because it was presented as a "total 
package" - as the only way to get a title deed, dips, water, etc.' From the start 
the international donors had insisted that, without some policy of privatization 
of land-holdings and without the certainty of ownership, no agency would be 
prepared to lend money for range development (see Holland 1986:38). Tobiko 
(1989a:61) and Gutto (1981:47) believe that the role played by the Government 
of Kenya and international donors has in the end been the most important 
driving factor behind the creation of group ranches in Kajiado District. Some 
backing for this statement can be found in the Lawrance report statement that 
initially the Mission was: 
8
 When the World Bank Appraisal Mission took place in April 1967 it was initially decided 
to restnct group ranch development to the Kaputiei section because the area had a comparatively 
high grazing potential, its people seemed to be more in favour of development than those in other 
areas, the Kaputiei Maasai had had some level of education and they had a history of contact with 
outsiders Lessons learned m the Kaputiei section would later be extended ω other parts of 
Kajiado Dlsmct and Kenya as a whole 
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'in some doubt as to the real need for registration of group ranch land as a 
condition of loans. Individual ranches whose land is not registered have 
already been given credit by the Agricultural Finance Corporation on other 
security, and obviously the pledging of group range land against a loan 
will not by itself provide any valid security to the lender, (...) We are, 
however, convinced after discussions with representatives of the World 
Bank, that registration of group ranches is a prerequisite to the loan of 
money for development purposes. Without the certainty of ownership and 
the clear right of the group to exclude outsiders, which is provided by 
registration, no agency would be prepared to lend money for range 
development' (Lawrence et al. 1966:31). 
Did all Maasai accept the group ranch concept? No, in northern Kaputiei and 
south-eastern Keekonyokie especially, near the better watered Ngong area, 
strong opposition existed towards the introduction of group ranches. Those 
Maasai favoured only the demarcation of individual ranches. In the end their 
group ranches (Kisaju/Kipeto, Olooloitikoishi/Kitengela, Nkatu/Saikeri and 
Olchoro Onyori) never functioned as such and the area was, in fact, under 
individual ownership (see Bekure et al. 1987:102). 
In a survey conducted by Njoka in 1977 76 per cent (out of 148 responding 
Kaputiei Maasai group ranch members) were said to be in favour of the group 
ranch concept. Of the 24 per cent not in favour 85 per cent preferred an 
individual ranch. Developments like water, dips, schools and shops were 
mentioned by 49 per cent of the respondents as being the most important 
advantages of the group ranch concept Free grazing under communal rights 
and land rights for the Maasai were mentioned by 30 and 16 per cent of the 
respondents, respectively. In other words, improvements and security of land 
rights were virtually seen to be of equal importance, at least by the late 1970s 
(see Njoka 1979:216-7). 
In conclusion it can be stated that the group ranch concept was, in many 
respects, an artificial creation having no traditional basis, being established as a 
result of administrative propaganda for change and accepted by a majority of 
Maasai because of securing access to land and the provision of several 
improvements such as water and veterinary facilities. 
7.2.3 The Process of Adjudication and Registration of Group Ranches 
The actual establishment of the group ranch followed a phased structure that 
started with the declaration of an "Adjudication Area". The essence of this land 
adjudication programme was the turnover of 'Tribal Lands" held under trust by 
the County Council, from common property into private property to be held by 
individuals or groups. Supervision of this process was in the hands of a District 
Land Adjudication Officer (DLAO). Demarcation, recording and survey 
officers were appointed to assist in the technical process of this exercise. 
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Determination of the Adjudication Section's boundaries was preceded by 
feasibility studies performed by the RMD. After discussions with the chiefs 
and elders of a section rough boundaries were drawn. Next, parts or the whole 
of an adjudication area were declared an Adjudication Section. In Kajiado 
District the Adjudication Sections were virtually congruent with the 
administrative boundaries where these tended to coincide with il-oshon 
boundaries. 
The moment that Adjudication Sections were pronounced, any person 
claiming to have an interest in that section had to bring his claim before an 
Adjudication Committee, formed by no less than ten persons resident within 
the Adjudication Section and appointed by the Adjudication Officer. According 
to Peron (1982:54) the Adjudication Committees were 'essentially composed of 
educated Maasai, politicians and government officials' and Grandin reports that 
most of them were given individual ranches (see Bekure et al. 1987:101). 
In addition, an Arbitration Board for the whole of the adjudication area was 
set up in early 1967 and was comprised of ten Maasai originating from every 
Maasai Section in Kajiado District including a representative for the Ngong 
area. Most of them were individual ranchers and/or politicians whose main task 
was to deal with disputes over sectional boundaries or claims concerning land 
ownership which could not be dealt with by the Adjudication Committee. 
Among the cases dealt with by the Board were a dispute between Purko and 
Matapalo Maasai in 1967 over the drilling of a borehole by a Matapalo 
individual rancher who had been "given" the ranch in Purko area by the 
Matapalo.' Galaty has reported on other more bloody armed clashes over 
boundary disputes, which occurred between the Matapalo and the Dalalekutuk 
in 1965, between the Purko and Loodokilani in 1972 and between the Ildamat 
and Loodokilani in 1975. In the last case it was said that an Ildamat chief had 
influenced the Land Adjudication Officer as a result of which a substantial 
portion of the Loodokilani section had been adjudicated to the Ddamat (see 
Galaty 1978:15/6). Like the Purko, it should be noted that the Dalalekutuk and 
Ildamat only entered Kajiado District after the Maasai Moves of 1911-13. 
The Adjudication Record was usually open for a period of sixty days. The 
Adjudication Section was divided into individual and group ranches and people 
were recorded as belonging to one specific parcel (a group or individual ranch) 
marked on the section demarcation map. The map and the record together 
comprised the Adjudication Register. All those who were recorded in the said 
Adjudication Register as having an interest in the group land were entitled to 
become members of the group. After completion of the registers they were 
It should be remembered that the Purko Maasai entered this part of Kajiado District only 
after they had been removed by the Colonial Government from Laikipia in 1912. At that time few 
people inhabited the area and the Matapalo Maasai did not bother so mich (see GoK/MLS 1967). 
Troubles between the Matapalo and the Puiko continued into the 1980s (see DN 13/08/81). 
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open for inspection for a period of sixty days during which complaints could 
be made to the Adjudication Officer. Finally the Adjudication Register, 
including the amendments made, was sent to the Chief Land Registrar. 
At a meeting the group of potential members then elected at least 3 but no 
more than 10 representatives. Their task was to apply for incorporation of the 
group ranch to the Registrar of Group Representatives (see below). In addition, 
the group members elected group ranch committee officers from among 
themselves (i.e. the Group Ranch Committee) responsible for day to day 
management of the group ranch. Finally, a certificate of incorporation and the 
Adjudication Register was forwarded to the Land Registrar of the District 
concerned who then issued a group title in the name of the group. This marked 
the birth of a legal group ranch; a corporate body, with a distinct name, a 
perpetual succession and with the rights and obligations to sue and be sued, to 
acquire, hold, charge and dispose of property of any kind and to borrow money 
with or without giving security (see Coldham 1982:2). 
Legal authority concerning group ranches was based upon the Land 
Adjudication Act 1968 and the Land (Group Representatives) Act 1968 (see 
RoK 1970b and Wanjala 1990:34). The former governs the process of creation, 
demarcation of group boundaries, adjudication of group rights and consequent 
registration of title under the Registered Land Act. The latter deals with the 
operation and administration of the groups. These Acts had to be newly 
introduced in 1968 because the Land Consolidation Act and Registered Land 
Act contained no provisions for the ascertainment and registration of group 
rights. 
7.2.4 The Structure and Administration of a Group Ranch 
For the internal functioning of the group ranches four main components are of 
vital importance; 
1. The Registrar of Group Representatives 
2. The Group Representatives 
3. The Committee 
4. The Members 
ad 1. The Registrar of Group Representatives, appointed by the Minister of 
Lands, is a public officer responsible for the general supervision of the 
administration of group ranches. The Registrar keeps a copy of the list of 
members and may check on the group's financial performance and day to day 
functioning. Decisions of the group representatives, the committee and the 
members are all subject to the approval of the Registrar; 
ad 2. The Group Representatives hold the land and other assets of the group on 
behalf of and for the collective benefit of all members of the group. Group 
276 Selling Wealth to Buy Poverty 
Representatives can be replaced voluntarily or by resolution of the members; 
ad 3. The Group Ranch Committee is composed of a chairman, vice-chairman, 
secretary, treasurer and three members. The Committee is responsible for the 
conduct of all business. It is charged with the responsibility to draw up and 
implement development plans. Correspondence and the maintenance of proper 
record keeping and accounts is also done by the Committee. It may issue 
instructions to Group Ranch members and make rules for the operation of the 
group. Among the most important regulations are the enforcing of grazing 
quotas and grazing management as well as the maintenance of the recognition 
of the group ranch boundaries. Group Ranch Committee officials are elected at 
a General Meeting held, in principle, once a year; 
ad 4. The Group Ranch Members are in fact shareholders of the group land 
and other assets such as water facilities and dips. Their share in the ownership 
of land is in undivided shares. A group ranch member is entitled to reside free 
of charge on the group land together with his family and dependents and is 
entitled to use the land, water, machinery, credit facilities, veterinary services, 
marketing arrangements and other provisions either free or in return for a cess, 
fee or other charge. Members are responsible for the election and removal of 
the group officials. At the time of group ranch incorporation all those people 
listed in the adjudication register were automatically recorded in the Group 
Ranch register. New members could only be added to the register by decision 
of the group representatives confirmed by a 60 per cent majority at a General 
Meeting of the Group Ranch. As we will see, this is the most debated issue in 
the process of group ranch subdivision in Kajiado District of today. 
Beside the Registrar of Group Representatives within the Ministry of Lands, 
the Kenya Livestock Development Project meant the involvement of a whole 
range of other Government agencies: the Range Management Division (RMD), 
Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC), Water Development Division, 
Veterinary Department and the Livestock Marketing Division (LMD). 
UNDP/FAO assisted in preparing detailed studies of range resources, 
hydrology, livestock and wildlife populations. Initially, the Kenyan 
Government proposed establishing a special unit within the RMD for the 
supervision of group ranch development. However, the World Bank Appraisal 
Mission of 1967 decided to lay the responsibility for project implementation in 
the hands of the AFC. A special Range Division, headed by an international 
development expert supported by S livestock specialists, was newly established 
within the AFC (see Grandin 1981:7). 
7.2.5 Рока Pilot Group Ranch 
In 1964 the pilot Рока group ranch located in South Kaputiei location south­
east of Sultan Hamud was started. The ranch was viewed as a test case for the 
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group ranch concept to be extended to the rest of Maasailand. Kenya and 
possibly even Africa. Some 30 families were grouped together in an 
ecologically favourable ranch of 8,926 hectares and given grants for water and 
dip facilities. In 1967 they were granted a loan through which every member 
was given a Sahiwal bull and cash to buy steers for fattening. In addition 
poorer members were provided with breeding stock. Twelve year span 
livestock projections were made by UNDP/FAO experts, which intended to 
bring down the number of breeding cows from 1,328 before development to 
900, the number of bulls from 84 to 30 and the number of 214 old steers of 
above 4 years of age to nil, whilst raising the number of calves, heifers and 
purchased steers for fattening. Over the twelve year period it was planned to 
purchase 3,714 steers. In terms of stock units the grazing pressure of 1,462 
KSU before development was allowed to rise to the carrying capacity placed at 
1,567 KSU.10 A total of over K£ 10,000 investments were planned, of which 
the bulk (K£ 6,000) was used to pay for the improved Sahiwal bulls. Water 
facilities, buildings, dips, tools and firebreaks completed the investments. It 
was calculated that, after an initial discounted balance in the first four years 
because of having employed development loans for working capital and 
operating costs, the following eight years would then make up for the deficit 
and, taking into account a 19 per cent rate of return, result in a final positive 
balance." 
According to John Halderman, who was attached to the group ranch as a 
ranch manager. Рока turned out to be rather successful in comparison with the 
traditional Maasai way of herding. Most of the Рока Maasai were progressive 
men who wanted to settle and take advantage of water development and cattle 
dips. Рока cattle was watered daily, dipped every week, covered only short 
distances and was as a result in better condition, produced more milk and had 
lower rates of mortality. However, as Halderman stresses, concerning the 
reproducibility of the Рока experiment it should be taken into account that the 
Рока members were convinced that settlement in this area would be possible 
due to the unusually favourable conditions of relatively high and consistent 
rainfall and the presence of both wet and dry season forage' (Halderman 
1972a:28). Let us analyze the functioning and impact of the Kajiado group 
ranches which came into operation by the end of the 1960s. 
7.2.6 Kajiado District Livestock Development Project Phase I, II and ΠΙ 
Officially Phase I of the World Bank Kenya Livestock Development Project 
In those days Kenya Stock Units (KSU) were used: an average ratio of 035 for cattle, and 
0 07 for shoats. 
1
 Poor members would be provided with woiking capital loans for steer fattening providing 
an addilional incoine. 
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(KLDP I) commenced on the 1st of May 1969.12 Besides the development of 
group ranches in Kajiado District, KLDP I created grazing blocks in North 
Eastern Province, commercial ranches (especially in Nakuru, Laikipia and 
Machakos districts) and company and co-operative ranches (in Tana River, 
Kwale, Kilifi and Taita-Taveta). A total of US$ 11.8 million was set aside 
under Phase I of the Kenya Livestock Development Project of which US$ 1.8 
million (about Ksh. 13-14 million) was reserved for Kajiado District group 
ranch development (see Njoka 1979:27/49). Water development was given 
priority under KLDP I in Kaputiei area as it received 57 per cent of the 
allocated funds. Upgrading of herds was also a major area of investment. 
On December 1st 1966 the Kaputiei Section was declared an Adjudication 
Section. UNDP/FA О planners proposed to demarcate a total of 19 ranches 
covering an area of 798,000 acres for some 900 families. This, however, was 
far from the FAO standard model for ranch development which proposed 30 
families on 35,000 acres. The need for entities to be manageable seemed to 
have reduced group ranch sizes. By 1970, in addition to Рока, 14 group 
ranches covering 603,000 acres for some 1300 families had been created in 
the Kaputiei area.13 With respect to land availability this was a shortfall of 
over 50 per cent in comparison with the model figure of 1,166 acres per 
family! 
Group ranch boundaries were tentatively established after discussion between 
the Maasai section leaders and the Range Management Division staff in 
consultation with local residents. In most cases, these boundaries followed 
natural landmarks such as hill tops and rivers. They were later demarcated by 
Land Adjudication officers. 
The Maasai were free to choose to become members of any group ranch. 
Most people registered for the ranch in which they were residing at the time. 
In violation of the group ranch rules some people managed to register in more 
than one group ranch. Those fully aware of the possible consequences of the 
group ranch concept spread their families and herds over adjacent group 
ranches in order to be able to transfer their cattle from one group ranch to 
another or to reduce the family's herd size in trying to prevent forced 
According to Halderman (1972a 8) Kaputiei area had already been divided into group 
ranches in 1965 However, it seems these were "self-help" schemes, by which groups of Maasai 
worked together to develop a particular area For example, Embolioi scheme had 10 participating 
families who constructed a dip and a watenank in 1966/7 In general, however, there was no 
development, except on Рока and the individual ranches and the Maasai continued their seml-
nomadic practices 
13
 It should be noted that Grandrn (1981 8) speaks of 1,700 families Giandm's figure, 
however, is based on membership totals For 1970 1,700 members are equivalent to some 1,300 
families as confirmed by Njoka (1979 41) For example, Kiboko members, numbering 67 in 1970 
had 37 different family names So, some of the members will have been brothers or fathers and 
(suil dependent) sons as well as independent brothers having established their own independent 
household 
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destocking. In general, however, most Maasai did not have a clear idea of all 
the consequences of the group ranch concept This is partly due to the fact that 
planners did not stress issues like grazing quotas and strict boundary 
maintenance so much as they emphasised the positive aspects such as dips and 
water development. In order not to cut off any Maasai from their culturally 
defined right to residence and grazing in their section, great efforts were made 
to register all the Maasai, whether or not they were still engaged in pastoral 
pursuits at the time (see Bekure et al. 1987:100). 
The Adjudication Registers for South Kaputiei were completed by the end of 
November 1968, and those for North Kaputiei by March 1969. It took another 
year before the first group ranches (Рока, Kiboko and Olkarkar) were officially 
incorporated by the 3rd of April 1970. Table 7.1 summarises Kajiado District 
Phase I group ranches.14 
Phase II of the Kenya Livestock Development Project (KLDP II) commenced 
in late 1974. Nationwide, KLDP II was a much more ambitious plan. Funds 
were increased fourfold and targets set at the development of 2.8 million ha of 
grazing land in North Eastern Province and the establishment or improvement 
of 60 group ranches, 100 commercial ranches, 21 company and co-operative 
ranches and 3 feedlots all over Kenya (see Evangelou 1984:47). 
Most of the new group ranches were established in Kajiado District. 
Adjudication sections in other parts of Kajiado District had already been 
declared during the Phase I period. In the Loodokilani, Ildamat, Purko and part 
of the Kisonko and Matapalo sections 16 Phase Π group ranches were 
incorporated. Table 7.2 shows Phase II Kajiado District group ranches. With 
the exception of those of the "intruding" Ildamat and Purko sections, most 
Phase Π group ranches were considerably larger in size in comparison to the 
Kaputiei section group ranches. In most cases the whole of an adjudication 
section was turned into a single group ranch. Group ranches created in Magadi 
Division, a dry area having a recommended carrying capacity of 8 hectares per 
stock unit, had to be sizeable of necessity. In spite of this improvement World 
Bank evaluation reports of 1976 criticized the group ranch programme 
especially for its failure to increase herd offtake. 
14
 In a RMD inventory of June 1969 a total of 16 group ranches comprising 26,565 hectares 
were considered to have a stock potential of 51,770 Stock Units (mature bull 1 25/cow with calf 
1 (Vsteer and heifers 1 year old-0 5/2 year old-O 75/3 year and over 1 0 SU) Their baseline survey 
numbered a total of 43,331 SU and a human population of 5,232 Adult Equivalents (AEs) In 
other words, the Kaputiei area overall was not overstocked and average livestock ownership 
amounted to 8 3 stock units per AE From these figures and using 1973 membership data it can be 
calculated that on average 1 group ranch member is probably equivalent to 3 0 AEs A sample for 
Merueshi and Olkarkar made by ILCA (1981 18) in early 1980 included 76 households totalling 
813 people (717 AE) of which there were some 135 official group ranch members This means on 
average 10 7 people (9.43 AE) per household or 1 77 member (1 56 AE) per household or S 3 AE 
per group ranch member. So the 1988 livestock census total of 1,385 households for 2,430 
members (1:175) matches exactly with ILCA's figures 
Table 7.1 Kajiado District Phase I Group Ranches 
Group Ranch 
Рока 
Kiboko 
Olkaikar 
Meraestn 
Mbtluu 
Mbuko 
Nkama 
Airol 
Imaroro/Mashuru 
Erankau 
Ilmamen 
Emani 
Empuyiankat 
Embolioi 
Olkinos 
total ha 
8,926 
15,870 
10,280 
18.546 
14,723 
18,477 
39,760 
18,692 
19,483 
8,985 
12,194 
13.211 
15,270 
24,000 
6,020 
244,437 
members 
1973-90 
30-30 
66-67 
58-93 
71-119 
64-89 
88-134 
322-489 
110-171 
316-383 
68-89 
102-125 
94-128 
76-98 
205-299 
90-116 
1,760-2,430 
ha/n* 
1973-90 
298-298 
240-237 
177-Ш 
261-156 
230-165 
210-138 
123-81 
170-109 
62-51 
132-101 
120-98 
141-103 
201-156 
117-80 
67-52 
139-101 
total su 
I988@ 
3,195 
5,554 
6,060 
5,606 
4,695 
6,621 
12,432 
6,170 
7,292 
3,767 
2^13 
3,034 
3,485 
1,968 
3,469 
75,861 
su/mb 
1988 
106 5 
829 
65 2 
471 
52 8 
494 
254 
361 
19 0 
42 3 
201 
237 
35 6 
6 6 
299 
312 
ha/su 
1988 
279 
Z86 
170 
3 31 
314 
Z79 
3 20 
303 
267 
2 39 
4 85 
4 35 
4 38 
12 20 
174 
3 22 
recom. 
ha/su 
6 0 
7 0 
7 0 
6 0 
4 0 
7 5 
4 5 
6 0 
6 0 
6 0 
5 0 
5 0 
5 0 
6 0 
5 0 
hh 
1988* 
42 
66 
103 
69 
56 
103 
266 
108· 
143 
79 
78 
55 
57 
68 
92 
1,385 
subdiv 
status-
sec­
tion* 
Kap 
Kap 
Kap 
Kap 
Kap 
Kap 
Kap 
Kap 
Kap 
Kap 
Kap 
Kap 
Kap 
Kap 
Kap 
source iv/i memoersnip aata trom progress repon tana aajuaicauon programme и л и lujiaao to tieaa к м и маиооі ош ot лрш ІУ/J (see also 
Hampson 1975 30) Data on 1990 membership obtained via personal communication 
@ MoLD 1988 (1 SU = 300 kg animal 0 6 cattle or 0125 shoals), 
# 1988 household numbers derived from author's calculation based on raw data of the Kajiado Disuict 1988 hvestock census The Embohoi figure is 
probably explained by their high number of not yet occupied plots The owners mostly remain in neighbouring Olíanos ranch which has a high slocking 
raie A large number of households on most group ranches reponed livestock sent away elsewhere, 
* Excluding an unknown group of Kamba having 523 cattle, 974 shoats and 46 donkeys. 
- Subdivision status refers to whether the group ranch has 
1 subdivided and titles issued, 2 given consent to subdivide by Registrar of Representatives and Land Control Board, 3 obtained consent by Registrar of 
Representatives, 4 no consent obtained, 5 not wanted to subdivide, 6 taken no decision yet to subdivide, 
A
 Кар = Kaputiei, Kee = Keekonyolue. Kis = Kisonko, Dal = Dalalekutuk, Dam = Ildamat, Loo = Loodokilani, Mat = Matapalo, Pur = Purko 
Table 7.2 Kajiado District Phase Π Group Ranches 
Group Ranch 
Rombo 
Kuku 
Osilalei 
Oldoinyo Nyokie 
Kilomto 
Shompole 
OUuramatian 
Enkaroni 
Nkoile 
Esokou 
Olkiloriu 
ninyiangalani 
Hang'ata Wuas 
CHken 
Torosei 
Subtotal 
total ha 
38,365 
96,000 
25,120 
38,629 
68366 
25,685 
62.689 
21,612 
11,378 
6,208 
4,109 
6,109 
9,606 
59,497 
24,852 
46,445 
545.197 
members 
1982-90 
512-513 
544-862 
167-168 
435-555 
162-354 
122-178 
366-670 
200-348 
190-332 
171-272 
72-91 
88-96 
118-122 
416-487 
164-339 
165-279 
3,892-5,334 
(+37%) 
ba/mb 
1982-90 
75-75 
176-111 
150-150 
89-70 
423-194 
211-144 
171-94 
108-62 
60-34 
36-23 
57^*5 
69-64 
81-79 
143-122 
152-73 
281-166 
140-102 
total su 
1988 
21,210 
Зб^го' 
16,370 
6,812 
8.602 
3,958 
18,119 
9,161 
3,720 
666 
592 
1.186 
816 
19,804 
7,118 
12,875 
167,529 
su/mb 
1988 
4 1 3 
4 2 4 
974 
12 3 
243 
222 
270 
263 
112 
2 4 
6 5 
124 
6 7 
407 
210 
461 
314 
ha/su 
1988 
181 
2.93 
153 
5 67 
797 
6 4 9 
346 
2.36 
306 
9 3 2 
694 
5 43 
1177 
3 0 0 
3 49 
361 
325 
recom. 
ha/su 
5 0 
6 0 
6 0 
5 0 
8 0 
5 0 
8 0 
8 0 
5 0 
6 0 
5 0 
5 0 
4 5 
5 0 
8 0 
5 5 
hh 
1988 
136 
223 
302 
97 
112 
36 
124 
104 
41 
7 
20 
36 
31 
227 
120 
109 
1,605 
subdiv 
status-
6 
6 
6 
6 
5 
4 
5 
5 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
5 
3 
sec­
tion* 
Kis 
Kis 
Kis 
Mat 
Loo 
Loo 
Loo 
Loo 
Pur 
Pur 
Dam 
Dam 
Dam 
Loo 
Loo 
Loo 
bouree MOLU najiaoo uisinct personal commumcalion, MOLU ІУВВ and auuiors calculations 
- see table 7 1 for subdivision status key, 
л
 Кар = Kaputiei, Kee = Keekonyokie, Kis = Kisonko, Dal = Dalalekutuk, Dam = Ildamat, Loo = Loodokilam, Mat = Matapato, Pur s Purko 
Table 73 Kajiado District Phase Ш Group Ranches 
Group Ranch 
Ewaso Kedong 
Loodo Anak 
Oldoinyo Orok 
Sajilom 
Enkonka 
Oolomunyi 
Oloontulugum 
Meto 
Lorogosua 
Mailua 
Nentanai 
В am maro 
Olgulului/Oloolarashl 
Selenkei/Emotoroki 
Kitengela/Olooloilikoishi 
Kisaju 
Saiken 
Olosho-Oibor 
ОІсЬогоЧЭпуоп 
Sub-total 
total ha 
53,136 
57,065 
28,701 
15,711 
15.923 
10.057 
12.925 
28,928 
38,282 
63,026 
3,692 
19,645 
147,050 
125.893 
74,794 
18,292 
4,945 
7,531 
3.000 
3.687 
244,437 
members 
1982-90 
484-1,062 
0-500® 
322^84 
450-571 
317-369 
151-200 
153-205 
408-607 
472-815 
642-642 
51-56 
225-445 
1,031-1.380 
210-922 
15&-440 
229-214 
44-115 
114-157 
127-127 
144-174 
6,496-9.485 
ha/mb 
1982-90 
110-50 
977.114 
89-59 
35-28 
5<M3 
67-50 
85-63 
71-48 
81-47 
98-98 
72-66 
87-44 
143-107 
599-137 
499-170 
80-85 
112-43 
66-48 
24-24 
26-21 
113-77 
total su 
1988@ 
38,816 
20,478 
4,640 
2,704 
2,044A 
3.266 
2,311 
13,151 
11,243 
15,348 
5.527 
10,331 
16,610 
13,399 
17,241 
3,880 
4,360 
6.548 
5,723 
14,658 
207.303 
su/mb 
1988 
365 
4 1 0 
9 6 
4 7 
5 5 
16 3 
113 
217 
13 8 
239 
98 7 
2 3 2 
12 0 
14 5 
39 2 
181 
37 9 
4 1 7 
45 1 
842 
219 
ha/su 
1988 
016 
279 
6 1 9 
5 81 
7 79 
3 08 
5 59 
2 2 0 
3 4 0 
411 
067 
190 
8 85 
9 4 0 
4 3 4 
4 71 
113 
115 
0 5 2 
025 
3 3 3 
recom. 
ha/su 
5 0 
5 0 
5 0 
6 0 
6 0 
6 0 
6 0 
5 0 
6 0 
6 0 
6 0 
6 0 
6 0 
7 0 
6 0 
5 0 
6 0 
6 0 
6 0 
6 0 
hb 
1988# 
413 
168 
f) 
71 
52 
43 
28 
130 
105 
m 
•m 
70 
28 
72 
95 
·)? 
71 
89 
83 
г? 
1,385 
subdiv 
status-
1* 
1# 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
6 
6 
6 
1 
21 
1 
4 
1 
Sec-
tion* 
Kee 
Kee 
Mat 
Dal 
Dal 
Dal 
Dal 
Mat 
Mat 
Mat 
Mat 
Mat 
Kis 
Kis 
Kis 
Кар 
Кар 
Kee 
Kee 
Kee 
-»48% (38%) 
Kajiado District 1.521.917 12.148-17,270 125-Í8 450,693 26 1 3 38 
source <e> Pasha 1986, author's denvation based on MoUJ 1988, UNUWtAU 1978 19 
- see table 7 1 for subdivision status key 
A
 1982 member and 1988 livestock figures MoLD Kajiado District adjusted for miscalculations * partly subdivided # never incorporated 
I m 1977 Kipeto (Keekonyokie Kisaju and Keekonyokie Oloyiangalam), Loodo Anak and (Kaputiei) Kisaju comprised, on paper, three group ranches At 
the tune of uicoiporation the western pan of (Kaputiei) Kisaju was added to Keekonyokie Oloyiangalam (to be called Endoyno Narok), while the eastern 
pan was named Kipeto/Kisaju Keekonyokie Kisaju was added to Loodo Anak "group ranch" This kind of adjustment also happened in the Ildamat area 
((Ildamat) Oloyiangalam, Olkilonb, Esokota) and Dalalekutuk (Sajilom, Enkonka, Oloomunyi and Oloontulugum) 
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Phase ΠΙ, begun in 1979, was not part of the Kenya Livestock Development 
Project, as the World Bank and other donors had stopped financing it. 
Nevertheless, 20 more group ranches were formed in Matapalo, Kisonko, 
Keekonyokie and Dalalekutuk sections. Even in parts of the northern Kaputiei 
area (Kitengela), where the group ranch concept had been refuted, group 
ranches were now incorporated.15 
This brought the total number of Kajiado District group ranches to SI 
covering some 15,200 km2 or 75 per cent of the district.16 Table 7.3 presents 
details of Kajiado District Phase III group ranches. It should be noted that, in 
the Keekonyokie section especially, some group ranches (Olosho-Oibor, 
Olchoro-Onyori and Saikeri) existed only on paper. Moreover, a process of 
dissolution of group ranches had begun by the beginning of the 1980s. 
Some care should be taken with regard to the availability of livestock for the 
Maasai pastoralists for each of the group ranches mentioned. Firstly, figures 
for group ranch members are not identical to the group's total number of 
households, people or adult equivalents (see note 14). Moreover, ratios between 
these variables differ per group ranch. Secondly, the number of stock units is 
based on livestock present on the group ranch at the time of the 1988 census. 
In other words, livestock belonging to households which had only temporarily 
settled or animals stationed with relatives or friends were included in the host 
group ranch total. Thus, relating livestock numbers to group ranch membership 
results either in an over or an underestimation of livestock. For this reason in 
tables 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 we included the number of households from which the 
livestock figures were obtained. 
Finally, livestock numbers fluctuate over the years as is shown in table 2.15. 
A baseline survey conducted by Bille and Anderson among Elang'ata Wuas 
group ranch members in April 1978 (two years after a drought) estimated an 
average household size of 9.4 persons owning some 49.6 livestock units of 250 
kilo. This is equivalent to 5.3 livestock units per person or 5.4 Livestock 
Equivalents/Active Adult Male Equivalents (LE/AAME) (see Bille & Anderson 
1980:28).17 By early 1990 our survey estimated an average of 10.5 persons 
For example, in July 1978 troubles arose in the Oloyiangalara/Kipeto scheme as a result of 
the demarcation of 11 individual ranches allocated m 1969 by the OUcejuado County Council 
(OCC). A group of 58 Maasai was evicted for chasing land adjudication surveyors In the end 
14,000-16,000 acres were set aside for the 11 individual ranchers. Also m Ewaso Kedong 34 
influential people claimed 2,000 acres each (see NT 24/09/78). 
In addition two more group ranches, Oloyiangalara/Kipeto (5,895 ha/191 members in 
Keekonyokie area) and Embakasi (2,400 ha/62 members located north of Kitengela town, actually 
outside Kajiado in Machakos District also known as Kitengela farm), are sometimes mentioned as 
being registered as group ranches. 
1 7
 Using their crude figures a recalculation to LE/AAME can be made to 39.7 LE for 7.3 
AAME, which conesponds to 5.4 LE/AAME. Bille and Anderson's data excluded livestock away 
from the boma, which was estimated io be some 2 per cent of total livestock muts. 
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per household possessing 11.1 LE/AAME in Elang'ata Wuas group ranch, 
suggesting a doubling of livestock wealth per person in the last 12 years!18 
In the following pages we will present some of the achievements and 
problems of the group ranch programme in Kajiado District It should be kept 
in mind that it is difficult to distinguish time effects from group ranch effects. 
Developments outside the sphere of the project can have a larger impact than 
the efforts of the project itself. For example, a favourable raise in livestock 
prices will probably have much more effect than the improvement of a whole 
range of marketing facilities when a rise in prices does not occur. 
73 Kajiado District Group Ranch Performance 
7.3.1 Achievements of the Kajiado District Group Ranch Project 
The primary effect of the introduction of group ranches was to (re)place the 
control over a vast area of Kajiado District in the hands of the Maasai 
pastoralists. The role of the Kajiado County Council as "trustee" of Maasai 
lands was restricted to the benefit of the local residents. As such group ranches 
have been instrumental in stopping a further carving out of large areas being 
brought into individual hands. As Pasha (1986:304) concludes, the 'fact that 
most of the land was adjudicated to groups who cannot sell the land has 
prevented wholesale alienation of land through the market'. During the 1970s 
and 1980s small, individual ranches were created and the immigration of non-
Maasai into the district also continued although probably at a slower rate than 
otherwise would have been the case. 
Secondly, the group ranches have served as mechanisms for the 
improvement of livestock management techniques, the provision of information 
and the investment of capital in co-operative facilities such as boreholes, dams, 
troughs, tanks, pipelines, cattle dips, crushes etc. Table 7.4 provides 
information about the facilities existing on the various group ranch territories 
and Kajiado District by 1988. 
The majority of the facilities available are not the result of loans provided by 
the Kenya Livestock Development Project. According to Dietz et al. (1986:12), 
only 15 boreholes, IS tanks, IS troughs and 16 dips were constructed during 
KLDP Phase I. Phase II added 4 tanks, S troughs and 4 dips only. In addition, 
other donors provided funds for the construction of boreholes and other 
facilities in the group ranches. Some of these became the property of the group 
ranches themselves. In April 1988 there was a total of 45 boreholes in the 
The ILCA baseline surveys in ODcaricar and Meniesbi group ranches conducted in 1980-81 
among 76 households registered 8.85 and 10.08 AAME per household and 3,477 and 3,855 LE 
per group ranch, respectively. This is 9.83 and 10.62 LE/ЛАМЕ for Olkarkar and Merueshi group 
ranches. 
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district as belonging to group ranches of which 23 were operational. Individual 
ranchers owned 155 boreholes (56 functioning). Institutions such as Livestock 
Training Centres (59bh/22 f). Ministry of Water Development (54bh/23f), other 
Departments (27bh/2f) and the Kajiado County Council (37bh/13f) owned the 
other boreholes. Ten boreholes, all out of operation, had unknown owners. 
Nevertheless, individually owned boreholes are sometimes available to group 
ranch in return for group ranch pasture or diesel oil, for example. Water from 
boreholes owned by one of the other groups mentioned is used for human 
consumption near towns, schools, health centres and also for livestock. 
Table 7.4 Water and Veterinary Facilities in Kajiado District, 1988 
DIVISION 
Central Loitokitok Ngong Magadi Total 
Group 
FACILmES F NF F NF F NF F NF F 
Total 
Kajiado 
NF F NF 
Boreholes (MoLD)# 
Boreholes (MoWD) 
Water Pans 
Water Dams 
Wells# 
Springs 
Rock Catchirents 
Tanks 
Km Water Pipeline 
Troughs 
Dips/Spray Races 
Crushes 
33 
45 
84 
20 
10 
13 
4 
57 
129 
113 
37 
63 
23 
93 
-
2 
-
1 
. 
14 
18 
7 
24 
2 
8 
10 
2 
4 
8 
17 
2 
12 
87 
13 
15 
20 
3 
22 
-
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
-
. 
12 
6 
4 
27 
4 
5 
-
3 
. 
17 
113 
13 
31 
14 
7 
30 
-
1 
-
3 
. 
-
-
-
6 
-
. 
1 
-
9 
. 
. 
1 
20 
85 
19 
1 
9 
1 
4 
-
1 
. 
-
2 
-
-
. 
7 
-
45 
83 
90 
38 
18 
33 
7 
106 
414 
158 
84 
106 
34 
149 
-
4 
-
4 
2 
14 
18 
7 
49 
8 
82 45 
139 248 
135 -
50 7 
29 -
44 4 
7 2 
170 14 
574 18 
217 9 
146 63 
162 9 
Source MoLÜ 1988, Mwangi IWU 
F=FuncUonmg, NF=Not Functioning, GR=Group Ranch area, KTfeKajiado Distnct, 
# underestimate. Figures given refer to facilities found in the group ranch area of Kajiado District, 
excluding individual ranchers Facilities belongmg to these are mcluded in the Kajiado Distnct 
total Borehole figures provided by the Ministry of Livestock Development (MoLD) apparently are 
far below those of the Ministry of Water Development (MoWD) survey (1989) Non-functioning 
boreholes are either non-operative (144), abandoned (21), dned up (12) or untraceable (71) 
Thirdly, according to some authors (e.g. Pasha 1986, Timoi & Kuluo 1990), 
group ranch development has directly or (in)directly been responsible for the 
establishment of schools, shops and health centres. It should of course be taken 
into consideration that it is difficult to separate project effects from those due 
to population growth and increased Government and NGO efforts over the last 
20 years. 
Fourthly, group ranches have allowed wildlife to roam freely over large parts 
of Kajiado District. Enclosed individual ranches would certainly have created 
severe problems for wild animals. For example, Maasai in the Kitengela area 
who opposed the inclusion of their area as a group ranch were instructed not to 
fence and cultivate the area to allow free movement of game park animals 
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from the adjacent Nairobi National Park.19 
7.3.2 Problems and Failures of the Kajiado District Group Ranch Project 
The major aim of the Kenya Livestock Development Project for the range 
areas from a governmental point of view, was to change a traditional pastoral 
system into a commercially oriented production system. Key issues in this 
process of transformation were the reduction of the number of livestock 
through the allocation of stock quotas, boundary maintenance and steer 
fattening. As the 1979 review mission concluded this was an extremely 
ambitious objective (see World Bank 1979:3). On the other hand the Maasai 
pastoralists as well as having different objectives (e.g. securing their land as 
well as acquiring facilities such as dips and boreholes) had high expectations 
which for several reasons failed to be met (see Timoi & Kuluo 1990:85). 
1. Delays and Problems in Implementation 
According to Njoka (1979:49) the 'greatest delay in the incorporation stage 
stemmed from undue emphasis on egalitarian considerations geared toward 
avoiding the emergence of landless Masai'. However, other issues have been of 
more importance in contributing to delays in implementation. 
Through subsequent legislation much of the supervision of the group ranches 
was given to the Registrar of Group Representatives. This one-man office was 
inadequate to deal with the task, so that group ranches actually received no 
help with organizational matters. Qualified managers for the group ranches 
were not provided. Ranch models were often unrealistic and overoptimistic. 
There was a serious lack of co-ordination between the several institutions 
involved. In total there were about 17 agencies whose operation affected the 
project in one way or another. A Project Co-ordinating Unit (PCU) was not 
able to streamline the operations of all these groups (see Langat 1983:54). 
Immature steers for ranch fattening were often not available. Also the AFC, 
having had no experience in dealing with traditional pastoralists, faced serious 
staffing problems resulting in the project falling behind schedule. 
Phase I was extended by an extra year. Phase II needed 3 more years before 
it was finally completed by 1982. Another major factor which created delays 
and major obstacles were periods of drought which occurred most significantly 
in the beginning and mid 1970s and in 1984. The World Bank's 1976 review 
mission resulted in a number of revisions including the lowering of the official 
targets to 29 group, 46 commercial and 29 company and co-operative ranches. 
At the close of phase Π 27 group ranches had been financed. 
The Maasai were able to slop (he Nairobi National Park authonties acquiring 100,000 acres 
of the Kitengela area Tbeir attempt to acquire this had begun m 1966 (see Sunday Post 29/07/73). 
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2. Investments and Loan Repayment 
From the start of the livestock development project the rate and amount of 
lending to group ranches has been a disappointment to World Bank officials. 
By March 1975, only 5 group ranches had circulated more than 50 per cent of 
their development capital loans (see Grandin 1981:9). This is in part 
attributable to a 4 to 26 months period which was needed before loan 
approvals were provided. In other words, some group ranches received loan 
approvals only by the end of Phase I. Actual utilisation of funds was as a 
result very low. Only 50 per cent (US$ 0.9 million) of the total KLDP Phase I 
budget for Kajiado District had been distributed by 1974. In terms of 
investments per acre by the end of 1980 for KLDP Phase I ranches this 
amounted to Ksh. 9/52 for development capital and Ksh. 5/62 for working 
capital as opposed to appraisal figures of Ksh. 17/71 and Ksh. 4/80, 
respectively. 
Development during Phase Π had many problems to face especially after the 
drought of 1976. Engines and vital spare parts of boreholes had been stolen 
and "AFC steers" lost. For example, Kiboko and Olkarkar group ranches had 
been provided with a central AFC herd of 2,000 steers in 1973/4. Only 577 
reached the KMC as the steers were abandoned or sold illegally when group 
ranch members migrated away during the 1975-6 drought period in order to 
save their own animals (see Livingstone 1986:271). Erankau group ranch 
members were obliged to repay a development loan for dry boreholes which 
had been drilled on a site without a water layer (see Peron 1982:61). 
Successful boreholes on other group ranches faced the difficulty of machines 
breaking down and expensive and time-consuming repairs. In addition, a 
number of group ranch committees misused funds for their own benefit (see 
below). 
By December 1980, the 15 Phase I group ranches had a total of Ksh. 
9,468,545/- AFC loan disbursed. Several group ranches had difficulties in 
repaying their loans for ranch development as well as steer fattening. A total of 
Ksh. 2,133,747/- was in arrears, which is 23 per cent of total disbursement. 
Average loan disbursement per Phase I member was Ksh. 5,429/- with Ksh. 
1,223/- in arrears. Mbilini (Ksh. 4,183/member), Kiboko (Ksh. 3,976/m), 
Olkarkar (Ksh. 3,699/m) and Nkama (Ksh. 2,145/m) in particular had high 
levels of debts (see Grandin 1981:12). Difficulties in repayment occurred, 
especially in Nkama (90 per cent arrears), Mbilini (45) and Imaroro/Mashuru 
(38). The former had been able to pay off by 1986 while others were still 
having severe problems. The interest rates of 12 to 13 per cent charged by 
AFC further increased the financial burden of the group ranches. This was an 
extremely high rate for a loan that was intended to be promotional in nature. 
Though repayment included a so called "grace period" of 3 years, during which 
only interest had to be paid, it should be noted that the World Bank charged 
only 2-3 per cent for the on-lending credit. 
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As a result of the difficulties in loan repayment other group ranches that 
were ready for financing became reluctant to take loans. Others believed that 
AFC, a Kikuyu-dominated organization, purposely tried to inflict heavy 
burdens of debt upon the group ranches in order to be able to sell the land to 
outsiders. Consequently infirastructural development slowed down. Moreover, 
the costs of development had risen dramatically with items like tanks, troughs, 
firebreaks and pipelines doubling in price since the start of Phase П.20 
Table 7.5 Loan Performance by Kajiado Group Ranches as at 1986 
KLDPl KLDPn 
Number of ranches IS 16 
Approved loan 15 8* 
Redeemed loan 2- I A 
Outstanding loan 13 7 
•without arrears 2# 3@ 
-with arrears (> Ksh 100,000/-) 5" 0 
Source MoALU 1У86, Vermaal WW 4Ì 
* Kilomto, Oldomyo Nyokie, Elang'ata Wuas, Esokota, Torosei, Oloyiangalam. Olken, 
Olkiramatian, - Mbuko, Empuyiankat, л Torosei, # Nkama, Menieslu; @ Oldomyo Nyokie, 
Esokota, Olken, " Olkaikar, Mbilim, Imaroro/Mashuru, Αϊτοί, Птатеп 
Table 7.S summarises the situation of loan approvals and arrears for Phase I 
and Π Kajiado group ranches by 1986. Total outstanding loans for group 
ranches with AFC amounted to Ksh. 60 million, of which Ksh. 16 million was 
due for payment in 1986 (see Dietz et al. 1986:12).21 Understandably 
members were not too willing to contribute to repayments of loans for 
structures that were mostly not working or from which they had no advantage. 
It should be noted that auctioning of group land was not feasible. Declaring a 
group ranch bankrupt and selling its land was politically impossible. A 
member's share in repayment was determined according to livestock 
ownership. Livestock inventories, however, were not carried out annually. This 
sometimes resulted in a situation whereby, as a result of the 1977 drought, 
impoverished members were forced to repay a large part of the loan while 
others who had been lucky enough to save or restore their herd paid hardly 
anything. 
By the end of the 1970s each debtor group ranch member was persuaded by 
2 0
 Nevertheless, because of exchange rales falling from Ksh 7 40 to Ksh 10 80 for 1 US$ 
resulting m less dolían being drawn from the original budget total project allocation was reduced 
from US$ 21 S million to US$ 17 S million by 1980 
21
 By the end of 1989 Nkama group ranch had an outstanding AFC loan of Ksh 228,000/-
Olher ranches (known) outstanding loans were Ksh 791,244/- for Imaroro/Mashuru (some 
members also willing to sell pan of the ranch to clear the loan, but discouraged by the MoLD), 
Erankau Ksh 35,365/-, Shompole Ksh 2,041,742/-. Oldomyo Nyokie Ksh 1,500,000/- (see 
MoLD-RMD/AR 1989) 
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AFC officers to repay its part of the group's loan.22 This was an expensive 
and time-consuming exercise. Another AFC method used to recover (part of) 
development capital loans was by channelling the profits created from steer 
fattening. The steers were given for fattening to the group ranch as an 
entity.23 In general, AFC was reluctant to provide loans to group ranches and 
preferred to deal with individual ranchers having better facilities and whose 
land would be more easy to auction if required. 
During the 1984 drought individual ranchers also suffered huge losses. Some 
of them were threatened by the auctioning of their land. A presidential 
directive of May 1st 1986 was needed to ban this proposition made by the 
AFC.24 On April 14th 1989 president Moi directed the AFC, headed by his 
son, to write off loans given to dairy fanners (mainly individual ranchers) 
whose cattle had died during the 1984 drought (see DN 15/04/89)." 
3. Boundary Maintenance, Stock Quotas and Range Conservation 
A major and most criticized objective of the group ranch planners was the 
implementation of boundaries and the imposition of individual stock quotas. 
Both measures were intended as ways of seeking a balance between the 
carrying capacity of the ranches and the number of stock allowed to graze on 
2 2
 In order to be able to repay its AFC loan, Ollaramatian group ranch sold 500 ha near 
Nguruman bridge to the Tana and Athi River Development Authority (TARDA a governmental 
regional development organization covering 31 per cent of Kenya's surface area) The proceeds 
cleared the AFC loan of Ksh 2,513,000/- (see MoLD/AR 1988 7) So far TARDA has taken no 
action Initial plans to develop the area as an irrigation scheme had to be dropped because of the 
failure to find donors willing to finance this venture 
Рока group ranch suffered from questionable AFC practices which, according to the latter, 
were due to "computer problems". Over the years money transactions had been booked on the 
group's current account instead being used to repay the inleresl affected development loaa This 
resulted in a considerable accumulation of arrears To solve this problem money from the current 
account and a new development loan were used, without informing Рока members, for providing 
Рока members with 300 steers 50 of which died shortly afterwards due to ECF Following the 
selling of the steers, AFC once again deposited the revenue, which cancelled the loan debt on the 
Рока group ranch current account instead of paying off the loan. The AFC informed the members 
that they had a positive balance on their current account which could be witlxfrawn This 
immediately happened and in the end, the Рока group ranch ended up m arrears' 
2 4
 Kajiado District fanners and ranchers owed a total of almost 133 million Kenyan shillings 
to the AFC by June 1986 The AFC agreed to reschedule only OK needy cases By early 1987, 
however, nothing had been done to assist the most badly affected debtors (see DN 15/06/86 and 
DN 23/01/87). 
According to key informants the final handling of this case excluded initially appointed 
deblois and vice versa sometimes ignoring the most needy ranchéis Sometimes, debts of over 
Ksh. I million were written off. 
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them.26 The way the first group ranches were formed has already been 
discussed. We concluded that they were supposed to have been based on viable 
socio-ecological units containing wet and dry season areas. However, a 
UNDP/FAO range ecologist, who was member of the original survey team in 
Kaputiei, later stated that out of 14 Phase I group ranches only 6 ranches were 
considered viable (Рока, Kiboko, Nkama, Imaroro/Mashuru, Empuyiankat, 
Embolioi), 4 doubtful (Arroi, Olkaikar, Merueshi, Mbilini) and 4 not viable 
(Mbuko, Erankau, Ilmamen, Emarti) (see Halderman 1972c:20-24). 
What is more, the viable prototype Рока ranch saw its members leaving the 
ranch in 1970 as the result of the failing of the short rains and the infestation 
of the area by army worms. Neighbouring Olkarkar, Kiboko and Mashuru were 
among the few ranches that did receive rain and so those ranches were invaded 
by other Maasai pastoralists. This happened again in late 1973 and early 1974 
when Maasai from North Kaputiei even went as far as the outskirts of Nairobi 
while those from the southern and central areas mainly went to the Chyulu 
Hills. During late 1976 the situation became even worse and thousands of 
Maasai cattle from as far as Tanzania actually moved into Nairobi. The Maasai 
were charged and banned from the city whilst their cattle were dying by the 
hundred. An estimated 150,000 cattle died (see KD AR 1977:1). In 1984 large 
numbers of Maasai cattle moved in the opposite direction towards the 
Namanga region and as far as Tanzania in a vain attempt to escape the 
drought 
As well as these major droughts, over the years small localized failures of 
the rains or outbreaks of diseases like ECF or Malignant Cathair forced group 
ranch members to seek grazing pastures outside their group ranch territory. In 
most cases members of other group ranches in need of green pastures were 
allowed to enter the group ranch territory. Closing one's ranch to neighbouring 
groups would be unwise as all knew that, due to the erratic rainfall patterns, 
reciprocal relationships needed to be maintained. Nonetheless, boundary 
disputes have been going on for many years, particularly between Mbuko 
versus Mbilini and Kiboko versus Merueshi group ranches. 
Another more problematic issue was the grazing of livestock belonging to 
neighbouring individual ranchers within the group ranch boundary during the 
wet season. By the time the dry period came these animals were returned to 
the individual ranch which had conserved enough grazing to cover until the 
next wet season. In some cases this practice was officially allowed by the 
group ranch committee in return for money or other assistance but it also 
sometimes happened illegally when animals were taken to family members 
Initially the Land Adjudication Officer suggested planting sisal hedge-rows between the 
group ranches. This was rejected by S Meadows, head of the RMD. because of the high costs 
involved in their establishment and maintenance. Moreover, it was expected that the boundanes 
would be grossly neglected anyway! (see MoLD/RMD 1966). Instead beacons and tractor lines for 
firebreaks were used as boundary markeis. 
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living in the group ranch. The 1988 Kajiado District livestock census clearly 
showed this habit of moving cattle to another area with or without the owners 
by group ranch members and individual ranchers alike. As Coldham (1982:7) 
states 'The establishment of group ranches has not put an end to the Masai 
custom of inviting friends and relations (particularly sons-in-laws) to come and 
settle'. 
Branding cattle was tried in order to stop this practice. By October 1969 
Рока group ranch members marked their cattle in order to be able to impound 
any cattle found within the group ranch boundary not bearing the Рока brand. 
It also allowed close controls to be kept on grazing quotas issued for each 
member and eventually led to forced destocking. The stock quota issue had not 
been stressed at the time of group ranch formation as it was expected that this 
measure would be opposed by most group ranches. Rich members wanted the 
quotas to be based on actual holdings at the time of incorporation. Poor 
members wanted equal allocations. A compromise was reached whereby, on 
top of a minimum quotum, extra allocations were given to wealthier members 
(see Heiland 1980a: 190). However, this object of the group ranch concept did 
not materialize in practice. Stock numbers belonging to individual members 
continued to be highly distorted on most group ranches. The lack of any 
effective power on the side of the group ranch committee to take action against 
trespassers and rich stockowners was responsible for this. Even if regulating 
instruments had been available it is highly doubtful if they would have been 
implemented as in a not insignificant number of cases the group ranch 
committee members themselves would have been affected. 
Does this mean that the group ranch concept has failed to conserve the Maasai 
pastoral lands? Firstly, we should note that rotational grazing has not 
materialized because most of the group ranches did not have a suitable balance 
of wet and dry season grasses. Secondly, reseeding was not undertaken. By 
contrast, range ecologists feared that, if the group ranches were developed as 
proposed, they would suffer overgrazing resulting in the deterioration of the 
rangeland resources. 
According to Njoka (1979:126) who compared permanent vegetation 
transects in Kaputiei ranches for 1967 and 1977, the range trend has been 
downward within this period. The total species frequencies for desirable plants 
decreased by 44 per cent, while undesirable plants increased by 77 per cent. 
The mean basal cover in southern Kaputiei grasslands decreased from 18 per 
cent in May 1969 to 2.4 per cent in May 1977. Climatic and range 
management factors have been responsible, with Njoka pointing to the latter as 
being the main cause. Livestock figures increased between 1967 and 1974 from 
an estimated 400,000 to almost 700,000 head of cattle, falling to less than 
400,000 head of cattle by 1977 again (see table 3.3). 
Njoka states that the range development inputs in the Kaputiei region are 
responsible for the rapid increase of livestock. For example, water facilities 
292 Selling Wealth to Buy Poverty 
more than doubled between 1968 and 1974 in the Kaputíei ranges (see Njoka 
1979:181). In addition, dipping, vaccination and other disease treatments 
resulted in a decrease in mortality and an increase in calving rates. The steer 
fattening programme enlarged the import of cattle from northern areas. 
Moreover the AFC wanted the best grazing areas reserved for the young steers. 
The growth of the Kajiado wildlife population further increased pressure on the 
district's rangelands, which continued to shrink throughout the 1970s due to 
the influx of non-Maasai occupying the high-potential regions. Finally, we 
believe that the increasing obstacles to mobility and flexibility will have 
increased pressure on certain specific areas such as around watering points and 
human settlements. 
From 1978 to 1980 ILCA conducted a follow-up survey which indicates that 
Njoka's statement that the Kaputiei range would probably not be able to 
recover turned out to be wrong (see Grandin 1981:40). ILCA data show that 
the 1975-76 drought had been followed by a good recovery and that no 
evidence exists for increasing degradation of the range lands. Rather, the group 
ranch programme has failed to prevent a calamitous loss of livestock 
population which itself enabled the post-drought recovery of the pastures. 
4. Commercialization 
The aspect of commercialization of the pastorali s ts livestock production was 
discussed briefly in chapter 4 and will be dealt with in more detail in chapters 
8, 9 and 10. Now it is appropriate to report that several writers have said that 
it 'does not appear, then, that the Group Ranches are serving the function of 
radically transforming Maasai pastoralism, from subsistence to commercial 
herding' (Galaty 1978:11). White and Meadows concluded that the 
composition of Maasai herds by the early 1980s was still dominated by female 
cattle (65 per cent) geared at the production of milk and less towards meat 
production (see White & Meadows 198 l:i). 
Others like Livingstone (1986:257) have reported that this failure of the 
group ranch to change the livestock production system is partly the result of 
factors like a diminishing people-livestock ratio. Planners seem to have stressed 
factors like "overstocking" which has blurred the fact that the Maasai 
throughout the 1970s actually became short of livestock and land.27 
We have seen in section 6 2 6 that (he FAO model requirement for land per Kaputiei 
family was more than twice as large as the final actual allotment. In case of livestock, 
requirements were placed at some 30 SU per family of six AE In June 1969 at the start of KLDP 
I the RMD noted some SO SU/family and 6 2 ha/SU Overall carrying capacity was estimated to 
be S 2 ha/SU In other words, even though the model requirement was not met, at the start of the 
group ranch project the Kaputiei Maasai on average had an adequate number of livestock for 
subsistence without the area being overstocked However, according to Halderman (1972a 16), 
differences in human population densities and ecological viability between group ranches resulted 
in a very inequitable allotment of potential grazing resources (e g SU/AE varied from 6 0 to 19 1) 
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Also problems in the marketing stnicture such as the low prices offered, 
price controls, lack of (functioning) holding grounds and KMC capacity 
problems in times of stress have been named as among the most important 
reasons for the low level of commercialized livestock production in Kajiado 
District A special consultation workshop sponsored by the World Bank and 
RMD held in 1983 recommended the development of an improved marketing 
transportation system and the organization of auctions in the two Maasai 
districts (see MICCD 1983:38) 
5. Internal Administrative Problems 
The creation and functioning of the group ranch committee is thought to be 
responsible for a number of the problems highlighted above. Instead of being 
an autonomous producer free to go within the section's area ruled by the 
council of elders on the basis of decision-making by consensus, the Maasai 
pastoralist was now confined by the authority of a democratically elected 
committee. 
Initially, most committees are said to have been formed by influential and 
wealthy Maasai. Not surprisingly these people were not very willing to 
implement strict ranch boundary maintenance and reduction of stock. Most of 
them were illiterate and this hampered good ranch administration. Even those 
who were able to read Kiswahili could not deal with the Land (Group 
Representative) Act as it was written only in English. Later many of these 
committee members left and were replaced by young, educated and ambitious 
Maasai. As a result, in many group ranches a single age group monopolised 
power. However, they lacked natural authority which made the committees in 
some ranches rather weak institutions.2' In most ranches the obligatory annual 
general meeting was not held for years in a row. When a meeting could be 
held the necessary 60 per cent quorum was often not met 
Corruption also undermined the functioning of the ranches. For example, in 
Рока group ranch 11 group ranch members, most of them committee members, 
used group ranch funds to buy 13 bulls for their own use. In Kiboko the 
chairman illegally sold some AFC loan steers. Those who criticised were 
removed from the committee. Not seldom were the committee members backed 
by politicians and civil servants, often themselves members of the group ranch 
committee. In some cases national leaders forced a committee to provide them 
with plots of group ranch land (e.g. Kitengela and Rombo group ranches, see 
28
 Tobiko (1989a 98) repotted for Mashuni group ranch that nobody wanted to take up a post 
In the group ranch committee because they did not know or understand its importance Finally, all 
non-Maasai members (Kikuyu and Kamba) were unanimously proposed and elected because of 
their proficiency m the languages spoken by the "Big Men from Nairobi" and they could act as 
intemedianes They held no power at all, however, over the group ranch members Although this 
"soluuon" is an exception, it does illustrate the local Maasai' general atutude towards the institute 
of the group ranch committee. 
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Peron 1982:69). Politicians divided the group ranch members and formed small 
splinter groups according to age group or clan. 
Nowadays, as a result of the membership issue, opposing factions split along 
the lines of wealth in cattle or in sons seem to have appeared (see below). In 
some cases (e.g. Olkiloriti and Lomgosua ranches) this has resulted in violent 
clashes. In fact an alien governing body had been introduced into Maasai 
society, burdened with a whole range of responsibilities, unsuited to fulfil its 
task and which, in the end, became increasingly politicized and corrupted. 
7.4 The Process of Subdivision of the Kajiado District Group 
Ranches 
7.4.1 Introduction 
With the above mentioned problems and the resulting frustrations in mind it 
will be no surprise that a large number of group ranches wanted to subdivide. 
The main disadvantages of group ranching were: management problems (38 
per cent), poor facilities (34 per cent), lack of individual title (21 per cent) and 
loan repayments (7 per cent) (see Munei 1987:12ο).29 
Again, Рока group ranch took the lead. Already by 1972 it declared being in 
favour of dissolving the ranch into individually owned shares. In tables 7.1, 7.2 
and 7.3 we included the subdivision status of the Kajiado District group 
ranches as at 1990. So far, seven group ranches have been subdivided and title 
deeds issued. At the other extreme five group ranches, all located in Magadi, 
the driest part of Kajiado District, have decided to continue their group ranch 
on a communal basis.30 Table 7.6 summarises the particulars of the Kajiado 
District group ranches subdivision status in 1990. By 1990 already 40 owners 
of ranches totalling 7,933 km2 had decided to subdivide, 4 amounting to 1,777 
km2 were opposed to this idea and 7 covering 5,458 km2 had not yet decided. 
In other words, by 1990 the whole of Ngong and Central Division group 
ranches covering some 52 per cent of the district's group ranch area and 
including 78 per cent of the ranches has either already ceased to exist or will 
do so in the years to come. 
For 1988 these figures stood at only 35 per cent of the ranches and 17 per 
Among members of subdivided group ranches the most important disadvantage of group 
ranches was said to be the lack of an individual tide deed (44 2 per cent), communal co-operation 
and corrupt commutées (27 7 per cent) (ASAL Kajiado Programme pers comminicauon) 
Recent reports (August 1991) however, speak of Oldomyo Nyokie and Olkerl group 
ranches of Magadi Division as also being willing to subdivide their group ranches Huge 
outstanding AFC loans, of Ksh 1 S m and 08 m. respectively, are prohibiting this for the momeiU 
despite président Moi's direcuve Oldomyo Nyokie group ranch committee proposed its members 
sell 600 acres to clear the loan and pave the way for subdivision (see Kajiado Focus 1991a 4) 
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cent of the territory. Magadi division group ranches want to continue while 
those in Loitokitok Division are still discussing the pros and cons of 
subdivision. Figure 7.2 shows the Kajiado District group ranches and their 
subdivision status as at 1990. The resulting average plot size if the group ranch 
were to be subdivided is also mentioned. 
Table 7.6 Kajiado District Group Ranches and Subdivision Status, 1990 
DIVISION SUBDIVISION STATUS (Nr/Km») 
Section Nr Km2 1 2 3 4 5 6 
CENTRAL 
Kaputiei 
Dalalekutuk 
Ildamat 
Purko 
Matapalo 
Loodokilanl 
MAGADI 
Loodokilani 
LOITOKITOK 
Kisonko 
NGONG 
Keekonyokie 
36 
17 
4 
3 
2 
7 
3 
4 
6 
5 
7,087 
2,638 
546 
202 
176 
2,209 
1,316 
1,777 
5,072 
1,234 
5Л25 2/2Э6 4/922 6/754 
4/546 
2/160 1/41 
1/62 1/114 
6/1,823 1/386 
2/1.059 1/257 
4/1,777 
6/5,072 
4/1,204 1/30 
TOTAL 51 15.170 9/1,929 9/1.004 14/3,959 8/1.041 4/1,777 7/5.458 
Source: tables 7.1. 7 2,7.3 
Note: Subdivision status key 1 subdivided and titles issued; 2 consent given to subdivision by 
Registrar of Representatives and Land Control Board; 3 consent obtained from Registrar of 
Representatives; 4 no consent given; 5 not willing to subdivide; 6 no decision taken yet. 
7.4.2 The Rationale for Group Ranch Subdivision 
By the late 1970s, when increasing calls for subdivision were heard, the 
Central Government clearly opposed the idea arguing that the semi-arid regions 
were ecologically and economically unfit for small individual ranches. An 
average of 2,000 acres was considered to be a viable ranch for a household 
within medium to high-potential ranching areas. In Kajiado District, however, 
an average plot size of only 529 acres would be available in theory for a 
standard Maasai household of 10 persons by the early 1980$." In terms of 
group ranch members an average of 132 and 101 ha per member were 
available for respectively 1982 and 1986. 
3 1
 For 1968/69 Halderman (1972a:l) calculated an average availability of land per adult male 
of 191 ha, which he considered to be insufTicienL By 1979, 9,356 Maasai households were 
counted in Kajiado District which could m potential share some 4,953,162 acres of ranching land, 
which means a potential average parcel size of 529 acres per household. 
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Figure 73, Kajiado District Group Ranches and 1990 Subdivision Status 
Table 7.7 presents the distribution of potential mean sizes of individual parcels 
were the Kajiado District group ranches to be subdivided among their members 
by 1990. It shows that more than half the ranches would end up having plot 
sizes of less than 100 ha. Only Рока and Kiboko group ranches would have a 
mean plot size of more than 200 ha/member. However, it must be remembered 
that this is the result of the refusal of these ranches to register more members. 
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In reality the availability of land per person will probably be in the order of 
other Kaputiei group ranches. With reference to the economic viability of 
subdivided Kajiado group ranches, according to Haldennan (1972b: 1), most of 
them would be economic disasters. 
Table 7.7 Potential Mean Plot Sizes for Subdivided Kajiado Group Ranches 
Division 
Central 
Loitokitok 
Ngong 
Magadi 
Total 
source taDies / 1 , 
0-49 ba 
9 
0 
3 
0 
12 
23 5% 
7.2 and 7.3 
50-99 ha 
14 
1 
1 
3 
19 
37 3% 
100-149 ha 
7 
3 
1 
0 
11 
216% 
150-199 ha 
4 
2 
0 
1 
7 
137% 
20Of ha 
2 
0 
0 
0 
2 
3 9 % 
Total 
36 
6 
5 
4 
51 
100% 
In 1981 Рока group ranch members officially requested the dissolution of their 
group ranch. This was reluctantly accepted at district level but refused by the 
Ministry of Livestock Development headquarters in Nairobi. Another group 
ranch, Kisaju/Kipeto, ignored this directive and went directly for a subdivision 
of their area. This group ranch had existed only on paper, without official 
registration, thus its "members" did not feel bound by official opposition. With 
pressure building up and knowing that, in fact, the 1968 group ranch act 
included an option for the dissolution of the group ranch, in May 1982 the 
Central Government proposed to set up a committee to examine the pros and 
cons of group ranch subdivision. 
By March 1983 the Group Ranch Education Programme (GREP), on behalf 
of the Maasai Inter-Church Committee for Rural Development organized a 
Group Ranch Consultation Workshop at Buffalo Lodge, near Amboseli 
National Parie.32 This workshop, funded by the World Bank and attended by 
Government officials, group ranch members, researchers and representatives of 
the churches acted more as a sort of substitute for the proposed committee that, 
in fact, never materialized. In preparation for the conference several meetings 
had been organized, whereby government officials and Maasai Members of 
Parliament (Nampaso and Oloidpitip) were invited. Both MPs stated in these 
meetings that they opposed group ranch subdivision and that they had made 
3 2
 GREP started in 1979 as a departmenl oí the Development Education Program™ (DEP) 
of the Catholic Diocese of Ngong Several workshops were organized by GREP during which 
Government officials were Invited in order to come to a better understanding between both groups. 
GREFs main task so far has been the creation of awareness among the group ranch membeis m 
identifying their problems and looking for suitable solutions to them. As such they have become 
involved ш the discussions concerning subdivision and the way it is executed. Since 1985 GREP 
has been sponsored by NOVIB, a Dutch funding organization Nowadays, the Group Ranch 
Education Programme (GREP) is mainly operative m Loitokitok Division A description and 
analysis of the Development Education Programme m Kenya is presented by Kronenburg (1986). 
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this view known to the President and the Minister of Livestock Production in 
the past. However, not all Maasai MPs opposed group ranch subdivision (e.g. 
ole Tipis), and those who said they did soon fell into disfavour with the 
President." 
It seems the churches had indeed made a miscalculation as, after the 
Consultation Workshop, the Government accepted the right of group ranches to 
subdivide. The main condition was that subdivision should not result in 
unviable holdings (see Timoi & Kuluo 1990:86). So, more group ranches 
passed resolutions for dissolution. In 1984 the government agreed to conduct a 
vote by all Kajiado District group ranches as to whether to do away with the 
groups or not. 28 ranches were in favour of this leaving 23 remaining. 
The Government had nevertheless not yet made up its mind although this 
outcome seemed to have made it more reluctant, realizing the possible negative 
effects of an en masse individualization of semi-arid ranching. This position 
was at sometimes publicly stated in early 1985 by President Moi when he said 
that sub-division should not be undertaken in dry areas used only for livestock 
keeping (see DN 05/02/85). The Ministry of Livestock Development in 
particular feared that the final outcome of the subdivision of group ranches 
would be negative. The Kajiado District Range Officer warned the district's 
group ranches that subdivision would not be a solution to their problems (see 
D N 09/08/85). He was supported by several Kajiado District administrators 
who stated that subdivision of undeveloped group ranches was uneconomical, 
risked the creation of a class of landless Maasai and was a threat to the 
livestock industry in the district (see DN 15/08/86, DN 12/10/86).34 The lack 
of a clear Central Governmental land and development policy was partly 
responsible for their worries. Developments in the district which demonstrated 
an increase in the selling of land will have contributed to the other part. 
Reports, concerning the illegal sale of group ranch land were being written 
by the late 1970s and early 1980s especially from the Rombo and Kitengela 
group ranches (see e.g. Weekly Review 11/07/77, DN 29/12/84). In the high-
potential areas of Ngong and Loitokitok dishonest speculators were selling land 
that simply did not exist or which still belonged to a group ranch. In the 
Attacks on Oloitipiup by rival politician John Keen started m January 198Э and involved 
issues like mismanagement of public funds and the corrupt allocation of land to himself and his 
political supporters. Oloitipiup, for mstance, helped the Nairobi mayor Kahare obtain a title deed 
for a 100 acre farm he bought m Kisaju "group ranch" This fact made the GREP members realize 
that Oloiupitip would not be of much help This became even more clear by October 1983 when 
Oloitipiup was dropped from the CabmeL He was accused of being one of the leaders of the failed 
"coup d'étal" of August 1982 and was striving to become Vice-President (see Weekly Review 
30/03/84) A few yean later, on January 22nd, 198S, he died 
Already by August 1980 a nominated MP from Kajiado District, Mr J Napatao, appealed 
to the Maasai to halt the "indiscriminate sale of land" Other politicians such as Oloitipiup and 
Keen also castigated those Maasai for selling their land without approval of their families (see DN 
18/08/80,12/10/81, 03/11/81) 
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Ongata Rongai area over Ksh. 2.5 million was made by conmen selling non­
existent 1/4 acre plots to 182 willing buyers for the price of Ksh. 15,000/- each 
(see Standard 04/10/77, Standard 29/09/88). 
In other cases councillors, businessmen and administrative officials were 
accused of grabbing land set aside for the settlement of poor landless people at 
the Ngong Hills, in Ngong and Ongata Rongai townships, in Oloolua forest 
and in Rombo and Ewaso Kedong' group ranches (see e.g. Peron 1982:67/9, 
Standard 31/05/79, D N 17/09/81, DN 05/02/83, Standard 24/10/84, DN 
15/11/84, DN 31/12/86). Accusations were also made about councillors 
allocating themselves plots, which had been earmarked for public use (e.g. 
schools, holding grounds, cemeteries) free or at favourable prices.35 This 
practice occurred throughout all the echelons of power. At the top land was 
grabbed as far as the Kenyan coastal strip. Maasai ministers and a former 
Nairobi mayor were involved in the illegal acquisition of land (100 acre plots) 
in the Kisaju-Kitengela area, with forest land in Narok District and with beach 
plots near Malindi, a small town north of Mombasa. In addition, land in 
possession of individual ranchers was increasingly being sold to outsiders. 
Most of the buyers were rich and influential Government officials from 
Nairobi. 
In spite of, or perhaps because of these developments, several group ranches 
had passed resolutions for subdividing by the mid-1980s. The wind of change 
towards subdivision was sweeping furiously through the district. The Central 
Government dropped its opposition towards subdivision and by September 
1986 Olkinos group ranch members were issued individual title deeds. On 
January 22nd 1987 Kajiado leaders resolved that all group ranches in the 
district should be sub-divided equally on the basis of the family unit. Ranches 
that had not completed repaying their loans from the AFC or any other 
financial institution would not be subdivided (see DN 23/01/87). 
More group ranches now speeded up their procedure for subdivision but saw 
their efforts frustrated due to outstanding loans, lack of surveyors and conflicts 
over membership (see below). By March 14th 1989 President Moi directed that 
subdivision of group ranches in Kajiado District should no longer be curtailed 
For example, all of ihe IS elected members and one nominated councillor of the Kajiado 
County Council, with among them a number of neh uidividual ranchers, appeared on a list of 
landless people who acquired one of 417 plots on the slopes of Ngong Hills The allocation had 
started after a directive by President Moi to settle landless squatters on Ngong Hills trustland 
Over 3,000 people had applied to obtain one of the 2 S acres plots valued at some Ksh 100.000/-
each. After press reports the Provinaal Commissioner nullified the plot allocation (see DN 
31/07/84, Weekly Review 09/11/84, Standard 24/10/84, DN 15/11/84) 
In another case a group of SO neh people, civil servants, councillors and businessmen, were 
accused of excising 2,500 acres from Ewaso Kedong group ranch without the consent of the group 
ranch members (see DN 31/12/86) To date the pracuce of providing шЪап plots, commercial or 
residential, to relatives or (political) fnends still continues. Plots in one of the Ngong Division 
rural centres are particularly valuable For example, m Ongata Rongai pnces of up to Ksh 
120,000/- for 1/4 acre plots are advertised 
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because of failure to repay loans and that title deeds should be issued as soon 
as possible. This waving of loans will speed up the process of group ranch 
subdivision in the years to come. 
Beside the negative experiences with the group ranch concept it has also been 
argued that a rationale for subdivision can stem from a positive expectation 
concerning economic development and ecological conservation especially in 
the view of Central Government. Development in Kajiado District will speed 
up and better care will be taken of the rangelands if land is held under 
individual tenure. Ironically, arguments for ecological conservation and 
economic development were among the most important mentioned by the 
government during the time of the introduction of group ranches. 
At least the overgrazing of land by neighbouring (individual) ranchers will 
no longer be possible when all land is kept in private hands, as stated by a 
Рока group ranch member (see DN 12/10/86 - Elang'ata Wuas also suffered 
from this practice). Whether destocking, rotational grazing, reseeding and other 
range conserving methods will be introduced by the new individual ranchers is 
more questionable. At least some of these measures are new to a large number 
of them. 
Envy of group ranch members of the wealth of owners of established 
individual ranches has also been said to be responsible for their members' 
willingness to subdivide their ranches. However, the position of the individual 
ranchers is structurally different as their ranch areas vary from 3S0 to some 
2,000 acres (140-800 ha). Frequently the head of the household also has a paid 
job. Many of them have sold portions of land and that has made them 
millionaires overnight. For example, since 1984 25 Kisaju individual ranchers 
neighbouring Olkinos group ranch sold at least 2,490 acres of land earning 
them Ksh. 12,245,500/-. This can be compared to the average earnings of a 
farmer of almost Ksh. 500,000/-. This should be valued in the light of an 
average annual income for unskilled labourers in Kenya of some Ksh. 15,000/-
to 20,000/- by 1990. 
On average Kisaju farmers originally owned some 350 acres. Almost 30 per 
cent of the original plot size has been sold by this group within a period of 6 
years. The majority of the buyers were of non-Maasai origin and included land 
buying companies, women's groups, a teacher's union, rich politicians, civil 
servants and businessmen.36 In some cases this has resulted in further 
subdivision in hundreds of parcels as small as half an acre.37 Reselling, at 
much higher prices to make profits of over 300 per cent has also occurred. 
Kisaju and Kitengela are nowadays called Die "Presidential area'', a buying place for 
district and national politicians including the President and Vice-President Impressive fences bave 
been erected and these exclude the Maasai from these lands. 
For example, the Nairobi ex-mayor subdivided his 100 acre farm into 28 portions of 1 to 4 
acres each. These are now ready for sale at pnces of Ksh. 5,000/- to 10,000/- per acre. 
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Only two Kisaju Maasai charged a total of 190 acres for Ksh. 335,000/- to the 
Kenya Commercial Bank. It has been stated that the Maasai prefer to sell land 
because of high interest rates and relatively low amounts of loans offered by 
the financing institutions. For the small subdivided ranches it is feared that 
their owners will not be able to attract enough funds from lending institutions. 
The alternative of selling land will make them almost landless as their plot 
sizes will be in the range of 12S acres only. 
Pasha (1986:307-9) has summarised the pros and cons of the subdivision of 
group ranches. Those supporting the subdivision of group ranches state that it 
would: 
- help self advancement and raise the standard of living of the Maasai; 
- help the Maasai procure loans since most banks accept freehold title deeds as 
security; 
- minimize exploitation of poor households by richer households; 
- encourage the Maasai to engage in other agricultural or industrial enterprises; 
- facilitate better operation and maintenance of infrastructures that currently 
are being poorly maintained by inefficient committees. 
People opposed to the subdivision offer four major reasons: 
- alienation of land to non-Maasai. They fear an influx of outsiders taking up 
the better-watered parts; 
- cultivation of large tracts of land will result in severe erosion as experienced 
for example in Machakos District; 
- the influx of non-Maasai will result in the erosion and eventual loss of 
Maasai culture; 
- subdivision will result in fencing of farms and even complete individual 
ranches to protect the crops from wildlife and livestock. The free movement 
of livestock will be further constrained. 
In the remainder of this chapter and in chapters 8, 9 and 10 we will attempt to 
analyze the above-mentioned arguments using examples from several Kajiado 
District group ranches. Olkinos group ranch, the first group ranch subdivided, 
will be closely examined concerning the sale of land and economic and 
ecological developments. Let us start with a description of the group ranch 
subdivision procedure. 
7.4.3 The Procedure of Group Ranch Subdivision 
A clear and legal procedure for the necessary steps to dissolve a group ranch 
was lacking in the Land Adjudication and Land (Group Representatives) Act. 
Therefore in 1984 Land Adjudication and Range Department officials produced 
a provisional scheme which was approved by the Commissioner of Lands 
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awaiting official legislation. The procedure for subdividing a group ranch into 
individual parcels is as follows (see Tobiko 1989a: 130-33): 
1. the decision to subdivide the group ranch has to be taken at a general 
meeting at which at least 60 per cent of the members agree to subdivide 
their ranch; 
2. the group ranch must apply for consent to subdivide from the Divisional 
Land Control Board; 
3. the group ranch must apply for consent to the Registrar of Group 
Representatives; 
4. a "demarcation" committee composed of the group representatives and 
committee members plus a number of elected (mainly older) members is 
then formed to demarcate an individual parcel for each registered member. 
The maximum number is 25 members; 
5. the Range Management Office has to be consulted to undertake a feasibility 
study of the group land. A sketch map is produced showing the individual 
plots. In addition public utility plots like water points, wells, schools, 
churches, shopping centres are set aside. In the specific case of Phase Π 
and ΠΙ group ranches where infrastmctural improvements have been 
minimal, development plans have been produced assessing the potentialities 
and constraints of the area. In fact these plans are comparable to the 
UNDP/FAO development plans created by the late 1960s for the Kaputiei 
group ranches. They also include suggestions for destocking the area within 
a ten-year span of time, give much attention to the existing water and 
veterinary facilities and suggest possible improvements. Some new centres 
of approximately 50 acres each are proposed to be set aside at certain 
strategic points in order to enable every former member easy access to 
several facilities after subdivision; 
6. after viability has been confirmed, group members apply for a surveyor to 
fix and adjust the boundaries of the sketch map in an attempt to equalize 
the plots and establish their exact size. He also plots roads of access to 
every parcel of land. After the map has been checked by the District 
Surveyor it is forwarded to the Director of Survey; 
7. the group ranches now apply to the Divisional Land Control Board for 
consent to transfer the single group title into individual titles and to transfer 
the public utilities to the county council; 
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8. the survey map and the register containing names and plot numbers are 
forwarded to the Chief Land Registrar in Nairobi. Soon after this the 
District Land Registrar issues letters of consent to all persons registered as 
landowners and title deeds are issued; 
9. finally, in a special general meeting, a resolution for the disbanding of the 
group ranch is passed. 
It will be clear that the whole procedure from the decision to subdivide to the 
final actual ending of the group ranch's existence is a lengthy and time-
consuming process. 
7.4.4 The Problematic Process of Group Ranch Subdivision 
In the introduction to section 7.4 we mentioned the fast growth of the number 
of group ranches willing to subdivide. By 1990 almost 80 per cent of the 
ranches had decided to do away with the group ranch structure and become 
individual landowners instead. 
Below details of the process of subdivision as it has been conducted in the 
Olkinos and Embolioi group ranches (the first group ranches subdivided) will 
be described. In addition some information concerning the process and state of 
subdivision of Рока and the other group ranches which were covered in the 
survey will be summarised. 
OLKINOS GROUP RANCH 
The decision to subdivide the ranch was made in 1981. A demarcation 
committee was formed, which set aside individual plots. Except for 7 absentees 
every member was able to state his favoured location. The group of seven 
obtained their plot via balloting of the remaining plots. Public plots for a 
(proposed) school in the north eastern area, a dip, a borehole and another 
(proposed) dip were set aside. Roads were demarcated so that every individual 
ranch was accessible. In January 1984 the list of 138 members was screened 
and amended by removing double registrations (8), deceased without inheritors 
(4), an individual rancher (1), under 18 years of age when registered in 1979 
(4) and members who were also registered in neighbouring ranches and 
preferred to go there (8). Registration of new members, most of them 
belonging to the Ilmeshuki age group, was opposed. During the process of 
subdivision the non-members put forward a claim for obtaining their own land 
only to be told to build their homes on the top of trees! Also, their attempts to 
bribe Kajiado District government officials were futile. 
The resulting subdivision showed 116 parcels which ranged in size between 
17 to 143 acres. When criticisms were made it was stated that this was the 
result of allocating larger parcels in unfavourable areas and to large families. 
Another complaint was made concerning the intended allocation to a non-
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member of a parcel belonging to a widow. Another protester had erected a 
fence for his shamba but saw the plot earmarked for someone else. Others 
complained about the small sizes of their plot. They also wanted to know what 
would be done with three vacant plots. To settle this and other difficulties the 
annual general meeting of November 1985 was to solve these problems. The 
first of the vacant plots was given to another widow whose husband had died 
before registration. The second unallocated parcel was balloted to a new 
registree. The last vacant parcel (25 ha) was "given" to an individual rancher, 
having land in Ngong and Loitokitok as a reward for his payment of the 
outstanding AFC loan (Ksh. 97,000/-) and survey fees (Ksh. 240,000/-)· 
Registration of the last three people made a total of 116 "group ranch" 
members. With the loan cleared and the surveyors' map produced by January 
1986, the Land Control Board gave consent for the transfer of the individual 
parcels to the new individual ranchers in September 1986. 
EMBOUOI GROUP RANCH 
Embolioi group ranch members asked permission from the Land Control Board 
to subdivide their ranch in October 1982. This was acceded and a demarcation 
committee installed. Disputes such as those in Olkinos arose over allegations of 
parcels being allocated to non-members, the eviction of a widow from a parcel 
on which she had buried her husband and the setting aside of large parcels for 
influential people at the cost of the powerless and absentee members. By 
February 1984 consent to proceed was given by the Department of Land 
Adjudication. However, by July 1984 the members had decided to install a 
new committee as the old one was accused of having allocated themselves and 
their relatives excessively large parcels. In September 1984 the Range 
Department gave consent to the appointing of a surveyor who finished his 
work by November that same year. Still, protests arose from people stating 
that, in spite of having contributed to the subdivision costs, they were not 
allocated a plot. 
The total costs of the subdivision of Embolioi group ranch amounted to 
some Ksh. 600,000/-, and it was partly covered by royalties paid in advance by 
gypsum-miners. A Ksh. 900,000/- AFC loan was also repaid. In total 700 acres 
were set aside for public plots used for (proposed) trading centres, schools, 
boreholes and dips. AU members agreed to use these facilities communally 
even after subdivision. By May 1986 the RMD noticed some remarkable 
differences between theirs and the surveyor's map in size, location and number 
of parcels. According to the group ranch committee, changes had to be made 
because seven registered members had not been included in the RMD map and 
because some RMD boundaries had been drawn without the area having been 
visited. 
At a general meeting in July 1986 the Embolioi register was finalised. In 
total 30 new members, most of whom had already been included in the land 
subdivision, were officially now registered. Out of 18 deceased members 16 
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were replaced by their inheritors and double and multiple entries adjusted. 
Unknown members and the sons of individual ranchers were removed from the 
list This resulted in a final allocation of 299 parcels ranging in size from 40.S 
to 71.2 ha. The Land Control Board gave its consent for the transfer of the 
titles to the Embolioi members by November 1986. After individual payments 
of Ksh. 200/- to the Board and another Ksh. 200/- to the District Land Register 
Office the titles were handed over in December 1986.38 
The reports above suggest that in most group ranches members easily met the 
60 per cent minimum quota needed to commence the dissolution of the ranch. 
This was confirmed by a survey based on a sample of 100 members (out of 
571) carried out in Sajiloni Group Ranch in 1989, where only 8 per cent were 
stated to be against subdivision (see Malleon 1989:1). 
Opposition towards subdivision seemed to come mostly from non-registered 
members and from members with many unregistered sons. It should be noted 
that these groups of opponents, the fonner having no legal say, do not 
necessarily reject the idea of subdivision itself but reject the way it is or has 
been done. According to Tobiko (1989b:15-16), who conducted a survey in 
Imaroro/Mashuru group ranch, elderly women in particular fear that 
subdivision will destroy harmonious communal life, create landlessness, limit 
resource utilisation, lead to land being sold or auctioned and thus threaten 
successful pastoralism as the mainstay of their society. Middle-aged and young 
women, in contrast support the subdivision of land wholeheartedly arguing that 
land parcelling is necessary for speedy development and the creation of a more 
comfortable life. 
The "second generation issue" of non-registered age groups has particularly 
divided group members and even families. We have seen how Рока and 
Kiboko members opposed registration stating that the resulting plot sizes would 
be too small to be viable. In other group ranches the younger generation has 
been registered, though sometimes only after physical threats from young 
people as happened, for example, in Oldoinyo Orok and Mailua group ranches 
in 1987. In other cases, the non-registered have sought legal assistance by 
bringing their case to court as the Kiboko young people did.39 
One owner saw thai. In return for a water connection, his parcel was reduced by S acres 
for the mstallalion by the Ministry of Water Development of 4 boreholes for supplying water to 
Kajiado Town and (In future) to neighbouring Ismya Town 
9
 Disputes under the Land (Group) Represeniatives Λα are usually between the members of 
the particular group or between the group and other persons The lauer is the case when dealing 
with the membership issue Aggrieved persons who have been refused to be given membership 
status within a group ranch can file their case in the District's Magistrates Court and if needed 
appeal lo the High Court. Once the court declares lhai certain individuals qualify to be members, 
then the group representatives will have no option but to register them as such (see Wanjala 
1990 57) However, in several cases the Court decided stated that it did not want to deal with the 
membership problem and directed the applications back to the group ranch committee 
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Box 7.1 ΡΟΚΑ GROUP RANCH 
By early 1981 the 30 Рока group ranch members decided to deny the request of 92 Рока non-member* for 
registration Moreover, a majonty (76 per cent) of the memben decided to strive for individual ranches 
They argued that the registraüoo of new members would result in the ranch being subdivided into too 
small parcels In fact the average 297 S ha per member was already considered to be unviable The refused 
members, most of them of the Dmmsho age group, mamed having children and even having been 
promoted to the status of junior elder, supported by a group of 43 women (wives and molbers) requested 
the Land Registrar and the late Mr S Oloitipitip, by then Minister for Local Government to help them 
The women feared that, after misappropnauon of loans the land would be auctioned Then- plea was futile 
and so were the letters that followed to the Ministry of Lands and Settlemeol refemng to the registraüoo of 
their eons' peen in neighbouring group ranches 
By May 1983 a request for subdivision was approved by the Department of Land Adjudication 
Registered supporters of the Dmmsho age group were removed from the group ranch committee Other 
members supporting the unregistered Рока residents were those having large families Some of them had an 
effective weapon for delaying the subdivision as they refused to contribute into the repayment of the AFC 
debt for the acquisition of bulls Though financed with group money, these were used solely by the 
committee members Preparations, however, continued and by February 1985, Рока group ranch signed a 
contract with a private surveyor to finalise the boundary lines and exact plot sizes as laid down by the 
Range Department and Demarcation committee Instead of a two month period the surveyor needed over 
two yean to draw the final Plan It was only then that the Kajiado officials noticed that plot sizes vaned 
between 189 ha to 533 ha, completely diflerent from the original Range Department map Survey work, 
costing Ksh 75,000/- had to be repeated and a new шар produced before April 1987 Again promises were 
not kepi and Рока group ranch threatened to cancel the agreement Finally, by November 1987 a map was 
produced, which became avaJable only by July 1989 It shows a total of 30 ranches from 299 to 319 ha 
and plots set aside for a school, trading centre, community centre and water point In August 1989 the 
Land Control Board gave their consent to Рока group ranch for the transfer of individual titles 
KIBOKO GROUP RANCH 
Like Рока, Kiboko group ranch members were opposed to the registration of new members However, 32 
non-registered members were more successful ш seeking assistance from Mr Oloitipitip in their struggle lo 
be accepted by the group ranch as new members In a letter dated February 11th 1983, Oloitipitip's 
Ministry requested the Minister of Lands (Kanuki) to register the 32 people listed By May 1983 the 
Nairobi register was updated 
By October 1983 the official decision to subdivide Kiboko group ranch was made by the 67 members 
In awaiting the actual allocation of plots members tned to claim certain parts of the group ranch by setting 
aside private оі-окгп for their calves and sick animals By January 1984 30 non-registered members of the 
Umuuho age-group complained to the Kajiado District Commissioner about the unofficial subdivision of 
the ranch In November 1984, after a heated debate, it was decided that the practice of creating individual 
ol-oken should stop as it undermined the grazing patterns within the group ranch At the same tune, with 
the 1984 drought coming at its height, members of other group ranches were required to leave the Kiboko 
area. 
By October 1985 rumours arose that, ш the Nairobi register Kiboko group ranch totalled 99 members, 
whereas the Kajiado and Kiboko registen still showed only 67 members At a general meeting in 
November this was confirmed Following a heated debate, in which old and "new" members had to be 
separated, only one member out of the group of 32 new registrations was accepted as replacing his 
deceased father The remaining 31 were "deregistered" in February 1986 In January the 67 members 
wanted to settle on the parcels allocated by the demarcation committee awaiting official subdivision 
Tensions arose between the two groups Kiboko group ranch tned to repay its loan as soon as possible by 
acquiring a new lot of AFC steers The animals were kept in a central herd By May 1988 they were able 
to clear the loan The group of 31 still pressed for registration Although more members seemed to have 
turned more sympathetic to this request, a majonty of 74 per cent still opposed registration A plea from 
the assistant chief of the area was also fhiitless In October 1988 the annual general meeting dealt with the 
subject extensively The Land Registrar was présent explaining the process of subdivision and the 
procedures for registration The group seeking registraüoo admitted that they had sought help from 
Oloitipitip The Land Registrar proposed to screen every member of this group and orphans, for instance, 
whose parents were not registered would not simply be able to inherit their father's plot A statement by 
one of the members that they should be given a piece of their uncle's land was waived as it had no legal 
backing Finally. 21 people were said to be fatherless and in four cases the father was a registered member, 
while two others were said to have been living on the Menieshi group ranch Still, the registered members 
(especially the Iseun age group) refused to regista a single new member In the August 1989 annual 
geooal meeting the group ranch committee reported that it was now ready to dissolve the group ranch In 
October 1989 the group of 31 obtained help from a lawyer, who summoned Kiboko group ranch to register 
the applicants or else be sued ш court By February 1990 a majonty of 70 per cent (47 members) still 
rejected the registration The case is still pending 
Chapter 7: Kajiado District Group Ranches 307 
Boi 7 J ELANG'ATA WUAS GROUP RANCH 
In 1985 Elang'ala Wuas group ranch had decided to close their register totalling 658 members At the 
time of Incorporation 415 members had been registered. A demarcation committee divided the whole 
group ranch into individual parcels After payment of Ksh 600/-, members had to sign a paper that they 
agreed to the size, quality and location of the allocated parcel It should be noted that Elang'ala Wuas 
has a huge variety in the quality of the ranch Allocation was rather biased favouring a few influential 
members For example, the Chief of the area, a member of the ranch and the Purità Land Control Board, 
managed to designate himself some 700 hectares or almost 12 per cent of the total group ranch area. He 
simply claimed all the land in between his newly built modem house and some young trees planted by 
him near a dam. Anybody opposing was threatened with being given a small plot north of Slngirame, an 
unfavourable location In February 1990 the Land Adjudication Officer Nairobi protested over this issue 
Since 1986 the Dkishlll age group of 218 persons has been trying to acquire the status of registered 
member for all of their agemates Ate one time the group presented a bottle of whisky, some tobacco, 
and a bow and arrow to the committee This was returned by the elders who told them to bnng a heifer, 
a crate of b e a and a blanket in order to avoid being cursed The non-registered members obtained some 
support from an opposing political faction within the group ranch This enabled them to contract a lawyer 
for their case The group made It a court case In November 1989, but nothing has happened since By 
December 1989 Elang'ala Wuas group ranch had removed double and multiple registered members. 
reducing the total membership to 487 members On average this would mean an allocation of 114 ha per 
member Also in Elang'ala Wuas group ranch those who came from elsewhere, even as far as Samburu, 
and those orphans whose fathers never registered will be Ignored Only two widows whose husbands died 
after 1982 have obtained membership By contrast, three sons of an Influential family within the group 
ranch are said to have been registered illegally 
METO GROUP RANCH 
In early 1972 only 12 Maasai In the southern Matapalo area decided to accept the possibility of obtaining 
their own individual farm. A majority of the people strongly opposed this idea and either became 
members of the Meto or Oldoinyo Orok group ranches By 1985, only a few years since Meto group 
ranch had started. It was decided to dissolve the ranch and form individual plots The matter had been 
left to rest for a while until September 1989 when, at an Annual General Meeting, the Meto members 
officially decided to subdivide their group ranch Only some older members, having many unregistered 
sons opposed the subdivision Over the years the Melo group ranch has registered new members raising 
their total of 408 in 1982 to 607 in 1990 Unregistered members are those of the youngest age-group, 
Ilkimunyak 
The process of subdivision in this group ranch Is still in the early stages By January 1990, official 
permission from the Land Adjudication Office had been obtained A feasibility study had been 
conducted, but no single plots demarcated so far This will be one of the most difficult group ranches to 
be subdivided Among the problems are the fact that out of some 600 members, only about half of the 
members actually live there A large group consists of Matapalo and Kisonko Maasai living in Tanzania. 
Others slay in neighbouring towns, once in a while coming to beg for a heifer or sleer, which is sold 
immedialely for drinking money The Tanzaman Maasai will be particularly willing to obtain a plot and 
Kenyan citizenship alike The group ranch commiuee has been thinking of allocating the Tanzaman 
Maasai small plots along the borderline with Tanzania It is possible that a family send a wife to settle 
there Denying them this parcel is a dangerous act The Meto Maasai depend on watering points (wells) 
some 10 km Inside Tanzania. Before the arrival of the Europeans this was Matapalo area It is also the 
borda line between Tanzanian Kisonko and the Matapalo If the Tanzania Matapalo were denied iheir 
Melo individual plot they could, in response, deny the Melo Maasai access to the wells On the other 
hand If all the Tanzania Matapalo decided to settle on (relatively large) individual parcels in Kenya, there 
Is the risk of the Kisonko Maasai moving into the 10 km zone of Matapalo area resulting in the loss of 
the wells as well This has already happened at the McuVTorosd border because of Torosei group ranch 
(Loodokilanl section) recently denying Meto Maasai access to the natural pans situated on Torosei group 
ranch which had previously been shared with the Meto Maasai' cattle It has been stated that the aim of 
this move was to force Melo members to move away from their part of Meto group ranch which was to 
be left for Torosei ranchers Another problem is the large variance of range quality Towards Torosei the 
grazing capacity diminishes Some pans also an rather hilly, which most members dislike After group 
ranch subdivision Meto members will possess, on average, slightly over 47 ha. 
LORNGOSUA GROUP RANCH 
By December 1980, three members who jointly paid for the siting and drilling of a new borehole 
requested the setting aside of 30 acres for Individual use This was turned down Yet by October 1989 all 
members agreed to subdivide Iheir ranch They cleared their register of double and multiple entries, 
accepted, after a heated debate, the registration of 182 new applicants bringing the total membership at 
815 This will after subdivision result In an average ranch size of 47 ha per member 
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This has been done, for instance, in Imaroro/Mashuru and Olkiloriti group 
ranches. In the latter group ranch the issue of subdivision has ruined the social 
harmony of the community. The "left hand" of the Ilkiseyia age group 
(Irangirang) were not allowed to be registered, in contrast to the older "right 
hand" section. During a meeting dealing with the registration issue the latter 
did not support their younger left hand warrior group. The Irangirang went to 
court in December 1989 and won their case. 
However, Olkiloriti group ranch appealed against this verdict and the case is 
still pending. During the time of this legal fight the Ildamat section was in the 
process of their oln'gesher ceremony. It was seriously delayed as a result of 
the problems between the right and left hand group, who were supposed to be 
united in one single age group of young elders after the completion of the 
ceremony (see chapter 4). However, in fear of a bloody clash between the two 
groups, instead of building one single big emanyata two small imanyat were 
built, one for every single hand of the warrior age-group. 
Once the decision to subdivide has been taken it still takes a long period 
before the actual handing out of individual title deeds is completed due to 
technical problems (see the above presented examples of Рока and Kiboko). 
The lack of good surveyors particularly hampers the group ranch subdivision 
process. As early as December 1984 Kajiado politicians urged the government 
to release more government surveyors as private surveyors were considered to 
be too expensive. Others pose that private surveyors work faster as government 
surveyors get more allowances if they take more time to finish their job. Loan 
repayment has been another hampering problem but has now been solved. 
The whole process of group ranch creation and subdivision has taken place 
over a period of some 20 years or even less in the case of Phase ΠΙ ranches. 
During this timespan developments within other land use activities like 
cultivation, wildlife conservation, forestry and mining also continued. In 
section 7.2.1 we already pictured some of the evolutions in the Ngong and 
Loitokitok area until the late 1960s. In the next section we will briefly present 
an outline of processes that took place from that time until the late 1980s. 
7.5 Land Pressures Building Up in Kajiado District: 1970-
1990 
7.5.1 Infiltration and Cultivation by non-Maasai Groups 
In the foregoing chapters (i.e. sections S.S.4 and 6.3.2) we described 
agricultural developments within Kajiado District since 1945 including the 
infiltration by Kikuyu, Kamba, Chagga and other peoples in search of arable 
land. As early as the late 1950s registration of land had been proposed for the 
Ngong area to rule out the possibility of people from outside the area coming 
and claiming land (see section 5.5.4). In section 7.1.2 of this chapter we made 
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clear that the threat of a possible mass influx by non-Maasai cultivators 
contributed to the Maasai willingness to accept the group ranch concept. 
Possible locations for the non-Maasai to settle were the traditional locations 
of small rural centres like Ngong Town, Kajiado, Loitokitok, Namanga, Sultan 
Hamud engaging in all kinds of trade activities. Others found employment with 
the Magadi Soda Company or other mining corporations in the district. In 
addition, the possibility of obtaining a small plot either under one's private 
ownership or as a tenant had increased tremendously since the creation of 
individual ranches and the beginning of the registration of land in Ngong 
(1961) and Loitokitok (1966). Wealthy non-Maasai now had the opportunity to 
buy a piece of land in Kajiado District Less well-off people came to work for 
the Maasai or their fellow kinsmen as agricultural labourers. 
When, by 1968, Kajiado District had lost its status of being a closed district 
and every Kenyan citizen could, in principle freely enter without the need of a 
legal document it became even easier to get employment in cultivating a piece 
of land.40 As a result, through the 1960s and 1970s agriculture extended to 
the south-west of Nairobi at an accelerating rate. By 1970 it had moved 
southward along the whole eastern base of the Ngong Hills as far south as the 
Kiserian river in later years followed by a spread along the southern boundary 
of Nairobi National Park (see Ecosystems 1982:67).41 
Expansion in Loitokitok Division seems to have occurred from halfway 
during the 1960s. Campbell's figures obtained from a sample population of 
cultivators in the Loitokitok area, show that the break point for the migration 
of non-Maasai to this area seems to have been the second half of the 1960s 
(see table 7.8). 
Table 7.8 Settlement of Fanners in the Loitokitok Area 
Dale 
63 
66-
71 
•62 
• 65 
•70 
•76 
source campeen ІУКІЬ yj 
Total 
n=110 
10 
27 
37 3 
59 0 
Maasai 
n=20 
50 
50 
250 
65 0 
Kikuyu 
n=62 
00 
16 
43.5 
548 
Kairta 
n=28 
00 
36 
321 
642 
4 0
 Before this date, one needed a pass to enter Kajiado Distnct which had to be renewed 
every 6-12 months The pass was only provided to those non-Maasai who had been placed on a 
special list after invitation by two Maasai (the 'Trespass Ordinance" regulations) Of course, after 
the creation of the group ranches in the Kapuuei area this region was provided wiih a new weapon 
( ie group ranch membership) to stop non-Maasai illegal infiltration Unless approved by (he 
group ranch, cultivation was not allowed. 
41
 In 1974 it was decided by the Ministry of Lands to station two surveyors permanently m 
the Ngong area due to the increase m land transactions in the area (see KDAR 1974 48) Out of a 
distnct total of 191 land transfers 117 requests bad been made m Ihis area while (he total for 
Loitokitok stood at 48 
310 Selling Wealth to Buy Poverty 
Information from district annual reports (1969. 1973) underlines the growth of 
land under cultivation since the late 1960s. For example, in 1969, acreage 
under maize and beans, the most important crops of those days, was 3,090 ha 
in Ngong and 1,880 ha in Loitokitok. By 1973 the area planted with maize and 
beans had increased to 3,500 ha in Ngong and 6,600 ha in Loitokitok (short 
rainy season acreage alone). Other important crops grown at the time were 
potatoes, coffee, peas, bananas, pyrethrum (Ngong only), cotton (Loitokitok 
only). To boost coffee production a coffee factory was opened in July 1963 in 
Loitokitok. 
Organizations (partly) involved in demonstrating agricultural production were 
started in Kajiado District throughout the 1960s. An important number of them 
were initiated by non-governmental organizations (e.g. Oxfam, World Vision) 
and missionaries as a follow up to famine relief efforts or in trying to broaden 
existing development efforts, e.g. Isinya-Maasai Rural Training Centre (CPK-
Anglican Church-1961); Rombo-model farm project (Catholic Church-1962); 
Ngong Farmers' Training Centre (British Council of Churches-Christian 
Council of Kenya/Oxfam-1965) and the Olooseos-Maasai Action for Self-
Improvement Project (Presbyterian Church of East Africa-1969). 
A strong momentum for the increase of cultivation in Kajiado District resulted 
from the 1973-76 drought period. Kaputiei Maasai herdsmen had driven their 
animals as far as the outskirts of Nairobi and the Chyulu hills, while those 
from Loitokitok moved to the Dalalekutuk area as well as Kimana and Rombo. 
Still, an estimated 60,000 cattle died in the June-December period of 1976 
alone (see DN 13/01/77). Famine relief was provided by way of maize meal 
and beans for some 60,000 people or over 40 per cent of the district population 
(see KDDP 1980:9). 
The non-Maasai farmers -especially those situated on the lower slopes of 
Mt. Kilimanjaro- faced a hard time. Only those on the higher slopes and those 
practising irrigated cultivation on the plains had been able to produce a 
reasonable crop during the years of drought (see Campbell 1978:34). This 
acted as an incentive for others to move to these better-watered, thus less 
drought-ridden lands. Maasai group ranch members did not oppose this move 
strongly as most of them were in deplorable circumstances and willing to 
attempt cultivation themselves or, more usually, hire labour to do so. With the 
lower slopes of Mt. Kilimanjaro almost completely overtaken by cultivation the 
cultivators now started to buy or rent plots along the margins of the swampy 
areas on the plains like Kimana and Rombo. Moreover, in 197S the Kajiado 
District Council decided to stimulate the local initiative in irrigated agriculture 
by providing a grant of Ksh. 53,000/- for the Kimana-Tikondo irrigation 
scheme. The scheme had started in the mid-1950s and needed to be resurveyed 
and expanded (see KDAR 1976:11. Kimani 1988:9). Other areas which had 
started by the 1950s such as Rombo, Isinet and Inkisanchani also increased 
their production. In addition, new areas were opened in Loitokitok Division for 
Chapter 7: Kajiado District Group Ranches 311 
irrigation by the middle of the 1970s; Impiron, Namelok, Elangata Nkima and 
Olorika (see section 4.4.2). 
As a result the area under cultivation increased rapidly. Moreover, with 
irrigation it became possible to increase the planted acreage for certain crops as 
one could cultivate almost continuously throughout the year. The production of 
horticultural crops gained in importance. The growing of onions became very 
popular as this cash crop had a very high gross margin. This occurred mainly 
at the cost of cotton growing. Agriculture lost its stigma of being only for the 
poor. Profitability triggered the opening of more parts of the Loitokitok's 
better-watered areas (Illasit, Osoit) or the extension of existing schemes like 
Namelok and Impiron for irrigated cultivation. In Ngong Division (Kiserian), 
Central Division (Namanga) and Magadi Division (Nguniman, Pakase, 
Shompole) irrigation also increased (tomatoes, melons). In the Ngong area it is 
mainly non-Maasai fanners using borehole water to supplement the growing of 
rainfed food crops, although tomatoes are also of importance. Irrigation 
practices in Namanga are negligible as they concern a few non-Maasai fanners 
using tap water only. In Ngong and Central Division it is expected that 
irrigated agriculture will rise in Ewaso Kedong and Kitengela areas, 
respectively. 
Of more importance is the irrigated activity taking place in Magadi Division 
(e g. melons, mangos and other fruits). In fact, this division probably contains 
the oldest irrigation scheme of the district.42 By the 1960s, the area under 
irrigated cultivation in Nguniman was estimated to be some 60 ha. According 
to Ecosystems (1982:48) this increased to 400 ha by 1970 and 1,000 ha by 
1980. This seems to be an overestimate. The Ministry of Agriculture 
mentioned a total area of almost 300 ha of which half was cultivated by some 
20O farmers in 1987 (see MoA/AR 1987:22). The 1988 farm census estimated 
the Nguniman irrigated area to amount to some 825 ha of which 410 ha were 
cultivated by 237 farmers, some 55 per cent being non-Maasai (Kamba 
mainly). In Pakase 15 fanners irrigated 17 ha (80 per cent non-Maasai). In 
Shompole there were 21 fanners fanning 17 ha and with the exception of one 
42
 Rev Wakefield, a missionary stationed in Mombasa who gathered descriptions of the 
interior during 1866-1870 by interviewing Arab Swahili caravan leaden, reportó of small scale 
imgation pracuces for the Nguniman and Pakase area (see Jacobs 1967 Э. Jacobs 197S 17) Trade 
caravans used to stop and barter for agncultural produce before continuing their journey through 
Maasailand. By that time maize, beans, millet and sweet potatoes are said to have been grown by 
a group of some 1,000-1300 people composed of iniermanying "agncultural11 Maasai, 
impoverished Maasai and neighbouring Sonjo By early 1900 the number of people seems to have 
dropped to only 400, while by 1918 the settlements were virtually abanioned Thus, the 
Nguniman settlements seem to bave been abandoned, resettled and abandoned again, depending on 
the fortunes of the pastoralists who occupied the plains (see Bemtsen 1979 116). 
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Kamba all were Maasai.43 
Disregarding individual irrigating farmers in Ngong and Central Division the 
total irrigated area in Kajiado District has been estimated to be 2,294 ha by 
late 1988 (see section 4 . 4 . 2 ) " In the same Fami Census of 1988, the area 
under rainfed cultivation was 11,529 ha making a total cultivated area of 
13,823 ha. It is difficult to relate this figure to estimates made by other 
authors. Agricultural officers have stated that the figures used by the MoA are 
not reliable and should be considered guestunates at best. For example, the 
Kajiado District Development Plan 79-83 estimated a total of 60,000 ha under 
cultivation for 1978 (see KDDP 1980:3). The Ministry of Agriculture gives a 
figure of 10,363 ha under crops for the 1982 long rains (see KDDP 1984:31). 
A recent figure by the Ministry speaks of 176,600 ha for Kajiado District for 
1988 (see MoA/AR 1988:3). Although the area under cultivation has certainly 
increased this could never have happened by a multiplier of 17 times.45 
Table 7.9 shows the annual cultivated acreage, thus in most cases including 
two growing seasons, for some of the most important crops in Kajiado Distnct 
for the 1976-1987 period. We also included the 1988 Farm Census estimate for 
1987, which reached a total of 20,456 ha planted crops. Official figures, 
however, were much higher. It is thought that the real value will be somewhere 
in between, rather towards the low side.4" Leaving aside these difficulties 
table 7.9 clearly shows the increase in the cultivated area in Kajiado District 
This is thought to be due to a combination of the increasing number of fanners 
This area is threatened nowadays because of plans by the Euaso Ngi'ro South 
Developmenl Authority and the Kenya Power and Lightning Company to built dams m the Euaso 
Ngi'ro nver A Ksh 120 million pre-feasibihly study made by a British consultancy firm, a 
candidate for the unplemenlation of the project, did not lake into account the environmental effects 
satisfactorily It has been prophesied by olheis that the Shompole swamp will dry up and thai the 
nverine area used by livestock mainly during penods of drought will diminish 
4 4
 It should be noted thai the 1988 Farm Census did nol cover the Elangata-Enkima/Olonka 
scheme estimated to be some 65 ha in size 
In 1982 the author stayed for a penod of three weeks m a little village named Kikelelwa 
along the Tanzania-Kenya border at the slopes of ML Kilimanjaro At thai urne several scattered 
(riots planted with maize, beans and bananas existed Down on the plains towards Nkama and 
Illasit Maasai herders could be seen with their livestock. On return in November 1988 the pastures 
had all been taken over by non-Maasai cultivators Bearing In mind the Ministry's potential arable 
area esumate of 156,800-168,000 ha, the esumate of 176,600 ha seems to be unrealistic On the 
other hand, Ecosystems (1982 9) estimated that some 33 per cent of the distnct (i e some 700,000 
ha) was not suffering from prohibitive obstacles for (ram-fed) cultivation 
Imeiplanting of crops was dealt with m the 1988 Farm Census by linking a portion of the 
total acreage lo each of these crops (especially maize and beans) Official figures do not seem to 
adjust the cultivated acreage for each of these crops and thus results m an exaggerated acreage 
The Farm Census figure, however, probably underestimates the real planted acreage due to the 
exclusion of some of the fanners and because of some respondents who could not remember the 
acreage planted for each σορ 
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and the resulting extension of the cultivated area and to the growing 
importance of irrigated agriculture particularly since 1982. 
Table 7.9 Kajiado District Annual Planted Acreage 1976-87 (ha) 
19761977 1978 1980 19811982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987a 1987b 
Maize 
Beans 
Wheat 
Millet 
Sorghum 
Peas 
Other veget. 
Onions 
Tomatoes 
Potatoes 
Carrots 
Melons 
Bananas 
Other frails 
Cotton 
Coffee 
Pyrethrum 
Sunflowers 
6,367 5,436 6.839 
4,106 4399 5,600 
60 
915 
150 
21 
100 
770 
500 
41 
8,200 
8,445 
-
-
-
-
1001,802? 
590 
550 
41 
105 
720 
. 
100 
65 
94 
57 
7 
-
8,54212.535 
9,80012,772 
-
-
-
-
455 
622 
482 
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Source: MoA/AKs ІУНО-Н , TAHUA ШК4 3U lor 1976-78 data, barm Census 19SH tiles 
Note: 1987a = MoA/AR; 1987b = 1988 Farm Census. 
The shift by the early 1980s towards cash crop production is also clearly 
shown. As noted in chapter 4, by this time Loitokitok Division has become the 
major supplier of onions and tomatoes for the Mombasa market. The decrease 
in the 1985 onion acreage was attributed to a drop in prices. 
Though some Maasai will have engaged in cultivation albeit only temporarily 
in response to the disastrous 1960/1, 1973/76, 1980 and 1984 drought periods 
or have entered crop farming through the acquisition of Kikuyu, Kamba or 
Chagga wives, the most common arrangement still is to let the plots out to 
tenants or sharecroppers. In chapter 4 information was provided concerning the 
ethnicity and tenurial status of Kajiado District farmers. It was concluded that 
Maasai farmers make up slightly above one quarter (27.2 per cent) of the 
fanning households. Here we will have a closer look at the involvement in 
cultivation of Maasai and non-Maasai at divisional level. 
In the Ngong Division the presence of Kikuyu farmers, the single largest 
group of cultivators, is paramount (see table 7.10). Other important non-Maasai 
fanners are Kamba (especially in Central Division) and Chagga (in Loitokitok 
mainly). Table 7.10 also shows that 60.5 per cent of the cultivators owned their 
plot, leaving some 36.7 per cent for tenants, 0.8 per cent for sharecropping 
arrangements and the remaining 2.0 per cent of the cultivators were engaged in 
various combinations of these tenurial relations. 
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Table 7.10 Number, Ethnicity and Tenurial Situation of Kajiado District 
Fanning Households 
Elhmcity farmers 
Cenlral 
Ngong 
Loitokitok RF 
Loitolulok IR 
Magadi IR 
Kajiado District 
Land tenure 
Central 
Ngong 
Loitokitok RF 
Loitokitok IR 
Magadi IR 
Kajiado District 
η 
954 
2,314 
2.751 
1,554 
273 
7,846 
η 
954 
2,314 
2,751 
1,554 
273 
7,846 
Maasai 
49.7 
16.4 
20.3 
39.9 
48.3 
27.2 
Owner 
74.3 
90.8 
37.4 
49.2 
57.5 
60.5 
Kikuyu 
12.8 
79.8 
42.5 
36.5 
19.0 
48.5 
Tenant 
24.7 
8.9 
57.3 
47.5 
42.5 
36.7 
Kamba 
35.5 
2.2 
9.1 
9.8 
29.7 
10.8 
Sharecropper 
0.8 
0.1 
0.9 
1.8 
0.0 
0.8 
Other 
2.0 
1.6 
28.1 
13.8 
3.0 
1Э.5 
Else 
0.2 
0.2 
4.4 
1.5 
0.0 
2.0 
source: iy»s farm uensus tues 
Note: RF = Rainfed Agriculture; IR = Irrigated Agriculture. 
The right to cultivate stems from group ranch membership, individual land 
ownership or the leasing of land either from the group ranch, an individual 
member or individual rancher. 
In contrast with other areas, most fanners in Loitokitok division are either 
legal or illegal tenants. "Illegal" means in this sense that these agreements have 
never been sanctioned by the Land Control Board as required by law (see 
KDDP 1984:14). Instead annual leases are agreed upon between the parties 
involved and renewal is therefore always uncertain. This insecurity handicaps 
them in acquiring loans. Moreover, there is always the risk of mass evictions 
by Maasai owners. For example, Kikuyu tenants were chased away from 
Impiron by early 1980 after having developed the irrigation scheme there since 
the 1970s (see Masharen 1989:10). Kuku group ranch members decided to 
chase away tenants (mainly Kamba) from Elangata-Nkima/Olorika schemes in 
1987. On Rombo group ranch the Kenyan tenants have been replaced by 
Chagga agriculturalists from neighbouring Tanzania (see Rimani 
1988:appendix Шс). The latter are said to be preferred because they pay higher 
rents and are easier to handle due to their illegal status in Kenya. Moreover, 
Chagga are respected inigators, who on the Tanzanian side of Mt. Kilimanjaro 
have been very successful coffee fanners. 
In Central Division tensions exist mainly in the Arroi group ranch near 
Kalembwani on the Kajiado-Machakos border. Kamba invaders, some of whom 
have been living there since the mid-1960s, and Maasai ranchers have clashed 
several times over the years (e.g. in 1973, 1979, 1983, 1986), including the 
stealing of livestock, burning of houses, destruction of shambas and the killing 
of people. Most recently, November and December 1989, a total of seven 
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people, including a nine months old baby, were killed in two clashes between 
the Arroi Maasai and Kamba at Kalembwani (see NT 13/01/83, DN 22/02/86, 
DN 14/12/89). 
Reasons for evicting migrants stem from several causes. Irrigated agriculture 
competes with livestock for the availability of water. The swamps are reserve 
dry season grazing areas. Their capacity is said to have been reduced, 
especially since 1982, due to the expansion of irrigation. Some are now 
gradually disappearing thus reducing the holding capacity of range land near 
such an area (e.g. Namelok, Rombo, Kimana-Tikondo, Inkisanchani). This will 
become far worse when the proposed water pipeline comes to transport most of 
the Noolturesh water to Machakos and Kajiado Town (see section 4.5.2). 
Furthermore, as a result of the use of chemicals and fertilizers for 
combatting crop diseases, the drinking water for the Maasai herds downstream 
has become polluted. This is a threat to both animals and humans. Also, 
livestock that damaged crops is sometimes killed by the cultivators. Those 
Maasai confronted with these setbacks want the immigrants to be evicted, 
while group ranch members having made huge profits from leasing plots, use 
theme to buy livestock and would like to see agricultural activities continue. 
By combining the information presented in table 7.10 it is possible to give 
an overview of the tenurial situation in relation to the fanner's ethnicity for 
each of the Kajiado District divisions. Table 7.11 shows that, as far as plot 
ownership for each ethnic group is concerned, the Maasai still take the top 
position in all divisions, although in Ngong this situation has almost been 
overtaken by non-Maasai. The relatively high number of Maasai tenants in 
Loitokitok seems to be the result of hiring plots by members of adjacent group 
ranches. For example, almost half of those Mbirikani members living in its 
northern area had plots near Amboseli (see KDAR 1976:50). 
Cultivators are faced with problems such as the salinization of irrigated 
fields and damage to crops by livestock or wildlife. According to the 1988 
Farm Census, farmers in Magadi and Central division mentioned wildlife 
damage as the most important constraint, while for Loitokitok and Ngong rain 
fed cultivators this was the reliability of the rainfall. Loitokitok irrigated 
farmers mentioned water shortage as one of the major problems. Like the 
Maasai pastoralists, those irrigators in schemes depending on water from 
Noolturesh river (e.g. Inkisanchani) are afraid that piping water from the 
Noolturesh spring towards Machakos District, a process initiated in September 
1987, will undermine their livelihood (see Masharen 1989:11). Otherwise the 
influx of agriculturalists is a threat in itself to the medium and long term 
viability of Kajiado District's ecosystem. Among the negative consequences are 
the use of farming methods suited for the humid regions but probably 
devastating to the vulnerable semi-arid soils (see Odundo 1992:20). The cutting 
of trees on the slopes of Mt. Kilimanjaro for building huts and for firewood 
increases the risks of landslides due to a diminished water conserving capacity. 
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Table 7.11 Land Ownership and Ethnicity by 
DIVISION 
CENTRAL 
NGONG 
LOITOKITOK 
RAINFED 
LOITOKITOK 
IRRIGATED 
MAGADI 
IRRIGATED 
KAJIADO 
DISTRICT 
Elhmaly 
Maasai 
Kikuyu 
Kamba 
Oiher 
Maasai 
Kikuyu 
Kamba 
Other 
Maasai 
Kikuyu 
Kamba 
Otter 
Maasai 
Kikuyu 
Kamba 
Oiher 
Maasai 
Kikuyu 
Kamba 
Other 
Maasai 
Kikuyu 
Kamba 
Other 
Source: barm Uensus ІУ8В tiles 
Owner 
92.0 
66.3 
58.8 
56.2 
96.0 
90.4 
75.5 
94.3 
69.5 
47.1 
25.5 
4.5 
88.2 
35.5 
13.7 
6.4 
75.4 
33.3 
41.3 
75.0 
84.3 
67.5 
39.1 
9.3 
Division, 
Tenant 
6.3 
32.7 
41.2 
43.8 
3.2 
9.4 
24.5 
5.7 
25.7 
43.7 
71.3 
94.6 
10.2 
61.8 
82.2 
86.2 
24.6 
66.7 
58.7 
25.0 
13.4 
29.1 
59.1 
88.5 
1988 
Sharecropper 
1.6 
1.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.3 
0.1 
0.0 
0.0 
3.5 
0.3 
1.2 
0.1 
0.2 
0.6 
4.1 
5.9 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
1.4 
0.2 
1.2 
1.3 
Else 
0.1 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.5 
0.1 
0.0 
0.0 
1.3 
8.9 
2.0 
0.8 
1.4 
2.1 
0.0 
1.5 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.9 
3.2 
0.6 
0.9 
Central 
Loitokitok IRR 
Щ 
Ngong 
Magadi IRR 
Maasai Kikuyu Q Kamba 
Loitokitok RF 
lb 
Kajiado 
iE 
Other 
Figure 7 J Landownership and Ethnicity of Kajiado District Faimers 
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As early as 1975 reports existed claiming that the eastern portion of the 
County Council Loitokitok forest was being destroyed by settlers felling fresh 
trees either for posts or for selling firewood and charcoal. This resulted in the 
reduction of the availability of water from the springs in the Kuku plains (see 
DN 10/12/75). Cutting trees for charcoal was banned. By April 1976, in order 
to replace the destroyed trees, people were allowed to settle in the forest to 
cultivate under the "plant by cultivation" scheme.47 
In August 1983, squatters are nevertheless said to have uprooted seedlings in 
order to frustrate the afforestation programme at Loitokitok - allegedly 
encouraged by politicians who promised them plots in this area (see DN 
21/08/83). A few months before a new directive banning the illegal burning of 
charcoal and the cutting of firewood in the District had been issued. Lorries 
loaded with charcoal and firewood had been seen being driven towards 
Nairobi. Only dead trees were allowed to be used and then only after having 
obtained an official permit from the administration (see KT 22/04/83). By late 
1984 the squatters, mainly from Tanzania, were given an order to quit. Chyulu 
Hills forest is also suffering from cultivation and charcoal burning (see DN 
01/07/88). 
In the Ngong area early worries were voiced by local Maasai residents that 
the fanning of the Kerarapon area at the foot of Ngong Hills, overgrazing and 
tree cutting in the higher zones in combination with the damming and pumping 
of water for irrigation purposes in the Kiserian area downstream and poor land 
management in the Bulbul area had all resulted in the drying up of Embakasi, 
Kiserian and Kantis tributaries of the Athi River (see J. ole Orumoi DN 
11/10/76 and M. ole Shompa DN 17/02/81). In spite of these early warnings, it 
was only by the beginning of 1985 that Ngong Hills forest was officially 
gazetted at a total of 30.77 km2. In 1967 the trees covered an area of some 4 
km2, while by 1980 this had been reduced to a mere 1.5 km2 of tree clumps 
(see DN 30/08/84). A grazing ban for the Ngong Hills was proclaimed in 
1982. Since that time the Ngong Hills have been undergoing increasing 
afforestation, though large parts are still open. Another gazetted area is the 
indigenous Namanga Forest covering some 118 km2 of which approximately 
half is covered (see Ecosystems 1982:59, KDDP 1988:144). 
Nowadays, attempts are increasingly being made to counterbalance the 
negative side effects of cultivation by soil conserving activities such as digging 
cut-off drains, constructing terraces, planting of trees/grass, fencing off and 
prohibiting planting too close to watercourses and advising farmers on the 
The land was set aside for some 200 landless people from Loitokitok and Talta-Taveta, 
each having been tncked by a "landbroker". To help these people it was decided to provide them 
with small plots in the niined County Council forest. While slaying in this area in 1982,1 was told 
that the farmers were allowed to intercrop maize and beans with the young trees provided they 
took care of them and would leave (he area the moment this new planting reached a certain height 
(see Standard OV04/76). 
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advantages of crop rotation, legumes interplanting and the like.48 
7.5.2 Wildlife Conservation and the Creation of Amboseli National Park 
In sections 5.5.4 and 6.3.2 the handing over of the Amboseli area to the 
Kajiado County Council in 1961 was discussed. Tourism grew rapidly 
following Kenya's Independence in 1963 and by 1968 revenues from Amboseli 
amounted to some 75 per cent of the Kajiado County Council's annual income 
(see Western 1982a:304). The Council obtained this money mainly from 
hunting and booking fees, from the sale of confiscated skins, the renting out to 
tourists of self-service bandas at 01 Tukai and from a 78 km2 lease to the East 
African Wildlife Lodges Ltd.4' This area in which "Amboseli Lodge" was 
situated was reserved for game only. 
In fact, the company wanted to extend the stock-free area to some 520 km2, 
while the local Maasai wanted the whole of the area set aside for grazing by 
their herds and flocks. A third party, the international wildlife lobby, demanded 
full protection of the Amboseli area for the preservation of the animals in their 
natural habitat. Growing human and livestock numbers were said to have 
resulted in diminishing numbers of wildlife. As early as 1965 American 
wildlife enthusiasts agreed to provide money for making waterholes for Maasai 
cattle provided the Maasai herders no longer entered the Amboseli swamps on 
which the wildlife and livestock heavily depended during the dry season period 
(see DN 21/02/65). Calculations foresaw a 40-50 per cent decline for the 
livestock population if the Maasai were deprived of the basin's water and 
swamps (see Western 1982a:304). 
The local Kisonko Maasai did not see why they should lose their traditional 
dry season grazing grounds for the benefit of the Kajiado County Council, the 
Kenyan Government and the tourists, while the costs were placed on their 
48
 Earlier efforts by the late 1960s had often been frustrated due to absentee farmers (see 
KDAR 1969:21) Odundo (1992.23) believes individual land tenure to be favourable for tree 
planting but recognizes that in the Nonh-Kaputiei region the area is bare with very little tree cover 
because of poor protection offered to the trees in their infancy from damage by livestock. In my 
view, wildlife and livestock damage can hardly be controlled. Moreover, livestock-keepers favour 
grassland pastures. Only small fenced plots used for residence or culDvaUon could possibly 
mercase the tree cover. 
49 
Hunting in Kajiado District was administered through the Game Department under a 
Controlled Area (Hunting Blocks) system that was operated throughout the country. When the land 
had trust status before adjudication and registrauon of group ranches, the Government had 
operated hunting, returning Controlled Area fees and booking fees to the Kajiado County Council. 
In 1972, for instance, a total of Ksh. 396.080/- had accrued bom hunung rising to Ksh. 532.841/-
by 1974. The money was distributed over (he whole of the distnet towards development projects 
such as cattle dips, dispensaries, water projects and construction of schools (see KDAR 1974:11). 
Following adjudication there was a verbal agreement with the Kajiado Maasai that the Government 
should continue to be responsible but that the income should be directed toward the landowners 
and not the Council (see UNDP/FAO 1978.25). 
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shoulders.10 Instead they argued firmly that they be given exclusive land 
rights for the whole of the Amboseli region. Promises made by British 
Governors and Kenyan Ministers throughout the 1950s and early 1960s had not 
caused them to lose their fears of loosing access to the Amboseli swamps. 
Indeed, by 1968 a plan had been launched before the Kajiado County 
Council to carve out slightly over 500 km2, comprising of the Amboseli dry 
season basin, from the 3,260 km2 Maasai Amboseli Game Reserve, for the 
exclusive use of wildlife. The Maasai protested using every political force they 
had and begging the Government to think twice before allowing the creation of 
an Amboseli National Park.31 Beside the loss of dry season grazing the 
creation of a National Park would mean vesting legal ownership in the hands 
of the Central Government including the revenues. This would make the 
Kajiado County Council bankrupt in one fell swoop. 
Finally, in 1970 a presidential directive had to be issued to resolve the 
impasse. In 1972 the boundaries of the new wildlife sanctuary were demarcated 
and the area gazetted as Government land. To go some way along with the 
Maasai the area was reduced from 518 km2 to 388 km2, leaving 160 ha of land 
surrounding the Ol Tukai tourist lodge owned by the Council and guaranteeing 
them an extra income besides a portion of gate receipts. Recurrent and 
developmental costs were to be for the Central Government. The latter will 
have been very much willing to do this as, for example, in 1976 it was 
estimated that the Kenyan Government and the Kajiado County Council jointly 
received revenues of approximately Ksh. 69 million in 1976 from hunting, 
game photography and motorized game viewing in the district (i.e. Amboseli 
and Nairobi National Paries). The costs were estimated at only Ksh. 4 
million.52 
Though the Central and Local Government had protected their own interests, 
the local Maasai had not. It should be noted that during the wet season game 
animals do not stay within the Parks' boundaries but spread out into the 
neighbouring "dispersal areas" or "spill-overs". For Amboseli and Nairobi 
The increasing number of tourists willing to visa Amboseli placed severe stress on the 
absorption capacity of the area and threatened to damage its ecological habitat irreversibly as a 
result of heavy off-road traffic wiiiun a fragile terrain 
Moreover, it has been slated that the Maasai, m an attempt to preempt the loss of their 
dry season grazing area deliberately lulled game, especially rhinoceros From 1966 to 1982 the 
number of ihinos declined from 70 to 14 (see Western 1982a 308). 
52 
It was calculated that the net foreign exchange earnings for the Kajiado District from 
wildlife were some Ksh 29 million, while an extra sum of Ksh 40 million was thought to be 
eamed from money spent outside Kajiado Distnct by a certain number of those tounsis who came 
to Kenya foremost because of Kenya's wildlife heritage Direct revenues from wildlife viewing 
and hunting was estimated to be some 16 5 million An estimated Ksh 400,000/- from viewing 
and Ksh 950,000/- from hunting (i e 8 per cent of total direct revenues) went to the Kajiado 
County Council whilst the Central Government eamed 92 per cent (see UNDP/FAO 1978 xvu/12) 
320 Selling Wealth to Buy Poverty 
National Parks dispersal areas of some 5,000 km2 and 2,000 km2, respectively 
were calculated while both parks together amount only to some 500 km2 ." As 
a result wildlife outside the parks had to be accepted as a part of land use in 
order to fulfil conservation goals.94 In fact, the only gain for the local Maasai 
came from outside donor funds provided by the New York Zoological Society 
who, in March 1973, signed a contract with the Kenyan Government through 
which US$ 140,000 was donated for the building of five new watering areas 
outside Amboseli National Park (see DN 10/01/73). 
In October 1974 Amboseli National Park was officially gazetted. The local 
Maasai were still allowed to trespass into the Park until 1977 due to the severe 
drought period of that time (see Campbell 1981a:231). Alternative water 
sources for the Maasai cattle, two boreholes outside the park supplied from a 
pipeline, were only completed by 1977, although they proved to be defective in 
design and deficient in cost-effectiveness frequently forcing the Maasai to re-
enter the park for water (see Western 1982a:308). Erection of bomas inside the 
Park, however, was not allowed.55 
In order to win support from the local Maasai an UNDP/FAO study team, 
contributors to the "Kenya Wildlife Management Project 71-11: (KWMP), 
proposed to install a "Wildlife Utilization Fund" (WUF) in 1975 through which 
money could be paid to people living in the vicinity of the Park.5* The 
amount donated should be in proportion to the amount of wildlife sustained on 
their land. Information for each area had to be collected from the seasonal 
distribution of migratory wildlife species (wildebeests and zebras mainly) 
calculated from data collected during "Systematic Reconnaissance Flights". The 
group ranch committee was chosen to be the direct receiver of these payments. 
Besides this grazing compensation fee revenues were to be attracted through 
organized hunting parties, camp sites and game cropping. The annual WUF 
compensation fee for the Amboseli group ranches was Ksh. 250,000/-, while 
By 1973 tensions had also arisen in the Kitengela area when, due to the drought, the 
Maasai moved their animals into Nairobi National Parte where 15 bulls were killed by the park's 
wardens It was stated that this act was pan of an attempt to take over the Kitengela area as an 
extension of Nairobi National Park. Negouauons about this had been going on since 1966 (see 
Sunday Post 29/07/73) 
Western (1982a°304) staled that permanent restriction of large herbivores to Amboseli Park 
would lead lo a reduction of some 40-50 per cent of these populations UNDP/FAO estimates 
speak of even less than 10 per cent for the Nairobi National Park wildlife migrating population 
(see UNDP/FAO 1978 xxn). 
During the 1984 drought the Wildlife Department was not able to pump water to the 
Maasai outside Amboseli Park due to budget restncuons Fust, tbe Maasai were allowed to enter 
the Park for water and later when the drought began they were also to graie their herds (see Moss 
1989 230) 
Loss of the dispersal areas was thought to be equivalent to a reduction of potential 
revenues from wildlife of some Ksh 3 3 million (see Western 1982a 306) 
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revenues from entrance fees alone in 1976 amounted to Ksh. 2.0 million for 
Amboseli National Park and were expected to rise to almost Ksh. 14.0 million 
by the year 2000 (see UNDP/FAO 1978:11/87/99). 
Finally, the KWMP proposed to establish a "Wildlife Extension Project" 
(WEP) permanently as it had experienced difficulties in involving the Maasai 
and gaining their understanding and support in communicating with other 
departments. Institutional and legal support was provided due to a 
reformulation of Kenya's national wildlife policy in 1975 and the Wildlife 
Conservation and Management Act of 1976. The newly established Wildlife 
Conservation and Management Department (WCMD) became responsible for 
the co-ordination of all the proposed plans for action. 
Although some improvements have been made inside the park such as the 
relocation of much of the parks's infrastructure and a less destructive road 
system, the most essential improvements made in order to gain local support 
quickly failed. Hunting fees were paid only until 1977 when a nation-wide ban 
on hunting was issued. Wildlife cropping was never seriously conducted. Only 
a few tented camps were established initially and without much success (e.g. in 
Olgulului and Kimana) Grazing fee compensation has been responsible for the 
building of some dispensaries, schools, dips, curioshops and boreholes but 
payments were stopped after 1979." 
One adult educator was employed to manage the Wildlife Extension Project 
in Kajiado District as well as in Narok! Assisted by some NGO's and through 
finances obtained from other donors workshops were conducted, wildlife 
committees established, tree nurseries started and some educational material 
produced. In August 1984 WEP made a new start funded by the African Fund 
of Endangered Wildlife (AFEW) and the United Nations Education, Cultural 
and Scientific Organization (UNESCO). The new style of the WEP assisted 
some group ranches in pressing the Government to pay hunting fees which 
were still owed to the ranchers since 1976. The project increasingly tried to 
educate ranch members concerning natural resources and wildlife conservation 
via the recruitment and training of "Conservation Action Leaders" (CAL). In 
addition, it helped to negotiate between Parìe officials and Maasai ranchers over 
access to water and grazing during periods of shortage. Unfortunately, WEP 
lacked official backing while at the same time was still considered to be a 
"top-down" managed project (see Berger 1987:9). 
Most disappointing, however, has been the failure to satisfactorily fulfil the 
promises made to the local Maasai of the provision of an adequate number of 
new watering points and dry season areas outside Amboseli Park. Until the late 
37
 In 1979 (he Kajiado County Council expected to earn a revenue totalling Ksh. 5,490JXXV-
its greatest source being the annual payment of Ksh 4,600,000/- by the Ministry of Tounsm & 
Wildlife as a royalty for Amboseli National Park (see Standard 07/01/79) By 1984 the Council 
was crippled financially In 1986 it leased the Ol Tukai lodge lo a private hotelier in an attempt to 
raise more revenue for the Council (see Standard 09/12/86) 
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1980s no funds were made available to finally resolve this issue. By May 1987 
the Director of the WCMD, Dr. Olindo, told the local Maasai that some US$ 
200,000 had been raised in America for Amboseli but that more was still 
needed (see Berger 1987:13). The Kajiado District Development Plan 1989-93 
mentioned a number of projects the district intended to realize over this period. 
Among the most important targets were the construction of a 57 km pipeline, 
two boreholes and a dam costing an estimated total of Ksh. 2,734,000/-. 
Furthermore three model campsites, three Maasai cultural centres, an education 
centre, a rhino survey and the construction of game-proof electric fences in 
Ngong-Kiserian and near Namelok were listed (see KDDP 1988:151-156). 
Requests f от fences near Amboseli had been made as early as 1980 (see DN 
21/11/80). On the Ngong Hills some game-proof fences existed prior to the 
mid-1970s (see KDAR 1974:10). 
Complaints about wildlife from fanners and pastoralists alike have continued 
over the years. Until recently it has been possible to obtain a compensation fee 
if crops, livestock or human beings were mauled by wildlife.18 Expansion of 
agriculture and a growing human population is thought responsible for the 
persisting conflict as wild animal numbers are on the decline. Drought took its 
toll in 1973-76 and 1984, (particularly of zebra's). 
In addition, and rather more significantly, some species (e.g. elephants and 
ihino) were endangered due to poaching. Rhinos in Kenya declined from 
20,000 in 1971 to some 600 by 1986. For Africa a total of 4,000 is mentioned 
(see DN 01/11/88). Though the Amboseli rhino population increased slightly 
after years of decline by 1977, there are now only a few remaining. Amboseli 
elephant numbers have been fairly stable over this period numbering some 750. 
Elephant numbers in Kenya, however, have decreased from 70,000 to only 
18,000 between 1980-90 (see DN 27/02/90). In the whole of Africa their 
numbers have dwindled from 1.5 million to 500,000-700,000 over this same 
period (see DN 20/01/90).59 
By the end of the 1980s poaching had increased considerably in Kenya. To 
combat the poachers the Kenyan Government increased the anti-poaching 
budget to Ksh. 120 m. for 1988/89 and intensified the search for the poachers 
(see DN 27/10/88). This time not so much Maasai ilmurran but ex-civil war 
soldiers from Somalia and Ethiopia were said to be responsible for the killing 
According to the 1989 Wildlife (Conservation and Management) Amendment Bill 
compensation for damaged crops and livestock was stopped, excluding cases of deaths or severe 
injury of human beings (see DN 30/11/89) 
Elephant populations in Africa have either been completely destroyed or reduced to small 
isolated patches due to the trade m ivory By the beginning of this century wild reserves were 
established by the colonial authorities. Nowadays the mam concentrations of elephants (> l/km2) 
can be found in central and southern Tanzania, northern Zimbabwe, north-eastern Zambia, 
northern Botswana and isolated patches m Kenya (e g Amboseli) (see UNEP/GEMS/GRID 1987). 
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of the animals. Their target was the rhino's horn and the elephants tusks.60 
The poachers are more than ever well-anned, use automatic guns and persist in 
reaching their goals. In Kenya, Tsavo elephants especially have been killed. 
Amboseli animals are still fairly safe, certainly as long as they stay inside 
the park, a habit they seem to have developed these days. This, however, also 
has its repercussions on the park's carrying capacity. The swamps' water is 
becoming increasingly polluted as a result of their urine and droppings. In 
addition they have become perfect foragers for the left-overs from tourists and 
from the lodges and they also harass cars stuffed with foodstuffs. Moreover, 
approximately 90 per cent of the Park's full grown Acacia xanthophloea trees 
had died by the early 1980s. Initially it was thought that (male) elephants were 
responsible for this by stripping the trees of their bark. It turned out, however, 
that these old trees were dying because of a rise of the water table and in 
increased salinity due to unrestricted tree felling on the slopes of Mt. 
Kilimanjaro for agricultural purposes. The elephants are now busy destroying 
the young Acacia trees (see Moss 1989:262). 
It is not only because of the attempt to conserve fauna and flora that 
solutions have to be found to the rising pressure on Kenya's National Parks 
and Game Reserves. By 1988 tourism overtook coffee as the main net foreign 
exchange earner (see chapter 4). To safeguard these interests the management 
of Kenya's wildlife heritage was transferred to the newly established 
independent Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS). It seems that the KWMP ideas of 
the mid-1970s are being revived as approximately 25 per cent of KWS funds 
have to go to the rural communities in terms of schools, clinics, water supplies 
and veterinary services and cropping of game by the Kajiado ranchers is 
propagated. 
However, nowadays Kajiado group ranches are in the process of dissolution 
and this threats the access of wildlife to the dispersal areas. KWS' major 
concern is the group ranches surrounding Amboseli National Park. The 
By the end of the 1960s the pnce of ivory increased sharply, rising to over six times by 
the end of the 1970s. Japan is the largest importer of ivory (some 60 per cent), followed by Hong 
Kong (20 per cent). It is mainly used to manufacture small seals, preferred by the Japanese instead 
of a signature, sculptures and ornaments An esumaled number of 70,000-80,000 elephants are 
killed worldwide to provide 825 tonnes of ivory every year This is equivalent to a 5-10 per cent 
annual reduction. In other words, within ten years the African elephant can be completely 
exterminated Younger elephants (with lower tusk weights) are increasingly being killed meaning 
that yet more animals need to be massacred in order to fulfil the demand for ivory In 1986 the 
international lobby resulted in the inlroducuon of an ivory quota (see Moss 1989 ¿0-2) ta June 
1989 the United States banned the ivory trade completely to save African elephants By January 
1990 an international ban went into force. This move was supported by Kenya and Tanzania 
Unfortunately, other countries (e.g. Zimbabwe, South-Africa, Malawi, Zambia and Botswana) 
oppose the ban 
Rhino hom is also mainly exported to Asia. It is used for medical puiposes and also as an 
aphrodisiac Poachers have gone as far as to kill the five rare white rhinoceros who stood under a 
24-bours protection by special mined guards in the Mem National Park (see DN 01/11/88) 
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"spectre of fencing" -which has to interrupt the animals' cycles of migration 
and which leads to overcrowding and finally to decimation- has speeded up 
and renewed the Governments' willingness to allocate funds to the surrounding 
group ranches. The interesting outcome of this has been that game department 
officials are threatening to exclude Loitokitok group ranches from their share 
in an annual fee of Ksh. 4,000,000/- from Amboseli gate earnings if they 
decide to subdivide. KWS has come up with a plan to persuade land owners 
not to fence their fragmented pieces of land but to charge tourists coming to 
view the animals (see Kajiado Focus 1991a:ll).61 
7.6 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has explored developments in land use and land policy concerning 
the livestock, wildlife and cultivation sectors of post-colonial Kajiado District. 
Special attention has been paid to the creation, performance and subdivision of 
group ranches. The birth of the group ranch concept should be placed 
somewhere between the 1955 report of the East African Royal Commission 
favouring individual land tenure for the whole of Kenya and the Lawrance 
Mission of 1965-66 which preferred the establishment of large ranches where 
ownership was vested in the name of a group in Kenya's semi-arid regions. 
In short the idea of a group ranch meant the setting aside of a certain piece 
of land, communally owned by a group of people recorded and registered as 
the legal owners through membership of the particular ranch. In contrast with 
the past, livestock movements would be restricted within the group ranch 
boundaries and non-members would be forbidden to bring and graze their 
animals. Through the provision of loans for infrastructural development and 
steer fattening an attempt was made to radically transform the nomadic 
subsistence-oriented production of the Maasai pastoralists into a sedentary, 
more commercial system. This market-oriented production was to bring about a 
destocking of the Maasai pastures while at the same time providing meat for 
the (inter)national market. It was thought that this approach would provide an 
answer to the 1960/61 collapse of the Maasai livestock sector. 
From the side of the Maasai a certain willingness to accept this proposal did 
exist. However, besides welcoming the idea of improvements in the provision 
of water, veterinary care, livestock quality and the like, a major rationale for 
accepting the group ranch proposal was the increase in the number of Maasai-
held individual ranches and the encroachment of non-Maasai into the District. 
A controversy already exists on how to distribute this amount of money among the 
Mbinkam, Selenkei, Kimana-Tikondo and Olgulului group ranches The latter claims a total of 
Ksh 2 4 million, while Ksh 1 6 million has been offered To make matters more complicated the 
Kajiado County Council and the District Development Commitlee have also put a claim to this 
new opportunity for raising revenues, arguing that all the Kajiado District inhabitants should profit 
from the district's wildlife 
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The fear that more land would be lost to Game Reserves or National Parks was 
also of some significance. 
In the early 1960s discussions concerning the status of Maasailand reached a 
height. The Maasai feared losing their land after Independence which until that 
time had been safeguarded by the Colonial Maasai Treaties which gave 
exclusive rights of occupancy to the Maasai within Kajiado and Narok 
Districts. Among the Kaputiei Maasai this debate was of particular importance. 
Several proposals such as the registration of the whole of the section under one 
title deed, or the creation of a fringe of individual ranches near the northern 
boundary to stop illegal infiltration were discussed. The Colonial Authorities 
disapproved the one title deed option. The finally accepted variant of individual 
ranches had been suggested by some of the young formally educated Maasai, 
but was objected to by the elderly. The Kajiado County Council, however, 
backed the idea of individual ranches, whereby apparent personal gain also 
played a role. The haphazard approach of the Government towards the Maasai 
land issue and the illegal approval of the creation of individual ranches by the 
Council was criticized by the Lawrance Mission. Finally, all of the Maasai 
sections accepted the group ranch concept, though in some regions of northern 
Kaputiei and the better watered parts of the Ngong area opposition persisted. 
Even where ranches were officially installed they never functioned as such 
among this group of Maasai. 
Implications of the introduction of the group ranch lay in the organizational, 
juridical and economical sphere. Actual establishment of the group ranches 
followed a phased programme. After the declaration of an "Adjudication Area", 
split into Adjudications Sections, any person claiming to have an interest in a 
particular section had to bring his claim before the Adjudication Committee 
composed of not less than ten people. Most of these were recruited from the 
group of educated Maasai, politicians and Government officials. After sixty 
days the section was further subdivided into individual and group ranches. 
Members then elected a total of 3 to 10 representatives and a group ranch 
committee for day-to-day management. A certificate of incorporation was 
finally issued by the Land Registrar of Kajiado District and the group officially 
registered under a specific name. 
In 1964 the pilot Рока group ranch had already been started in the south 
Kaputiei location. By 1969 phase one of the Kenya Livestock Development 
Project (KLDP I) was officially started. By 1970, 14 group ranches, covering 
over 10 per cent of the district's area were recorded in the Kaputiei area. Phase 
Π was started by late 1974. A total of 16 ranches comprising another 25 per 
cent of the Kajiado District area were ultimately added. Finally by the early 
1980s, although no longer under the KLDP, 20 more ranches were 
incorporated. This brought the total of group ranches to 51 covering some 
15,200 km2 or some 75 per cent of the area. 
Analyzing the performance of Kajiado District group ranches revealed that 
group ranches had indeed been an effective instrument in stopping the further 
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massive excavation of individual ranches at the cost of the majority of the 
Maasai people. Secondly the group ranches served as mechanisms for the 
improvement of livestock management techniques and the construction of 
facilities such as boreholes, dams, troughs, tanks, pipelines and cattle dips. 
Most facilities were constructed by funds from sources other than the KLDP. 
Nonetheless, the existence of a framework such as the group ranch is 
considered to be partly responsible for being able to attract these funds. 
Thirdly, group ranches are thought to have stimulated the erecting of schools, 
shops and health centres. A final achievement of group ranch development is 
said to have been to allow wildlife to continue roaming freely over large parts 
of Kajiado District. 
Alongside these achievements a number of problems and failures have to be 
mentioned. The targets of pasture destocking and commercialization of 
livestock production were not realised. Major problems were encountered while 
trying to achieve these extremely ambitious objectives e.g.: delays and 
problems in implementation; disappointing rates of investment and difficulties 
in loan repayment by those who actually did receive some funds for 
development; continuing trespass of group ranch boundaries; no transformation 
into or substantial increase of market-oriented livestock production and 
corruption among several group ranch committees. 
The final outcome of these problems and resulting frustrations among many 
group ranch members was that by the late 1970s the wish for subdivision of 
the group ranch into individually owned shares could increasingly be heard. As 
at the time of Independence the Government did not take a clear position in 
this issue. Within the Ministry of Livestock Development in Kajiado District it 
was feared that the final outcome of group ranch subdivision would be very 
negative. Other government echelons and departments held less clear views. 
In general those opposing subdivision stated that it would lead to the 
alienation of land to non-Maasai; create severe erosion in areas where 
cultivation should be started; erode Maasai culture and restrict the free 
movement of wildlife and livestock to the detriment of the meat-producing and 
tourist-attracting functions of the district Those in favour of subdivision said 
that subdivision would: help self advancement and raise the standard of living 
for the Maasai; raise the ability to procure a loan from the bank using the 
freehold title deed as collateral; minimize exploitation of the poor by the rich; 
promote Maasai engagement in agricultural and industrial enterprises and 
facilitate better maintenance of the existing infrastructure. 
The procedure of group ranch subdivision is a complex one requiring several 
stages. Most important is that agreement is needed from at least 60 per cent of 
the members. If this is obtained a demarcation committee will be installed and 
the RMD will perform a feasibility study. Finally the boundaries of the newly 
created individual holdings need to be surveyed. By 1990, 40 ranches had 
already decided to dissolve their ranches. Only 4 were opposed to this idea and 
another 7 had not yet decided. In other words, at that time the whole of Ngong 
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and Central Division which incorporated 78 per cent of the ranches had either 
ceased to exist or were in the process of dissolution. 
Examples from Olkinos and Embolioi as well as many other group ranches 
were provided to illustrate this complex and time-consuming process. Disputes 
over ranch boundaries, corruption in plot allocation, conflicts between 
registered and non-registered group members are among the problems that 
accompany the process of group ranch subdivision in Kajiado District 
Reviewing the creation, performance and subdivision of Kajiado District 
group ranches it can be concluded that in many respects, the group ranch 
concept proposed by outsiders turned out to be an artifícial creation, lacking a 
firm traditional sociological as well as an ecological basis and which was 
overambitiously geared at destocking and commercialization of production 
while taking no account of pastoralists strategies and household needs. Funds 
provided by international donors such as soft loans were ultimately channelled 
towards the group ranches at high interest rates. Once they ran into trouble in 
repaying these loans, either because of corrupt group ranch committees or 
natural causes like droughts and diseases killing the steers bought for fattening 
purposes, many members no longer felt obliged to contribute to the well being 
of the ranch. In addition, the use of the group's pastures by herds belonging to 
neighbouring individual ranchers and the fast increasing numbers of young 
Maasai willing to become registered contributed in many cases to a growing 
negative feeling towards existence of the group ranch and the ultimate call for 
subdivision. The initial opposition of Central Government seems to have 
changed towards a standpoint of modestly support of this process. 
In the following chapter we will attempt to analyze the outcome of the 
subdivision process so far. In particular the state of affairs for the subdivided 
group ranches of Olkinos and Embolioi will be considered. 
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Box 8.1 OLKINOS GROUP RANCH PROFILE 
Olkmos (Fbase I) group ranch (6,020 ha), located some 15 km north-east of kajiado Town 
borden the Athi River-Namanga road to the west, the Isinya River and Embolioi group ranch to 
the east, Kisaju River and Kitengela group ranch to the north and Isinya Town to the south It is 
pan of the Isenya sublocation of the North-Kaputiei location of Central Division. Approximately 
750 people lave on this subdivided group ranch 
In Isinya Τ С ther is a primary school, a secondary school, a health centre, the 
Maasai Rural Trauung Centre and some shops Other Olíanos shops are located near the cattle 
dip (Oldokunyi) and at the Empaupat area in the north Recently immigrants have also started 
small shops In the north is Korompoi primary school Finally a borehole (1974) is available 
near the east-central pan of the ranch Olkmos residents also make use of Embolioi primary 
school and the borehole at Olturoto 
Situated on the Athi-Kapiu Plams, Olkmos group ranch covers a flat area. The 
altitude is about 1,585 to 1645 m. Rainfall is about 500-600 mm The soils are generally 
imperfectly drained, cracking clay, Verusols (Lll) in the south, with patches of moderate to 
well-drained firm clay Planosols (L9) in the cendal part In the north soils are firm gravel clay 
(V2 with typical brownish stones giving the area its name Empaupat The Olkmos vegetation is 
classified as open grassland Peiwiselum mezlanum and stramlneum, Themeda trtandra, 
Sporobolus frimbriaius, Digiiaria rmlanjtani are the dominant grass species Some scattered 
shrubs, mainly alongside the nvers, include Balanites eagypiica and Acacia spp Near the cattle 
dip a resting camp for mine workers is located (mainly Kamba) Olkmos women's group runs a 
tannery and cultivates some small (dots near the borehole Grants and Thomson's gazelles are 
found m the ranch throughout the year Wildebeest dominale during the rainy season 
EMBOLIOI GROUP RANCH PROFILE 
Embolioi (Phase I) group ranch (24,000 ha) is located to the north of the Konza-Magadi railway 
branchlme. Its south-western up being only some 5 km from Kajiado Τ С Administrauvely the 
ranch belongs to the Isenya sublocauon of the North-Kapuuei locauon of Central Division 
Olturoto and Engmgin centres sent the area Here there are shops, churches and primary 
schools For medical assistance people have to go to Isinya Τ С Embolioi group ranch has two 
boreholes, one being out of order Otherwise use is made of water collected in the holes made 
by the gypsum mining activity which is prevalent m the area, particularly m the Engmgin area. 
Embolioi group ranch is a relatively flat area and, like Olkmos, is part of the 
Athi-Kapm plains The vegetation is an open grassland with scattered trees Dominant grass 
speœs are Pemisetum mezlanum, Themeda ¡riandrà and Sporobolus spp Acacia species are the 
dominant bush species The soils are mainly the well-known cracking clay saline imperfectly 
drained Vertisols (Lll) In addition patches and conçlexes of moderate to well drained 
Planosols are found The are id m agro-chmauc zone V Mean annual temperatures vary between 
18-20°C and rainfall amounts to some 500 mm annually Embolioi is frequently invaded by 
wildlife, wildebeest m particular 
One women's group operates and specializes m the producuon and selling of traditional 
ornaments 
CHAPTER 8 
THE IMPACT OF SUBDIVISION OF OLKINOS AND 
EMBOLIOI GROUP RANCHES 
8.1 Introduction 
In the next two chapters the effects of the process of group ranch subdivision 
as in early 1990 will be presented. Statements made by opponents and 
supporters of the dissolution of group ranches as summarised in section 7.4.2, 
have been the leading starting points for our analysis of this process; 
destocking of ranches, investments in infrastructure, picking up other activities, 
fencing of parcels and selling of land, among other issues, were studied in 
order to estimate the impact of group ranch subdivision so far. 
Besides population characteristics this chapter will pay particular attention 
to the direct outcome of the subdivision process in Olkinos and Embolioi 
group ranches, the allocated plot sizes and their economic and ecological 
viability and the resulting changes in residence patterns. Furthermore, other 
changes that occurred in the use of land such as herd movements, fencing and 
the establishment of shambas and ol-okeri will be discussed. Survey results 
obtained among the Maasai of Kiboko, Elang'ata Wuas, Lomgosua and Meto 
group ranches -none of these ranches at the time yet subdivided- and from 
established individual ranchers of northern Kaputiei, Loodokilani and Matapalo 
and from a group of land buyers in the Olkinos territory will also be presented. 
In chapter eight the effects of the commoditization of land will be dealt with, 
including investments made by the plot owners to improve their individually 
owned parcels. 
8.1.1 The Characteristics of the Sample Population 
A total of S43 households were interviewed during the survey period. Out of 
this group 183 had recently acquired a former group ranch parcel (i.e. Olkinos 
and Embolioi group ranch members), 317 households still lived on a group 
ranch (i.e. Kiboko, Elang'ata Wuas, Lomgosua and Meto), 34 respondents 
owned an established, individual ranch and 9 individuals had recently obtained 
land on the former Olkinos group ranch. Figure 8.1 shows the survey locations. 
The exact sample fraction for each group ranch or group of individual 
ranchers is hard to know because the latest Kajiado District population figures 
are from 1979 and are available only for the sub-locational level. To overcome 
this problem, the total number of registered members within our sample 
households was related to the 1990 official number of registries for each of the 
group ranches. The specific ratio found for each group ranch was used to 
estimate the probable total number of households living on this group ranch. 
Table 8.1 shows the resulting sample fraction estimates. Also included is 
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information concerning the registration status of the head of household. 
Table 8.1 Sample Size of Survey Population 
LOCATION SECTION No of 
h/holds 
Sample 
Size % 
Heads 
reg 
Heads 
not 
reg 
Olíanos 
ЕтЬоІюі 
Kiboko 
Elang'aia Wuas 
Lorngosua 
Meto 
Ind Ranchers 
- Kaputiei 
- Loodokilani 
- Matapalo 
Buyers Olkinos 
- Maasai 
- non-Maasal 
Kaputiei 
Kapuüei 
Kaputiei 
Loodokilani 
Matapalo 
Matapalo 
Kaputiei 
Loodokilani 
Matapalo 
na 
na 
116 
299 
99 
487 
578 
451 
248 
7 
·) 1 
63 
4 
59 
108 
75 
38 
75 
100 
104 
34 
14 
9 
11 
9 
3 
6 
93 
25 
38 
15 
17 
23 
14 
7 
7 
7 
14 
75 
10 
108 
75 
21 
59 
96 
102 
na. 
na. 
na. 
n.a. 
na 
0 
0 
17 
16 
4 
2 
na. 
na. 
na. 
na. 
aa 
source authors survey 
Note the estimated total number of households presented is speculative For Olíanos and Embohoi 
we used the number of parcels For the other group ranches we calculated a conversion factor 
based on the total number of registered household members of our sample population 
Figure 8.1 Location of Survey Area in Kajiado District 
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It should be noted that, in spite of our intention, we did not succeed in 
interviewing all of the former 116 OUdnos members due to what could be 
called "absentee ownership". A total of eight plot owners were either living 
elsewhere permanently or roamed around in or even outside the district 
Information obtained showed that the absentees either had another occupation 
(e.g. cattle trekker), owned a second farm elsewhere, stayed on their father-in-
law's individual ranch or, as in one case, were in prison. 
In addition, a number of the owners interviewed had not yet settled in their 
new location, but were staying with relatives or friends in another boma either 
nearby or far away (e.g. Mashuni, Embolioi, Kitengela, Kisaju, Kiambu). For 
example, in Embolioi 52 individual parcels (17 per cent) were found that had 
not yet been settled. The majority of these belonged to young members or to 
widows who were staying in other households as dependents. 
A similar problem existed with reference to the group of buyers. In fact, 
absenteeism among the buyers is even more significant. Out of a group of 
some 63 buyers in Olkinos group ranch only 10 had settled by February 1990. 
As a result our buyers sample will be biased due to the fact that non-settled 
outsiders, who could possibly have bought for speculative reasons only, could 
not be interviewed. 
Finally, it should be stressed that great care has to be taken in accounting 
for the differences between the subdivided and not yet subdivided ranches 
solely to the fact of individual ownership. Each of the group ranches has its 
own specific history and level of development and differences also existed 
before the start of group ranch subdivision in late 1986. Longitudinal changes 
within the same area should be studied to assess this impact. Whenever 
possible historical data will be cited for the sample group ranches. Bearing the 
above remarks in mind general reference will also be made to other base-line 
studies such as those of Metson (1974), Njoka (1979), ILCA (1981) and White 
and Meadows (1981). 
Table 8.2 shows the human population characteristics of our sample Maasai 
population. The mean household size (including dependents - see below) for 
our sample of group ranches which include Olkinos and Embolioi was 
estimated to be 8.6 persons. Individual rancher average household size stood at 
14.4 persons. A clear north-south increase in mean household size can be 
found for the study area (e.g. Olkinos 6.0 to Meto 10.6). It is generally held 
that the Maasai sections, residing in the southern parts of the district, are "more 
traditional". 
Data for Embolioi and Kiboko for early 1968 gave average household sizes 
of S.7 and S.6 people, respectively. Average household size figures provided 
by Metson (1974) and ILCA (1981) stood at 8.1 and 9.6. Metson's survey was 
conducted among 174 households all over Kajiado District. ILCA's base-line 
figures were obtained from a group of 202 households in the south-eastern 
region of the district 
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The number of children (excluding dependents) in the 0-15 years of age 
cohort among the 500 group ranch households was estimated to be 1,933, or 
50.3 per cent. For Embolioi and Kiboko figures of 45.7 and 47.4 per cent for 
1968 were found (including children of above 15 years of age). The 1990 
youth figures for these ranches were 64.4 and 64.0 per cent. Metson (1974) 
and LLC A (1981) enumerated overall percentages of 56.1 and 68.1 for the 
under 16's, respectively. 
The number of dependents (i.e. adults and children not originally belonging 
to the household, such as grandparents, unmarried sisters or disabled brothers 
for instance) stood at 458 persons (10.6 per cent) of the group ranch sample 
and 65 persons (13.2 per cent) for the individual ranchers. Embolioi and 
Kiboko dependency ratios for 1968 were 9.9 and 9.5 per cent as compared to 
1.9 and 5.8 per cent for 1990, respectively. In 1981 ILCA found 22.8 per cent 
of the household members to be dependent. 
The husband:wife ratio was found to stand at 1:1.63 for group and 1:2.28 
for individual ranchers. The Embolioi and Kiboko ratio changed between 1968 
and 1990 from 0.94 to 1.26 and from 1.40 to 1.74 wives per husband. Metson 
found a Kajiado District average of 1.76 wives in 1974. ILCA reached 1:2.07 
for their Olkarkar, Merueshi and Mbirikani sample. Huge differences, however, 
existed between ILCA's sub sample locations; Olkarkar 1.63, Merueshi 2.11, 
and Mbirikani 2.74. This difference, apparently illustrative of the north-south 
factor, can also be found within our sample also (Olkinos 1.19 to Meto 2.09). 
Again no hard conclusions can be drawn from the above deliberations 
concerning possible trends as specific place and time characteristics will have 
influenced the outcomes of each of the surveys mentioned. 
Table 8.3 presents the livestock ownership characteristics of our survey 
population. The average per capita cattle ownership for all our sample 
households, excluding non-Maasai buyers, is estimated to be 9.1 head of cattle 
per person. This seems to be a break with the trend of declining cattle/capita 
ratios in Kajiado District as was presented in figure 0.3.' In addition a mean 
small stock number of 12.9 per person was found. ILCA counted for the early 
1980s for their Olkarkar, Merueshi and Mbirikani sample 10.6 cattle and 7.7 
shoats per person. 
The Embolioi and Kiboko samples underline these higher livestock 
ownership figures. In 1968 Embolioi households owned on average 4.2 cattle 
and 3.3 shoats per person. In 1990 this had changed to 7.2 cattle and 18.1 head 
of small stock. Kiboko livestock ownership increased from a mean of 8.1 cattle 
and 1.9 shoats to 11.3 cattle and 11.2 shoats per person. 
It should be noted, however, that our sample has a slight over representation of individual 
ranchers For the 'group ranch pastorahsts' the figure stands at 8 1 cattle/person Extrapolation of 
ILCA's pastoral people growth trend in relation to the MoLD 1988 results, applying an annual 10 
per cent uiaease for cattle, would place the cattle/people ratio at approximately S.S cattle/person 
for the whole of the distncL Cattle ownership in Central Division will be above this mean as 43 
and 34 per cent of the cattle and human population, respectively, are found m Central Division 
Table 8.2 Population Characteristics of Survey Population 
Location 
OUunos 
EmboUoi 
Kiboko 
Qang'ata Wuas 
Lomgosua 
Meto 
Ind Ranchos 
-Kapuoel 
-Loodoblam 
- Matapalo 
Buyers OUunos 
- non-Maasai 
Total 
no 
of" 
hh 
108 
75 
38 
75 
100 
104 
34 
14 
9 
11 
9 
3 
6 
543 
head of 
hh 
m 
97 
69 
38 
75 
96 
103 
32 
14 
8 
10 
9 
3 
6 
519 
f 
11 
6 
0 
0 
4 
1 
2 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
24 
wi­
ves 
115 
87 
66 
116 
178 
215 
73 
21 
16 
36 
9 
3 
6 
859 
children 
0 -
m 
54 
32 
33 
67 
95 
107 
27 
8 
4 
15 
1 
0 
1 
416 
S 
f 
6-1(1 
πι 
33 51 
36 45 
23 36 
78 82 
91 75 
103 124 
21 40 
5 8 
5 7 
11 25 
3 1 
2 1 
1 0 
388 454 
f 
57 
40 
30 
64 
77 
100 
37 
4 
12 
21 
3 
2 
1 
408 
11-15 
m 
51 
43 
33 
62 
56 
59 
47 
13 
и 
23 
4 
2 
2 
355 
f 
32 
34 
21 
42 
59 
49 
30 
6 
9 
15 
0 
0 
0 
267 
>15 
m 
58 
64 
36 
67 
69 
94 
80 
29 
18 
33 
12 
4 
8 
480 
f 
39 
15 
7 
19 
14 
14 
37 
23 
9 
5 
12 
5 
7 
157 
dependents 
adult 
m 
17 
5 
7 
38 
38 
59 
37 
11 
15 
11 
1 
0 
1 
192 
f 
27 
4 
12 
39 
65 
51 
26 
15 
3 
8 
1 
0 
1 
225 
child 
m 
3 
0 
1 
20 
15 
17 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
57 
f 
4 
0 
0 
19 
6 
10 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
40 
total 
persons 
m 
331 
258 
184 
411 
444 
563 
264 
84 
63 
117 
28 
10 
18 
2,473 
f 
318 
222 
159 
377 
494 
543 
227 
75 
55 
97 
28 
12 
16 
2,368 
total 
sam­
ple 
pop. 
649 
480 
343 
788 
938 
1.106 
491 
159 
118 
214 
56 
22 
34 
4.851 
av. 
hh 
size 
6 0 
6 4 
9 0 
105 
9 4 
106 
14.4 
114 
13.1 
19.5 
6 2 
7 3 
5 7 
8 93 
total 
sample 
AAME* 
472 83 
35237 
254 66 
596 59 
694 78 
834 32 
404 30 
129 57 
98 23 
176 50 
42 50 
19 39 
2311 
3,65135 
source authors survey 
* AAME = Active Adult Male Equivalents The AAME represents the average daily food energy requirements of an active Afncan adult male, or 2^30 
Kcal, based on the nutrient and energy шике recommended for populations in Afnca by the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) Thus, the food 
energy requirements for an adult male are taken as 1 AAME, and the requirements of members of other population dasses are expressed as proportions 
of this as follows duld 0-5 years 052 AAME, child 6-10 years 0 85 AAME, child 11-15 years 0 96 AAME and adult female 0 86 AAME (see ILCA 
1981 50) 
Table 8.Э Livestock Ownership Characteristics of Survey Population 
Location 
Olkmos 
Embolioi 
Kiboko 
Elang'ata Wuas 
Lomgosua 
Meto 
Cattle 
Calves 
M 
501 
643 
407 
1,038 
1,313 
1,297 
F 
481 
420 
405 
1,204 
1.256 
1,149 
Matures 
M 
1,361 
1,092 
1,174 
1,093 
2,042 
1,195 
F 
2,715 
1,278 
1,873 
3,591 
3,734 
3,682 
Total 
5.058 
3,433 
3,859 
6,926 
8.345 
7.323 
Small stock 
Sheep 
M 
1,748 
2,631 
488 
601 
1,280 
1.293 
F 
5,063 
3,572 
1,636 
2,343 
1,765 
2,966 
Goats 
M 
1,122 
1,044 
361 
1,390 
1,669 
1.848 
F 
2,703 
1,434 
1,343 
5,498 
3,460 
5469 
Total 
10,646 
8,681 
3,828 
9,832 
8,174 
11,676 
Don 
keys' 
16 
25 
69 
228 
519 
583 
Camels 
M F 
0 
0 
0 
1 
2 
1 
0 
0 
0 
2 
2 
1 
Total 
0 
0 
0 
3 
4 
2 
Poul­
try 
924 
365 
51 
377 
65 
0 
Bee­
hives 
0 
1 
4 
3 
0 
0 
Total 
LE* 
5,401 
3,913 
3391 
6489 
7,392 
7.184 
Ind Ranchers 
- Kapuuei 
-Loodokllani 
- Matapalo 
Buyers Olkmos 
- Maasal 
- non-Maasai 
Total 
1,235 
331 
481 
423 
32 
32 
0 
6,466 
source author's survey 
1,138 
256 
575 
307 
50 
50 
0 
6,103 
2,051 
741 
591 
719 
68 
68 
0 
10,076 
4.118 
1,445 
1,421 
1,252 
134 
134 
0 
21,125 
8442 
2,773 
3,068 
2,701 
284 
284 
0 
43,770 
1,672 
1,008 
225 
439 
83 
83 
0 
9.806 
3,072 
1,869 
491 
712 
300 
300 
0 
20,717 
1419 
518 
404 
597 
40 
40 
0 
8,993 
2462 
888 
802 
872 
261 
261 
0 
22,830 
8,825 
4,283 
1.922 
2,620 
684 
684 
0 
62,346 
168 
20 
32 
116 
0 
0 
0 
1,608 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4 
2 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
7 
2 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
11 
328 
216 
82 
30 
2,251 
51 
2,200 
4,361 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
8 
7465 
2,697 
2405 
2363 
318 
318 
0 
41.753 
LE = Livestock Equivalents The calculation of bvestock equivalents is based on metabolic weights (bveweight a n ) , which are closely related to food 
energy requirements ILCA (1981 49) estimated an aggregate coefficiem of 0 7 1 for cattle and 0 17 for small stock) These coefficients are multiplied 
by the number of animals of the household herd to determine the number of bvestock equivalents (LE) 
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These data also show a change in the cattle:small stock ratio in favour of the 
latter. For Embolioi the cattle:sinall stock ratio changed from 1:0.79 for 1968 
to 1:2.53 by 1990. The Kiboko ratio changed from 1:0.33 to 1:0.99. For 1977 
the overall ratio for our ranches (excluding Meto and Lorngosua) was 1:0.77 
(see ILCA 1979:10). Our overall sample cattle:small stock ratio stood at 1:1.42 
for early 1990. In other words, the importance of small stock within the 
Maasai herds seems to have increased structurally with a factor of 2 to 3 over 
the last decades. 
Finally, the trend in the percentage of mature female cattle has been 
studied. The Embolioi and Kiboko base-line studies of 1968 revealed a total of 
69 and 70 per cent for cows and heifers. In 1990 we calculated a reduction to 
54 per cent for Embolioi and to 61 per cent for Kiboko. The overall percentage 
for our group ranches was 68 per cent, while for individual ranchers this, 
surprisingly, stood at 67 per cent. A structural switch to a market and meat-
oriented economy for cattle, except maybe for Embolioi does not seem to have 
occurred. The number of donkeys, camels, chickens and beehives owned are 
also presented. In the last column the cattle and small stock numbers owned by 
our sample population have been recalculated in terms of Livestock 
Equivalents (LE) (see below). 
Table 8.4 highlights the estimated mean landownership in ha per person and in 
ha per Active Adult Male Equivalents (see below). The estimated population 
density for both 1986 and 1990 is also given. Most striking is the large 
difference in mean 1990 landownership between the individual ranchers (36.74 
ha/person) and the (former) group ranch herders (9.29 ha/person). The table 
shows a decrease in average landownership as the result of the growth of the 
population. In addition, the net result of the transfer of land by Olkinos, 
Embolioi and Kaputiei individual ranchers further decreased landownership. 
We would like to discuss the estimation of wealth classes of the sample 
population. In order to be able to compare the absolute data and estimate the 
wealth stratification of our survey population we recalculated the human and 
livestock populations in terms of Active Adult Male Equivalents (AAME) and 
Livestock Equivalents (LE) respectively (see ILCA 1981.20).2 
For their East African Range Livestock Systems Study ILCA developed these measures to 
rank wealth classes as it was felt that this greatly influenced the strategy of production Several 
parameters were discussed -the number of cattle, the ratio of volume of milk available to a 
household to that required for subsistence- but all were withdrawn Finally, a ratio of livestock 
units to people units was accepted as the best available wealth parameter A livestock equivalent 
(LE) based on metabolic weight was developed as it gives a more precise indication of the feed 
requirements of the herds Its ratio lo a human metabolic equivalent (AAME) was used as the 
stratifying parameter (LE/AAME) Cut off points were established at S and 13 LE/AAME to 
produce three strata. Adopting the ILCA wealth parameter enables us to compare our results with 
theirs. This and the practice that wealth obtained through other sources of income is mostly 
invested In livestock offset our initial idea of developing a new measure for stratifying the Maasai 
population according to wealth. 
Table 8.4 Landownerstup Characteristics of Survey Population 
Location hh popu- popu- total (estimated) (est) mean (est.) mean estimated 
lation lauon acreage acreage sample landownership landownership density 
1986 1990 of study population* (ha/person) (ha/aame)@ (persons/km2) 
^ * 1986 1990 1986 1990 1986 1990 1986 1990 
(ha)# 
Olíanos 
Embolioi 
Kiboko 
Bang'ala Wuas 
Lomgosua 
Meto 
Ind Ranchers 
- Kapmipi 
- Loodokilam 
- Matapalo 
Buyers Olkinos 
- Maasai 
- non-Maasai 
108 
75 
38 
75 
100 
104 
32 
14 
8 
10 
9 
3 
6 
610 
451 
322 
741 
882 
1,041 
433 
150 
87 
196 
aa 
n. a. 
n. a. 
649 
480 
343 
788 
938 
1,106 
461 
159 
93 
209 
56 
22 
34 
6,020 
24,000 
15,870 
59,497 
38,282 
28,928 
7 
7 
7 
7 
504 
136 
368 
5,143 
7,003 
6.092 
9,163 
6,623 
6.671 
17.124 
5.957 
4,986 
6,181 
n. a. 
aa 
na 
4,585 
6.861 
6.092 
9.163 
6.623 
6.671 
16,938 
5.639 
5,118 
6,181 
99 
59 
40 
8 43 
15 53 
18 92 
12 37 
751 
641 
39 54 
39 71 
57 31 
3154 
aa 
aa 
aa 
706 
14 29 
17 76 
1163 
706 
603 
36 74 
35 47 
55 03 
29 58 
177 
Z70 
117 
1157 
2114 
25 45 
16 34 
10 14 
851 
45 04 
48 74 
68 35 
38 06 
aa. 
aa. 
na 
970 
1947 
23 92 
15 36 
9 53 
800 
4189 
43 52 
65 95 
35 78 
233 
306 
173 
1196 
644 
5 29 
8 08 
13 31 
15 58 
256 
2 52 
174 
317 
aa 
aa. 
aa. 
14 15 
700 
5 63 
860 
14 16 
16 58 
2 75 
2 82 
182 
3 38 
56 57 
37 00 
85 00 
source author's survey 
# the hectares given include areas set aside for public use like roads, schools, dips, market centres and the like 
* 1986-90 decrease of acreage for Olkinos and Embolioi includes illegal sales of land and gifts 
@ AAME = Acuve Adult Male Equivalents (see table 8 2) 
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Table 8S Wealth Strata of Sample Population Based on LE/AAME, 1990 
LOCATION Stratum I 
(04.99) 
Stramm Π 
(5-12.99) 
Stratum ΠΙ 
G: 13.00 ) 
Total 
Olkinos 
Embolioi 
Kiboko 
Elang'ata Wuas 
Lomgosua 
Meto 
Ind. Ranchers 
-Kaputiei 
- Loodokilani 
-Matapalo 
Buyers Olkinos 
-Maasai 
-non-Maasai 
37 (34.3%) 
25 (33.3%) 
9 (23.7%) 
24 (32.0%) 
33 (33.0%) 
43 (41.3%) 
6 (17.6%) 
4 (28.6%) 
1 (11.1%) 
1 ( 9.1%) 
7 (77.8%) 
1 (33.3%) 
6(100%) 
29 (26.9%) 
24 (310%) 
11 (28.9%) 
30 (40.0%) 
36 (36.0%) 
39 (37.5%) 
11 (32.4%) 
3 (21.4%) 
4 (44.4%) 
4 (36.4%) 
0 ( 0.0%) 
0 ( 0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
42 (38.9%) 
26 (34.7%) 
18 (47.4%) 
21 (28.0%) 
31 (31.0%) 
22 (21.2%) 
17 (50.0%) 
7(500%) 
4 (44.4%) 
6 (54.5%) 
2 (22.2%) 
2 (66.7%) 
0 ( 0.0%) 
108 (100%) 
75 (100%) 
38 (100%) 
75 (100%) 
100 (100%) 
104 (100%) 
34 (100%) 
14 (100%) 
9 (100%) 
11 (100%) 
9(100%) 
3(100%) 
6(100%) 
Total 184 (33.9%) 180 (33.1%) 179 (33.0%) 543 (100%) 
Source: author's survey 
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Figure 8.2 Distribution of Wealth Strata 
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The distribution of our sample population along the three wealth strata is 
shown in table 8.5 and figure 8.2. Compared to ILCA's 1980 data for 
Olkarkar, Menieshi and Mbirikani group ranches located in the eastern part of 
Kajiado District, it seems that, on average, our sample group ranch households 
are more evenly distributed along the three wealth classes, 34, 34, 32 per cent 
for stratum Ι, Π and Ш, respectively, while the ILCA strata stood at 27, 49 and 
35 per cent Strong conclusions cannot be drawn as we are dealing with 
different populations in time and space. ILCA conducted their survey in a 3-4 
years post-drought period, while our research was undertaken in a 5-6 years 
post-drought period. Compared to the overall wealth distribution found, 
Olkinos and Embolioi households show a similar percentage for stratum I, 
while stratum Ш is slightly over-represented (Olkinos in particular). Let us 
now tum to an in depth analysis of the subdivision process in Olkinos and 
Embolioi group ranches. 
8.2 Olkinos and Embolioi: the Earliest Subdivided Group 
Ranches 
8.2.1 The Outcome of the Group Ranch Subdivision Process 
Olkinos and Embolioi members mentioned four main reasons for the 
subdivision of their ranches: preference for individual land ownership; 
construction of permanent houses; acquisition of individual loans; improvement 
of livestock and pasture management (see GRF Olkinos (1985:1) and GRF 
Embolioi (1986:1)). 
An examination of group ranch documents learned that the members' 
opinion on the principle of subdivision was primarily positive. Some protests 
were made, though these mainly concerned the way subdivision into individual 
parcels was conducted rather than the process as such. Non-registered and 
mainly young Maasai, fearing to become squatters or being left to the mercy of 
their parents, did object. Table 8.6 summarises the Olkinos and Embolioi 
members opinion concerning the process of subdivision and allocated plot 
Table 8.6 Opinion on Subdivision Proposal and Allocated Plot 
Opinion on subdivision 
Opinion allocated 
Veiy positive 
Poaave 
Intennediale 
Negauve 
Very negative 
plot 
Olkinos ( 
Positive 
9 1 0 
Quantity 
43 1 
2 5 5 
7.8 
10.8 
0 0 
11=108) 
Intermediate 
7 0 
Quality 
88 2 
9 8 
2 0 
0 0 
0 0 
Negaüve 
2 0 
Location 
85 3 
8 8 
2 9 
2 0 
10 
Embolioi (n=75) 
Positive 
95 7 
Quantity 
38 4 
41 1 
164 
4 1 
0 0 
Intermediate 
2 9 
Quality 
54 8 
37 0 
»2 
0 0 
0 0 
Negative 
14 
Location 
548 
384 
6 8 
0 0 
0 0 
source author's survey 
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• > Korompoi primarv school (16 ha) (OLKINOS τ с ι 
Alangata 
borehole (4 ha) 
Ngong Ngare 
cattle dip (1 S hal 
π - size of ranch (ha) 
_ · Road 
Figure S3 Olkinos Subdivided Group Ranch 
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Figure 8.4 Embolioi Subdivided Group Ranch 
The data of table 8.6 confinns an overall, positive attitude towards the 
principle of subdivision. Some intemiediate and negative feelings are held 
mainly with respect to the quantity of the allocated area, although some 80 per 
cent still stated that they had a positive or very positive opinion about the size 
of the allocated parcel. 
After the exclusion of public plots and roads a ranch mean of 46.71 ha 
resulted for the 116 Olkinos members. Some people complained that some 
members of the group ranch committee and their relatives and friends, had 
allocated themselves large parcels in the most favourable places. Indeed eight 
out of ten committee-members fall into the category of the 25 per cent largest 
plot holders. The chairman and vice-chairman obtained the two largest parcels 
of 132 ha and 131 ha, respectively. Figures 8.3 and 8.4 show the subdivided 
Olkinos and Embolioi group ranch area. Before the time of subdivision, 
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ownership of the ranch lay in the hands of all group members and their 
families. As a result every single person had a theoretical uniform shared 
ownership of land and free use of the total group ranch area. As shown by 
table 8.4 the average "landownership" for OIkinos would be only 7.06 ha per 
person for 1990 while in 1986 it was 8.43 ha per person. Subdivision of the 
group ranch has resulted in plots varying in size. 
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Figure 8.5 OIkinos Plot Sizes (ha) 
Source author's survey 
Figure 8.6 Land per 
household member (hhmb) 
Figure 8.5 gives the range of parcel size for 108 households on the OIkinos 
group ranch at the time of subdivision in 1986. Plot sizes averaged 47.62 ha 
through a range from 11.00 to 132.00 ha per parcel. The gini-coefficient found 
for this distribution was 0.26. 
The inclusion of household sizes to assess the distribution of the relative 
land availability per household member (i.e. parcel size/family size) for the 108 
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households is shown in figure 8.6. The 1986 population was set at 0.94 of its 
1990 size. It was concluded that for the households within our Olkinos sample 
an average of 11.05 ha per household member (hhmb) was available ranging 
from households having only 2.43 ha/hhmb to a maximum of households 
owning 65.96 ha/hhmb at the time of subdivision. In majority most household 
members have access to a potential area of less than 10 ha. 
Plot sizes obtained by ten Olkinos committee-members averaged 81.80 ha 
as compared to a mean plot size of 42.53 ha for non-members. The parcels 
belonging to former members of the now dissolved Olkinos and Embolioi 
group ranch committees are marked showing their favourable allocation (see 
figures 8.3 and 8.4). Because the committee-members have relatively large 
families the difference in mean landownership per household member between 
them and non-committee members is somewhat reduced: 14.04 ha/hhmb for 
committee-member households and 10.75 ha/hhmb for non-committee member 
households. 
For the Embolioi sample of 75 households the group ranch subdivision 
resulted in an average plot size of 93.37 ha per household over a range of 30.0 
to 225.0 ha per parcel. The mean land availability for the Embolioi households 
was 19.83 ha per person, varying between households having only 3.44 
ha/person and those in possession of 135.60 ha/person for 1986. Plot sizes 
appointed to 11 former Embolioi committee-members averaged 130.74 ha 
while those for non committee members were 86.84 ha. Taking into account 
household sizes the mean land ownership was 28.49 ha/hhmb and 17.85 
ha/hhmb for committee and non-committee member households, respectively. 
From these figures it can be concluded that the subdivision process in 
Olkinos and Embolioi ranches has been very favourable for the former 
conumttee-members. Nonetheless, they are still far from the mean ranch size of 
14 established individual ranchers interviewed in the northern Kaputiei area of 
425.46 ha/household or 39.71 ha/person in 1986. 
8.2.2 Changing Residence Patterns and Social Consequences 
The subdivision process implies that a group of households who stayed 
together in a single boma will split up and each will move to its own parcel. 
This process of individualization, however, is not of recent origin but has been 
going on for the last thirty years. It has been stated that the introduction of 
group ranches and the individualization of production has led to a considerable 
decrease in boma size and the emergence of single-household bomas (see 
Bekure et al. 1987:204). As a result boma sizes in the Kaputiei area started to 
decrease sooner than in the Phase III group ranches of Meto and Lomgosua. 
Table 8.7 underlines this situation with Kaputiei bomas having 
approximately half the average number of households compared to the 
Matapato region. For the small Ildamat area in Central Division we were able 
to reconstruct this process of boma size reduction. Soon after the 1960/1 
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drought there were 7 big bomas of some 12 households each in the area. It was 
densely bushed and populated by many wild animals. After the division of the 
area into some ten individual ranches and 3 group ranches (Olkiloriti, Esokota 
and Ildamat-Oloyiangalani) the number of bomas increased although they 
became much smaller. According to our informant this process was partly the 
result of the reduction of trees and wild animals which had increased safety in 
the area and the rise in the number of livestock, which both allowed and forced 
people to spread out over the area. 
Table 8.7 Mean Number of Households per Boma and Size of Boma, 1990 
0 
mean 
bh/boma 
Oik 
96 
187 
Emb 
74 
181 
Ind 
34 
236 
Buy 
9 
167 
Kib 
36 
208 
Ews 
74 
484 
Lor 
100 
368 
Met 
104 
3 01 
% of hh by 
boma size 
54 2 
38.5 
41 
10 
10 
10 
43 2 
500 
68 
00 
00 
00 
47 0 
38 2 
14 7 
00 
00 
00 
667 
22 2 
11 1 
00 
00 
00 
22 2 
72 2 
56 
00 
00 
00 
41 
419 
33 8 
109 
14 
83 
50 
510 
35 0 
40 
20 
30 
bouree autnors survey 
For all of the other regions in Kajiado it is suggested that there is a clear 
downward trend in the number of households living together in a single boma. 
Unfortunately, we lack historical data for our survey area in this respect. Still, 
information provided by other researchers indicates a total of 4 to 8 households 
(30-50 persons) for a typical Maasai boma in the late 1950s period (see Jacobs 
1963:42). For the 1950s, Njoka (1979.222) found an average boma size for the 
Kaputiei area of 6.22 households, dropping to 5.13 households per boma for 
the 1960s and 2.70 for the 1970s. Grandin found a figure of 1.6 and 1.8 
households in 1983 for Olkarkar and Merueshi Kaputiei group ranches (see 
Bekure et al. 1987:175). Thus reduced boma sizes are not the result of 
subdivision alone but stem from a variety of reasons such as the 
individualization of production, reduced wildlife numbers and the demand of 
livestock for food and water. As stated in section 8.1.1, subdivision will 
probably have hastened this process though a number of plots have still not yet 
been occupied by their lawful owners who preferred or were forced to stay 
with their relatives. 
The splitting of bomas has also increased the relative number of single Maasai 
households. Table 8.8 clearly shows the large number of Olkinos and Embolioi 
sample households living alone nowadays (54 and 43 per cent, respectively). 
By contrast, the other group ranch households of Kiboko, Elang'ata Wuas, 
15 4 
45 2 
36 5 
29 
00 
00 
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Lomgosua and Meto mainly live with at least one other household in a single 
boma (only 10 per cent of group ranch households resides alone). No clear 
picture emerges about residence patterns in relation to the wealth strata. 
Olkinos ranchers follow a pattern that can be found among the established 
ranchers whereby it is the rich households who stay alone. Wealthy Embolioi 
ranchers, however, seem to follow the group ranch standard. Perhaps the 
relatively large size of the Embolioi parcels and their remote location hinders 
the splitting up of rich households having high labour needs. 
Information was gathered on the household's labour efforts since the time 
of subdivision. According to 45.3 per cent of Olkinos former group ranch 
members leisure time since individualization has decreased, while the 
remaining members have not experienced any change. For Embolioi these 
figures are 30.6 per cent (decrease), 2.0 per cent (increase) and 67.3 per cent 
(no change). It has been argued by opponents of group ranch subdivision that 
this will lead to a loss of co-operation between Maasai households and 
possibly even a loss of culture; the changed residence pattern puts a strain on 
short time assistance; the dissolution of the group ranch committee means that 
there is no longer a forum for mobilizing efforts towards communal action. 
These developments are strengthened by the influx of non-Maasai as, due to 
their different economic activities, they sometimes even run into conflict (e.g. 
over fencing of shambas). Although the non-Maasai still only own a small 
percentage of the land their numbers are increasing and will soon outnumber 
the Maasai which will probably erode away Maasai cultural habits and rites. 
Table 8.8 Residence Pattern of Sample Households by Wealth Strata (nr) 
Oik Emb Ind Buy Kib Ews Lor Met 
Stratum 1 Alone 
Wilh others 
Stratum 2 Alone 
With others 
13 
19 
12 
15 
16 
9 
9 
15 
2 
4 
3 
g 
4 
3 
0 
0 
2 
7 
1 
9 
2 
22 
0 
30 
0 
33 
2 
34 
10 
33 
5 
34 
Stratum 3 Alone 
With others 
Total Alone 
With others 
source, autnor s survey 
27 
10 
52 
44 
7 
18 
32 
42 
11 
6 
16 
18 
2 
0 
6 
3 
5 
12 
8 
28 
1 
19 
3 
71 
3 
28 
5 
95 
1 
21 
16 
88 
Ranchers in the subdivided areas were asked about their opinion on the level 
of co-operation between former group ranch members since subdivision. 
According to 72.7 per cent of the Olkinos members there had been no change 
in this respect According to 20.5 per cent collaboration had actually decreased 
while only 6.8 per cent stated that it had increased. For Embolioi the opinion 
was reversed as only 3.4 per cent mentioned a decrease in co-operation while 
25.4 reported an increase. The remaining 71.2 per cent of the Embolioi 
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residents had experienced no change in this respect From the group of 
established individual ranchers 10.0 per cent talked of an increase, 13.3 per 
cent a decrease and 76.7 per cent claimed no change in the degree of co-
operation since the time they had obtained their individual ranch. Kaputiei 
individual ranchers reported an increase while Loodokilani and Matapalo 
ranchers were more pessimistic about co-operation. 
Within the single Maasai household tensions arise nowadays as a result of 
individual landownership if the head of the household decides to sell part of 
his land without the knowledge or approval of the other family members.3 
This sometimes leads to such excesses as in a case near Illasit where sons took 
their father to court to prevent him from selling the remaining 17 hectares of 
land that remained from an initial landownership of some 80 hectares. 
The question of inheritance also arises. According to Kipury (1992:37) 
many single, divorced or separated Maasai women have become disinherited 
due to land subdivision which forced them to move to the peri-urban slums 
ending up in unfavourable activities like prostitution. In my opinion, this is a 
too strong statement. For instance, the Olkinos members believed that the plots 
should be inherited by all the sons (51.4 per cent), the sons without land (7.5 
per cent), all the sons and unmarried daughters (13.1 per cent), (unmarried) 
daughters only (0.9 per cent), while 27.1 per cent had no opinion yet. In 
Embolioi 93.3 per cent of the families stated that all the sons would inherit 
their parents' land. Sons without land (2.7 per cent), the eldest son only (1.3 
per cent), all sons and unmarried daughters (1.3 per cent) were also mentioned. 
Only 1.3 per cent were stated to have no opinion. Thus the small group of 
unmarried daughters seems not to be totally forgotten in respect of land 
inheritance. 
S3 The Economic Viability of Allocated Plots 
83.1 Introduction 
The small sizes of the Olkinos parcels in particular raises questions about 
economic and ecological viability, stocking densities, fencing and access to 
other parts of the former group ranch territory. In this and the following 
sections we will attempt to provide some answers to these questions. We will 
start our analysis assuming that all household members actually live on the 
ranch, all animals are kept on the ranch and the quality of the individual plots 
Officially the family bas to be consulled and to approve (he proposed sale of land Indeed 
the Land Control Boards who decide to approval of sale or mortgage of land often sent applicants 
back to consult their families However, in most cases wives who object will lose this battle under 
the threat of physical harm. It has also been reported thai some Maasai applicants claimed to be 
unmarried while m reality they were married and had children (see Kajiado Focus 1991a. 13) 
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is uniform. The first question then is if the allocated plot sizes are able to 
provide the Maasai households a reasonable standard of living under a system 
of pure pastoralism. Of course, between seasons fluctuations will occur, 
sometimes even resulting in periods of severe drought This should be kept in 
mind when reading the following paragraphs. 
8.3.2 Sdfsufficiency Threshold Levels 
According to Nestel, who surveyed the nutritional status of the Maasai, a 
household of 6 persons will need at least 6 χ 9.7 = 58.2 head of cattle to be 
able to subsist completely on a diet of milk and meat (see Bekure et al. 
1987:81/127).4 Recalculating this in terms of adults places the minimum level 
for complete nourishment at 12.1 head of cattle per A AME. It should be noted 
that ILCA did not include small stock as a possible source of food in their 
exercise. Inclusion of sheep and goats places the minimum selfsuffiency 
requirement at 8.6 LE/AAME. Utilizing this set of different keys we are able, 
whilst showing the influence of the parameters applied, to determine the 
percentage of Maasai households having a surplus or deficient number of 
livestock with reference to the "selfsufficiency" scenario i.e. the ability to be 
completely self sufficient in food from one's own herd alone. Percentages for 
selfsufficiency will depend on the base of reference used. 
For instance, for the cattle/person selfsufficiency scenario 47,200 head of 
cattle would be needed for our total sample population while the total cattle 
ownership stands at only 43,769 head of cattle. In terms of LE/AAME a total 
of 31,410 LE would be required with overall sample ownership standing 
favourably at 41,753 LE or 11.4 LE/AAME in 1990. Distribution of livestock 
over the sample households, however, is not uniform and thus results in 
households positioned above or below the threshold level on the scale of self-
nourishment from their own herd. The LE/AAME threshold would place all of 
the stratum I households and a large part of those in stratum Π under the level 
by which they would be able to practise pure pastoralism. 
4
 Nestel's figure is based on a reference adult requirement of 2,300 Kcal, a daily output of 
milk per lacialmg cow valued at 700 Kcal, and a fraction of cows in milk of about 20 per cent of 
the total herd In addition, each head of cattle is assumed to provide 50 Kcal/day in the form of 
meat This amounts to some 7 TLU per person needed In chapter 2 we used a rough figure of 4 
TLU per person as the bottom line for subsistence It should be noted that this figure allowed 
inclusion of other species besides cattle and used rather low conversion rates for the 2S0 Kg 
standard Tropical Livestock Unit, 0 72 for cattle and 0 072 for small stock In the Maasai setting 
the TLU conversion factors used by Nestel are higher, 01 for small slock and for caule location 
dependent figures ranging between 0 70 and 0 83 The Ministry of Livestock Department Kajiado 
District used an overall conversion co-efficient of 06 for cattle, 0125 for shoats m estimating 
total Stock Units (SU) (see chapter 7) Based on total livestock numbers of the Kajiado District 
Livestock 1988 census the following conversion rates between the group of livestock units can be 
presented. 1 LE = 1 06 TLU (ILCA-Kajiado) = 1 17 TLU (Kenya) = 1 23 SU (MoLD 1988-
Kajiado) 
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Table 8.9 shows that, roughly speaking, half to two thirds of the Maasai 
households are no longer able to depend solely on their animals for their food 
needs. At one extreme, the cattle/person key estimates that between S2.6 
(Kiboko) to 81.7 per cent (Meto) lack enough cattle for self-nourishment 
Some 44.1 per cent of the individual ranchers' households are in this same 
position. In terms of LE/AAME the situation is less dramatic; 39.5 (Kiboko) to 
65.4 per cent (Meto) for group ranches and 32.4 per cent for individual 
ranchers. 
Table 8.9 Percentage of Sample Households Living Below the Minimum 
Levels of Pure Pastoralism in 1990. 
Cattle/person Cattle/AAME TLU/AAME* LE/AAME» 
(<9.7) Mean (<12.1) Mean (<8.7) Mean (<8.6) Mean 
Olkinos 
Embolioi 
Kiboko 
Elang'ata Wuas 
Lomgosua 
Meto 
Individual Ranchers 
- Kaputiei 
- Loodokilani 
- Matapalo 
Buyeis Olkinos 
• Maasai 
- Non-Maasai 
67.6 
72.0 
52.6 
69.3 
69.0 
81.7 
44.1 
42.9 
44.4 
455 
77.8 
33.3 
100.0 
8.0 
7.5 
11.3 
8.2 
8.7 
6.4 
16.4 
15.7 
21.1 
13.6 
5.0 
15.0 
0.0 
62.0 
64.0 
50.0 
65.3 
66.0 
79.8 
44.1 
42.9 
44.4 
45.5 
77.8 
33.3 
100.0 
12.1 
10.6 
15.7 
11.3 
12.8 
8.8 
19.9 
19.4 
24.6 
16.7 
7.6 
22.8 
0.0 
57.1 
61.3 
42.1 
60.0 
57.0 
72.1 
41.2 
42.9 
44.4 
36.4 
77.8 
33.3 
100.0 
10.7 
9.5 
12.6 
9.4 
10.4 
7.5 
16.1 
16 2 
18.9 
13.5 
66 
19.7 
0.0 
48.1 
50.7 
39.5 
54.7 
51.0 
65.4 
32.4 
28 6 
33.3 
36.4 
77 8 
33 3 
100.0 
13.4 
11.9 
14.3 
11.1 
119 
9.0 
18.2 
19.1 
20.4 
15.3 
8.0 
24.0 
0.0 
source: aumor's survey 
* TLU: 0.72 for caule and 0.072 for small stock. # LE: 0.71 for cattle and 0.17 for small stock. 
The subdivided group ranches, Olkinos and Embolioi, are between the range 
for group ranches and far from the established individual ranchers' score. Our 
group of settled buyers seems to be split into well-to-do Maasai pastoralists on 
the one side and poor non-Maasai on the other, at least in terms of livestock 
wealth. 
8J.3 Selfsufliciency Versus Size of Allocated Plots 
Herd sizes needed for the food supply of the human population in tum imply 
certain requirements from the rangelands. In chapter 1 we discussed these 
requirements of forage, water and protection for herbivores. Forage availability 
expressed in tenns of quantity (dry matter) and quality (protein and minerals) 
is first of all related to the type and composition of forage, type of soil, 
precipitation and evaporation. Management practices like rotational grazing, 
understocking or overstocking also influence the actual grazing capacity of a 
unit of land in the short and long term. 
Forage requirements of livestock are usually expressed in terms of daily 
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intake per kg liveweight and an average of 2.5 per cent bodyweight is normally 
accepted. However, as the quantity and quality of the rangelands is also 
determined by the use made of them an extra margin on the supply side has to 
be taken into account. To offset losses from wastage and trampling ILCA 
calculated a threshold of 10 kg/TLU/day for Kajiado District To safeguard the 
rangeland resources for the middle to long tenn, implying a maximum 
consumption of forage growth that may be grazed each year without inducing a 
downward trend in forage production, they doubled this figure to 20 
kg/TLU/day (see Bekure et al. 1987:161). In terms of minimum land 
requirements this would mean from at the low 10 kg/TLU/day allowance and a 
year of good rainfall 1.5 ha/TLU to 4.2 ha/TLU at the 20 kg/TLU/day 
threshold in combination with a poor long rainy season. Thus for the former 
Olkinos and Embolioi group ranches this would mean that the permissible 
stocking levels could vary from 1,433 to 4,013 TLU and from 5,714 to 16,000 
TLU, respectively.5 
The minimal herd size requirement for food subsistence can be expressed in a 
minimal land necessity for each specific household. A threshold of 9.7 cattle or 
7.0 TLU/person would mean a land requirement ranging between 10.5 and 29.4 
ha per person depending on the short or long tenn grazing capacity. In other 
words within this selfsufficiency scenario the average Olkinos Maasai 
household of 6.0 persons would need between 63 and 176 ha of land to be able 
to keep some 42 TLU in an ecologically viable way. Utilising the livestock 
equivalent and the active male equivalent would result in a requirement of 8.6 
LE per AAME, indicating a land need of 13.7 to 38.3 ha per AAME 
depending on the season.6 
For an analysis of the subdivided Olkinos and Embolioi group ranches we 
would like to start with an estimation of the potential availability of land per 
person for our sample population in 1986, the time of subdivision. In addition, 
the early 1990 situation will be discussed in order to discover a trend in the 
land availability with reference to the minimum needs for every single 
household within the sample. This estimation will be conducted using the TLU 
(ILCA) per person as well as LE per AAME keys. 
According to the ILCA learn. Potter showed for the Athi plains (to which Olkinos and 
Embolioi belong) that grasslands did not lose long-term productivity even when grasslands were 
continuously grazed at a stocking level of 2 ha/TLU (see Bekure et al. 1987:169). Potter himself 
recently suggested a 4 ha/TLU stocking level for a 100 ha farm. He fount that using IS different 
combinations of height and frequency of cutting grass to estimale herbage growth resulted m 'IS 
quite differenl assessments of potential herbage availability for a grazing animal, with no clear 
indication as to which was the "nght" value' (Potter 1989 13). 
4
 1 LE is equivalent to 1 06 TLU (ILCA). Tlius 1.5 ha/TLU = 1.59/LE and 4.2 ha/TLU = 
4.4S ba/LE. As a result lanl needs m terms of 8.6 LE/AAME is 13.7 ha for a good season lo 38.7 
ba for a poor rainy season. 
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At this moment it is interesting to recall the statements made by several 
commissions and researchers concerning the availability or minimal 
requirement of land in Maasailand. We have seen how, in the early 1930s, the 
Carter Land Commission did not so much estimate the Maasai need for land as 
rather castigate the availability of some 85 ha per person (3 persons per square 
mile). In 1965, the Lawrence Commission considered a potential acreage of 80 
ha per adult Maasai male as unviable for a single person let alone a family. 
For the Kaputiei area, Halderman calculated a potential average ranch size of 
almost 190 ha by the late 1960s. This was far below the UNDP/FAO model 
figure of 467 ha per family or some 45 ha per person. Finally, according to the 
Ministry of Livestock Development (Kajiado District) plot sizes below 200 ha 
cannot support a family even on a subsistence level (see MoLD 1988:57). 
For the situation in the late 1980s table 8.10 summarises the availability of 
land for our sample households. The data underlines the difficulty for the 
Maasai producers of today in being able to follow the selfsufficiency scenario 
as far as the availability of land is concerned. 
Table 8.10 Percentage of Sample Households Having an Inadequate Amount 
of Land Within a Selfsufficiency Scenario, 1986 and 1990. 
ha/person/hh* 
Olkinos 
Embolioi 
Ind Ranchers 
- Kapuuei IR 
- Loodokilam IR 
- Matapalo IR 
Buyers 
- Maasai 
- non-Maasai 
ha/aame/hM 
OUunos 
Embolioi 
Ind Ranchers 
- Kapuuei IR 
- Loodokilam IR 
- Matapalo IR 
Buyers 
- Maasai 
- non-Maasai 
1986 
mean 
1105 
19 83 
44 02 
4187 
6255 
32 30 
2 01 
3 32 
135 
mean 
1626 
28 82 
55 30 
5269 
8136 
3809 
286 
493 
182 
<]0.5 
64 8% 
25 3% 
125% 
14 3% 
25 0% 
00% 
1000% 
1000% 
1000% 
<13.7 
565% 
227% 
15 6% 
214% 
25 0% 
00% 
1000% 
1000% 
1000% 
<29.4 
95 4% 
907% 
43 8% 
35 7% 
25 0% 
700% 
1000% 
1000% 
1000% 
<38.3 
95 4% 
89 3% 
43 8% 
35 7% 
25 0% 
700% 
1000% 
1000% 
1000% 
1990 
mean 
9 11 
18 23 
40 86 
37 20 
60.52 
30 26 
188 
3 12 
126 
mean 
13 57 
26 41 
5133 
46 87 
78 55 
35 81 
2 69 
464 
171 
< 70.5 
73 1% 
307% 
15 6% 
214% 
25 0% 
00% 
1000% 
1000% 
1000% 
< 13 7 
67 6% 
28 0% 
15 6% 
214% 
25 0% 
00% 
1000% 
1000% 
1000% 
<29.4 
97 2% 
920% 
46 9% 
429% 
25 0% 
700% 
1000% 
1000% 
1000% 
< 38.3 
96 3% 
89 3% 
500% 
429% 
25 0% 
800% 
1000% 
1000% 
1000% 
source autnors survey 
* ha/person-hh = the amount of land available per person per household, 
# ha/aame-hh = the amount of land available per AAME per household, 
Ihe mean availability of land bas been calculaled by totalling the potential individual land 
availability for each person (or AAME) for each household divided by all persons (or AAME). 
This (hirers from the mean resulting from a division of all land by all persons (AAME)' 
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In times of stress, when the carrying capacity of the ranch drops considerably, 
only a mere 10 per cent or less of the Olkinos and Embolioi households would 
be able to keep their animals on the individual ranch without suffering a 
shortage in grass and/or severely overstocking it. Moreover, a comparison 
between 1986 and 1990 data reveals that, over a three year period, this 
capacity has been lost by another one to two per cent of the sample 
households. Upto half of the established individual ranchers' households are 
faced with a theoretical shortage of land in periods of low rainfall. Due to the 
population increase this shortage of land will become more pronounced unless 
emigration away from the livestock sector or even physically from Kajiado 
District will increase. 
A household having less than the minimum plot size could still be purely 
selfsufficient if it possesses a large enough herd, although this would imply 
that the ranch is overstocked. Of course the opposite, having a small herd and 
a large parcel resulting in understocking, is also possible. We should have a 
look at the distribution of the households in terms of selfsufficiency in both 
categories of landownership; deficit and surplus. Table 8 11 shows the results 
of the LE/AAME versus landownership crosstabulation for the 1990 situation. 
Table 8.11 Percentage of Selfsufficient Households Within Four Categories 
of Landownership, 1990. 
Location 
Olkinos 
Embolioi 
Ind Ranchers 
- Kapuuei 
- Loodokilam 
-Matapalo 
Buyers 
Olkmos 
Embolioi 
Ind Ranchers 
- Kapuuei 
- Loodokilam 
-Matapalo 
Buyeis 
source, author's sui 
A 
η 
72 
21 
5 
3 
2 
0 
9 
В 
η 
36 
54 
27 
11 
б 
10 
0 
rvey 
На/ААМЕ 
not 
selfsufficient 
597% 
714% 
800% 
66 7% 
1000% 
na. 
77 8% 
На/ААМЕ 
not 
selfsufficient 
25 0% 
42 6% 
25 9% 
18 2% 
167% 
4 0 0 % 
na. 
< 13.7 
selfsufficiem 
40 3% 
28 6% 
200% 
33 3% 
00% 
na 
22 2% 
¿ 13.7 
selfsufficient 
75 0% 
57 4% 
741% 
818% 
83 3% 
600% 
na. 
С 
η 
104 
67 
16 
6 
2 
8 
9 
D 
η 
4 
8 
16 
8 
6 
2 
0 
На/ААМЕ 
not 
selfsufficiem 
49 0% 
56 7% 
5 0 0 % 
500% 
100 0% 
37 5% 
77 8% 
На/ААМЕ 
not 
selfsufficient 
25 0% 
00% 
18 8% 
125% 
167% 
50.0% 
na 
<38.3 
selfsufficient 
510% 
4 3 3 % 
500% 
500% 
00% 
62.5% 
222% 
S 38.3 
selfsufficient 
75 0% 
1000% 
824% 
87 5% 
83 3% 
500% 
na. 
It can be concluded that some households, in spite of having a shortage of 
land, still possess an adequate amount of livestock for complete food 
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selfsufficieny. For instance, within the group of Olkinos ranchers who lack 
enough land even under the least restrictive stocking densities (quadrant A) 
still 40.3 per cent do possess the number of animals required for complete 
selfsufficiency. This is equivalent to 26.9 per cent of all Olkinos households. In 
contrast, 25.0 per cent of Olkinos households in quadrant В (having a land 
availability of 13.7 ha/AAME or more) face a shortage of livestock. This is 8 3 
per cent of all Olkinos households. In Embolioi the reverse situation exists. In 
quadrant A, at the below 13.7 ha/AAME level, 28.6 per cent (or 8 0 per cent 
of all Embolioi ranchers) are selfsufficient in food while having a land deficit 
In quadrant B, above 13.7 ha/AAME, 42.6 per cent (or 30.7 per cent of all 
Embolioi ranchers) have an inadequate food supply from their herd although 
they own enough land. This indicates that large numbers of Embolioi 
households hold a reasonable amount of land but lack the animals to make use 
of i t This outcome underlines the information of table 7.1 based on the 1988 
livestock census results, suggesting rather low ratios of stock units per member 
for Embolioi group ranch, though more pronounced than in this survey (see 
table 8.9).7 
Olkinos and Embolioi Maasai, Kajiado individual ranchers and Olkinos 
buyers were asked to estimate the economic viability of their present plot if it 
were the only source of income. Table 8 12 presents their opinions. 
Table 8.12 Opinion on Economic Viability of the Individual Ranch 
Highly viable 
Viable 
Intennediate 
Unviable 
Highly unviable 
Olkinos 
(i>=101) 
79 
35 6 
48 5 
69 
10 
Embolioi 
(в=73) 
411 
43 8 
151 
00 
00 
Individual 
ranchers 
(n=34) 
118 
55 9 
26 5 
59 
00 
Olkinos 
buyers 
(n=7) 
28 6 
14 3 
571 
00 
00 
Maasai 
buyers 
(n=3) 
00 
33 3 
667 
00 
00 
non-Maasai 
buyers 
(n=4) 
500 
00 
50 0 
0 0 
00 
source au mor's survey 
The opinions of Maasai owners seem to underline our analysis of the potenttal 
viability of the subdivided group ranches. The low average parcel size (42.63 
ha) in the Olkinos area is reflected in the opinion of its inhabitants concerning 
the viability of their plots today. In contrast, 73 Embolioi members 
7
 Applying (he cattle/person instead of LE/AAME versus lareiownership will somewhat 
change the above estimation of land and livestock deficiency The cattle/person ratio will enlarge 
the group of owners having a shortage of land as well as livestock The TLU/AAME ratio is more 
or less equivalent to the LE/AAME ratio as far as land is concerned but, due to its lower 
conversion rate for small stock (0 1 or 0072 for TLU as compared to 017 for LE) the group of 
households categorized as having an insufficient number of animals for pure paslorahsm will be 
larger As a consequence percentages for each of the four quadrants arising out of the land-
livestock crosstabulauon will change 
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interviewed, showed more or less the same livestock per person ratios although 
they possessed an average plot size of 91.93 ha in 1990. The majority were 
still convinced of the economic viability of their ranch. 
Respondents from the group of established individual ranchers had an 
average ranch size of 529.36 ha, ranging from 42.0 to 2,337.0 ha by 1990. In 
spite of this favourable position they were less convinced of the economic 
viability of their ranch than the Embolioi members. Their relatively large 
household sizes, their current standard of living which also comes from other 
sources and the threatening loss of access to former group ranch areas were 
held responsible for this attitude. 
Finally, half of the immigrant buyers who actually settled in the area, 
seemed to be aware of the marginality of the area for cultivation purposes and 
they held an intermediate position concerning the viability of their ranch. The 
other half, however, thought very positively in regard to the economic viability 
of their newly acquired plots. It should be remembered that the majority of 
them practised cultivation which, in the 1986-1990 period, experienced 
relatively good weather conditions. This, in combination with the relatively 
large plot sizes, especially in comparison with those in their home area, is 
thought to be responsible for their moderate optimism. 
8.4 Ecological Viability of the Allocated Plots 
8.4.1 Introduction 
Besides economic viability we attempted to gain insight into the ecological 
viability of the allocated individual ranches. An argument often used in favour 
of individual landownership is that it is supposed to enhance the (continued) 
ecological viability of the ranch. Destocking one's ranch to recommended 
stocking levels, practising rotational grazing or grass reseeding are among the 
improvements expected to go along with the subdivision of group ranches. For 
example, it is stated by the Ministry of Livestock Development in Kajiado 
District that 'the subdivision of Group Ranches into individual Ranches has 
compelled some of the Ranchers affected to dispose of livestock by sale to 
levels Ranches can hold' (MoLD 1988:56). 
Those opposing subdivision fear that the farms will be fenced, free 
movement of stock and wildlife will be restricted and cultivation intensified, all 
of these threats to the natural habitat of the Maasai. These threats are also 
recognized by the Ministry which stated 'This does not mean however, that 
Group Ranch subdivision is the solution to maintenance of proper balance 
between livestock and range resources on offer, far from it, the subdivision of 
group ranches is in itself a problem that needs attention and urgently given the 
small sizes of the resultant subdivisions which are not viable for livestock 
upkeep, the enterprise most suited due to the prevalent ecological situation' 
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(MoLD 1988:56). 
In chapter 3 we concluded that over 90 per cent of Kajiado District falls within 
zones V and VI. For our study area table 8.13 summarises information 
presented by the Livestock Department Kajiado District concerning the 
recommended stocking rate, range trend and actual stocking density. The 
presented information underlines the difficulty in defining the right stocking 
rate and grazing capacity of a certain piece of land. Kiboko group ranch, for 
instance, though having a stocking rate recommendation of 7.0 ha/SU only and 
being among the most overstocked locations in respect to its potential (2.4 
times), was characterized as being in good condition by the Ministry of 
Livestock Development in 1988.' 
Table 8.13 Ecological Characteristics of the Study Areas 
Location 
Oliónos 
Eroboboi 
Kiboko 
Elang'ata Wuas 
Lomgosua 
Meto 
lul. Ranchers 
- Kapuliei 
-Loodokihml 
-Matapalo 
Eco-
zone 
V-4 
V-4 
V-2 
V-3 
V-3 
IV/V 
V-4 
V-3 
-Э 
Rainfall r/Eo 
mean (%) 
(mm) 
575 27 
476 25 
495 26 
465 25 
497 26 
520 27 
Recom 
stocking 
rate 
(ha/su) 
5.0 
6.0 
7.0 
5.0 
6.0 
5.0 
-
. 
-
Source MoLD 1988; MoLtVRPU 19*Фа, lltob, 19g9cv 
Actual 
stocking 
density 
(ha/su) 
1.74 
12.20 
2.86 
3.00 
340 
2.20 
-
. 
-
Recom/ 
actual 
stocking 
1988 
29 
05 
24 
17 
18 
2.3 
-
. 
-
Range 
condì non 
1988 
fair 
fair 
good 
fair 
fair 
fair 
fair 
? 
fair 
Range 
trend 
1988 
down 
down 
down 
down 
down 
down 
down 
? 
stable 
Embolioi area, stated to be understocked, was labelled as having only a fair 
ranch condition. Olkinos subdivided group ranch was categorized as being the 
most overstocked group ranch though its ranch condition was similar to that of 
Embolioi. The one-time census observation of the actual stocking density 
related to a yearround recommended rate of stocking could possibly be the 
main factor held responsible for these discrepancies. In other words, massive 
livestock movements towards an area in good condition will have blurred the 
* At the stan of KLDP I, the UNDP/FAO range ecologist had placed both Kiboko and 
Embolioi among the viable ranches. Norton-GnfTiths (1977:11), however, produced a composite 
greenness map of Kajiado District based on a Landsat images time senes analysis, placing Kiboko 
group ranch in category 2 (modest consistently dry) while Embolioi m categones 3 (intermediate) 
and 4 (modest consistently green). 
' The Ministry's applied thresholds of 6.0 balsa fat Embolioi and 5.0 ha/su for Olkinos are 
equivalent to 7.38 ha/LE and 6.15 ha/LE, respectively. This Is above ILCA's land need esumate. 
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picture of high stocking densities going together with depleted areas and vice 
versa. 
8.4.2 Water and Forage Availability in the Areas of Survey 
The availability of water varies as to seasons as well as to place. For our 
sample households we investigated the sources of water, the mean distance to 
these sources and the frequency of watering the cattle and small stock animals 
in the dry and wet seasons (see table 8.14). 
Table 8.14 Availability and Condition of Water Sources, 1988 
Olklnos 
Embolioi 
Klboko 
Elang'ata Wuas 
Lomgosua 
Мею 
-Kapuüeim 
- Loodokilani IR 
- Matapalo IR 
Boreh. 
f nf 
1 0 
2 1 
1 1 
1 3 
0 2 
0 0 
8 S 
8 0 
12 2 
Pan 
f nf 
0 0 
5 0 
1 0 
2 0 
4 0 
0 0 
6 0 
26 0 
11 0 
Dam 
f nf 
1 0 
0 0 
0 0 
1 0 
2 0 
0 0 
10 0 
0 0 
11 0 
Well 
f nf 
0 0 
0 0 
1 0 
0 0 
0 0 
1 0 
2 0 
0 0 
1 0 
Spring 
f nf 
0 0 
0 0 
1 0 
0 0 
0 0 
1 0 
2 0 
0 0 
1 0 
Rockcat. 
f nf 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
Tank 
f nf 
2 0 
1 1 
2 1 
2 0 
3 0 
13 0 
19 0 
0 0 
0 0 
Trough 
f nf 
2 0 
2 0 
2 2 
4 0 
2 0 
9 0 
16 2 
7 0 
21 0 
NoCe: f = functioning; nf = not functioning 
It should be noted that changes have occurred in the area and that the 
availability of water sources in other areas outside the group ranch area should 
also be taken into account (e.g. Meto moving to Tanzania and Torosei group 
ranch). 
Table 8.15 presents an overview of the study area water sources used in the 
dry and wet season for both cattle and small stock. Borehole watering is 
mainly practised by established individual ranchers in the Matapalo and 
Loodokilani area during the dry season. During the wet season pans (natural 
and man-made) are used. The Meto, Lomgosua and Elang'ata Wuas group 
ranch members follow a similar pattern except in the dry period when wells 
are used. Most of these are deep and dug in rocky hills by labour hired from 
Tanzania. This job can take several years. The water is collected in buckets 
which are thrown upwards passing through several hands before being emptied 
in large troughs where the animals concentrate for drinking. 
By contrast livestock watering in the northern part of our study area 
(Olkinos and Embolioi) depends on the nearby rivers (e.g. Kisaju, Olturoto and 
Isinya rivers) during the wet season. 
Table 8.15 Water Sources Used (%) 
Oik 
Emb 
Kib 
Ews 
Lor 
Met 
Ii>d 
-Кар 
-Loo 
-Mat 
Buy 
С 
w 
dm 
1 
1 
100 
19 
24 
11 
13 
8 
25 
9 
0 
A 
E 
(» 
30 
1 
0 
73 
70 
79 
56 
23 
75 
82 
33 
Τ 
τ 
rv 
65 
97 
0 
0 
1 
0 
28 
64 
0 
0 
67 
Τ 
wl 
0 
0 
0 
5 
5 
10 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
L 
bb 
4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 
0 
0 
9 
0 
E 
ot 
0 
0 
0 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
D 
dm 
4 
30 
0 
0 
0 
0 
13 
31 
0 
0 
0 
R 
P» 
7 
14 
3 
0 
0 
0 
3 
8 
0 
0 
0 
Y 
rv 
46 
7 
74 
0 
25 
5 
6 
15 
0 
0 
67 
wl 
11 
17 
3 
«7 
64 
77 
31 
31 
25 
36 
0 
bb 
32 
29 
21 
28 
11 
18 
47 
15 
75 
64 
33 
ot 
0 
3 
0 
5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
s 
w 
rtîn 
1 
1 
100 
19 
38 
0 
16 
8 
29 
20 
0 
M 
E 
Ρ« 
29 
1 
0 
75 
53 
82 
45 
23 
71 
60 
33 
A 
τ 
rv 
67 
97 
0 
0 
2 
0 
36 
69 
0 
0 
67 
L 
wl 
0 
0 
0 
3 
7 
18 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
L 
bh 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4 
0 
0 
20 
0 
S 
ot 
0 
0 
0 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
τ 
D 
util 
5 
29 
0 
0 
0 
0 
12 
31 
0 
0 
0 
о 
R 
Ρ» 
7 
16 
6 
3 
0 
0 
3 
8 
0 
0 
0 
С 
Y 
rv 
44 
7 
76 
66 
25 
5 
6 
15 
0 
0 
0 
к 
wl 
11 
17 
3 
0 
63 
77 
33 
31 
33 
36 
67 
bb 
33 
30 
15 
27 
13 
18 
46 
15 
67 
64 
33 
ot 
0 
1 
0 
4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Source: autnors survey 
Note: dm = dam; pa = pan; rv = river; wl = well; bb = borehole; ot = other. 
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In the dry season Olkinos members tum to waterholes in the dry nver bed and 
boreholes. Embolioi members mainly use dams and boreholes. Finally, all 
Kiboko members mentioned the use of dams in the wet season. For the dry 
season use was made of the Kiboko river and boreholes. 
Table 8.16 Mean Distances to Watersources in Wet and Dry Season (Km) 
and Frequency of Watering Livestock 
Olkinos 
Embolioi 
Kiboko 
Elang'au Wuu 
Lotngosua 
Meto 
lud midien 
- Kapuüei 
-Loodokilam 
-Matapalo 
Olkinos buyers 
Cattle 
Distance 
(km) 
wet 
143 
203 
157 
153 
3 59 
239 
131 
1 17 
089 
177 
100 
dry 
339 
329 
495 
615 
1048 
856 
353 
308 
400 
369 
233 
Frequency 
( U m η 
wet 
137 
164 
138 
100 
109 
101 
110 
118 
100 
109 
133 
days) 
dry 
108 
no 143 
2.00 
241 
206 
158 
100 
188 
200 
100 
Small stock 
Distance 
(km) 
wet 
146 
2 01 
153 
148 
256 
2 89 
115 
117 
094 
139 
100 
dry 
108 
1 10 
143 
200 
241 
206 
345 
308 
367 
369 
2 33 
Frequency 
(H In η days) 
wet 
146 
169 
126 
609 
3 61 
5 75 
426 
118 
5 33 
645 
133 
dry 
122 
1.21 
147 
236 
3 32 
284 
203 
108 
2 33 
2 82 
100 
source aumor s survey 
Table 8 16 provides infonnation on the mean distance between the household's 
boma and their source of water for cattle and small stock in the wet as well as 
the dry season period It can be concluded that, especially during the dry 
season Lomgosua, Elang'ata Wuas and Meto lack nearby water sources. 
Table 8.17 Presence of Dry Season Pastures 
dry season pasture of ranch 
Olkinos 
Embolioi 
Kiboko 
Elang'ata Wuas 
Lomgosua 
Meto 
Individual Ranchers 
- Kaputiei 
- Loodokilam 
• Matapalo 
Olkinos buyers 33 3 66 7 
source aumor s survey 
enough 
37 6 
38 9 
618 
65 3 
932 
724 
500 
69 2 
667 
91 
not enough 
624 
611 
382 
347 
68 
276 
500 
308 
33 3 
818 
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Information was also gathered on the opinions of the plot owners about the 
quantity of dry season pastures on their ranch (see table 8.17). The majonty of 
the Maasai respondents of the not yet subdivided group ranches stated to have 
a large enough dry season grazing area as opposed to the subdivided areas of 
Embolioi and Olkinos. Besides the availability of water the presence of forage 
(grass, shrubs, bushes) is of importance. Forage capacity particularly in the dry 
season determines the overall grazing capacity of an area. In 1973, Metson 
found among the 172 Maasai households he sampled a percentage as high as 
90.70 per cent stating that the dry season grazing pastures were not enough 
(see Metson 1974:table 33). This negative response will probably have been 
influenced by the harsh conditions of 1973/74. At the time of our fieldwork the 
Maasai had experienced a number of good years. The majority of Olkinos and 
Embolioi individual plot owners considered their private parcels not to contain 
adequate dry season reserves. In contrast the opinions of group ranch members 
and individual ranchers were more positive in this respect. Only the Matapalo 
individual ranchers who had the smallest ranches among the group of 
established ranchers, also judged their dry season pastures to be too small. 
8.4.3 Stocking Densities 
The extent of over and understocking of each individual ranch within our 
sample has also been estimated. If the availability of land per livestock unit is 
less than the 1.5 ha/TLU (1.59 ha/LE) or 4.2 ha/TLU (4.45 ha/LE) stocking 
levels the household's ranch should be considered overstocked in the short or 
long run, respectively. 
Table 8.18 Stocking Densities of Individual Ranches 
Stocking Density/Ranch 1986 Stocking Density/Ranch 1990 
Location 
Olkinos 
Eirtohoi 
lud Ranchen 
- Kaputiei 
-LoodokUanl 
-Matapalo 
Olkinos Buyers 
(ha/LE) 
mean 
2 32 
4 88 
5 38 
4 22 
814 
4 78 
0 33 
< 1 5 9 
56 0 « 
25 7 « 
18 8% 
14 3% 
25 0% 
200% 
1000% 
< 4 4 5 
900% 
581% 
65 6% 
64 3% 
62.5% 
700% 
1000% 
(ha/LE) 
mean 
152 
404 
502 
3 37 
911 
407 
0.28 
< 1 5 9 
720% 
36 5% 
219% 
14 3% 
25 0% 
300% 
1000% 
<445 
930% 
63 5% 
719% 
78 6% 
500% 
900% 
1000% 
source autnors survey 
Table 8.18 reveals that by 1990 at least half of all individual rancher 
households faced the situation of having a shortage of land on which to keep 
all livestock on the ranch without threatening its long term potential. In 
Olkinos specifically, 93.0 per cent of the households did not possess enough 
land for the animals they owned. Olkinos' high stocking density is mainly the 
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result of the necessity of meeting daily requirements from livestock keeping 
and a basic lack of land. This applies to 96.3 per cent of the Olkinos 
households. In fact, over 70 per cent of the established individual ranchers -of 
whom only SO per cent were considered to have a deficiency in land at the 
4.4S ha/LE level- had overstocked their ranch. 
In other words the postulation that the individualization of land will result 
in stocking rates that do not bypass levels of carrying capacity is, to say the 
least, somewhat questionable. The answers given by the individual ranchers 
with reference to herd size management after obtaining their own ranch have 
much to say in this respect (see table 8.19). Approximately one out of five 
Olkinos and Embolioi members having their ranch overstocked in 1986, stated 
to have increased the herd size even further since the moment of subdivision. 
Table 8.19 Herd Size Management Conducted After Obtaining an Individual 
Parcel 
Loc anon 
Olíanos 
(n=95) 
Embolioi 
(o=72) 
Individual 
Rancben 
(o=29) 
N Kapuueim 
(i»=13) 
LoodokilamIR 
(n=5) 
Matapalo IR 
(o=ll) 
Buyers Olkinos 
(n=3) 
Reduced/Increased 
held size 
Reduced herd size 
No reduction/increase 
Increased herd size 
Reduced had size 
No reduction/increase 
Increased herd size 
Reduced herd size 
No reducuon/mcrease 
Reduced herd size 
No reduction/increase 
Increased herd size 
Reduced herd size 
No reductionflncrease 
Increased herd size 
Reduced herd size 
No reduction/increase 
Increased herd size 
Reduced herd size 
No reduction/increase 
Increased herd size 
Toul 
42 
811 
14 7 
69 
83 3 
9.7 
13 8 
58 6 
276 
00 
76.9 
231 
00 
600 
400 
364 
364 
273 
00 
500 
500 
Overstocked Ranch 
1986 (<1 59) 
40 
760 
200 
111 
667 
22 2 
200 
600 
200 
00 
1000 
00 
00 
1000 
00 
500 
00 
500 
00 
500 
500 
Understocked 
Ranch 1986 £1.59) 
24 
87 8 
98 
56 
88 9 
56 
91 
636 
273 
00 
727 
273 
00 
667 
333 
250 
500 
250 
na. 
bouree auinors survey 
Except for the Matapato individual ranchers the majority of households had not 
actively changed the number of animals on their ranch after obtaining an 
individual parcel. Of those who did, most decided to increase rather than 
decrease their livestock numbers. This seems to be the trend both for the over 
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as well as for the understocked ranches.10 
It could be argued that the subdivided group ranches' members were not 
interested in destocking their individual parcels as most of them were still 
recovering from the 1984 drought A longer time perspective would therefore 
be desirable. Nonetheless, the group of 29 established individual ranchers who 
obtained their ranch over a period of 7 to 25 years, are not in a significantly 
better position with regard to stocking densities and the reduction of herd sizes. 
Considering the less well-off position of recently subdivided group ranches 
there seems to be little support for the destocking-after-individualization 
hypothesis. It should be remembered that, in fact, no real destocking incentive 
existed for the individual ranchers as they mostly continued having access to 
group ranch territories either by way of family or stock friend relationships. 
Baxter (1987:vi) goes even further by stating that 'It may still be arguable 
in the West that natural resources are best conserved when they are in private 
ownership, but there is no evidence at all from Africa to support the 
contention; indeed, all the evidence suggests the contrary. Overgrazing and 
ecological damage are serious problems where wealthy stock-owners have been 
able to override common rights and customary restraints.' 
Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) have shown that land degradation occurs all 
over the world in a wide variety of contexts which include different types of 
society, land tenure regimes, market relations, population pressures and the 
like. In chapter 9 we will deal with the issue of privatization of land tenure and 
land conservation practices in more detail. 
8.5 Changes in Herd Mobility After Subdivision 
8.5.1 Grazing Management 
It should be realized that the figures provided and the conclusions drawn above 
concerning stocking densities started from the presumption of strict boundary 
maintenance and a virtually uniform quality of the land in time and place. 
Reality was found to be different As at the time of the creation of group 
ranches Maasai households of subdivided Olkinos and Embolioi group ranches 
continued using the pastures in a communal way for their daily herding 
practices and for medium to long term movements. Reasons for this practice 
are the following: 
Firstly, as stated by the Ministry of Livestock Development there is a need for 
mobility due to the economic and ecological unviability of many individual 
It should be realized that herd sizes for 1986 have been uniformly obtained by way of 
redudng the livestock equivalent parameter to 85 per cent of its 1990 level, not taking account of 
the actual stocking density of the ranch for each and every household. 
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ranches. Even daily grazing in most Olkinos and Embolioi individual ranches 
virtually requires by definition that the plot boundaries be violated as the 
average distance to watering sources far outstrips the mean plot hectarage. 
Medium and long term mobility, whereby herds accompanied by family 
members move away from the boma for a certain period in search of water, 
disease free pastures, the grazing or lending of animals to friends or relatives 
are all methods used to optimize the demand for and the availability of these 
resources. 
Secondly, and as a result of subdivision, taking the herd to an Olkinos, 
Embolioi, Empuyiankat, Kitengela or Рока Maasai rancher is now legal other 
than when under the rules of group ranch ownership. 
Thirdly, as many owners have not yet settled nor may ever do so, large 
parts of the pastures, though individually owned, can freely be used with or 
without permission by the neighbouring households' livestock for grazing. 
Table 8.20 Rationale and Number of Livestock Located in Other Bomas at 
Time of Survey 
Livestock located 
in other bomas 
- households (%) 
- cattle (%) 
- smaUstock (%) 
-loan(%) 
- grazing (%) 
- other (%) 
Olkinos 
(ii=100) 
250 
22 
92 
182 
591 
227 
Embolioi 
(i»=74) 
203 
48 
37 
53 8 
77 
38.5 
Kiboko 
(n=38) 
184 
28 
42 
00 
500 
500 
Elang'ata 
Wuas 
(n=75) 
34.7 
78 
64 
48 2 
296 
222 
Lomgosua 
(n=100) 
45 0 
64 
50 
500 
402 
91 
Meto 
(n=104) 
442 
62 
71 
191 
53.2 
27.7 
Kaj Ind 
Ranchers 
(n=34) 
324 
129 
05 
38 5 
461 
15 4 
source aumor s survey 
Table 8.20 shows that a large number of households had transfeired part of 
their herd to bornas other than their own at the time of survey. Foremost 
animals were located elsewhere because of assisting friends or relatives (loan), 
fresh pastures (grazing) or for crossbreeding purposes or to avoid disease 
infected areas (other). Meto members particularly mentioned this last motive. 
To get an idea of the relative number of households involved in medium to 
long term livestock movements respondents were asked to give the number of 
cattle sent away and/or received during 1989, including the area of destination, 
period involved, the relation to receiver/sender and the financial arrangement 
(see table 8.21). Periods mentioned for sending or receiving livestock varied 
from a minimum of two weeks to all the year round. Some authors had 
expected that individual ownership could possibly result in the practice of 
hiring grazing areas for payment. However, only one household in Embolioi 
and another in Lomgosua stated that they had paid a certain sum of money for 
taking cattle elsewhere. Among Olkinos and the established individual ranchers 
nobody mentioned payment in return for grazing. It seems that this is restricted 
to times of severe stress. For example, an Olkinos household mentioned that it 
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paid Ksh. 4,000/- per month for letting its livestock graze in the Embakasi 
ranch during the 1984/S drought. Individual ranchers in the Nkoile area are 
also mentioned as renting. 
Table 8.21 Medium and Long Tenn Movements of Cattle and Small Stock, 
1989 
Livestock movements 
m 1989 
CATTLE SENT 
- households (%) 
- caule (%) 
-group ranch 
- subd ranch 
- Ind ranch 
SMALLSTOCK SENT 
- households (%) 
- smallstock (%) 
- group ranch 
- subd ranch 
- ind ranch 
CATTLE RECEIVED 
- households (%) 
- catüe (%) 
- group ranch 
-subd ranch 
- ind ranch 
SMALLSTOCK 
RECEIVED 
- households (%) 
- smallstock (%) 
- group ranch 
• subd ranch 
- ind ranch 
source autnors survey 
OUunos 
(IPIOO) 
40 
50 
00 
75 0 
250 
30 
10 
00 
667 
33 3 
60 
42 
00 
667 
33 3 
10 
07 
00 
00 
1000 
Embolioi 
(n=74) 
14 
50 
00 
33 3 
667 
41 
19 
00 
1000 
00 
95 
24 
28 6 
571 
14 3 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
Kaj Ind 
Ranchers 
(n=34) 
23.5 
17 9 
500 
00 
500 
17 6 
87 
1000 
00 
00 
17 6 
31 
83 3 
00 
16 7 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
Kiboko 
(ii=38) 
211 
17 9 
87 5 
12 5 
00 
26 
13 
1000 
00 
00 
21 1 
56 
looo 
00 
00 
79 
26 
667 
33 3 
00 
Elang'au 
Wuas 
(n=75) 
38 7 
317 
93 1 
34 
34 
14 7 
28 7 
100 0 
00 
00 
86 
18 
1000 
00 
00 
13 
15 
1000 
00 
00 
Lom-
gosua 
(n=100) 
30 0 
112 
800 
00 
200 
50 
33 
400 
00 
600 
19 0 
116 
68 4 
00 
316 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
Мею 
(n=104) 
32 7 
246 
971 
00 
29 
202 
16 3 
95 2 
00 
48 
19 2 
161 
85 0 
0 0 
150 
125 
100 
92 3 
00 
77 
It should be noted that the need to send livestock away is not so much 
correlated to the legal status of the area but to its ecological situation. Meto, 
Lomgosua and Elang'ata Wuas have a larger variance in ecological potential 
than the Kaputiei ranches. This is illustrated by the fact that, like most Olkinos 
and Embolioi ranchers, established ranchers from the Kaputiei area did not 
send away their animals during 1989. Only 21.4 per cent of the Kaputiei 
households stated that 2.7 per cent of their cattle was located elsewhere. This 
is comparable with Olkinos, Embolioi and Kiboko ranches. 
In contrast, the mobility patterns of Loodokilani and Matapalo individual 
ranchers' animals are similar to those of the members in Elang'ata Wuas, 
Lomgosua and Meto group ranches The latter ranch in particular also makes 
use of Tanzanian pastures. 
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8.5.2 Fencing Characteristics in the Subdivided Areas 
Daily herding journeys are becoming without doubt less easy to conduct 
Besides the legal obstacles there are physical barriers such as fences, shambas, 
ol-okeri (reserved pastures) and the presence of wildlife in and outside the 
National Parks. It has been stated by opponents to group ranch subdivision that 
these constructions and changes in land use will, in the long run, undermine 
the viability of the livestock economy in Kajiado District. Table 8.22 provides 
information concerning fencing and free movement in the subdivided areas. 
Table 8.22 Fencing Characteristics in the Subdivided Areas (%) 
Fenced ranch 
Fenced ol-okeri 
Fenced shamba 
Free movement 
- increased 
- unchanged 
-decreased 
Olkinos 
(n=108) 
1986 1990 
00 00 
? 37 
19 83 
1 1 
75 3 
23 6 
Embolioi 
(n=75) 
1986 1990 
00 00 
·» 27 
13 93 
17 
68 3 
300 
Kaj Ind 
Ranchers 
(n=34) 
1986 1990 
91 91 
7 35 3 
8 8 216 
33 
53 3 
43 3 
Maasai 
Buyers 
(n=3) 
1990 
00 
00 
33 3 
non-Maasai 
0.0 
83 3 
16 7 
Buyers 
(n=6) 
1990 
16 7 
na 
67 7 
source aumor s survey 
Note percentages always refer to the total sample population and disregard the actual possession 
of a shamba or ol-okeri 
From table 8.22 we learn that the effects of subdivision on mobility has so far 
been modest. Approximately three quarters of the Olkinos and Embolioi 
members sampled stated that the free movement of their herd has not changed. 
So far, the Maasai pastoralists had not fenced their new individual plots, but 
one of the immigrant buyers had done so (i.e. 17 per cent). The need for fence 
construction is higher for the latter because they mainly use their ranches for 
cultivation and want to protect their crops against wildlife and livestock 
destruction. Moreover, the small parcels belonging to the immigrants are less 
costly to fence than those belonging to the original Maasai inhabitants. Lastly, 
most immigrants are familiar with fencing their areas whereas the Maasai have 
no tradition in this respect. The fact that all ranches in Olkinos and Embolioi 
are not (yet?) fenced is because of the following reasons. 
Firstly, fencing is a very costly affair. A fence made from poles and barbed 
wire costs approximately Ksh. 60/- per meter Thus fencing a plot of 40 ha 
will cost approximately Ksh. 150,000/-! (or Ksh. 75,000/- if one's neighbours 
are willing to share the investment). In the Loodokilani and Matapalo area 
people construct natural fences made from thorny bushes. This alternative is 
not easily available for the Embolioi and Olkinos area which lack this kind of 
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vegetation. Material used for fencing of ranches and ol-okeri in Elang'ata 
Wuas, Lomgosua, Kiboko and Meto is only thom bush. Fences constructed in 
Embolioi, Olkinos and established individual areas use both thorn bushes and 
poles and wires. Huge fences were only seen being erected in the so called 
"Presidential Area" of Kisaju. Wealthy new owners have been responsible for 
this development Table 8.23 provides information on fencing practices in 
Kiboko, Elang'ata Wuas, Lomgosua and Meto. 
Table &23 Fencing Characteristics of Not Officially Subdivided Areas (%) 
Households 
possession of 
Fenced ranch 
Fenced ol-okeri 
Ftvcedshamba 
source auinor s sui 
Kiboko 
(n=38) 
1986 
η a. 
7 
7.9 
•vey 
1990 
na 
211 
132 
Elang'ata 
Wuas (n=75) 
1986 
13 
? 
4.0 
1990 
52 
78 7 
80 
Lomgosua 
(it=100) 
1986 
na 
7 
10 
1990 
na 
260 
60 
Meto 
(n=104) 
1986 1990 
na na 
•» 58 
13 6 231 
Noie fenced individual ranches m Elang'ata Wuas group ranch are unofficial 
Comparing the situation in the subdivided and not (yet) subdivided group 
ranches reveals that, in fact, the relative number of households having a fenced 
shamba or fenced ol-okeri is higher in the latter areas. However, the increase 
in fenced localities is higher in Olkinos and Embolioi area, especially as a 
result of the influx of immigrant buyers. Also among the original inhabitants of 
the subdivided group ranches the construction of fences has grown faster since 
1986. 
A second reason for the low level of fenced ranches in Olkinos and 
Embolioi stems from the fact that a large number of these parcels have not yet 
actually been occupied by their owners and are still free to be used (see section 
8.1). These plots either belong to Maasai living with their family in another 
boma nearby or to people who roam around in towns or stay in other parts of 
the district or the country. Areas bought by outsiders for speculative purposes 
are also still available for the local Maasai herds. 
Thirdly, it is questionable if the livestock owners are really interested in 
turning away from the traditional communal use of the pastures forced on them 
by climatic conditions. Similar to what happened after the introduction of the 
group ranch phenomenon, herders will not be willing to keep their animals in 
places without grass or water. Subdivision will not have changed this attitude 
as it cannot change the climatic conditions in the area. As long as an individual 
rancher is not able to have an adequate source of water and feed for his 
animals he is simply forced either to migrate to other places or to sell off part 
of his herd. In my opinion, the collapse of the group ranch could even 
encourage the mobility of herds to other ranches as there is no longer a ranch 
committee to oppose the practice. 
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8.6 Other Land Use Changes 
8.6.1 Reserved Grazing Pastures (Ol-okeri) 
Although we examined the fencing practices of individual farms, ol-okeri 
(reserved pastures for calves and sick animals) and shambas, it should be 
realized that the growth as such in the number of the last two is also of 
significance. Unfenced ol-oken and shambas contribute to a reduction in the 
accessibility of grazing areas for the Maasai herds. Tables 8.24 and 8.2S 
summarise the number of ol-oken and shambas possessed by our sample 
population in a time perspective. 
Table 8.24 Increase in Number of Ol-okeri of Sample Households (%) 
-no ol-oken 
-individual 
-communal 
established 
-1982 
1983-1989 
ind ol-oken 
esubbsbed 
• 1982 
1983-1989 
com ol-oken 
established 
-1982 
1983-1989 
source autnors 
Oik 
(n-97) 
33 0 
67 0 
00 
217 
78 3 
217 
78 3 
00 
00 
survey 
Emb 
(n.74) 
662 
33 8 
00 
91 
909 
91 
909 
00 
00 
IR 
(n-31) 
19 4 
774 
32 
680 
320 
721 
27 9 
00 
1000 
Buy 
(n=3) 
667 
33 3 
00 
η a. 
η a. 
η a. 
na­
na. 
η a. 
Klb 
(n=37) 
27 0 
649 
81 
13 0 
87 0 
15 0 
85 0 
00 
100 0 
Ews 
(n=74) 
14 9 
594 
25 7 
39 3 
607 
326 
67 4 
616 
384 
Lor 
(n=100) 
15 0 
290 
560 
53 7 
463 
560 
440 
52 7 
47 3 
Met 
(n=104) 
48 
115 
83 7 
288 
712 
18 2 
818 
325 
67 5 
Of OUT sample population 75.0 per cent stated to have access to an ol-okeri. 
Table 8.24 shows that, except in Embolioi (34 per cent) and among Olkinos 
buyers (33 per cent), more than half of the households in each region had 
either a private ol-okeri or they shared one with one or more households. Table 
8.24 also reveals that, for both categories, an overall increase in the number of 
ol-okeri has recently occurred. For example, in Olkinos and Embolioi over 
three quarters of the ol-okeri have been established in a relatively short period 
since 1982." Splitting up of communal ol-oken could be partly responsible 
for this recent increase. However, group ranches of Kiboko, Elang'ata Wuas, 
Loragosua and Meto which are not yet subdivided show a similar pattern of 
The rationale for taking the 1982/3 dividing line is the acceptance of the group ranch 
subdivision by the Kenyan Govemnœm in 1983 It should be noted however, that the 
uuensificanon of discussions and, in some cases, the principal decision by the group ranch 
members of several group ranches to subdivide took place at different moments from 1981 (Рока) 
until 1989 (Loragosua) (see chapter 7) 
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increase, albeit less pronounced. 
From the undivided group ranches 55 households claimed to have started a 
communal ol-okeri in the last 7 years as opposed to 42 who had done so 
before. For individual ol-okeri these figures are 65 and 29, respectively. This 
indicates a process of individualization in ownership of ol-okeri since the early 
1980s. By 1990 all but Meto and Lomgosua group ranches showed a pattern of 
preference for individual ol-okeri. Of all households having an ol-okeri 57.4 
per cent held this in private ownership, while 42.6 per cent had access to a 
communal ol-okeri. In addition, we should bear in mind that the absolute 
number of communal ol-okeri will be lower as these are shared tracts of lands. 
Sizes vary, depending on the number of borna's sharing and the size of the 
herd from 20 ha in subdivided group ranches to 80 ha for established 
individual ranchers. 
The rapid increase in the number of ol-okeri seems to have been influenced by 
the process of subdivision. As stated by Bekure et al. (1987:184/205), 
frequently the establishment of these specific kinds of plots in the south 
Kaputiei area has become a mechanism for claiming a certain part of the group 
ranch area with the expectation of subdivision. An example for Merueshi group 
ranch where, shortly after incorporation, sons of a deceased chief established 
their private ol-okeri is given to support this statement. Other methods of 
laying claims such as the construction of permanent houses, the digging of 
wells or the drilling of boreholes could be of importance as well. 
As such it is interesting to note that in Embolioi 40.9 per cent of the ol-
okeri was established in 1985, while 47.8 per cent of Olkinos members 
established them in 1986 shortly before official subdivision. However, 
surveying and allocation of plots had been done in November 1984 and 
November 1985, respectively. Moreover, half of the Olkinos and Embolioi 
members do not possess an ol-okeri at all. Lastly, one would expect 
committee-members to be among the ol-okeri claimers, especially around the 
date that the decision to subdivide was taken. Olkinos and Embolioi 
committee-members, however, show a similar percentage difference between 
those with and without an ol-okeri as non-committee members. In Embolioi all 
four committee-members established their ol-okeri in between 1983 and 1985. 
In Olkinos, however, none of the four committee-members started their ol-
okeri in this period. In other words, although possibly being used as a location 
claiming mechanism as suggested by Bekure et al. (1987) our data do not seem 
to fully support this postulation for the northern Kaputiei area. 
8.6.2 Cultivated Plots (Shambas) 
A similar pattern of recent origin for cultivated plots is shown in table 8.25. 
Except for Elang'ata Wuas, where only a few members practise cultivation, 
subdivided and undivided ranches alike show that some 80 per cent of those 
366 Selling Wealth to Buy Poverty 
who commenced agriculture did so after 1982. 
Of our total sample population 232 or 42.3 per cent claimed to be 
cultivating a shamba. The total acreage cultivated by 231 households out of a 
total group of S39 households was 291.9 ha equivalent to an average plot size 
of 1.26 ha. The mean plot size for this group was 0.72 ha at the time they 
started cultivating. This means that in a relatively short period, besides an 
increase in the number of Maasai households cultivating, the average plot size 
cultivated increased by some 75.8 per cent. A total of 152 of the cultivating 
households embarked upon this activity after the 1984 drought, as opposed to 
71 households who had begun before leaving 9 households for which no 
information could be obtained. In other words, approximately 10-15 per cent of 
our total sample population had begun with cultivation before the drought of 
1984/5 and this rose rapidly to over 40 per cent by 1990.12 
Table 8.25 Increase in Number of Shambas of Sample Households (%) 
% households 
culDvatmg 
shambas 
estabhsbed 
-1982 
1983-1989 
mean plot size 
mean plot size 
% change 
at start (ha) 
1990 (ha) 
Oik 
(n=97) 
37 0 
19 4 
806 
066 
1 12 
691 
Emb 
(n=74) 
413 
19 2 
80 8 
102 
131 
27 8 
IR 
(n=31) 
471 
250 
75 0 
115 
390 
237 5 
Buy 
(n=3) 
77 8 
00 
1000 
184 
2 23 
211 
Kib 
(n=37) 
278 
100 
900 
0.56 
063 
122 
Ews 
(1*74) 
122 
55 6 
444 
093 
107 
14 6 
Lot 
(n=100) 
300 
107 
89 3 
068 
080 
183 
Met 
(»=104) 
85 6 
292 
70 8 
050 
097 
936 
source auinors survey 
As shown in table 8.26 the group of 223 households, for which full 
information is available had cultivated a total area of 273.72 ha by 1990. As 
compared to the first season of farming the size of the shamba either increased 
or remained the same (see last columns). Keeping this in mind the 1984 
acreage cultivated by the pioneer group of 71 households will be in between 
their total initial plot sizes (57.67 ha) and the 1990 acreage (118.78 ha). 
In other words, a minor 01-0.2 per cent of the total area owned 
(communally or individually) by our total sample population was farmed 
before 1984/5. In any case, until 1990 the land under cultivation increased with 
a minimum of 154.94 ha being the total area cultivated by the group of new 
farmers. As a result the land fanned will have increased to approximately 0.53 
per cent of the total area owned by our total sample population. 
Nine households (Elang'au Wuas3, Individual Ranchers 2, Мею 2, Kibokol, 
Lorngosua 1) stated that they had cultivated in the past but were not doing so now. 
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Table 8.26 The Extent of the Area Cultivated by 1990 
Subdmdftl areas 
-Olkinos 
-Embohoi 
Not subdivided 
-Kiboko 
-Elang'ata Wuas 
-Lomgosua 
-Meto 
Ind ranchero 
Buyers 
Total 
sample 
area (ha) 
(1) 
4,585 
6,861 
6,092 
9,163 
6,623 
6,671 
16,939 
485 
51327 
source author's survey 
shamba 
(ha) 
(2) 
37 88 
3515 
606 
10 50 
20 81 
84 74 
62 82 
15 76 
27372 
(2) 
of 
(1) 
0 83* 
0 51% 
010% 
011% 
031% 
127% 
037% 
3 25% 
053% 
year 
started 
1964 
1979 
1978 
1957 
1974 
1965 
1958 
na 
ha 
<1985 
1273 
889 
263 
444 
162 
3171 
56 76 
na 
118 78 
ha 
1985--
25 15 
26 26 
343 
606 
1919 
53 03 
606 
15 76 
154 94 
+ 
85 2 
407 
188 
22 2 
30 8 
761 
56 2 
800 
shamba 
± 
11 1 
59 3 
812 
667 
69 2 
23 9 
37.5 
200 
ι size 
-
3.7 
00 
00 
111 
00 
00 
63 
00 
Note the sample area totals presented (column 1 and 2) refer to land occupied by the group of 
223 households from whom which this information was available 
+ = increased, ± = unchanged, - = decreased size of the shamba since the household started 
cultivating 
It should be noted that the cultivated plots are not necessarily located near the 
household's boma. For example, one Loodokilani individual rancher had an 32 
ha farai in the Loitokitok region and another farm of 16 ha near Namanga 
Town. Another individual rancher had a farm in the Kitengela area. Four 
shambas belonging to Embolioi ranchers were located in Olkinos. In return 
four "Olkinos plots" were located in Ngong and Kitengela area. One member 
from Meto as well as one from Lomgosua had a plot in Ilmarba. Finally, one 
Elang'ata Wuas group ranch member stated that he possessed a 2.0 ha fami in 
Naivasha (Nakum District). 
Part of the absolute increase in shambas will be the result of a growth of 
the population. Still, more factors must be operative for the booming increase 
since the early 1980s. A factor which seems to have influenced the growth in 
the number of cultivators and the acreage under crops has been the 1984 
drought which left many Maasai with heavily reduced herd sizes. This seems 
to explain the distinct increase in cultivating ranchers in most areas. The more 
permanent position of Elang'ata Wuas could possibly be explained from this 
factor as the Elang'ata Wuas Maasai did not suffer so much from the drought 
as other groups did. In addition, large parts of Elang'ata Wuas group ranch are 
not very well suited for rainfed cultivation. 
8.6.3 Competition from Wildlife 
Finally, we should pay attention to the wildlife issue. In sections 4.4.3, 6 3.2 
and 7.5.2 we pointed out the importance of the wildlife sector for the national 
economy attracting many tourists from abroad resulting in a huge growth of 
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tourism since the 1970s. We also concluded that the local Maasai, by allowing 
game animals to spread over their pastures, supported the viability of AmboseU 
and Nairobi National Parks and, as a consequence, the national economy. This 
hospitality, however, had detrimental effects on their livestock holdings 
through prédation, competition for forage and the spread of disease by game 
animals. Over the years the Maasai have only been compensated minimally for 
this burden. Fencing of individual pastures is feared to (further) undermine the 
wildlife sector, which is facing a declining trend anyway (see table 3.S). 
Table fL27 Wildlife Development in the Subdivided and Established 
Individual Ranchers' Areas 1977-87 
Kajiado District 
1977 
1983 
1987 
Wüdlife TLU 
114,451 
115,395 
67,302 
Wildlife Density 
(TLU/km2) 
58 
59 
31 
Ratio 
Livestock 
Wildüfe 
2 9 
31 
5 9 
Olkinos (n=108) Emboben (№75) Kaj Ind. Olkmos Buyas 
TLU TLU Ranchen (ii-9) 
'77 768 '77 8,770 (n=34) 
•87 171 '87 3,311 
WD (TLU/km2) WD (TLU/km2) 
'77 13 5 '77 37 2 
'87 3 0 '87 140 
Wildlife numbers 
- inacased 
- unchanged 
- decreased 
Wildlife damage 
- Increased 
• unchanged 
- decreased 
Source aumorssurvi 
2 2 
663 
315 
4 5 
727 
261 
cy and Heden 1УМ, limnblaU d al 
18 6 
424 
390 
18 3 
45 0 
367 
ІУИУ, Said et al 
167 
400 
43 4 
207 
448 
345 
ІУ8У 
0 0 
83 3 
167 
0 0 
83 3 
167 
For the Embolioi and Olkinos areas we were able to obtain some rough 
estimates of game animals present in March 1987. Zebra's, wildebeests and 
Grants gazelles were the most important animals on these ranches. For both 
ranches numbers diminishing since 1977 have also been recorded (see table 
8.27). 
Taking into account the 1976 drought which killed many wild animals the 
negative trend is even more significant. This is confirmed by the ranchers 
opinion that wildlife numbers and therefore the damage are decreasing. Still, 
Embolioi faces an above-average number of game. This is reflected by 
Embolioi members when they mention the transmittance of diseases from 
wildlife as one of their most important problems (see table 10.24). Embolioi 
ranchers stated they often have to move their herds to safer places in response 
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to calving wildebeests which cause Malignant Catarrh." Indeed, from table 
10.13 it can be concluded that this disease mainly affects the northern Kaputiei 
area and hence former group ranch members and established individual 
ranchers alike. In addition, the recently settled non-Maasai complain about crop 
damage. The doubling of the human population as a result of this influx and a 
natural growth in combination with increased fencing is expected to at least 
restrict the entrance of game and to change migration patterns. 
8.7 Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter the effects of the process of group ranch subdivision in respect 
of the size, economic and ecological viability of the new individually owned 
parcels have been presented. Attention has also been paid to aspects of land 
use, including patterns of residence, fencing, livestock movements, cultivation 
and wildlife habitats. This analysis was based on the post subdivision 
developments as they have occurred on Olkinos and Embolioi group ranches 
since late 1986 until the beginning of 1990. Developments in other group 
ranches (e.g. Kiboko, Elang'ata Wuas, Lomgosua, Meto, and buyers and 
individual ranchers) were provided by way of reference. 
Our data showed average household sizes of 6.0 to 10.6 for Olkinos and 
Meto, respectively. The number of children in the 0-15 years of age cohort was 
50.3 per cent For Kiboko and Embolioi this figure stood at 64.0 and 64.4 per 
cent as compared to 47.4 and 45.7 per cent for 1968. This illustrates the 
increased growth of the Maasai population, probably due to a reduction in 
child mortality. In the words of a Maasai elder 'these days, as opposed to the 
past, we have children of every height'. 
Cattle ownership under our sample population stood at 9.1 head of cattle 
per person with the addition of 12.9 shoats. If the sample population is 
representative of all Kajiado Maasai pastoralists, this means that the declining 
trend in cattle ownership as shown before for the 1950-1985 period has been 
reversed.14 Besides, it should be taken into account that in general 
productivity of Maasai cattle has risen due to the introduction of improved 
13
 Malignant Catarrhal Fever (MCF) is earned by the wildebeest and Red Maasai sheep. Tbe 
viras is excreted by Ibe female wildebeest duiing cslving md lactation. Tbe calving period of 
wildebeest OD tbe Athi-Kapiti plains usually coincides with tbe onset of tbe keg rains (April-June) 
(see UNDP/FAO 1978:51). Wildlife acts as a reservoir for the blood parasites (i.e. tsetse-tües) that 
are responsible for Trypanosomiasis in cattle. 
14
 The 1988 Livestock census enimented 633388 cattle for an estimated total of some 
145,000 Maasai. A certain mimber of these cattle will have been held by non-Maasai (especially 
Kikuyu staying in tbe Ngong Division). Thus, district-wide, cattle ownership will probably average 
some 4 cattle per person. Especially in tbe Magadi area cattle ownership is below avenge cattle 
holdings. 
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breeds (see chapter 10). Moreover, these days the number of smallstock in the 
whole of Kajiado District is higher than that for cattle. The sample population 
cattle:smallstock ratio found was 1:1.42. This is in line with the 1988 
Livestock Census figure of 1:1.52 for the whole of Kajiado District A less 
dramatic shift occurred in the percentage of female cattle within the Maasai 
herds. For Embolioi this was reduced from 69 per cent in 1968 to 54 per cent 
by 1990. The overall percentage of female cattle with the herd stood at 68 per 
cent for the group and 67 per cent for individual ranchers. A structural switch 
to a market and meat-oriented economy for cattle does not seem to have 
occurred. 
Landownership per person has decreased over the 1986-90 period due to 
natural population growth and the sale of land. The availability of land for 
Olkinos ranchers decreased from 8.43 ha/person in 1986 to 7.06 ha/person in 
1990, a 16 per cent reduction as a specific result of this last factor. Embolioi 
figures for these years are 15.53 ha/person and 14.29 ha/person, respectively. 
Wealth classes among our group of respondents are based on livestock 
equivalents owned by active adult male equivalents (LE/AAME). A fairly even 
distribution along three strata was found. The same cut off points had been 
used as defined by ILCA for their 1980 population. Their stratification showed 
a larger group of respondents in the middle stratum and a sipaller one in the 
lower stratum. 
The second section of this chapter dealt with the outcome of the process of 
group ranch subdivision in Olkinos and Embolioi. An overall positive position 
towards the process of subdivision and allocated plots was recorded among the 
Olkinos and Embolioi ranchers. Approximately 1 out of 5 households, 
however, had from mixed to negative feelings concerning the size of the plots 
allocated. The former Olkinos member now possesses a 46.71 ha mean size 
ranch ranging from 11.00 to 132.00 ha per parcel. Former committee-members 
were found to have designated themselves and their relatives significantly 
larger parcels at the most favourable locations. Plots held by committee-
members averaged 81.80 ha as compared to 42.53 ha for non-committee 
member households. For Embolioi the average plot size was 93.37 ha varying 
from 30.0 to 225.0 ha per parcel. Again former Embolioi committee-members 
held a higher amount of land (i.e. 130.74 ha as compared to 86.84 ha for non-
committee members). Thus the process of subdivision has been favourable to 
the most powerful within the Maasai group ranch constellation. 
One of the main questions concerning the subdivision of group ranches deals 
with the economic and ecological viability of the allocated plots. In the past 
several scholars mentioned minimum land requirements for individual ranches 
of some 80 ha/adult male or 467 ha per household. Herd sizes needed by each 
household imply certian demands on the amount of land required. Taking into 
account livestock food requirements there is a land requirement ranging 
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between 13.7 ha/AAME/hh to 38.3 ha/AAME/hh for the wet and dry season, 
respectively. For OUdnos and Embolioi we concluded that only a mere 10 per 
cent or less of the households would be able to keep their animals on the 
individual ranch without suffering a shortage in grass or without severely 
overstocking it Moreover, since the time of subdivision this capacity had 
decreased by another 1-2 per cent. 
Starting from four different categories of landownership based on a situation 
of deficit or surplus for the wet season or the dry season it was estimated that 
for those OUdnos households lacking sufficient land in both seasons 40.3 per 
cent nevertheless owned a large enough number of animals for complete 
selfsufficiency. In the opposite situation of having enough land for both 
seasons 75 per cent of these parcel owners were selfsufficient in livestock. For 
Embolioi these figures were 28.6 per cent and 100 per cent, respectively. We 
also concluded for Embolioi that large numbers of the households held a 
reasonable amount of land though they lacked the animals to make use of it. 
Asked for their opinion on the economic viability of their individual ranch a 
large majority (84.9 per cent) of the Embolioi considered it to be highly viable. 
OUcinos households which, in general, had much smaller parcels, showed more 
mixed feelings in this respect. Only 43.5 per cent said to believe their parcel to 
be either viable or highly viable. 
Information concerning the ecological viability of the newly allocated plots on 
a group ranch scale collected by the Kajiado District 1988 Livestock Census 
was presented showing the recommended stocking rate, the actual stocking 
density, estimated range condition and trend and the availability and condition 
of water sources. According to these figures an overstocking of most ranches 
(except Embolioi) was determined at ratios of 1.7 to 2.9 times the densities 
allowed. However, overall range condition was stated to be fair (or even good 
as in the case of Kiboko). 
An inquiry into the availability of dry season pasturage revealed the reverse 
picture with OUdnos and Embolioi ranchers complaining of insufficient dry 
season reserves on their privately owned parcels. Half of the established 
individual ranchers -especially Matapalo ranchers- shared this opinion. 
One of our main interests was to determine the stocking densities before and 
after the individualization of the now privately owned ranches in OUdnos, 
Embolioi and established individual ranchers. Mean densities found for 1990 
were 1.52 ha/LE (OUdnos), 4.04 ha/LE (Embolioi) and 5.02 ha/LE (individual 
ranchers). In 1986 these figures were 2.32 ha/LE, 4.88 ha/LE and 5.38 ha/LE, 
respectively. Short and long term thresholds were applied which revealed that 
for both OUdnos and Embolioi the densities had increased resulting, for 
OUdnos, in a theoretically unviable ranch size of 72.0 per cent of all the 
ranchers on the short run and as high as 93.0 per cent in the long term. For 
Embolioi these figures were 36.5 and 63.5 per cent, respectively. 
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This outcome has led us to question the postulation that the 
individualization of land tenure will result in a reduction of the stocking rate at 
canying capacity levels. In fact, those ranchers that actively changed the 
number of animals on their ranch did so by increasing rather than decreasing 
the total number of animals, irrespective of whether or not they possessed an 
over or understocked ranch. Established individual ranchers behaved similarly. 
Besides the level of stocking we showed an interest in (the change in) 
grazing management practices after the subdivision of Olkinos and Embolioi 
group ranches. It was found that some 20-25 per cent of households 
interviewed had located part of their herd in other bomas at the time of survey. 
Kaputiei established ranchers mentioned a total of 21.4 per cent Overall a total 
of 32.4 individual rancher's households mentioned that they had transferred 
part of their livestock away from the ranch. Thus among the group of 
Matapato and Loodokilani individual ranchers a similar number of households 
had animals located elsewhere as their neighbouring group ranch members. 
Detailed information for 1989 medium and long term herd movements of 
cattle and smallstock revealed that it was not so much the legal status but the 
ecological condition of the ranch which was the driving force behind 
transferring animals to other places for medium to long periods of time. Also 
no firm evidence could be found of a trend towards the commoditizatìon of 
grazing. Only two households mentioned they had paid money for access to 
pastures elsewhere. 
The practice of locating livestock in other bomas is also influenced by the fact 
that the subdivision process has accelerated a further decrease in boma size and 
the emergence of single household bomas. Nowadays half of the Olkinos and 
Embolioi members live in single household bornas. On these ranches less than 
two households reside in a single boma whereas for the Matapalo and 
Loodokilani Maasai this figure stands at between 3 and S. Reports for the late 
1950s give an overall boma size of 6-8 households in Kajiado District. This 
changing pattern of residence influences the availability of labour and the level 
of co-operation. Tasks in household matters such as collecting firewood, the 
fetching of water and the herding or milking of livestock has to be organized 
along other lines. No clear picture, however, emerged as in Olkinos co-
operation was said to have decreased, whereas Embolioi members reported an 
increase. 
The complete fencing of ranches has not yet occurred among the group of 
respondents. In the Olkinos and Embolioi areas enclosures were erected to 
prevent animals from entering shambas (cultivated plots) or ol-okeri (small 
reserved pastures). This trend is on the increase. As a percentage of all 
households interviewed 3.7 per cent of the Olkinos ranchers and 2.7 per cent 
of the Embolioi households were in possession of a fenced ol-okeri. For 
shambas these figures were 8.3 and 9.3, respectively for 1990 as compared to 
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only 1.9 and 1.3 for 1986. This increase is faster than the increase in the 
number of shambas over this same period. 
Enclosures made by not yet subdivided group ranch areas show an even 
higher percentage of households involved in the practice. However, the 
increase in this is somewhat slower than in the subdivided group ranches. 
Fencing practices among established ranchers, particularly of ol-okeri, is in the 
order of 35 per cent In our view the fencing of shambas and ranches by non-
Maasai buyers will pose the major threat to the mobility of Maasai livestock. 
By 1990, 23.6 per cent of the OLkinos respondents stated that in their view free 
movement had indeed decreased after the subdivision of the group ranch. For 
Embolioi this was 30.0 per cent. The need to defend the cultivated plots 
against game and livestock is expected to result in a fast growth of small 
enclosures scattered over the former group ranch territory. Because these 
parcels are small, fencing will be not too costly for an individual owner. 
Maasai ranchers, not accustomed to this practice of enclosing one's territory 
are faced with high costs if use is made of poles and barbed wire. In addition, 
many Maasai owners had not yet settled on their new plot. A final reason for 
the non-appearance of fenced ranches is thought to be the realization of the 
Maasai that, due to the climatic conditions, fencing one's ranch will result in a 
dramatic collective disaster in the long term. 
Furthermore, attention was paid to the actual increase in the number of ol-
okeri and shambas as the growth as such, either fenced or unfenced, will also 
reduce the accessibility of grazing areas for Maasai herds. By 1990, 75.0 per 
cent of the respondents claimed to have access to an ol-okeri, either 
individually or communally owned. Since 1983 a huge increase in the number 
of ol-okeri was recognised, for both types of ol-okeri. By 1990 57.4 per cent of 
the ol-okeri were held in private ownership. Communal reserved grazing areas 
were mainly found among Meto and Lomgosua households. Other researchers 
have pointed out the land-claiming rationale behind this move; by establishing 
an ol-okeri in one's own favourable location one could anticipate the allocation 
of individual parcels at the time of group ranch subdivision. However, our 
Olkinos and Embolioi did not support such a hypothesis. 
Of the total sample population 42.3 per cent claimed to be cultivating a 
shamba by 1990. The total acreage cultivated was 291.9 ha. This is equivalent 
to a mean plot size of 1.26 ha. When these cultivators started growing their 
first crop, die average plot size was only 0.72 ha. In other words, both the 
number of shambas and the acreage covered has increased rapidly. 
Approximately 10-15 per cent of our total sample population was engaged in 
cultivation before the 1984/5 drought and this rose rapidly to over 40 per cent 
by 1990. We estimated that the area under cultivation had increased over this 
period from 0.1-0.2 to 0.53 per cent of the total area available to our sample 
population, including the non-cultivators. Besides a growth in the number of 
households, the 1984/5 drought is held responsible for the rapid increase in the 
number of cultivators. A loss of pastures could possibly be balanced by 
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allowing livestock to graze the fields after harvesting. This requires good 
relations between cultivators and livestock keepers. Damage done to the crops 
before harvesting could frustrate this relationship. Another often mentioned 
negative effect of an increase in the cultivated acreage is that of trespass to 
reach to watering points. This calls for corridors in order to allow herders to 
travel as straight as possible. 
Finally, we have attempted to highlight the competition for pastures by 
game in our study area. According to official wildlife estimates based on aerial 
countings a decline in the number of wild animals has been recorded. This 
trend was confirmed by our respondents. A doubling of the human population 
and increased fencing is expected to further reduce competition from wildlife, 
particularly in the northern Kaputiei area. 
Let us now tum to chapter 9 for an evaluation of the use of the individual 
title deed as a collateral for loans as propagated by subdivision supporters or 
for a quick sell out to (non) Maasai as feared by their opponents. 
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APPENDIX 8.1 
KIBOKO GROUP RANCH PROFILE 
Kiboko group ranch (15,870 ha) is a KLDP phase I group ranch, inhabited by some 1,000 
Kapuaei Maasai It is located m the far north-eastern end of Central (now Mashuru) Division, 
Kajiado District, and approximately ISO km from Nairobi down the Nairobi-Mombasa main road. 
The road passes through the ranch although the largest part is in the south The ranch stretches 
from Simba Τ С to Kiboko Τ С (Machakos District) Simba centre has several shops, a nursery 
and primary school, a health centre and slaughter house Kilunyeti centre is located m the south 
One shop, a dispensary and primary school make up the most important facilities here A borehole 
and dip can be found m the centre of the ranch. Another borehole and dip can be found in the 
north but they aie not functioning In addition the ranch has 3 crushes, 4 troughs, 3 water tanks, 1 
well, 1 spring, 1 water pan and S km of water pipeline 
Kiboko group ranch is for the most рал located m agro-climatic zone V A large number of 
prominent hills are present The elevation of the ranch averages around 1,000 m. Soils are 
dominated by red sandy loams on the plains, lava on the hills and nverine complexes along 
Kiboko river bordering m the eastern part of the ranch Other, seasonal rivers aie the Esiteti m the 
south and the Kaiungu m the north The vegetation is dominated by a complex of bushland and 
bushed grasslands m the north and a complex of grassland to bushed grasslands on the erosion 
prone plains m the south Grasslands make up some 60 per cent of the ranch Approximately 25 
per cent is covered by bushed grasslands Some scattered spots of wooded dense bushland can also 
be found Dominant trees are Acacia species and perennial grasses such as Pennlsetum mezianum, 
Cenchrus cilltaris and saligum There is a large variety of wild animals such as giraffes, hyena's, 
lions, wildebeests and zebras for example and m above average numbers 
The main activity is livestock keeping Kiboko group ranch was rewarded for good results m this 
respect by winning the second position m the Faim/Ranch competition of Rift Valley Province m 
1986 Some people aie involved m subsistence cultivation and they mainly grow maize and beans 
Animal disease, especially East Coast Fever (oltikana), is a major problem for the Kiboko 
ranchers During penods of stress animals are sent to Chyulu Hills m a search for pasture and 
water 
On the ranch there used to be one women's group which is now defunct The group appears 
not to have been functioning for the last 3 years There are no church buildings m the ranch 
except for an Anglican church that uses a classroom at Kilunyeti for its Sunday service 
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ELANG'ATA WUAS GROUP RANCH PROFILE 
Elang'ala Wuas (phase Π) group ranch (59,497 ha), located some IS km south-west of Kajiado 
Town, includes two sublocations (Lang'ata Wuas and Toroka) in the Loodokilam location of the 
Central Division. Most of the 3,000-3,500 Loodokilam Maasal Uve in permanent bomas 
concentrated in the eastern half of the ranch In the south-western part of the ranch most of the 16 
individual randies (12,767 ha) are carved out Along the Toroka seasonal nver the Magadi 
Railway branch and some trading centres can be found (e g KMQ, Mlle 46 (also named Elang'ala 
Wuas Τ С ), Naudot and Singiraim) Ollepesi, located along the waterpipeline providing water for 
the individual tanches m the south, is a growing small cenere Primary schools can be found in 
Mile 46 (since 1960), KMQ, Singiraim, Naudot and Oltepesi (also called Enchoro Esentue) Most 
schools lack good facilities Mile 46 has had a Government run health centre since 1966 Churches 
are mainly found m Müe 46 (CPK, AIO. KMQ (CPK, Catholic Church, PCEA), Oloolera (AIO 
and Oltepesi (CPK) 
Situated in the Rift Valley borderzone, the altitude vanes considerable from 1,800 m m the east to 
1,100 m in the wesL Raulfall is between 450-500 mm annually The ranch is in agro-climatic zone 
V Mean annual temperatures are from 19°C to 23°C rising towards the west A wide variety m 
landforms can be found (hills, plateaus, undulating plains) Soils are also diverse, but mainly 
Chromic Cambisols (well-drained moderately deep, dark reddish brown stony clay loams) 
The vegetation is dominated by woodland & bushland m the west and some wooded & bushed 
grassland in the east Open grasslands can be found m the central and north-eastem parts 
Especially Comiphora africana. Acacia tortihs and grasses like Pennlsetum mezianum, Sporobolus 
marginatus and pelusides, Cenchrus cilhans, Chloris roxburghuuia and Cynodon dactylon are 
abundant In the periodically flooded valleys grasslands are highly productive 
Seasonal swanks are a common feature on the southern side of the Group Ranch and of major 
importance for the provision of water to people, livestock and wildlife in the wet and dry seasons 
(e g Lake Loonkujit, Emparbal Naibor, Kaponko, Ençarbal Olkarkan) 
Toroka nver is the most important seasonal nver m the Group Ranch Ruiming along the 
northern pan of the ranch it ends at Lake Kaponko m the south-western part of the Group Ranch 
In Elang'ala Wuas group ranch boreholes, sub-surface dams and wells have been constructed 
which are owned pnvately or communally Pans are the most widespread water facility Boreholes 
are also very common They ate concentrated m Orpmkata, two (not functioning) are communally 
owned and the rest are private There are other boreholes at Ndupa and on the way ω Mile 46 
trading centre Wells are very common m KMQ m the Toroka nver, near Mile 46 and near 
Naudot 
Livestock keeping m Elang'ala Wuas is pnmanly characterized by trekking the animals for 
watering from the fat south to the far east in cyclical penods of three to four days m the drier 
months of the year This is necessary because the south-westem comer, used as a dry season 
grazing area for group ranch members and individual ranchers alike, lacks watering points 
Another dry season atea fot the livestock owners living near Singiraim and Mile 46 is in the 
north-western comet of the ranch Pastures m neighbouring Kilomto group ranch are frequented all 
the year round Livestock diseases include ECF (around KMQ and the eastern border only), F&M, 
Blackquaiter for cattle and Foolrol, Brucellosis for shoals Dips ate widespread but, due to lack of 
water, hardly ever operate New breeds of caule have been introduced like Sahiwal, Fnesian, 
Ayrshire, Guernsey, Jersey, Hereford, Charoláis for caule and Galla goats, Blackbeated Persian 
sheep and Dorper sheep Poultry keeping and apiculture can also be seen 
Gazelles, giraffes, zebra, ostnch, hyenas and wolves are the most common wild animals 
Lions, leopards and cheetah are also present and make frequent attacks on livestock, especially on 
the western side of the group ranch 
Cultivation is on the increase although success is limned. Limestone mining concentrates in 
KMQ Individuals also engage in marble mining Others sell sand at a mere Ksh 100/- a truck. 
Fout women's groups are active m steet-fauemng, cultivation and handicrafts 
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LORNGOSUA GROUP RANCH PROFILE 
Lomgosua (phase ΠΙ) group ranch (38.282 ha) is situated south of Elang'ata Wuas group ranch 
covering Ruanje and Lomgosua sublocations of Lomgosua Location, Central Division. It stretches 
westwards from Bissel Trading centre (not included m the ranch) located some 30 km south of 
Kajiado Town on the road to Nanunga Some 3,000-4,000 Matapalo Maasai Uve on the ranch. 
Along the northern border with Enkarom and Elang'ata Wuas group ranches some individual 
ranches can be found. 
Two trading centres, Lomgosua where the fust shop was constructed m 1958 and Ilmotio (1965) 
serve as purchasing centres for several food and household items Lomgosua is situated in the 
centre of the ranch and Ппюио on the western border These shops acquire (heir items from Bissel 
Trading Centre in the east Lomgosua primary school was started m 1979, followed in 1982 by 
DmoDo There are no dispensaries in Lomgosua group ranch. A World Vision sponsored mobile 
dime has been paying only monthly visits since 1988 The sick have to trek all the way to Bissel 
dispensary for attention Two churches have appeared in the area since the nud-1980s, one at 
Lomgosua and another at Ilmotio Roads are few and not tarmacked yet Vehicles can hardly use 
the few existing roads during the rainy season. 
Lomgosua group ranch has an undulating landscape with a few isolated hills (Lemeipod, Ruanji, 
Laasur, Longai, Kipokot) As in Elang'ata Wuas group ranch the altitude falls from the east (1,750 
m) towards the west (1,350 m) Rainfall is higher than in Elang'ata Wuas, ranging from 500 to 
600 mm annually Most of the ranch is m agro-climatic zone V The mam soils are well drained, 
very deep sandy loam to clay orthic luvisols in the west, chromic luvisols in the east of the ranch 
The latter soil type also occurs m the central part mixed with imperfectly drained clayish eutnc 
planosols The hilly parts are covered with mainly friable, stony clay loam eutnc regosols 
The vegetation on the ranch shows a wide variation the principal types being bushed grassland, 
wooded grassland among scattered patches of open grassland Acacia species are abundant as is 
Balanitis aegyptica (Maasai name lomgosua), Commiphora qfricana and grasses like Pennisetum 
тегапіит and Thtmeda triandra 
Several seasonal nvers (e g the Ruanji, Olmoikeya and Isinon) cover most pans of the ranch 
In the northern region several swamps can be found m the ramy seasons after the floodmg of 
these rivers In the Isinon nver World Vision has built a dam. Several small and a few large pans 
(near Ilmotio and Enchorro) have also been dog holding water from 2 weeks up to 4 months after 
the rams North and south of Ruanji lulls, near Bissel and west of Lomgosua centre, several wells 
have been dug Often labour from Tanzania is hired for this time-consuming job Some of these 
wells are very abundant and provide water al the year round Lomgosua ranchers also make use of 
wells in ВаПшшо group ranch (Ilmarba wells) In 1957 a borehole was constructed m Lomgosua 
centre 
Dry season grazing areas are found on the neighbouring Osilalei group ranch as well as towards 
the south-east of Lomgosua centre In this area water is scarce and ECF prevalent Other common 
diseases are CBPP and Anaplasmosis Unfortunately no operational dip is available The people 
use hand-spraying pumps These are said to be little effective in иск control The commonest wild 
animals on the ranch are giraffes, gazelle's, elands, impalas, hyenas and foxes These species do 
not pose a senous problem to the livestock economy 
Cultivation Is increasing although the plots are small and receive minimal attention due to the 
amount of attention required for livestock keeping 
Lomgosua area has only one women's group which is not functioning well if at all 
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METO GROUP RANCH PROFILE 
Meto (phase ΙΠ) group ranch (28,928 km1) Is situated In South Matapalo Location, Central 
Division of Kajlado District, bordering Tanzania. Approximately 2,750 Matapalo Massai Uve on 
this rand) Onginally Meto group ranch mcluded adjacent Oldoinyo Orok group ranch as well In 
the process of splitting the ranch 12 individual ranches were formed (3 at Empukani, 2 at 
Oloshoibor, 1 at Кипра and S at Oloinmmmi) 
Meto trading centre has 5 shops, a dispensary, a primary school and a village polytechnic The 
CPK Anglican Church has a building here They also run the Maasai Rural Training Centre sub­
station. Enkeju e Lend has only one shop, a nursery school and a CPK church Other 
denominanons have planned to establish themselves m Empukani (Baptist Church), Oloshoibor 
(African Inland Church) and Kumpa (PCEA) Roads in the area are virtually non-existent, except 
for a junction between Bissel and Meto 
On Melo group ranch three distinct land units can be distinguished, namely, the plains (Empukani 
and Oloshoibor m the south, Oloinmmmi and Kumpa in the north-east and Ilurpen in the south­
western area of the ranch), the gently sloping hills (e g Nooliatuam where Meto trading centre is 
located, Olgos, OUuu and Enketesuna), and lastly the hills (Lempalakai m the north, Muntanikua 
and Kukuo in the south-west, Losuua, Ruanje Kipaipiyoi and Parmtmg'at m the north-west 
Lolayioni, Sambu, Loluamiloi and Nemampuli hills are located m the central region) The ranch 
vanes in altitude between 1,479 m to 2,100 m. The average rainfall is 600 mm annually 
Most of the soils are a combination of well drained, deep reddish brown sandy clay loam 
chromic luvisols and imperfectly drained blick, very firm clay eutnc planosols Vegetation is 
almost entirely bushed grassland Cenchrus allmris (African foxtail grass) and Pennisetum 
mezianum (bamboo grass) are abundant perennial grasses Acacia lortilis, Octmum americanum 
and Asplllia mozambkensis are the most abundant trees available Low and unreliable rainfall 
accounts for tuft grass which has a low nutnuonal value This is worsened by quite high 
températures particularly m the Ruanje region and m the Enkeresuna where the vegetation dries up 
rapidly 
All the streams on the Meto group ranch are seasonal There are a few pans, the most important 
one being at Empukani which provides water for a few months after the rains During the rains the 
people and their animals get water from pot holes along the stream beds There are 3 individual 
boreholes and one Kumpa commmity borehole Some wells are also founl al Kukuo, Laasur, 
Misluye and Noonkinye However, these wells frequently dry up Many people get their water 
from Tanzaman springs like the Looretel, Olcborroibor, Lolairashi. Entapiupi and others These 
water facilities are quite far away and unreliable The people living in Enkeresuna water their 
animals at points as far as 40 kilometres away, for example at Ilmarba wells The Laasur, Kukuo, 
Noonkinye and the Mishiye wells dry up frequently 
According to key-Informants the MRTC at Meto has fostered improved and conunercially based 
livestock farming In the area. It has also introduced better subsistence cultivation methods Many 
families have adopted the practice of cultivating small gardens where beans and maize are grown 
to supplement their diet This is taking place at a fast rate and some areas like Olkiu which had 
not done this before are now doing so 
The problem of disease and pests is also quite dominant. East Coast fever. Black water. Foot 
and Mouth and many others have caused much loss of caule m the years 1972-4 and 1982-84 
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CHAPTER 9 
PARTITION, TRANSFER AND MORTGAGE OF LAND IN 
SUBDIVIDED GROUP RANCHES IN KAJIADO DISTRICT 
9.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we will present quantitative data concerning the partition, 
transfer and mortgage of land in Olkinos, Embolioi, Empuyiankat, Kitengela 
and Рока subdivided group ranches. In addition, improvements made by the 
new private ranch owners will be discussed. Both issues are among the most 
important arguments used by- opponents and supporters of individual 
landownership, respectively. A review of experiences of this process of 
changing communal into individually owned land among groups in other 
countries will also be presented. 
The threat of and the actual sale of land is the most highly debated topic of 
today in Kajiado District (see e.g. Pasha 1986, Tobiko 1989a, Dietz & Rutten 
1989, Kajiado Focus 1991a). For Olkinos and Embolioi we are able to relate 
the official land transactions with the characteristics of the households which 
we have collected and presented above to gain a better understanding of this 
subject Developments taking place in areas of Kiboko, Elang'ata Wuas, 
Lorngosua and Meto not yet subdivided as well as on individually owned 
ranches will be used as a base of reference. Before turning to the outcome of 
this analysis, the legal procedures concerning the partitioning, selling and 
charging of land will be outlined. 
9.1.1 Land Control Board Procedure 
According to the Land Control Act, anybody wishing to subdivide, transfer or 
mortgage land in his or her possession has to obtain consent from the Land 
Control Board of the District Land Control Boards are purely administrative 
bodies whose function is to grant or to refuse consent of particular transactions 
brought before them. They cannot and do not have the power to choose 
between competing purchasers for the same parcel of land. Land Control 
Boards have no power to alter contracts agreed upon between two parties. 
Kajiado District has three Divisional Land Control Boards: the Purka Land 
Control Board covering Magadi and Central Division; the Oloolaiser Land 
Control Board for Ngong Division and the Loitokitok Land Control Board for 
the division of that name. The Board is headed by the Kajiado District 
Commissioner and its members are local Maasai leaders (e.g. councillors, 
chiefs, individual ranchers). Board members are supposed to be "watch guards" 
in helping the Boards to reach just decisions. 
In principle the Purka Land Control Board has a meeting every month in 
Kajiado Town where the applicants present their cases. Applicants have to 
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show the title deed of the plot and explain the intention of the intended 
partition, mortgage or transfer of land to the Board. The Board will not give 
consent if it is of the opinion that the parcel is too small to be split, if division 
would be into too many new parcels, too large a portion of land would be sold 
or the price offered was too low. Sometimes the head of the household is told 
to bring his family to the next Board meeting. If money had changed hands 
before consent from the Land Board was sought the transfer will be declared 
illegal and will not be accepted. 
After consent for subdivision is obtained the owner presents this approval to 
the district or any other licensed surveyor who prepares mutation forms. After 
conducting the demarcation the forms are registered with the Land Registrar 
who issues new parcel numbers. The Land Control Board has to be consulted 
anew if the owner wants to transfer one of these partitioned parcels to a buyer 
or to his heir. If consent is obtained a transfer document is prepared and new 
title deeds issued by the Office of the Land Registrar. Transfers include selling 
and gifts mainly by inheritance. 
Table 9.1 Kajiado District Lands Department Activities 1979-89 
1979 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Ha registered ('000) 
New tides 
Subdivisions 
Transféra 
Leases 
Charges 
Lease certifícales & 
büe deeds issued 384 1,461 3,838 1,656 2,731 2,876 4,527 
Source KDAU WN and ШКО. KUUH \m ГЗУ, MoL/AK 1УЙУ, Staüsücal Abstract 1У82 and 
1988 
Note new titles are mainly the result of subdivisions Title deeds and lease certificates are 
documents handed out to the rightful owner after payment of a fee 
The amount of work for the Purka Land Control Board has risen enormously 
in the last years. In 1984 a total number of 164 cases (including renewed 
applications) for subdivision, transfer or charging of land were dealt with. This 
figure remained more or less the same for 198S (203) and 1986 (187). In 1987, 
after subdivision started, it more than doubled to 398 requests. The following 
year it stabilized at 381 cases dealt with. Lastly, in 1989, another doubling 
occurred placing the total number of applications at 756. 
By 1978 4,929 titles were registered in Kajiado District rising to as many as 
18,918 titles by 1988. Most of these, however, are in the Ngong and Loitokitok 
regions. The issue of title deeds for the whole of Kajiado Distnct is done by 
the Kajiado District Lands Department. The Department's work depends 
mostly on the land transactions approved by the three operative Divisional 
Land Control Boards and records received from the Land Adjudication 
Department (see table 9.1). 
,409 
351 
104 
263 
2 
215 
1.754 
1,111 
304 
807 
8 
359 
1.754 
2,088 
359 
1,071 
4 
572 
1,754 
1,942 
334 
759 
2 
518 
nfa 
2.124 
434 
1,494 
18 
525 
nfa 
1,679 
498 
1,365 
18 
487 
nfa 
nfa 
724 
2,410 
28 
625 
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92 Land Actions Performed by the New Kaputiei Land 
Owners 
9.2.1 Fragmentation of Parcels by the New Kaputiei Individual Ranchers 
From table 9.2 we learn that since the Olkinos group ranch split up in 
September 1986 -subsequently followed by Embolioi, Empuyiankat, Kitengela 
and Рока group ranches- some 36.7 per cent out of a total of 757 new Kaputiei 
individual ranchers applied to further subdivide their privately owned parcel up 
until February 1990. In terms of the affected area this amounts to 34.7 per cent 
of former group ranch land. The average period for the 757 members during 
which they had the opportunity to apply for subdivision was only 30 months. 
Reasons for applying for further subdivision were varied. In a number of 
cases subdivision was in order to acquire more title deeds which, if needed, 
could be inherited by the sons, widows, unmarried or divorced daughters. 
Another reason for subdividing a ranch was for obtaining a loan by using the 
land as collateral. Although the whole of the plot could be mortgaged a small 
part of the ranch is preferred as it avoids the risk of losing the entire parcel in 
case of a failure to meet loan repayments. Finally, subdivision is a condition 
for anybody wishing to sell part of his land. Tables 9.2, 9.3 and 9.4 provide an 
overview of the applications made to partition, transfer and mortgage land in 
the former group ranches of Olkinos, Embolioi, Empuyiankat, Kitengela and 
Рока, up to February 1990. Appendix 9.1 shows the maps of the latter ranches. 
In principle, the Land Control Board will allow nobody to sell all of his land 
and become landless. Among the cases rejected were those with no rationale 
for subdivision or transfer, family members who were opposed to the idea, or 
others who had too small a parcel too small to be subdivided or sold. Still, 
several cases have been found in which original rejections were allowed later 
with or without amendments having been made. Some key-informants stated 
that most requests for subdivision are made for the sale of parcels and less for 
inheritance or for mortgage. This seems to be confirmed by the actions of the 
members of the earliest subdivided Olkinos group ranch. Some 68.5 per cent 
(37 out of 54 Olkinos members whose applications for subdivision were 
consented to) subsequently asked pennission to sell one or more lots of their 
fragmented plot Other acts undertaken by this group of 54 Olkinos farmers 
were the giving of gifts (5.6 per cent), mortgage (9.3 per cent) and further 
subdivision (1.9 per cent) leaving 14.7 per cent of them undertaking no action 
as yet.1 From this it may be concluded that the primary requests for 
subdivision made to the Land Control Board are intended to enable the selling 
of one of the new titles rather for loan acquisition or inheritance. 
1
 In addition three members charged the whole of their plot. 
Table 9.2 Applications for Partition of Original Parcels of New Kaputìei Individual Ranchers, February 1990 
Olkinos 
Embolioi 
Empuyiankat 
Kitengela 
Рока 
Total 
Date ranch 
subdivided 
sepl986 
ПО І986 
mai 1987 
feb 1989 
aug 1989 
Consented 
or % 
54 46.6 
57 19.1 
29 29.6 
71 45.3 
3 10.0 
214 28.3 
ha 
2,748 
4.899 
4.716 
6^09 
921 
19,793 
% 
45.6 
20.4 
30.9 
35.6 
10.3 
27.3 
Rejected 
nr % ha 
3 2.6 91 
1 0.3 93 
1 1.0 113 
2 0.9 113 
0 0.0 0 
7 0.9 410 
% 
1.5 
0.3 
0.7 
0.6 
0.0 
0.6 
Pending 
nr 
7 
12 
6 
25 
1 
51 
% ha 
6.0 327 
4.0 891 
6.1 824 
11.7 1,876 
3.3 315 
6.7 4,233 
% 
5.4 
3.7 
5.4 
10.3 
34 
5.8 
Dropped 
nr 
0 
4 
1 
1 
0 
6 
% 
0.0 
1.3 
1.0 
0.5 
0.0 
0.8 
ha 
0 
445 
146 
111 
0 
702 
% 
0.0 
1.9 
1.0 
0.6 
0.0 
1.0 
Total applications 
nr % ha % 
64 55.2 3,166 52.6 
74 24.7 6,328 26.4 
37 37.8 5,799 38.0 
99 46.3 8,609 47.1 
4 13.3 1,236 13.8 
278 36.7 25,137 34.7 
ruote: me numoer ot new parcels resulting nom partiuonea imiviauai plots by tne Maasai pastoraiists range irom two to seven, some owners αινιαεα m 
one transaction whilst others subdivided in repeated steps to as far as into the third generation. 
Table 9.3 Applications for Transfer of Parcels of New Kaputìei Individual Ranchers to New Owners, February 1990 
Date first Consented 
application 
Olkinos mar 1987 
EmboUoi jun 1987 
Empuyiankal jul 1987 
Kitengela jun 1989 
Рока n.a. 
mb 
38 
24 
9 
13 
0 
% 
32.8 
8.0 
9.2 
6.1 
0.0 
nr 
50$ 
28# 
9« 
15-
0 
ha 
596 
657 
533 
191 
0 
% 
9.9 
2.7 
3.5 
1.0 
0.0 
Rejected 
mb % nr ha % 
Pending 
mb % ha % 
Dropped 
mb % nr ha % 
Total applications 
mb % nr ha 
2 1.7 2 32 0.5 
1 0.3 1 8 0.03 
0 0.0 0 0 0.0 
1 0.5 4 4 0.02 
0 0.0 0 0 0.0 
6 5.2 6@ 68 1.1 
12 4.0 12A 270 1.1 
9 9.2 9 198 1.3 
16 7.5 24n 336 1.8 
0 0.0 0 0 0.0 
1 0.1 
3 1.0 
0 0.0 
2 0.9 
0 0.0 
1 10 0.2 
4 43 0.2 
0 0 0.0 
2 69 0.4 
0 0 0.0 
41 35.3 
33 11.0 
17 17.3 
30 14.0 
0 0.0 
59 
45 
18 
42 
0 
706 
978 
731 
600 
0 
11.7 
4.1 
4.8 
3.3 
0.0 
Total 84 11.1 102 1,977 2.7 4 0.5 4 44 0.6 43 5.7 51 872 1.2 6 0.8 7 122 0.2 121 16.0 164 3,015 4.2 
\ 4 güts ot 42 ha; <g> 1 gift ot 2 ha; # 2 gilts oi IIU ha; x 1 gut ot 4 ha; * 1 gift ot Ш ha; - J gilts o\ 'i'J ha; " I gitt ot M) ha; mb =* member, bxcludmg 
the gills a total of 115 members (15.2 per cent) applied to sell 2,723 ha of land (3.8 per cent) to interested buyers. 
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Figure 9.1 shows the acceded fragmented parcels on the former Olkinos group 
ranch by February 1990. The map includes the ranches divided once as well as 
the parcels that were split, sold, fragmented anew and resold. Parcels as small 
as 1 acre can now be found in the Olkinos area. For example one rancher sold 
25 acres, which was subsequently further subdivided in 15 portions of 6 acres 
(1), 2 acres (5) and 1 acre (9), and transferred to 14 immigrants. 
9ЛЛ Transfer of Land Among the New Kaputiei Individual Ranchers 
After partitioning the individual ranch it becomes possible to transfer part of it 
to a willing buyer or an heir. Table 9.3 shows that 16.0 per cent of the new 
Kaputiei individual owners made the effort to fill in land transfer application 
forms and defend their requests before the Land Control Board. This happened 
within an average period of 25 months. By February 1990 11.1 per cent of the 
ranchers had obtained consent to transfer 1,977 ha of land, either as a sale or a 
gift, and this was 2.7 per cent of the total subdivided group ranch area. The 
willingness to transfer land on Kitengela group ranch is astonishing. One out of 
seven Kitengela ranchers applied to transfer part of the individual ranch within 
a short period of only 9 months! 
Tables 9.4 and 9.5 provide information on the number of sellers, acreage, 
price and the ethnicity of the buyers for already acceded and pending transfers, 
respectively. So far 78 Maasai, equivalent to 10.3 per cent of the total number 
of former group members sold 1,728 ha or 2.4 per cent of their original group 
ranch land in return for Ksh. 18,525,205/-. In addition 39 people (5.2 per cent) 
are waiting for consent before selling another 823 ha for a total of Ksh. 
9,907,000/-. In other words 110 ex-group ranch members (14.5 percent), have 
sold or are in the process of selling 2,551 ha or 3.5 per cent of former group 
ranch land at a price of Ksh. 28,427,205/-.2 This is the equivalent of an 
average land price of Ksh. 11,144/- per hectare. On average, the households 
will have earned Ksh. 258,429/- from the sale of land. Figure 9.2 shows the 
Olkinos inhabitants who sold paît of their land. 
It should be noted that the sale of land does not have a constant pattern but is 
rather one of "boom and slump". This is illustrated by table 9.6. Apparently an 
initial selling out by those who want to do so is followed by others some time 
later. Pioneer sellers show up again after some time. 
Out of a total of 117 sellers (78 consented and 39 pending) seven sold land before and are 
waiting for consent to sell another pomon, meaning that a total of 78 plus 32 members (110 
membm) are involved in the commercial transfer of former group ranch land The seven second-
üme sellers come from Olkinos (4), ЕтЬоІюі (2) and Kitengela (1) If we exclude Рока group 
ranch, as this ranch only recently subdivided, the percentage of members involved in commercial 
transactions rises to 1S.1 per ceni of the members and 4 0 per cent of the subdivided area. 
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ТаЫе 9.4 Authonsed Primary Transfers of Parcels to New Owners as at February 1990 
Olkrnos 
Embolioi 
Empuyunkat 
KitengeU 
Рока 
Total 
Total 
fncflibcrs 
116 
299 
98 
214 
30 
757 
Total ha 
6,020 
24,000 
15.270 
18,292 
8.926 
72^08 
Ha sold 
abs 
504 
554 
512 
158 
-
1,728 
% 
84 
Z3 
33 
09 
00 
24 
HasoWmonlb 
abs % 
14 0 023 
15 J 006 
160 010 
176 010 
- 00 
Sellen 
nr 
36 
23 
8 
11 
-
78 
% 
310 
77 
82 
51 
00 
10 3 
Ksh. earned 
6,497.000/-
5,728.000/-
3,330.000/-
2^70,205/-
18,525,205/-
Ethmcity of buyers 
Massai 
9 
8 
2 
5 
-
24 
ta 
136 
259 
122 
68 
-
585 
Noo-
Maasai 
37 
18 
6 
7 
-
68 
ha 
368 
295 
390 
90 
-
1,143 
noie gitis are exciuoea ine actual numoer ot tirsi-ume buyers lies above me v¿ meoüonea Because mis ligure only reters to me гашюег ot pateéis SOM 
and tbe eihmcily of tbe buyer Non-Maasai in particular buy in small groups of 2-10 people In cootrast only a few buyers acquired more than one parcel 
Table 93 Pending Primary Transfers of Parcels to New Owners as at February 1990 
OUunos 
Embolioi 
Empuyunkat 
Kiteogela 
Рока 
Total 
members 
116 
299 
98 
214 
30 
Total ha' 
6.020 
24,000 
15,270 
18,292 
8,926 
Ha to be sold 
abs 
66 
266 
198 
293 
-
% 
11 
η 
13 
16 
00 
Ha tobe 
sold/month 
abs % 
18 003 
81 003 
62 004 
325 018 
- 00 
Willing sellers 
or 
5 
И 
8 
15 
-
« Ksh to 
be earned 
43 1.120.000/-
40 2^89.000/-
82 2,712,000/-
70 3,486.000/-
00 
Ethnicity of buyers 
Maasai 
1 
3 
2 
2 
-
ha 
4 
63 
32 
8 
-
Non-
4 
8 
7 
20 
-
ha 
62 
203 
166 
285 
-
Total 757 71508 823 1 1 39 5 2 9,907,000/- 8 107 39 
Note gills are exciuoea ui me iv appucanis willing to sell land but wbose case is pending, seven had previously soia апошег portion οι mar una. 
716 
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Table 9.6 Authorised Selling of Land by OIkinos and Embolioi Ranchers in a 
Time Perspective 
OIkinos 
Embolioi 
1987· 
Pers Ha 
7 98 
4 193 
1988 
Pers Ha 
16 234 
7 141 
1989 
Pers Ha 
13 128 
12 220 
1990» 
Pers Ha 
5 44 
0 0 
number of persons involved m selling totals 41 instead of 36 as shown in table 94 because of S 
ranchers who sold anew m another year 
Our main interest, besides the extent to which subdivision and selling occurred 
in the subdivided group ranches, was directed to the specific socio-economic 
identity of the seller. Would there be a specific group of Maasai involved in 
this practice of selling land? Which specific set of features could possibly be 
associated with the willing-seller type of Maasai individual rancher? 
For OIkinos and Embolioi we now had the opportunity to link the personal 
and socio-economic characteristics of those who sold land and those who had 
not. Table 9.7 summarises the presence or absence of a correlation between the 
sale of land and a whole range of personal, household or plot characteristics of 
the Maasai ranchers of OIkinos and Embolioi. 
Table 9.7 Correlations With Sale of Land (0.10 sign, level)3 
Variable OIkinos 
(n=108) 
Embolioi 
(n=75) 
Age 
Education 
Wealth (LE/AAME) 
Маш occupation 
Plot size 
Plot size/person 
Committee member 
source authors survey 
negative 
negative 
negative 
negative 
negauve 
positive 
positive 
negative 
negative 
negauve 
negative 
negative 
negative 
negative 
3
 For OIkinos we found a conelation between the selling of land and class of wealth, though 
the significance level was above the 010 threshold (01165). A major problem m respect to the 
wealth variable analysis is that, often pan of the money earned from the sale of land is used to 
buy livestock. Also, our wealth estimate (livestock per AAME) does not include possible other 
family fortunes. Wealth stored m a bank account or m captai assets is not included. 
To overcome the № t problem we tried to relate the group of sellers to numbers of livestock 
owned by them m early 1988 as recorded by the Livestock Census For OIkinos a group of 10 
sellers and 20 non-sellers could be traced from the original Census Tiles The average wealth 
figures for the group of sellers was S 86 LE/AAME for January 1988 and 6 70 LE/AAME for 
January 1990 The group of 20 non-sellers, showed a similar trend m that their wealth was placed 
at a mean of 8 33 and 9 39 LE/AAME for 1988 and 1990, respectively In other words, the group 
of sellers seems to be less wealthy than the non-sellers although with the data available now this 
cannot be stalisacally validated. 
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The above information suggests that age, education, wealth, main occupation or 
size of the plot are of no significance as far as the selling of land is concerned. 
Sellers of land can be found among the young, old, literate, illiterate, rich and 
poor alike. The involvement of all of these groups seems to reflect the broad 
range of viable logic behind the selling of land; acquisition of capital for 
investment in productive assets, expensive consumer goods or for sheer 
subsistence. 
FOT OUdnos correlations were found to exists between the land availability 
per household member and the selling of land. The trend is that households 
increasingly sell land the more land per person is held in possession. However, 
among the group of most well-off land-holding households no one is involved 
in this practice. In this group of landowners the former committee-member 
households are over-represented. Thus there is a strong correlation between 
committee-membership and the dislike for the selling of land. No former 
committee-member had sold a single piece of land from his own parcel by 
early 1990. Some, however, had bought land from another group ranch 
member and resold this shortly afterwards with a huge profit4 
9.Z3 Mortgage of Land By the New Kaputíei Individual Ranchers 
Besides offering land for sale parcels are used as collateral when acquiring 
loans from a financial institution. Table 9.8 summarises the amount of land 
mortgaged as well as the number and amount of the loans taken by the new 
Maasai individual ranchers. 
Table 9A Original Plot Owners Mortgage of Land to Financial Institutions as 
at February 1990 
Persons % Ha % Loan Status 
(Ksh.) 
Olkmos (0=116) 
Emboüoi (D=299) 
Empuyunkai (n=98) 
Kilengela (D=214) 
Рока (II=30) 
Totti 
bouree äumors survey 
7 
б 
1 
DO 
2 
1 
16 
1 
60 
20 
03 
land 
09 
33 
21 
01 
346 
349 
49 
mortgaged 
132 
319 
1,146 
49 
57 
15 
02 
07 
36 
16 
01 
1,055.0<ХУ-
2,273.000/-
70,00(V-
400.000/-
300.000/-
4,028.000/-
lOSXOI-
consented 
consented 
penduig 
consented 
consented 
consented 
pending 
For instance, a former Olkioos comimttee-member bought 22 26 ha at Ksh. 110,000/- and 
resold this piece to a Kikuyu buyer six months later for Ksh 220,000/-
Chapter 9: Partition, Transfer and Mortgage of Land 393 
/ 
/ 
^ 
4 \ 
$ I 
.« 
^ 
* // ?// 
ί// Si 
* 
*'/ 
^ /I 
4ff 
///£ 
//J/^\ 
Ir/ IfC 
"с ~ 
/-¿Λ 
Jl^ 
M** 
тёс 
"bil ЧІТС^ 
°M/ 7\> 
^ к 
ì s ^ ^ 
0 
Х ^ 
г> 
<^л 
""Ч 1 
\ус 4^\ 
N ^ 
"^ -""'^  <J^ 
// f 
^ 
X 
V 
й 
f 
'1 
ir ej[ 
γ^ 
MC 
^Л 
~~~-r 
ч / 
V 
У 
i 
^ 
*/T 
P^-^ 
-Сг^  
JT \У\, 
с»*\х 
^ s 4 / \ 
^^ / 7 ^'"s^y / 
'W^fs 
Λ\ϊ 
/ \ / / у^ ƒ χ /t / / 
fS 
\ А 
< \ \ \ л 
У 
/ceRIe d 
E km 
^^ 
^ 
"^ Ç 
•ч \ 
к 
k 
ν/Ί Y^ 
\ 
4
-\-
< 
/\ \ \ ι 
rr) 
Γ\
 r»A ••school \ \ ) (OLKINOSTCI 
\^-^ 
V**J 
s^ \ С 
1 ^ у 1 /^ 
\ У\ 
^\У 
\ S ^ Í 
S v 
\ , o*^  
Í 
V 
^ 
P 
V s 
О
 a 
1 borehole 
Κι 
У 
В « Buyer 
С - Chairman 
VC - Vice Chairman 
Τ - Treasurer 
S - Secretary 
CM - Committee member 
RC . Relative to chairman 
FC - Friend of chairman 
RT - Relative to treasurer 
FS - Former aecretary 
n% . Percentage of land mortgaged 
. . . - Road 
Figure 93 Mortgagees of Olkinos Land as at February 1990 
394 Selling Wealth to Buy Poverty 
Comparing the number of people and amount of land involved in mortgaging 
versus selling of land makes clear that the Maasai owners sell their land rather 
than use it as collateral to acquire money. Only 17 applicants (2.2 per cent) 
intend to or actually mortgaged 1,195 ha or 1.6 per cent of the area for a loan 
totalling Ksh. 4,098,000/-. Of this group two Olkinos ranchers had also sold 
land and one Embolioi rancher was willing to do so. It has been suggested that 
selling off land is a faster, less obstructive and more comprehensible way of 
acquiring money than mortgaging one's plot Figure 9.3 shows the 7 Olkinos 
ranchers who took loans using their individually owned land as collateral. 
It is thought that the low level of loans requested is partly due to the 
absolute or relative unavailability of funds but also to rejections by finance 
institutions, lack of familiarity with the procedures, high interest rates and fear 
of default among prospective borrowers. It is hard to know the relative 
importance of each of these factors. It seems, however, that most ranchers are 
simply not interested in obtaining credit. Loan rejection is estimated to be IS 
per cent overall. Default among established individual ranchers is high. Also 
the relative unavailability (small sums of Ksh. 5,000-50,000 only) is said to be 
a handicap when a large loan is required. 
Within our survey sample we found 5.6 and 1.4 per cent of the Olkinos and 
Embolioi population, respectively, stating they had mortgaged parts of their 
land. This corresponds quite well with the official land mortgagees percentages 
of 6.0 and 1.5 of the total population of these territories. On average 
mortgagees obtained some Ksh. 30,000/- per ha. Land mortgaged amounted 
from 20.0 up to 132.0 ha. Mostly Pan African Credit or the Kenya Commercial 
Bank provided the loan. 
We were mainly interested to know if those taking up loans by mortgaging 
their land showed any special personal characteristics. For Olkinos a positive 
correlation between their main occupation, wealth and education in relation to 
the mortgaging of land was found. For the seven households who had 
mortgaged part of their land six heads of households had their main occupation 
in the public sector (two politicians and two civil servants) or were self-
employed businessmen (one cattle traders and one shopkeeper). Only one 
person mentioned livestock keeping as his main occupation. Rich households 
and those whose heads of households had had a higher level of education were 
also over-represented within this group of mortgagees. It should be realized 
that it is not yet clear if these characteristics are themselves the impetus or 
whether they reflect the minimum requirements imposed by the lending 
institutions. Former committee-members are also strongly represented within 
the group of mortgagees. Their experience in dealing with loans will be a 
possible explanation for this. 
None of the established individual ranchers or buyers in our sample stated 
that they had mortgaged land. However, a large number of individuals within 
both of these groups stated that they had obtained a loan without using their 
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plot as collateral (see table 9.9).' 
In other words, individualization as such does not seem to have resulted in 
a boom in loans taken up by the ranchers. Property located elsewhere or a well 
paid job could also be used for the acquisition of a loan. For Olkinos, Maasai 
having their main occupation outside the livestock sector such as businessmen, 
politicians and civil servants are now the only people responsible having a loan 
and the only ones willing to take a new one. Among those ranchers who had 
had a loan in the past the committee-members are strongly represented. 
Table 9.9 Past, Present and Future State of Loans Among Respondents 
Olkinos (№108) 
Embolioi (ii=75) 
Kiboko (ii=38) 
Elang'ata Wuas (o=75) 
Lomgosua (№100) 
Meto (n=104) 
Individual fanchcrs (n=33) 
- Kaputiei (ii=14) 
- Loodokilani (n=8) 
- Matapalo (0=11) 
Buyers Olkinos (n=9) 
source auinor s survey 
Percentage 
of persons 
naving a ™* 
loan by 1990 
65 
139 
28 
41 
10 
10 
42 2 
214 
500 
63 6 
111 
Date 1990 loan issued 
since 
1987 
85 7 
75 0 
1000 
667 
1000 
1000 
200 
0 0 
0 0 
667 
0 0 
before 
1987 
14 3 
250 
00 
33 3 
0 0 
00 
800 
1000 
1000 
33 3 
1000 
Former 
loans 
(repaid 
before 
1990) 
00 
66 
53 
53 
30 
00 
38 2 
14 2 
333 
727 
11 1 
Persons 
warning to 
take a loan 
16 2 
14 3 
111 
19 2 
242 
13.5 
15 6 
0 0 
115 
364 
11 1 
Embolioi shows a different situation. Of ten current Embolioi borrowers (i.e. 
including those having a loan without mortgaging land) seven stated their main 
occupation to be livestock keeping. This ratio is more or less congruent with 
the Embolioi overall employment characteristics. Still, taking into account the 
main occupation of the Embolioi previous and willing borrowers, totalling 5 
and 11 persons respectively, the non-livestock sector is slightly over-
represented among the group of (willing) borrowers. Otherwise no special 
group involved in money-borrowing practices was found among the new 
individual ranchers. 
Meto and Elang'ata Wuas group ranch members seem to underline the 
favourite position of the rich and educated as the people specifically stated to 
be willing to borrow in the near future. In Elang'ata Wuas the Maasai of 20 to 
40 years of age are among the most interested in acquiring a loan. Among 
buyers and established individual ranchers there is no significant distinct group 
of Maasai involved in money-borrowing. 
Buyers involved in speculation, however, did use their newly acquired plots to obtain a 
loan. 
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93 Land Buyers Personal Characteristics and Land Actions 
In this section we will deal with the activities of land buyers in the Kaputiei 
area in more detail. In chapter 8 information concerning ethnicity, household 
size, livestock wealth and ownership of land for our small sample of buyers of 
Olkinos land was presented. Now we would like to have a slightly broader 
look at this group of land seekers. We will specifically study their motives and 
objectives for buying land in Kajiado District. In addition, we will present their 
subsequent land transfer activities after having acquired their own parcel of 
land in the district. 
Table 9.10 Characteristics of Olkinos Parcel Buyers 
Ethnicity Ongin 
Massai Empuyiankat 
Maasal Kisaju 
Maasai Kisetian 
Kikuyu Kiairbu 
Residence 
Nairobi 
Olkinos 
Olkinos 
Olkinos 
Age 
25 
45 
32 
67 
Education 
Secondary 
Pnmary 
Рпшагу 
Secondary 
Mam 
occupation 
Subordinate 
Nairobi 
University 
Veten nary 
officer 
Pastoralist 
Retired 
church 
minister 
I .and used 
for 
Livestock, 
cultivation 
Livestock, 
cultivation 
Livestock, 
cultivation 
Poultry 
keeping 
Other 
wife is 
teacher in 
Olkinos 
wife runs 
shop and 
makes 
handicrafts 
keeps 2,000 
chickens 
Kikuyu Ngong Olkinos 58 Secondary Retired civil Cultivation 
servant 
uses tractor, 
market crops 
Kikuyu Nairobi Olkinos 40 University Engineer Cultivation wife (NGO-
worker) and 
children m 
Nairobi 
Kikuyu Ngong Olkinos 54 Pnmary Cultivator Cultivation, 
poultry 
keeping 
200 chickens, 
children 
schooling in 
Ngong 
Kikuyu Kiambu Nairobi 67 Pnmary Parastatal Cultivation 
employee 
hotel and 
shamba m 
Kiambu 
Kikuyu Kiambu Nairobi 
Source author's survey 
70 None Cultivator Cultivation children m 
Kiambu 
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Information presented in chapter 8 refers to those buyers who had actually 
settled on their newly acquired land. Of 9 buyers interviewed in the Olkinos 
area 3 were Maasai and 6 non-Maasai. Table 9.10 summarises some relevant 
details concerning the buyers' background such as ethnicity, place of origin, 
residence, age, education, main occupation and use of newly acquired plot. 
The information provided in table 9.10 for settled buyers suggests that these 
are not the most poor of Kenya's society. Moreover, as stated by some of the 
elders, they receive financial support from their children. None of the Kikuyu 
kept livestock. It has been suggested that fear of cattle rustling by the Maasai 
was preventing them from doing so. As stated before, most buyers of Olkinos 
territory had not yet settled at the time of survey. A generalization of the 
characteristics of the settled group will therefore be a rather biased picture of 
the buyers in Kajiado District 
In the tables 9.4 and 9.5 facts concerning land dealings for all buyers from 
Olkinos and other group ranches were presented. Although we lacked details 
about the level of education, age, main occupation and the like, ethnicity was 
known and any subsequent action taken in respect of the fragmentation, 
transfer or mortgage of land. Key-informants were able to provide some 
background information on this group of buyers both Maasai and non-Maasai. 
Out of a total of 37 plots sold to non-Maasai on Olkinos group ranch all but 
6 were acquired by Kikuyu. Two land-buying companies, 2 Kamba, 1 Kalenjin 
and 1 Arab also bought land. The latter was said to have plans for small 
industry. Among the Kikuyu buyers were rich businessmen, civil servants and 
some less well-off. The Maasai who bought 9 plots in Olkinos were mostly 
former Olkinos group members, individual ranchers, civil servants and local 
politicians. 
Among the 8 Maasai buyers of land in Embolioi were a local hotel-owner, 
a teacher, a Land Control Board member and some individual ranchers. A total 
of 18 plots was sold to non-Maasai. Only one Indian was among the group of 
otherwise Kikuyu buyers. This man had settled and cultivated beans mainly. In 
fact, Embolioi is better-known for its (informal) selling of land to Indian 
gypsum miners. Most of these are Indians living in Nairobi who 'buy' land per 
acre for some Ksh. 10,000/- to Ksh. 20,000/-. The acquired plots are exploited 
in their strip mining business using bulldozers and shovels.6 
Gypsum (hydraled calcium sulphate) Is a basic ingredient in the cement industry, in 
fertillzen, in plaster matenals and the like. Production in the area started in 1968 (see TARDA 
1984 33) By early 1985 it was estimated that some 2,000 acres had been laid to waste (see KT 
28/03/85). In an earlier article the estimate presented had been only 70 acres (see KT 28/11/84). 
Local workers receive some Ksh 30/- to 5(V- per day, depending on their productivity On a 
moiuhly basis people may make up to Ksh. 1,500/-. By the mid-1980s land was leased for some 
Ksh. 130/- to 150/- per day (see KT 28/11/84) The Indian miner managed to get some Ksh. 
1.000/- to Ksh. 1,50(У- per tons, of which some 10 per cent was paid to the then sull-functloning 
Embolioi group ranch (see KT 28/03/85). 
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The major negative aspect of this work is that it turns the pastures into 
wastelands of waterfilled low depressions, dotted by rocky, man-made hills. 
Ironically, Embolioi Maasai themselves are involved in this practice by 
offering their labour to sift through the soil to collect pieces of gypsum. Some 
residents do not bother so much about the environmental degradation because 
the basins act as small pans. The animals, however, do not seem to like the 
collected water from these depressions so much as it is too salty. 
In Empuyiankat all non-Maasai buyers were Kikuyu with one woman 
buying three parcels. None of them had settled by that time. Authorisation was 
given to the sale of land in Kitengela and that was also mostly sold to Kikuyu 
in the event 
The relationship of cultivators with the soil is much more direct than for 
pastoralists. In fact, for the latter, digging the earth is a sign of poverty. In 
contrast cultivators actually work the soil and directly use the produce grown 
from it 
Davison (1987:19) quotes a Kikuyu woman stating that "Without land we 
are nothing". She recalls, how prior to British involvement, land among the 
Kikuyu was perceived as a sacred, generative resource belonging to their 
ancestors. The introduction of land registration (i.e. the Swynnerton Plan) 
during the 1950s resulted in a precedence of individual landownership vested 
in males heads of households which marginalized the usufruct rights of 
women. Only after Independence were women allowed to own land. With the 
recent introduction of land sales in the Kikuyu area wennen began to worry 
about land security and tensions between neighbours and even family members 
erupted over land. The unconditional provision of credit for land purchase was 
proposed to ameliorate this situation (see Davison 1987:26). In addition to land 
as a necessary resource for making a living, several writers and key-informants 
mentioned the aspect of a certain obsession among the Kikuyu for acquiring 
land at all costs as land is considered to be the only true indication of wealth. 
In the Ngong area, Kikuyu women groups are also active, as land buyers. 
Maas (1986:29-52) has reported for a Kiambu Kikuyu women group stating 
that "it's always a good thing to have land". Initially, the group worked 
together to improve their houses. After that almost all the group's income was 
invested in the acquisition of land. However, this was not used for farming 
purposes. According to Maas the group was simply investing money in land 
for status and speculation and as a security for old age. This last reason was 
mostly to strengthen the position of the women within their families (vis-à-vis 
their daughters mainly) and to lessen their dependence on their sons and 
daughters-in-law. 
Out of the 46 plots bought in Olkinos 6 have been further subdivided into 30 
new plots. Tables 9.11 and 9.12 provide information about the actions taken by 
the buyers of land concerning the juridical status of their newly acquired plots. 
Table 9.11 Authorised Partitioning, Transfer or Moitgage of Land by Buyers as at Februaiy 1990 
Location 
CHkrnos 
Emboboi 
Empuyiankat 
Total 
Ethnicity 
Maasai 
Non-Maasai 
Maasai 
Non-Maasai 
Non-Maasai 
Maasai 
Non-Maasai 
plots 
nr 
9 
37 
8 
18 
2 
6 
19 
61 
bought 
ha 
136 
368 
259 
295 
122 
390 
517 
1,053 
Consented Subdivisions 
pers 
1 
5 
1 
1 
1 
7 
plot 
1 
5 
2 
3 
1 
10 
ha 
44 
68 
68 
228 
44 
364 
inn plots 
2 
28 
17 
44 
2 
89 
Consented Transfers 
pers 
2 
1 
1 
2 
2 
plot 
2 
4 
3 
2 
7 
ha 
38 
16 
7 
38 
23 
Ksb. 
520,000/-
150.000/-
44,000/-
520,000/-
194.000/-
buyer* 
2nm 
4nm 
3 nm 
2nm 
7nm 
Consented Mortgage 
pers 
2 
1 
2 
1 
4 
2 
plot 
2 
1 
2 
1 
4 
2 
ha 
32 
2 
53 
37 
85 
39 
Ksb. 
460,000/-
300,000/-
880.000/-
150,000/-
1,340,000/-
450,000/-
* nm = non-Maasai Kitengela buyers bave not yet applied lor runner subdivision, transter or mortgage ol tneir newly acquired land fofca memoen nave 
not yet sold land. No application has been dropped or rejected 
Table 9.12 Pending Partitioning, Transfer or Mortgage of Land by Buyers as at Februaiy 1990 
Location 
Olkmos 
Emboboi 
Empuyiankat 
Total 
Ethnicity 
Maasai 
Non-Maasai 
Maasai 
Non-Maasai 
Maasai 
Non-Maasai 
Maasai 
Non-Maasai 
plots 
nr 
9 
37 
8 
18 
2 
6 
19 
61 
bought 
ha 
136 
368 
259 
295 
122 
390 
517 
1,053 
Pending Subdivisions 
pers 
1 
1 
plot ha 
1 24 
1 24 
m η plots 
6 
6 
Pending Transfers 
pers 
2 
2 
2 
2 
plot 
2 
2 
2 
2 
ha 
40 
21 
40 
21 
Ksh 
850,000/-
440,000/-
850,000/-
440,000/-
buyer* 
2 nm 
2 am 
2 nm 
2nm 
Pending Mortgage 
pers 
1 
1 
plot 
1 
1 
ha 
4 
4 
Ksh 
100,000/-
100,000/-
' nm = non-Maasai Kitengeta buyers have not yel applied tor ruimer subdivision, transter or mortgage oi tneir newly acquired land rata members nave 
not yet sold land. No application has been dropped or rejected 
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Second time transfers had also occurred as two Maasai owners resold their 
newly purchased parcels to new non-Maasai buyers. Three people mortgaged 
their land. 
So far 8 new owners in Olkinos, Embolioi and Empuyiankat subdivided 11 
plots totalling 408 ha into 90 new ones. They furthermore resold 9 plots or 61 
ha and mortgaged 6 parcels totalling 124 ha. It therefore seems that, for the 
moment these new buyers prefer to mortgage twice the amount of land that 
they would offer for sale. Apparently, selling for speculative reasons is not 
much done. However, when analyzing the pending transfers and mortgages 
another picture emerges. An extra total of 61 ha is being offered for sale while 
only 4 ha is being offered as collateral for a loan. In other words, selling and 
mortgaging seems to be equally frequently performed practices among the 
group of primary buyers. As we have seen this is quite different from the 
initial (Maasai) sellers. 
Besides those seeking a quick fortune by way of speculation (some Maasai, 
an Empuyiankat Kikuyu women and land-buying companies mainly), the 
majority of the buyers seem to be land conscious and development oriented, 
Maasai and non-Maasai alike. In fact, some of the Maasai who sold only 
recently purchased land used their profits to invest them in acquiring double 
this amount of land. Within our sample of 9 buyers the Maasai from Kiserian 
offered his SO acres to a willing Indian buyer at a price of Ksh. 700,000/- in 
February 1990. This parcel of land had been bought from an Olkinos resident 
in March 1988 for only Ksh. 150,000/-! 
To illustrate this land-consciousness we could also refer to the construction 
of the Kiserian-Isinya road. Among Maasai politicians a quarrel emerged when 
one of them tried to change the initial plans and redraw the road's location to 
run closely along his parcel of land. Others backed by a Maasai government 
top-official, opposed this move. Now the road trespasses over land recently 
bought by the latter. In this way the development of the plot or its eventual 
sale will be much more profitable! 
Unfortunately, the original Maasai landowners had underestimated the value 
of what they had once owned. Let us have a look at the use they made of the 
money they had obtained from these sales. 
9.4 Use of Loans and Money Obtained from the Sale of Land 
A most interesting issue was to acquire information concerning the utilization 
of the proceeds of the sale of land and loans taken. Would the Maasai involved 
indeed devote this money to productive investments? Do differences exist 
between sellers and mortgagees? Did Maasai or non-Maasai buyers invest in 
the same way? Or was the money used for other purposes, possibly even 
outside Kajiado District? 
Information from key-informants had made clear that analyzing these issues 
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would be a difficult exercise. In addition to the usual reluctance to open one's 
books on monetary dealings, the overall disapproval of land sale repeatedly 
aired by a number of individuals and institutions outside and within the Maasai 
society has given this practice a stigma. Those land-selling Maasai who rather 
consumed the proceeds instead of making structural improvements on their 
ranch would not be very willing to show their records. 
Table 9.13 clearly shows that, after individualization, increasing numbers of 
Maasai ranchers in OIkinos, Embolioi and established Kajiado individual 
ranchers alike made improvements after the individualization of 
landownership.7 In OIkinos, for example, the percentage of people involved in 
infrastructural improvements rose from 21 to 56 per cent of all OIkinos 
ranchers. Embolioi group ranch percentages rose from a mere 8 to 45. Those 
ranchers who did not make improvements after obtaining their own parcel 
mostly stated a lack of financial resources or the fact they had not yet settled. 
Among the group of buyers a similarly high percentage of infrastructural 
improvements made could be observed. Unfortunately, we lack detailed 
information concerning the construction of facilities by individuals on the 
ranches not yet subdivided.' 
Table 9.13 Extent of Improvements Created by Individual Ranchers 
Improvemenl (abs) 
Improvement (%) 
Reason for no 
improvement 
- lack of finance 
- lack of knowledge 
- just or not yet settled 
- no interest 
- not applicable 
OUunos 
(n=108) 
b a 
23 60 
21 56 
126 
11 
221 
2.1 
621 
Embolioi 
(o=75) 
b a 
6 34 
8 45 
437 
0 0 
4 2 
56 
46.5 
Ind 
ranchers 
(n=34) 
b a 
7 30 
21 88 
00 
00 
00 
00 
1000 
Source aumors survey 
b = before individualization, a s after individualization 
Kaputiei 
(n=14) 
b a 
0 12 
0 86 
0.0 
00 
00 
00 
1000 
Loodo-
kilam 
(n=9) 
b a 
2 7 
22 78 
00 
0.0 
00 
00 
1000 
Matapalo 
(n=ll) 
b a 
5 11 
45 100 
00 
0.0 
00 
00 
1000 
Buyers 
(n=8) 
a 
7 
87 5 
00 
00 
1000 
00 
00 
7
 It should be clear that the figures do not give information about the total number and kind 
of improvements made Moreover, they do not show the total number of farmers who made an 
improvement over both penods The mam aim is to show the change in the relative number of 
ranchers involved m establishing one or more improvements before the tune of subdivision as 
compared to after subdivision. 
* It is known that two groups of Meto Maasai of 4 and 8 people, took the initiative of 
dnlluig a borehole. Some opposiuon existed to this as it was feared that land was being claimed 
before the process of subdivision was to start Still, all group members now make use of the 
boreholes by paying a small fee. 
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Table 9.14 Correlation of Infrastructural Improvements Made Before and 
After Subdivision with Sellers and Mortgagees Versus Non-
Sellers and Non-Mortgagees 
Land 
Improvements made 
Before 
After 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
OIkinos 
Sold 
yes 
6% 
34% 
24% 
16% 
no 
12% 
48% 
20% 
40% 
Embolioi 
Sold 
yes 
1% 
14% 
10% 
5% 
1 
no 
4% 
81% 
34% 
51% 
OIkinos 
Mortgaged 
yes 
5% 
2% 
7% 
0% 
no 
18% 
75% 
31% 
62% 
Embolioi 
Mortgaged 
yes no 
0% 5% 
1% 94% 
1% 40% 
0% 59% 
source: autuor s survey 
Note: the group of non-sellers excludes ranchers who mortgaged land. The group of non-
mortgagees excludes the sellers. 
Confronted with the increase in the implementation of improvements, we are 
interested to evaluate the effect of the title deed by comparing sellers and 
mortgagees with non-sellers and non-mortgagees (see table 9.14). 
For both groups, sellers and non-sellers, an increase can be recorded in the 
number of ranchers who made improvements. For example, for OIkinos 18 per 
cent of the ranchers -excluding mortgagees- made an improvement. After 
subdivision this increased to 44 per cent. However, the rise in OIkinos ranchers 
involved in improvements is significantly higher among the group of sellers. 
Before subdivision they made up 33 per cent of the improvers or 6 per cent of 
all ranchers. Afterwards this rose to 55 per cent or 24 per cent of all ranchers. 
For the group of OIkinos mortgagees a less clear picture emerged. Although 
overall the number of people involved in improvements grew from 23 to 38 
per cent, the relative portion of mortgagees did not (notably). 
For Embolioi ranchers in particular the effects of selling on possible 
improvements made is also questionable. The relative position of the sellers 
before and after individualization stands at 20 and 22 per cent of the group of 
people who invested in improving the infrastructure. For Embolioi mortgagees 
these figures were 0.0 and 2.5 per cent. In other words, non-sellers and non-
mortgagees seem, in general, to be just as development oriented. 
Table 9.15 Source of Finance for Infrastructural Improvements (abs) 
Source of finance 
Improvemenis (ex. fence) 
1. own capital 
2. loan 
3. selling of land 
Fence 
1. own capital 
2. loan 
3. selling of land 
aource: author's survey 
OIkinos 
(n=108) 
63 
8 
23 
10 
2 
10 
Embolioi 
(n=75) 
38 
0 
4 
9 
0 
1 
Ind. R. 
(n=34) 
52 
14 
12 
4 
2 
3 
Kap. 
(n=14) 
24 
7 
12 
3 
2 
3 
Loo. 
(n=9) 
6 
0 
0 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
Mat Buyers 
(IÏ=11) (n=8) 
22 13 
7 0 
0 0 
1 5 
0 0 
0 0 
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Table 9.IS shows the sources of finance used for the improvements. A similar, 
if not even more important question concerns the kind of infrastiuctural 
improvements made. Are these investments those to increase the carrying 
capacity of the ranch such as pans, boreholes or fences? Table 9.16 presents an 
overview of the number of ranchers who constructed such facilities. 
Table 9.16 Infrastructural Improvements Before and After Individualization 
No unprovemenl 
Modem house 
Pan 
Tank 
Water pump 
Borehole 
Wells 
Dip 
Spcayrace 
Fence 
( D = 1 0 8 ) 
b 
85 
16 
2 
4 
1 
0 
0 
0 
17 
7 
в 
48 
51 
10 
8 
3 
0 
0 
0 
17 
22 
Embolioi 
(i>=75) 
b 
69 
2 
0 
3 
1 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
a 
41 
31 
5 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
10 
Ind. 
rancbere 
{o= 
b 
27 
2 
0 
34) 
a 
4 
23 
21 
18 
4 
8 
0 
11 
4 
8 
Kaputiei 
(*= 
b 
14 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
14) 
a 
2 
11 
9 
10 
4 
1 
0 
6 
2 
6 
Loodo-
kilani 
(0=9) 
b 
7 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
a 
2 
5 
4 
2 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
Matapalo Buyers 
(B= 
b 
6 
1 
2 
1 
0 
2 
2 
2 
1 
0 
И) 
a 
0 
7 
8 
6 
0 
6 
0 
4 
2 
2 
(4=8) 
a 
1 
7 
0 
6 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
5 
source aumors survey 
b = before individualization, a = after indiviAialization 
figures refer to the absolute number of respondents uivolved m the construction of a particular 
kind of facility. The total number of improvements will be slightly higher as some people erected, 
for instance, two modem houses. 
For the majority the building of a modem house seems to have been the most 
favoured endeavour. Fences -for shambas mainly- sprayraces and pans 
followed though some way behind. Boreholes were not erected, the costs 
involved being probably too high.9 In contrast, the established individual 
ranchers were in a much better position in respect to the supply of water and 
dips alike. 
The group of buyers mostly invest in fences and tanks. Their small plots 
allow them to do so more easily. Watertanks are used for human consumption 
and the roofcatchments of their newly erected modem houses are used to fill 
these tanks. 
In other words, as far as the Olkinos and Embolioi Maasai are concerned, it 
can be concluded that the apparently positive effect of group ranch subdivision 
in respect of the amount of infrastructural improvements should be diluted to 
9
 Dnlling a borehole costs some Ksh 220,000/- Additional funds are needed for a ρυπφ 
(Ksh. 96,000) and diesel Moreover the risk of failure exists Fencing a 40 ha plot with barbed 
wire and poles will cost some Ksh 150,000/- If all neighbours participate this sum of money 
could at best be halved For erecting a modem house one needs some Ksh 100,000/-
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some degree as most investments in infrastructure are in consumer facilities 
such as modem houses and less in dips or boreholes. 
Among the group of Olkinos ranchers who made improvements before 
subdivision, mortgagees of land and wealthy (stratum Ш) livestock owners 
were over-represented (see table 9.17). Some 66.7 per cent of the mortgagees 
had made some improvement before subdivision. More specifically all of them 
had dug a pan, whereas among the group of non-mortgagees, no-one had. For 
Embolioi these relationships could not be confirmed. 
Table 9.17 Statistically Significant Correlations Between Improvements 
Made and Household Characteristics, Olkinos (per cent) 
Olkinos before Olkinos before 
subdivision subdivision 
mort- non- str sir sir 
gage mortgage I II III 
Alliropr 66 7 9 9 16 7 10 3 310 
Fencing S00 3 9 -
Pan 1000 0 0 
Olkinos after Olkinos after Olkinos after 
subdivision subdivision subdivision 
school no land non- pastoral non-
school seller seller pastoral 
611 37 0 (SOO 38 2 
37 0 118 326 12 3 
7 7 0 0 - 97 0 0 
bouree auinor s survey 
Noie: "All improvements" includes, houses, boreholes, pumps, dips, sprayraces, wells, tanks, pans, 
dams but excludes fences. 
When considering the effected improvements after subdivision we can see that 
Olkinos sellers of land were over-represented among those who made an 
improvement on their ranch. This group was also mostly involved in fencing. 
This is also the case for those who built a house (37.2 per cent of the sellers as 
compared to 23.4 per cent of the non-sellers). This latter relationship was, 
however, not significant. Olkinos ranchers who constructed a pan after 
subdivision can mainly be found among the educated and those Maasai having 
their main occupation outside pastoralism. Before subdivision this was mainly 
done by those ranch members who, after subdivision, mortgaged their land (i.e. 
mainly committee members). For tank constructors no special group was 
found. 
For Embolioi the group of non-educated Maasai was most significant 
among those who invested in some kind of improvement after subdivision. 
This relationship was also found to be significant for the erection of a fence 
after subdivision. Before subdivision the group of "non-pastoralists" was 
mostly involved in this latter aspect. 
The relations sketched above can also be specifically viewed from the angle of 
those who fenced, sold or mortgaged land. It has often been propagated that 
the fencing of rangelands would start a shift towards the capitalization of 
livestock production and include a process of intensification resulting in higher 
productivity. 
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So far, Olkinos and Embolioi members have not fenced their ranches. 
Enclosures have been erected only for ol-okeri and shamba. Olkinos ranchers 
who fenced after subdivision are mainly among the group of educated Maasai 
and land sellers. For Embolioi this latter relationship was not found to be 
statistically significant Instead, ranchers who were occupied outside the 
livestock sector were mostly among the group of fencers. This relationship was 
also valid for the group of educated Embolioi heads of households. The single 
correlation found between Olkinos after-subdivision-fencers and infrastructural 
improvements made was in the construction of pans (10 per cent of the fencers 
did so, whereas none of the non-fencers did). Two out of six before-
subdivision-fencers constructed a tank whereas none of the non-fencers. For 
Embolioi none of these relations were found. 
With respect to sellers and mortgagees of land and infrastructural 
improvements made it was found that the Olkinos mortgagees were over-
represented in before-subdivision construction of pans and fences. After 
subdivision the group of Olkinos sellers were mainly seen among those who 
constructed some kind of improvement and fencing. 
We now come to a review of the spending of money for other than 
infrastructural improvements. In chapter 8 we already mentioned ranchers 
using the proceeds from the selling of land to buy livestock instead of 
destocking their ranch (see section 8.4.3). In the words of an Olkinos rancher 
who remarked that he had been lucky to have procured some land at the time 
of the group ranch's subdivision, 'I feel I should sell part of my land to buy 
animals, cultivate a piece of land and finally get married'. He had already 
found some willing buyers but the selling process was still proceeding. 
Another Olkinos landowner involved in the cattle trekking business on the 
route from Emali to Ngong livestock markets said he wanted to sell all of the 
plot and leave the area. The same intention was aired by an Olkinos medicine 
man and his brother both roaming in Maasailand. Two other brothers of these 
men had sold land and ended up drinking beer in Isinya pubs. Another Olkinos 
respondent admitted that he had sold land to use the money for drinking. 
This practice of selling land and misusing the proceeds is often criticized. 
Foe example, one Maasai observer stated 'we are selling land but instead of 
developing the remaining portion, we rush to buy Peugeots which are parked at 
bars, awaiting to take home the owner after "gulping" the proceeds from land 
transactions. The vehicle may drive you home or equally to death' (see Kajiado 
Focus 1991a: 10). 
This statement does not stand alone and has also been aired by key 
informants within the Maasai society, officers within the Ministry of Livestock 
Development and by the national newspapers (see e.g. DN 15/01/87 and 
Standard 31/08/87). In some cases the Land Control Board has told applicants 
for land transfer to disappear and apply anew the moment they were sober. 
Another Olkinos Maasai, coming to grasp the finite character of the amount of 
406 Selling Wealth to Buy Poverty 
land that could be sold, offered the same portion of his land to various people. 
He was ordered by the Purka Land Control Board to stop this practice. To 
avoid getting involved, Maasai sometimes illegally "sell" their land without 
going through the Land Control Board procedures (see DN 23/01/87). Once the 
buyer realises his position he needs a lot of time and effort to recover his 
frequently squandered money. Nonetheless, sometimes he will succeed or even 
end up as the legal landowner as a compensation for the money lost! Some 
key-informants stated that potential buyers sometimes followed this strategy on 
purpose. 
We tried to check the complaint about "buying cars" by analyzing the 
number of cars in possession and the time of their purchase. Table 9.18 shows 
the percentage of respondents for each of the survey locations, including the 
total number bought -some owned more than one car. 
Table 9.18 Ownership of Cars and Time of Purchase 
Olkinos 
Embolioi 
Kihnko 
Elang'aa Wtus 
Lomgosua 
Meto 
Individual ranchers 
-Kaputiei 
- Lorxlokilani 
-Maupato 
Buyers 
Persons (%) 
111 
8.0 
53 
4 0 
10 
10 
643 
55 6 
63 6 
444 
source aumor s survey 
Cars 
19 
6 
2 
3 
1 
1 
9 
10 
7 
4 
Purchased wiibln 
last 2 years 
9 
5 
1 
0 
0 
0 
3 
2 
1 
0 
Purchased more 
than 2 years ago 
10 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
5 
5 
6 
4 
Noce mfonnauon Гот time of purchase is lacking Гот some of the Kaputiei and Loodokilani cars. 
The favourable position held by the established individual ranchers is clearly 
shown. Whereas Olkinos members did possess a reasonable number of cars 
before the first sale of land, Embolioi car ownership is of more recent date. 
However, by correlating the land sellers with the recent car owners, no valid 
relationship could be found. Most car owners belong to the "rich" wealth 
stratum. 
Land held under private ownership was seen as a prerequisite, or at least a 
major incentive for raising consciousness concerning responsible use of 
resources. Improved range management by destocking the ranch, the 
introduction of rotational grazing, the burning of the pastures, the planting of 
trees and the growing and provision of extra feed was expected to be 
increasingly implemented. Table 9 19 shows that the percentage of ranchers 
who applied these improvements before and after the start of subdivision (i.e. 
1987) is very modest Burning pastures to get rid of ticks and eradicate shrubs 
Chapter 9: Partition, Transfer and Mortgage of Latid 407 
and poor grasses which will then be replaced by young fresh herbage was 
feared for the possibility of things getting out of control or for a failure of the 
rains. 
Sena (1990:67) has argued for the planting of belts of trees and the growing 
of napier grass as supplementary feeding. Potter (1989:14-18) questions this 
latter option as he does commercial reseeding and hay-making. Instead in situ 
ranch conservation and the planting of sorghum should provide additional 
sources of fodder. Commercial feeds are too expensive and will result in 
unprofitable holdings, especially for beef cattle. Only strategic supplementary 
feeding to female cattle of 1-2 kg per day during the post-calving period could 
ensure reconception as soon as possible. Improved breeds could also be 
supported in this way. These have a rather poor tolerance of the conditions in 
Kajiado District so, to raise the likelihood of their survival, they could be 
given a high quality diet (see Potter 1989:18). Mention has been made of the 
option of mixing in chicken dung as a means of extra feeding (see van Klinken 
Conf. file paper. A more detailed account of processes of intensification and 
diversification of the Maasai livestock economy is provided in chapter 10. 
Table 9.19 Ranch Improvements Initiated Before and After Subdivision 
Olkrnos 
Emboboi 
Kiboko 
Elang'ata Wuas 
Lomgosua 
Meto 
Individual ranchers 
-Kapuuei 
-Loodoblam 
-Matapalo 
Buyeis 
Rolauonal 
grazing (%) 
6 5 
4.2 
0 0 
253 
7 4 
0 0 
4 2 4 
231 
7 7 8 
364 
0 0 
Before 
1987(%) 
250 
5 0 0 
na 
813 
250 
na. 
727 
1000 
667 
500 
na. 
Since 
1987 (%) 
75 0 
500 
na. 
189 
75 0 
na. 
27 3 
0 0 
333 
5 0 0 
na. 
Burning 
(%) 
21 
14 
0 0 
4 0 
4 0 
10 
3 0 
0 0 
0 0 
9.1 
14 3 
Extra feed 
(%) 
11 
0.0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
2 9 
7 1 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
Feed 
since 
1988 
1984 
1984 
Tree 
planting 
0 9 
0 0 
η f a. 
nfa. 
η fa. 
nfa. 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
source author's survey 
Note- Maasai pastoralists provide leaves of specific trees (e g olparrama, ololrien, oliunigomi) to 
their livestock (calves mainly) during the dry seasoa Acacia pods are mainly provided to goats 
These practices were excluded from (he extra feed category Extra feeding provided by the 
OIkinos rancher was cabbage The Kapuüei individual rancher feeded napier grass Burning of 
grass was mainly done to eradicate ticks After the introduction of acaracides burning of pastures 
decreased notably (see White & Meadows 1981.25). 
In the following section a review of experiences of changing land tenure 
legislation among other African pastoral groups is presented. The effects of 
these adjustments will serve as a base of reference for the Maasai situation 
outlined above. 
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9S Review of Experiences of Individualization of African 
Pasture Land 
Analyzing the evolutionaiy process of the individualization of landownership 
among the Maasai raises questions about the causes, details and final results of 
similar developments of this kind of land tenure transformation among other 
groups such as African pastoralists in particular. 
In chapter 1 we mentioned that a growing number of African countries are 
switching to a land policy characterized by Western concepts of adjudication 
and registration of individual title deeds. According to Riddell (1988:39), since 
the early 1980s economic planning in developing countries has wholly 
abandoned social property concepts and embraced a planning pattern which 
emphasizes a form of private property rights. In spite of doubts and harsh 
criticisms expressed about the appropriateness of implementing this concept in 
the rangelands by researchers, Non-Governmental Organizations and 
representatives of Western Governments alike (e.g. Lawrence Mission), several 
pastoralist groups have been confronted with the privatization of land 
ownership. 
One of the first experiences with the effects of changing land tenure among 
nomadic pastoralists in Africa has been reported by Dufour for the Bedouin 
pastoral society living in Tunisia. In 1935 a decree was published which 
contained provisions about the exploitation and fair distribution of collective 
lands. However, the result was that the plots of equal size allotted to each 
member of the group were quickly snapped up by the most enterprising and 
richest members. The result was a concentration of landownership in the hands 
of a small aristocratic group (see Dufour 1971:44-5). 
At the time of Independence, similar attempts were made but failed as well; 
'the plots allocated were too small; and the beneficiaries, having neither credit 
nor the technical advice required for rational working of their newly acquired 
land, either neglected it or hastened to sell their rights in it' (Dufour 1971:45). 
This experiment was abandoned in 1960. A new reform of agriculture was 
promulgated in 1969. The legislative arsenal of the Government again lacked 
any power to stop the concentration of holdings. A continually widening gap 
between "big" and "small" farmers is characteristic of the land tenure situation 
in Tunisia. 
Ezeomah described the situation for the pastoral Fulbe (Fulani) of Nigeria. The 
need to provide food for a growing population resulted in the extension of 
cultivation at the cost of traditional grazing areas and enhanced the importance 
of individual landownership. The importance of communal rights decreased 
resulting in increased conflicts between fanners and pastoralists. Ezemoah 
pleaded for the establishment of grazing reserves providing facilities such as 
water, access roads, improved grass and other feeds (see Ezeomah 1987:43). A 
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similar call was made by the Fulbe themselves, as early as 1970. Their newly 
created National Livestock Association expressed, among other things, its 
concern with regard to their land and herding problems, the security of cattle 
routes and the lack of representation at state level. 
According to Milazi (1988:51), Botswana's changing rangeland tenure system 
is partly the result of an increased population and partly a response to 
government programmes aimed at increasing employment and income in rural 
areas. Two specific development initiatives were the World Bank Livestock 
Development Programme of 1972 followed in 1975 by the Tribal Grazing 
Land Programme (TGLP). The former was mainly oriented at fenced ranching 
and infrastnictural development at the expense of social support while giving 
little attention to sociological factors (see Milazi 1988:52). The latter 
programme declared the subdivision of tribal land into three zones of land 
tenure; communal, commercial and state i.e. reserved land. The major aims of 
this programme were to halt the degradation of pastures that had increasingly 
become concentrated in the hands of a few wealthy people. Both trends had to 
be stopped. 
Bennet et al. hold that the TGLP drew heavily upon the "Tragedy of the 
Commons" paradigm as formulated by Hardin in 1968 (see section 9.6.1), and 
that, in the end, most of the programme's resources went to large, commercial 
holders in exclusive tenure areas. Above all, most large holders do not seem to 
have adopted the improved production and land use practices envisaged by the 
TGLP (see Bennet et al. 1986:viii). Furthermore, some ranch owners brought 
their cattle to the communal areas under drought conditions (see Hinderink & 
Sterkenburg 1987:193). To make matters worse increasing commercialization 
encouraged by an EEC subsidy had replaced tribal and extended family 
obligations and communal management with individualistic and competitive 
behaviour to the detriment of the ranch (see Blaikie & Brookfield 1987:195). 
Another well-known project geared at the radical transformation of pastoralists 
into "modem" ranchers was started among the Ankole of southwestern Uganda 
in the mid-1960s by the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) and the Government of Uganda. The project was intended to create 
125 cattle ranches of several thousand acres each, to be placed in the hands of 
'competent ranchers who will be able to undertake large-scale beef production 
on an economically viable basis' (Doornbos & Lofchie 1971:166). By 1968 
only forty ranches had been completed. 
One of the major causes for this failure of implementation was the 
controversy between the several parties involved, especially between the 
USAID and the Government of Uganda. The issue of ranch tenure forced all 
other planning considerations into the background. The primary point at issue 
was whether to allow absentee owners to acquire a ranch and this resulted in 
intense debates and political struggles. USAID feared that the allocation of 
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ranches would lead to politically influential individuals acquiring ranches at the 
cost of the onginal inhabitants. Doornbos and Lofchie recalled the process of 
negotiations between US AID and the Uganda Government. They demonstrated 
a major failure of communication both between and within the sections of the 
two parties. The role of diplomatic considerations was also highlighted. 
Pressure from the American embassy resulted in a situation by which USAID 
could not take a strong position against the ranch tenure question. As a result 
top officials and influential businessmen had been able to allocate to 
themselves most of the 40 ranches that had been constructed (see Doornbos & 
Lofchie 1971:186). 
Gunn (1990:156-161) for northern Somalia shows us a rather similar picture of 
the implementation of livestock development projects including the 
introduction of new land tenure legislation. By 1975 all land was secured in 
the name of the state making it illegal to own land privately. Only small 
parcels (30 ha) could be leased for 10 year periods. However, grazing land, as 
opposed to agricultural land, was excluded from this, leaving pastoralists 
without legal claims. Classifying marginal land as agricultural land enabled the 
creation of private rangeland "exclosures" in the intermediate zone between 
pastures and cultivated plots. For example, by 1982 there were 14,500 of these 
ranches, so densely packed around the perimeter of the grazing land that no 
corridors were left for transient herds to get to the town's permanent wells (see 
Gunn 1990:161). 
The owners of these ranches were small livestock co-operatives introduced 
by the government as a new form of collective ownership in the pastoral areas. 
Although initially designed for poor pastoralists the members now included the 
more wealthy. In fact, these co-operatives mainly acted as a family-owned 
private company situated in the better-watered areas of the range and receiving 
outside aid for infrastructural developments. Moreover, while holding these 
special rights to dry season pastures and receiving assistance, many co-
operative members had the majority of their livestock graze on the free 
ranching areas. 
Let us resume considering the situation in respect of changing landownership 
and mounting pressures laid upon the pastures by other activities for some of 
the afore mentioned Kenyan pastoral groups (see chapter 3). 
Oba (1987), reporting on the Obbu Borana living in the north-east corner of 
Marsabit District bordering on Ethiopia, concluded that, by the late 1980s, 
farming was being practised at individually selected relatively high potential 
plots within communal rangelands. Bushland and forest clearings had resulted 
in the enclosure of some 200 km2 of formerly communal land in the Obbu 
Borana area. Although no legal ownership was connected to this it could serve 
as a basis for the near future. Some wealthy stock-owners grabbed as much as 
possible at the cost of the less well off. "This has happened on Marsabit 
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mountain, where big traders-cum-farmers and politicians have acquired 
disproportionately large faims relative to those of poor families' (Oba 
1987:41). 
Sandford (1983a:93) states that the Borana pastoralists supported the 
introduction of grazing blocks only to the extent that they provide a device for 
keeping Somali pastoralists out of the area. 
For Tana District, Kelly (1987:82) informs us of the Orma worries in respect 
of controversial plans of the Kenyan Government to appropriate a large portion 
of dry season grazing lands to be turned into an irrigated rice-growing scheme 
(Bura). Private and company ranches predominantly owned by non-Orma 
wealthy fanners, urban businessmen, merchants and parastatals, and National 
Parks reduced the pastures available to a fast growing number of Orma 
pastoralists.10 Nowadays, the competition for pasture is reported to be very 
intense at times. Furthermore, diversification into farming by the Orma along 
the banks of the Tana River has raised tensions between the original Pokomo 
fanners and the encroaching Orma. 
9.6 Land Tenure and Livestock Development: A Review of 
Theoretical Considerations 
The issue of land tenure in livestock herding systems in relation to overgrazing 
of pastures is a frequently debated and highly controversial topic among 
researchers from a large number of fields such as economics, anthropology, 
ecology and geography and amongst decision-makers, development workers 
and, last but not least, livestock keepers themselves. A second topic of debate 
is the role of land tenure versus the commercialization of livestock production 
systems. 
9.6.1 Land Tenure and Land Degradation 
It has recently been estimated that IS per cent of the earth's land area has been 
degraded by human activities to varying degree (see UNEP 1992:42). The main 
causes of such degradation are overgrazing (34.S per cent), deforestation (29.S 
per cent), agricultural activities (28.1 per cent), over-exploitation (7 per cent) 
and bio-industrial activities (e.g. excessive manuring 1.2 per cent). We would 
like to remind that the total area of grazing land in the world comprises of 
some 24 per cent whereas land under cultivation is 11 per cent, forests and 
woodlands comprise 31 per cent and 34 per cent is classified as "other land". 
Between 1969 and 1979 their population doubled, mainly as the result of immigralion of 
Wardey people. 
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In other words the relative importance of overgrazing for land degradation is 
less than the figures presented above would suggest 
About 3.5-4.0 million ha of rainfed croplands are currently lost every year 
in the world's drylands (0.8 per cent of the total dryland rainfed area). In 
addition, 1.0-1.3 million irrigated ha are wasted (0.8 per cent of the world's 
total irrigated area in the drylands) (see UNEP 1992:43). 
Percentages of rangelands within drylands most affected by desertification 
are highest in North America (80 per cent). South America (75 per cent) and 
Asia (74 per cent). Africa (73 per cent) ranks fourth." By the late 1970s 
estimates stated that roughly 75 per cent of the publicly held rangeland and 60 
per cent of the privately held ranges in the United States were in fair to poor 
condition as a result of overgrazing (see Gilles & Jamtgaard 1982:1). 
The link between overgrazing and land tenure was popularized by Garret 
Hardin's classic article about the "Tragedy of the Commons" written in 
1968.12 Hardin argued that any commonly held and collectively owned 
resource that is exploited by individuals will be overused. He used common 
ownership of rangelands as an example to demonstrate his point of view. 
Common pastures shared by individually owned herds will lead to a situation 
of over-exploitation as no incentive operates for individual herd-owners to 
reduce their number of animals. The benefits of reducing one's herd will be 
passed on to their neighbours, whereas the costs are a burden for the individual 
herder. In other words, although Hardin and others realise that land tenure is 
only one of the causes of ranch depletion, it is postulated that only under 
individual tenure is it possible to control the number of animals on a ranch as 
then the costs and the benefits would apply to one and the same individual. 
Unfortunately, this simple and apparently straightforward idea has resulted 
in some kind of doctrine which perceives full individual ownership of land as 
the only viable option for sound livestock development (e.g. the prevention of 
overstocking and the increased marketing of livestock) in every region of the 
world. However, as Sandford (1983a: 16) rightly stresses, it is seldom 
remembered 'that the alleged greater efficiency of private over communal-
landownership was initially based on evidence in fertile northern Europe not in 
arid tropical rangelands, and that in Europe also the social consequences were 
often dire'. In Africa's drylands conditions preclude the development of 
More widespread than désertification is the gradual deterioration of agricultural sods in 
dryland areas expansion of cropping, with ever-shorter fallow penods, into areas with marginal 
rainfall exposes the soil to wind erosion (see World Bank 1992 SS) 
As Blaikie and Brookfield point out a "common" is a resource or facility which is 
distinguished by three charactenstics, it is subject to individual use, not to individual possession; 
usen have independent rights of use and only as a group can usen exclude others who are not 
membets of thai collective (see Blaikie & Brookfield 1987 186) 
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individually owned ranches unless huge areas are allocated.13 
Furthermore, it is often forgotten that traditional controls over the use of 
resources exists among the livestock communities (e.g. the Maasai ll-oshon). In 
a number of cases these traditional forms of tenure have deliberately been 
destroyed and this has made environmental degradation possible.14 
Vittianen (1982:60) has shown that for the Kababish pastoralists of 
Northern Kordofan in Sudan the spread of agriculture to areas with little or 
uncertain rainfall was the main cause of desertification. The ploughing of dry 
season pastures even in times of drought resulted in desertification mainly by 
way of wind erosion. In addition, the loss of these pastures has led to 
overgrazing of the remaining wet season pastures. 
As stated above the rangelands in full private ownership in the United States of 
America or leases such as in Australia also suffer from degradation.15 
Examples presented in section 9.5 seem to underline the view held by some 
writers that environmental degradation is similar if not worse on private 
commercial ranches than it is under the traditional communal system. 
Individual ranchers are able to exploit communally held resources whilst 
preserving their own pastures for the dry season. Those ranchers who had 
Rainfall vanes considerably from year to year in the rangelands of the Sahel and East 
Africa. In parts of Kenya areas of rain storms rarely exceed five kilometres in width and on 
average less than one kilometre The conversion of common rangeland into pnvate holdings would 
only infiede the movcmenl of animals and increase the possibility of overgrazing To prevent this 
Gilles & Jamtgaard estimated that Maasai herders must have access to 120,000-200,000 hectares 
(see Gilles & Jamtgaard 1982 3/4) 
14
 Jodha has shown how m semi-and western Rajaslhan (India) traditional controls over 
grazing lands (Jagirdari system) were removed and some 25 per cent of the pastures were 
transferred into pnvate ownership for cultivation m the early 1950s Following this decline, 
livestock farming underwent several changes The mean size of herds decreased, the proportion of 
sheep and goats increased while that of unproductive animals declined This latter development 
was mainly the result of stall feeding implying higher pnvate costs The growing importance of 
smallstock was said to have resulted from the fact that these can better deal with degraded 
pastures and provided easier access to better-watered areas elsewhere The increased marketability 
and profitability of animal products m recent years was mentioned by Jodha as being an 
explanation of the above mentioned changes (see Blaikie & Brookfield 1987 196-207) 
According to Jodha those who were able to gam from the process of the privatization of 
communally owned land are now also m a better position to exploit the remaining pastures for 
commercial purposes Processes that have led to the degradation of land have also resulted in a 
strengthened strauficauon of the population Meanwhile, on the land converted (rom pastoral to 
arable use under pnvatization, all the consequences of using ecologically marginal land without 
regard for its vulnerability were seen 
15
 Behnlce (1983 9) describes how m Australia and in North Amenca people started to use 
fences when grazing became a scarce resource m order to control land rather than cattle The idea 
was not to close themselves m but to keep others out Initially livestock production became less 
productive because the ranches became overstocked and overgrazed as the flexibility to handle the 
margmality of the area was lost 
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ranches too small to provide an adequate standard of living for their families 
are forced to overstock them in case no other source of livelihood or 
communal pastures are available. In addition, if market prices are high the 
overstocking of privately owned ranches could become very lucrative by 
investing the profits in other enterprises (see Gilles & Jamtgaard 1982:3). 
USAID, prompted by the disappointing performance of its livestock and 
range management projects decided by the mid-1980s to conduct a major 
review of its policies towards the livestock sector (see above for the Ankole 
livestock development project). Attention was primarily directed towards 
African land tenure problems. Planners often pointed out that communal land 
tenure was the major obstacle to increased animal output for urban markets and 
range conservation. Development projects thus embraced the "Tragedy of the 
Commons" paradigm as a rationale for establishing individual rights. However, 
experience has shown that tenure reform has often not been an effective 
instrument in fulfilling either growth or conservation policy objectives. The 
USAID study concluded that in most pastoral production areas of Sub-Saharan 
Africa, communal tenure makes economic and ecological sense (see Bennett et 
al. 1986:158). The group ranch system was viewed as being the most suitable 
arrangement for the better range areas, although it was recognized that in these 
areas ranches would need to compete with cultivation and game parks. 
Close attention should be paid to the developments of regulatory and 
community management institutions for communal land usage. It was realized 
that this would be a long and difficult undertaking, especially as nowadays 
planning is dominated by some form of private property rights. If these new 
property rights undermine the sound management of marginal pastures and/or 
bring an end to economies of scale in the provision of certain facilities, e.g. 
boreholes and fencing then community ownership of land seems to be more 
favourable. Whenever such economies of scale do not exist and pastures are 
plentiful or when careful management and maintenance of numerous scattered 
small facilities, e.g. open wells is required, then private ownership may be 
preferable. 
In itself private ownership is not enough to control livestock numbers at the 
low levels usually desired by range scientists. The occurrence of both types of 
land tenure within the same area could result in parasitic behaviour by 
individual ranchers at the cost of communally owned pastures. Apart from 
combating overgrazing land tenure adjustments are often proposed to stimulate 
commercialization of pastoral livestock production. 
9.6.2 Land Tenure and Commercialization 
Commercialization within pastoral systems is an even more hotly debated topic 
among scientists, development planners and administrators. As with the 
concept of land degradation a complex set of parameters shape the process and 
final outcome of the commoditization of livestock production. Several theories 
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which deal with agrarian change have looked at this process closely. Most 
theories stress that land tenurial adjustments are crucial in respect of 
transfonning a subsistence-based livestock producing system to one orientated 
to the market. Swynnerton's plan to intensify Kenya's agricultural production 
and the Kenya Livestock Development Programme that introduced group 
ranches in Kenya both recognised this aspect 
Attempts among groups of subsistence-oriented pastoralists in other 
countries have almost all failed. As Behnke (1983:3) states, no ranching 
scheme has ever engineered a complete and abrupt reorganization of a pastoral 
society. Some pastoralists, however, did commercialize their herding operations 
all at once, frequently disregarding outside help and without fenced ranching. 
This recognition has led Behnke to make a threefold division among livestock 
producing systems: subsistence pastoralism, open-range ranching and fenced 
ranching. Each of these systems is thought to have its own particular rationale 
and characteristics of production. The most striking differences are that 
subsistence pastoralism depends on natural pastures in climatically unstable 
environments forcing animals to move in search of grazing or water or to 
avoid diseases. This results in high labour demands. 
Open-range ranching refers to the "cowboy" type of ranching found in 
Medieval Spain and after the American Civil War. These operations were 
much less labour intensive. Ranchers were relatively rich in stock and market-
oriented. 
Fenced ranching is normally carried out on large stretches of land (between 
1,000-100,000 ha) which carry large permanent herds of some 1,000-10,000 
animals. Fencing was seen as a shift in the commercialization of cattle to one 
of cattle and land. But, as Behnke highlights, fences were seen as only the 
beginning and they were followed by the increased use of artificial watering 
points, fodder production, the use of irrigation, veterinary inputs and feed 
supplements. 
In other words, when shifting from open-range to enclosed ranching, 
production becomes increasingly characterized by high rates of capital 
investment, whilst labour remains low or is even economised upon. 
Behnke stresses that it should be remembered that commercial livestock 
systems can be organized differently and include ranchers who use traditional 
methods of husbandry, housing, clothing and the like. Range ranching should 
be included as a form of commercial ranching. The major problem facing 
subsistence pastoralists in Africa nowadays is that, in contrast to the western 
world of free resources and few people, they need to substitute an intensive 
system of production for an extensive system of production for exchange. 
The idea of subsistence pastoralists becoming primarily market-oriented 
would seem to be one lacking all common sense. A relative shortage of 
livestock and an apparent abundance of labour should not allow these 
pastoralists to sell their source of livelihood, even if commercial outlets and 
reasonable prices exist. 
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Marketing and productivity have often been interchanged when evaluating 
different forms of livestock production. However, several writers have shown 
that the inclusion of subsistence milk consumption, relatively cheap inputs of 
land and grazing and the like places nomadic pastoralism in an equal if not 
even a more favourable position with respect to productivity (see e.g. Dahl & 
Hjort 1976, Swift 1982, Behnke 1985). Commercialization of livestock 
production involves a redefinition of production goals, not necessarily an 
increase in the level of productivity (see Behnke 1983:25). Moreover, the 
moment off-take channels become unreliable in time of stress, pastoralists will 
still be forced to keep a larger number of animals within their herds than are 
strictly necessarily for human consumption, as a security against periods of 
drought. Thus commercialization could lead to even more "surplus" animals. 
In chapter 7 (section 7.3.1) we briefly looked at the process of 
commercialization among Maasai pastoralists. Lack of incentives (low prices, 
moderate needs) and a poor marketing structure have been mentioned amongst 
the most important reasons for the relatively moderate rate of commercialized 
livestock production in Kajiado District (see also chapter 4). In chapter 6, we 
have shown that Maasai pastoralists certainly reacted to market incentives as 
livestock was offered to illegal outlets mainly, offering higher prices. 
Research conducted by White and Meadows in the early 1980s showed that 
the basic profitability of individual ranches per livestock unit was not higher 
than that of group ranches and that higher individual ranchers' household 
income levels were attributable to higher livestock numbers, steer fattening 
operations (largely AFC financed) and to non-livestock sector activities (see 
White & Meadows 1981:vi). Moreover, it should be realized that group 
ranches and Tanzanian pastures have provided young steers for fattening on 
individual ranches. Subsequent marketing will be recorded in the accounts of 
the individual ranchers. 
Evangelou (1984:260) also found no significant differences in the levels of 
marketing between individual ranchers and group ranch producers suggesting 
that the individualization of land tenure would not stimulate commercial 
production in Maasailand. Moreover, Evangelou states that the rates of 
livestock off-take among the Kajiado Maasai are as high as possible under the 
present circumstances. In chapter 6 we demonstrated that Maasai pastoralists 
have always been interested in selling cattle and have not avoided illegal 
trading if prices offered by official markets were too low. In chapter 10 
contemporary commercial livestock actions will be considered in detail. 
9.7 Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter we presented an analysis of the outcome of group ranch 
subdivision in Kajiado District with respect to the transfers of land and the 
improvements made. Any rancher willing to partition, transfer or mortgage 
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land has to seek permission from one of the three Kajiado District Land 
Control Boards. This Board has been afforded the power to tum down an 
intended fragmentation, sale or mortgage of land. Nonetheless, in general the 
Boards approve most applications after adjustments advised have been made. 
After consent is obtained, new title deeds are issued by the Office of the Land 
Registrar in the district In the last decade the number of Kajiado District titles 
registered has risen enormously from 4,929 in 1978 to 18,918 in 1988. 
The subdivision of group ranches is one of the main reasons for this growth 
in the number of title deeds. Olkinos, Embolioi, Empuyiankat, Kitengela and 
Рока group ranches had been subdivided in February 1990. In this way, a total 
of 757 Maasai received their privately owned parcel of land. Between 
September 1986 and February 1990 some 36.7 per cent of these ranchers 
applied for authority to further subdivide their individual ranches. 
For Olkinos, the earliest subdivided group ranch, 64 members (55.2 per 
cent) had done so. From this group 54 gained actually permission to partition 
their plot into two or more parcels. Finally, 37 people (68.5 per cent of the 
group of 54) subsequently asked consent for the sale of one or more lots. In 
contrast, in addition to the 3 Olkinos ranchers who mortgaged all of their land, 
5 members who had subdivided their ranches charged part of their land. In 
other words requests for parcel partitioning seem intended to render the sale of 
part of the ranch possible rather than to using it as collateral for a loan. 
Including data from the other subdivided group ranches showed that, by 
February 1990 78 Maasai or 10.3 per cent of all former group members had 
obtained consent to transfer 1,728 ha of land in return for a sum of Ksh. 
18,525,205/-. This is 2.4 per cent of the total former group ranch territories. No 
specific set of characteristics could be perceived for the group of sellers. 
Nonetheless, the group of Olkinos former committee-members turned out to be 
foremost among the group of non-sellers. Those committee-members who did 
sell had bought their land previously and apparently for speculative reasons. 
Furthermore, a correlation was seen in the plot size per person and the selling 
of land. The more land available the more will be sold, except by the most 
well-off land holding households who are not engaged in selling at all. This of 
course reflects the fact that the group of former committee-members are very 
much aware of the value of the land they possess as well as the shortcomings 
this amount of land still poses for fenced ranching livestock production. 
Obtaining loans from financial institutions by offering land as collateral 
does not appear to have developed significantly among the Maasai new land 
owners. Only 17 applicants (2.2 per cent) of all former group members 
intended to or actually mortgaged 1,195 ha от 1.6 per cent of the former group 
territory. It was stated that the selling of land is a much faster, less obstructive 
and more comprehensible way of obtaining money than is mortgaging one's 
plot. Financial institutions (especially the AFC) also seem to be somewhat 
reluctant to provide loans, except in the case that the prospective borrower has 
been formally educated to a high level and has other more important sources of 
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income besides livestock keeping. Only Embolioi seems to part somewhat from 
this rule. The individualization of land as such seems therefore not to have 
resulted in a boom in loans obtained by the ranchers. Other factors such as the 
level of education, the main occupation, experiences or lack of it with financial 
institutions seem to be of more importance. 
The group of land buyers in Olkinos group ranch was also analyzed in order to 
obtain information concerning their area of origin, main occupation, residence, 
education, age and the like. The foremost motives and objectives for buying 
land in Kajiado District were dealt with. In addition to the 9 buyers that had 
settled in the area or resided nearby, key-informants gave information about as 
many buyers as possible and this revealed that, out of a total of 37 plots sold 
in Olkinos area, all but 6 were acquired by non-Maasai. Rich business men, 
civil servants and less wealthy people were among the Kikuyu buyers. Maasai 
buyers were mainly former Olkinos committee-members, individual ranchers, 
civil servants and politicians. Another special group of informal buyers found 
were Indians who were practising strip gypsum mining on Embolioi group 
ranch. 
Evaluating the actions taken so far by the buyers of land showed a 
preference for mortgaging land instead of reselling it. The inclusion of pending 
partition, transfer and mortgage applications shows that the frequency of selling 
от mortgaging seems to be more or less equal. This is in great contrast to the 
Maasai preference for selling rather than mortgaging land. 
Information was also gathered concerning the utilization of the proceeds of the 
sale of land and loans taken. On Olkinos the percentage of people who made 
infrastructural improvements rose from 21 to 56 per cent of all Olkinos 
ranchers. The Embolioi group ranch percentage increased from a mere 8 to 45. 
Lack of funds or the fact of not being settled were among the most frequently 
mentioned reasons for not conducting an improvement. Comparing Olkinos 
sellers versus non-sellers and mortgagees versus non-mortgagees shows that 
both groups were increasingly engaging in infrastructural improvements. 
However, die rise amongst the group of sellers is significantly higher. No clear 
picture emerged for the borrowers. Embolioi ranchers also seemed to be as 
much development oriented either selling or non-selling, mortgaging or non-
mortgaging their land. This is also reflected in the fact that only 5 Embolioi 
members said that they had used the proceeds of the sale of land and no one 
mentioned the use of a loan. Olkinos had higher figures with 33 times the sale 
of land and 10 cases of loans named as the source of the finance required for 
the construction of infrastructural improvements. 
The kind of improvement made was also considered. The building of a 
modem house seemed to have been the most popular. Fences (mainly for 
shambas mainly), sprayraces and pans followed but at some distance. 
Boreholes had not yet been drilled. The group of buyers was mostly investing 
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in fences and watertanks. 
So far, the ranches have not been fenced by the original Olkinos and 
Embolioi ranch owners. Like drilling boreholes, this is a costly innovation. 
Those Olkinos ranchers that did fence their shamba or ol-okeri were mainly 
found among the group of educated Maasai and land sellers. For Embolioi it is 
the non-pastoralists who are mostly involved in this. 
In other words, most of the infrastructural improvements made seem to have 
occurred in non-productive facilities such as the building of a modem house. 
People will need to sell another part of their parcel in rader to undertake real 
development Other accusations about consumer behaviour by the Maasai 
ranchers who sold part of their land were frequently referred to the buying of 
cars and the drinking of beer. However, no clear correlation could be found in 
this respect 
The marginalized Maasai who roam and who have no involvement in the 
former group ranch matters and the like, seem to be the most willing to sell 
part of their ranches and earn the salary of a lifetime all at once! Some 
excesses have apparently followed! 
We also looked at the less capital-intensive improvements made in range 
management Hardly any innovations had been undertaken since the time of 
subdivision. Potter (1989) has stressed the common sense nature of this attitude 
as these adjustments would not be economically viable anyway. 
This chapter was concluded by presenting a review of the experience of the 
individualization of African pasture land and some theoretical reflections on 
this issue in relation to environmental degradation and commercialization as 
well. Examples from Tunisia, Nigeria, Botswana, Uganda, Somalia and other 
Kenyan districts all report of the decreasing availability of land for nomadic 
pastoralism. All reports show features of our outline of the Maasai history of 
land use, land ownership and land policy in the last century. Increasing 
competition for the better-watered pastures by encroaching farmers, herder 
cultivators as well as absentee herd owners were found to varying degree. 
It is Government and programmes sponsored by international donors which 
have mosdy either by intention or not been responsible for the introduction of 
individually owned ranches. Dominated by the doctrine of the "Tragedy of the 
Commons" concept, overgrazing and commercialization would be dealt with 
effectively once the collective ownership of pastures was ended. In fact the 
final outcome of these projects propagating privatization and the subsequent 
commoditization of land was often that influential and wealthy people were 
able to grab large parcels of land at the expense of a large group of less 
wealthy and less powerful pastoralists. Furthermore, traditional rules for 
pasture management have increasingly been thwarted and rendered useless. 
Several writers report that they predict that land tenurial changes and 
commercialization will ultimately lead to the further stratification of society. 
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White and Meadows, referring to the economic viability of Maasai group 
ranches versus existing individual ranches, concluded in the early 1980s that 
'Group ranches should not be sub-divided into individual units but, for 
the time being, should stay under group ownership. (...) Division of 
group ranches into individual units would not replicate the apparent 
success of the individual ranches in Kajiado but would result in sub-
viable economic units, since the land:population ratio of the average 
group ranch is much below that of the average individual ranch. Also, 
since dry season grazing on group ranches is only available in a few 
areas, shared by all members, sub-division would lead to acute problems 
of access' (White Sc. Meadows 1981:vi). 
Statements such as this can nowadays also be read in Worl Bank Develompent 
Reports. Remembening the World Bank's initial position towards the Maasai 
lands (Narok District in particular) and the Banks strive for private ownership 
of land the following sounds revolutionary: 
'Pastoralists in Africa face particular problems in maintaining access to 
their traditional pastures. An example is the case of the Maasai and 
Sambuni of Kenya. At one time the Kenyan government hoped to set up 
group ranches as a way of increasing beef exports while retaining 
collective management. Recently, the government has promoted the 
privatization of these ranches, asserting that corporate land tenure 
impedes rational land management. The Bank study notes that Maasai 
elders regard private landownership as an "alien concept" and express 
fears that "subdivision may lead to a disastrous change of lifestyle of the 
Maasai people." The only source of income for the Maasai people is 
livestock. Their culture provides them with a system in which they can 
preserve the arid and semi-arid areas (...) in such a way that certain areas 
are put aside in periods of drought in order to keep grazing areas in 
good condition. Although lately it has become more difficult to do, it 
still works within and among group ranchers, especially where upgraded 
cattle breeds are introduced. However, in the fragile (semi-) arid areas it 
might even become impossible to keep livestock on an individual basis 
on small plots; it will also irrevocably lead to soil erosion, overuse of 
water resources, and desertification' (World Bank 1992:37-38) 
In this chapter we have tried to highlight the issue of access to land for Maasai 
pastoralists after subdivision. It seems to underline the experience of other 
pastoralist groups that the individualization of land mostly benefits those who 
are among the most influential and wealthy members of society. We ought to 
speak of the "Tragedy of the t/ncommons" to underline that ultimately a small 
group of well-off people are able to restrict access to land for a large crowd of 
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less well-off people, instead of all acting irresponsibly towards a collectively 
owned resource. 
Moreover, as stated and proved by several authors (e.g. Fallon (1962:28) 
and Evangelou (1984:253)) individual landownership is no guarantee for proper 
range management Also this research has shown that instead of destocking 
theoretically overstocked individual ranches the owners not seldom bought 
more livestock from the proceeds of the sale of land. In fact, also commercial 
livestock production on individual ranches could lead to a more profound 
misuse of that particular tract of land in case the owner is forced to overstock 
his ranch because of a large household demand or because of loan repayment 
obligations. Not livestock but human numbers are of importance. 
In the next chapter we will review the current Maasai abilities and strategies 
applied to cope with the decreasing land resource. 
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Figure 9.6 Poka Subdivided Group Ranch 
CHAPTER 10 
THE FUTURE OF MAASAI PASTORALISM IN KAJIADO 
DISTRICT 
10.1 Introduction 
Nomadic pastoralism requires livestock, labour and land in order to fulfil its 
major goal which is the provision of food for the stock-keeping human 
population. Cossins (1983:217) mentions three series of constraints which have 
to be overcome in the pursuit of this aim: 
1. Normal - seasonal events: episodes of diseases, parasites, availability of 
forage; 
2. Disasters - epidemic disease, drought; 
3. Long-term changes - irreversible loss of dry-season grazing, land tenure 
changes. 
Nomadic pastoralists constantly try to manipulate all three production factors to 
meet the mainly milk-oriented production goal of traditional subsistence 
pastoralism. Several strategies (long term) and tactics (short term) are 
employed in order to spread risks and to physical, economical and social 
survival. The most important livestock related, risk-avoiding strategies and 
tactics are: 
1. Communal possession of pastures and water allowing for optimal flexibility. 
This strategy is employed in order to optimize the use of the low ecological 
potential of the arid and semi-and rangelands, their minimal and unreliable 
precipitation and of disease-infected areas. 
2. Diversification of the family's herd; i.e. the keeping of cattle, camels, goats, 
sheep and donkeys, each having specific requirements for food and water 
and possessing different production capacities and abilities to adapt to the 
harsh environment. This diversification allows for the use of all the 
ecological possibilities and provides complementary output for the pastoral 
household.1 
For example, cattle and sheep are grazers and prefer grass pastures. Camels and goals are 
browsers, eating the young shoots and leaves of trees -although they sometimes also eat grass 
Camela can go for long distances, require watenng only once m two weeks, produce milk even in 
the dry season and have a high drought survival rale but also a high calf mortality. Cattle bave a 
lower rale of survival, have to be watered daily and cannot go for very long distances but they do 
produce excellent milk and meat and are used to slock capila) Goals are stronger than sheep and 
reproduce very quickly. They are mainly kept for meat and are less important for milk m the dry 
season. Donkeys are used as earners 
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3. Herd accumulation, selective breeding and the dominance of the female sex 
in the herd's composition. Besides using different species, pastoralists use a 
specific sex composition strategy favouring females in up to 60-70 per cent 
of the total herd in order to maximise the production of milk and the 
reproductive capacity of the herd. 
4. Relations with "stock associates" or "bond-friends". Animals are given to 
friends or relatives in order to spread the risks. In fact, each man is in the 
centre of a field of diverse formalized inter-personal social relations. This 
fact acts as a disaster-insurance as the "owner", in rebuilding his herd, seeks 
help from his stock-associates. Provision of labour is also an option. 
With diminishing land resources the Maasai pastoralists need to diversify or 
intensify all their economic activities. Those Maasai who have lost their land 
or who will only be able to legally claim restricted access to inherited lands, 
will have to look for new opportunities. 
Several possibilities can be mentioned as ways of withstanding the decline 
in cattle wealth and some of them relate to the above mentioned strategies. 
Among these are: 
1. diversification of production (e.g. increased importance of small stock, 
cultivation, wage labour); 
2. intensification of production (e.g. improved breeds, better veterinary care); 
3. commercialization of production (i.e. increased sales of livestock and its 
produce) together with changing food habits (i.e. increased intake of grains 
and other agricultural products instead of livestock products). 
In the last decades several authors have reported Maasai households adopting 
one or more of the above-mentioned strategies (e.g. Bemtsen 1979a, Metson 
1974, Campbell 1979b, Njoka 1979, Ingule 1980, White & Meadows 1981, 
Grandin et al. 1982, Bekure et al. 1987). For an analysis of several 
characteristics of our survey population we will compare our data with that of 
these authors. 
Metson (1974) conducted a survey among 172 Maasai spread over all of 
Kajiado District Campbell (1979b) interviewed 164 Maasai pastoralists, 90 
Maasai fanners and 135 non-Maasai farmers in the Loitokitok region. Njoka 
(1979) concentrated on 148 Kaputiei households. Ingule (1980) interested 
himself in the acceptance and means of the introduction of improved breeds 
among a group of 300 Maasai all over Kajiado District. White and Meadows 
(1981) collected information on Рока, Olkarkar, Kiboko, Elang'ata Wuas and 
Lomgosua group ranches and adjacent individual ranchers. Twelve households 
were interviewed In each group ranch. The main object of their research which 
was undertaken between August 1980 and July 1981, was to quantify the 
extent to which group and individual ranch development had changed the 
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pastoral production system and improved the living standards of the Maasai 
(see White & Meadows 1981:i). Kiboko, Olkarkar and Рока were considered 
as representing the developed group ranches in Kajiado District, while 
Lomgosua and Elang'ata Wuas exemplified the undeveloped ranches.2 Finally, 
the research conducted by the International Livestock Centre for Africa among 
282 Maasai households in Olkarkar, Merueshi and Mbirikani group ranches in 
the early 1980s revealed very detailed information about labour, livestock 
management and commercial livestock production (see Grandin 1982; Grandin 
et al. 1982, Bekure et al. 1987). 
But what is the state of diversification and intensification of the Maasai 
economy in the early 1990s? In the following section we will present a brief 
overview of our sample of 500 (former) group ranch Maasai households, 34 
established Maasai individual rancher households and 9 land buyer households 
in respect of the adaptive strategies employed. 
10.2 The Personal Characteristics of the Sample Population 
In section 8.1.1 the basic characteristics of our surveyed population were 
presented. Here we will consider to some more detailed information concerning 
their personal features such as age, level of education, additional training and 
knowledge of languages. All of these are thought to be of importance in order 
to assess the ability of the Maasai population to cope in the future. 
The level of education of the head of household per wealth class as found in 
this survey is shown in table 10.1. It shows that, except for the Olkinos buyers, 
half to almost all of the heads of the households interviewed had never been to 
school. For the group as a whole at best some 20-30 per cent had had some 
primary education. No statistically significant correlation was found with the 
wealth class in this respect. The rich, however, show in general more educated 
heads of household. 
Metson (1974:table 7) reached an overall figure of 15.7 per cent of 
educated Kajiado Maasai heads of households for 1974. Except for ЮЬоко our 
survey found a remarkable improvement as compared to 1980 figures presented 
by White and Meadows (1981:62). Their sample in ЮЬоко, Elang'ata Wuas, 
Lomgosua and of individual ranchers recorded that 8, 17, 8 and 33 per cent of 
heads of households, respectively, had obtained some kind of formal education. 
Unfortunately, White and Meadows used another method to stratify their survey population; 
a chief was asked to appoint ranchers for three distinct groups of neh, average and poor classes. 
For every group ranch 12 households were selected, four stemming from each wealth class. 
However, in comparing White and Meadows' data with those of ILCA for Olkarkar shows that in 
fact While and Meadows had stratified their population mio medium, rich and very neh groups. 
Despite this setback, we will at urnes refer to their dala whilst bearing in mind the small size and 
the bias in White and Meadows' sample. 
Table 10.1 Level of Education of Heads of Household by Wealth Stratum 
Olkinos Erabolioi Kiboko Elang'ata Wuas 
I ΠΙ Tot I ΠΙ Tot I Π UI Tot I II ΠΙ Tol 
None 73 0 621 54 8 63 0 
Pnmary 216 27 6 33 3 27 8 
Secondary 54 69 95 74 
College 00 34 2.4 19 
University 00 00 00 00 
720 750 500 653 
240 167 346 253 
00 42 115 53 
40 00 00 13 
00 42 38 27 
1000 909 944 947 
00 91 56 53 
00 00 00 00 
00 00 00 0 0 
00 00 00 00 
79 2 73 3 57 1 70 7 
208 133 286 200 
00 100 95 67 
00 33 48 2.7 
00 00 00 00 
Lomgosua Meto Individual ranchers Buyers 
I III Tot I II IH Tot I II III Tot I II HI Tot 
None 75 8 77 8 806 78 0 791 846 636 779 
Pnmary 18 2 19 4 
Secondary 3 0 00 
College 3 0 2 8 
University 00 00 
source author's survey 
Note I, II, III = wealth strata for poor, middle and ncfa households, respectively 
16 1 
32 
00 
00 
180 
20 
го 
00 
16 3 
47 
00 
00 
12 8 
00 
2.6 
00 
364 
00 
00 
00 
19 2 
19 
10 
00 
33 3 63 6 471 500 
500 273 294 324 
167 00 00 29 
00 91 23 5 14 7 
00 00 0 0 00 
14 3 na 00 111 
286 n.a. 1000 444 
42 9 aa. 00 33 3 
00 aa. 00 00 
14 2 aa. 00 111 
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Table IQJ. Heads of Household Additional Training and Knowledge of 
Kiswahili and English (%) 
Training 1 
Training 2 
Speak Kiswahili 
Read/write Kiswahili 
Speak English 
Read/write English 
OlklDOS 
(D-108) 
bouree, auinor s survey 
Note: m = Massai, nm : 
93 
0 9 
843 
407 
343 
324 
= non-1 
Embo-
llol 
<n-75) 
17 3 
27 
85J 
347 
307 
307 
Kiboko 
(n=38) 
0 0 
00 
76 3 
184 
10.5 
79 
Elang'ata 
Wuas 
(n-=75) 
200 
13 
«00 
42 7 
240 
22 7 
Loto-
gosua (D«100) 
100 
4 0 
37 0 
230 
17 0 
17 0 
Meto 
(o=104) 
125 
10 
35 6 
18 3 
115 
115 
Ind 
ranchen-(n»34) 
233 
88 
882 
500 
471 
47 1 
Buyers 
пКЗ) ппЧб) 
667 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
1000 1000 
1000 834 
1000 83 4 
1000 83 4 
We also collected information concerning additional training followed by the 
heads of household (see table 10.2). Overall 15.3 per cent of the sampled heads 
of household had attained some kind of additional training. This is in line with 
the 16.3 per cent figure found by Metson (1974:table 8). 
The kind of training most frequently mentioned for our group was 
veterinary training (83 per cent) and range management (19 per cent). Other 
main categories of additional training named were blue collar jobs (16.9 per 
cent), militaiy/police/security (13.3 per cent), social/health (10.8 per cent), 
priest/catechist (9.6 per cent), commercial (7.2 per cent), formal adult 
education (6.0 per cent), other (13.3 per cent). The favourable position in terms 
of levels of education is also shown in the higher percentage ability to 
read/write Kiswahili and English among the northern Kaputiei heads of 
households, established individual ranchers and the group of buyers. 
Besides considering the head of the household, information was gathered about 
other household members. For the younger generation (from 5-18 years of age) 
in particular a significantly better school enrolment rate was found (see table 
10.3). Differences between locations were nonetheless rather high. For 
instance, the Kaputiei group ranches had much lower percentages of non-
educated than the southern Matapato and Loodokilani ranches. 
White and Meadows (1981) found 57 per cent of their 5-18 years of age 
cohort attending school (Kiboko 67 per cent; Elang'ata Wuas 40 per cent; 
Lomgosua 41 per cent; individual ranchers 82 per cent). Surprisingly, for 
Lomgosua and individual ranchers these figures are above those found by our 
survey 10 years later. This probably stresses the bias in the White and 
Meadows' sample as it is mainly among the wealthy households that the 
percentage of educated household members is highest. 
The sex composition of school-attending children found by White and 
Meadows for Kiboko stood at 70 per cent for boys and 67 for girls; Elang'ata 
Wuas boys 56 per cent and girls 45 per cent; Lomgosua boys 59 per cent and 
girls 15 per cent Metson 1974 (table 10) found overall figures for the 
percentage of school-attending children of 16.9 for boys and 8.7 for girls. 
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Table 10.3 Level of Education Household Members (above 5 years of age) 
Olkinos Embolloi Klboko Bang'ata Wuat 
Tot M F Tot M F Tot M F Tot M F 
5-18 
None 162 180 143 279 216 35 9 320 31S 327 312 440 602 
Pnm. 773 755 793 697 749 630 590 565 622 47 1 545 380 
Seco 63 65 64 24 3.5 И 90 120 51 17 IS 18 
> 18 
None 570 187 703 568 4 4 819 775 308 934 776 586 868 
Prim. 263 437 200 294 689 106 146 385 66 131 213 90 
Seco 167 376 97 138 267 75 79 307 0 0 93 201 4 2 
Lomgosua Meto Individual Buyers 
Massai oon-Maasal 
Tot M F Tot M F Tot M F Tot M F Tot M F 
None 778 682 890 759 658 876 320 315 327 100 0 0 200 i l l 0 0 200 
Pnm. 219 313 HO 239 338 124 590 565 622 800 1000 600 445 500 400 
Seco 0 3 OS 0 0 0 2 0 4 00 90 120 5 1 100 0 0 200 444 500 400 
> IS 
None 921 84 1 943 872 657 970 557 38 1 69 1 111 0 0 143 167 0 0 273 
Pnm. 70 I H 57 95 246 26 202 309 216 44.5 1000 285 444 429 454 
Seco 0 6 3 2 0 0 30 87 04 221 298 163 444 0 0 572 389 57 1 273 
Coli 03 16 0 0 0 3 10 0 0 15 0 0 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Umv 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 05 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 0 0 
souice authors survey 
In addition to the level of education we were interested in the place of 
residence of the household members. In some families the head of the 
household resides away from the household's home whilst sometimes other 
household members were also stated to be living elsewhere for most of the 
year. Employment is the main reason for this temporary absence. In table 10.4 
information concerning this aspect of income earning strategy is given. 
It was among the group of buyers that this forni of "absentee ownership" 
was most significant. Also, one out of four Olkinos ranchers did not stay in the 
household residence for most of the year. A difference between these two 
groups is that buyers mostly reside outside Kajiado District in an urban area, 
while the Olkinos ranchers usually stayed nearby in another Olkinos or 
Embolioi boma. 
Nairobi was mentioned by some two thirds of the head of households as 
their urban place of residence outside Kajiado District Also mentioned were 
Athi River, Eldoret, Nakuru and Mombasa. For other household members 
Nairobi was only important for the group of buyers, the Olkinos and individual 
ranchers' households. A wide variety of other places was found (e.g Mombasa, 
Athi River, Isiolo, Kisumu). The reason for residing elsewhere is mostly linked 
to the performance of off-ranch employment In the following section attention 
will be paid to this diversification strategy of the Maasai household economy. 
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Table 10.4 Main Place of Residence (%) 
431 
Heads of 
households 
Boma 
In district (rural) 
In district (urban) 
Out district (rural) 
Out district (urban) 
Other (unspecified) 
Other household 
members (n) 
Boma 
In district (rural) 
In district (urban) 
Out district (rural) 
Out district (urban) 
Other (unspecified) 
Olklnos 
(n=108) 
75 0 
12 1 
37 
18 
4 6 
28 
529 
82 4 
90 
60 
0 4 
23 
0 0 
Source author's survey 
Embo-
(n=75) 
920 
00 
27 
00 
27 
27 
399 
93 2 
63 
03 
00 
03 
0 0 
Klboko 
(n=38) 
92 2 
52 
26 
0 0 
00 
00 
303 
85 5 
13 5 
06 
0 0 
03 
00 
Hang'ata 
Wuas 
(n=75) 
907 
00 
80 
0 0 
00 
13 
70S 
95 2 
17 
18 
00 
04 
00 
Lom-
gosua (n-100) 
910 
10 
30 
0 0 
30 
20 
830 
941 
18 
4 0 
0 0 
00 
0 0 
Meto 
(n=104) 
980 
0 0 
10 
10 
0 0 
0 0 
7.002 
994 
04 
01 
0 0 
01 
0 0 
Ind. 
(n»34) 
882 
00 
58 
0 0 
58 
00 
456 
86 8 
26 
77 
00 
29 
00 
Buyere 
ni(3) 
666 
00 
00 
0 0 
33 4 
0 0 
19 
842 
15 8 
00 
0 0 
00 
00 
nm(6) 
666 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
33 4 
00 
28 
53 6 
0 0 
0 0 
14 3 
32 1 
00 
Note m = Maasai, nm = non-Maasai. 
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Filmactor, personnel officer, computer specialist, university lecturer, NGO-
officer, travel agent, pilot; who would have thought half a century ago or even 
less that all of these jobs could be filled by Maasai in 1990? Though still 
exceptional the Maasai do occupy these jobs nowadays. 
For each household interviewed we recorded the current and former main 
occupation(s) of the heads of household Table 10.5 gives the main occupation 
in broad categories held by the heads of households at the time of survey. 
Table 10.5 Main Occupation of Head of Household 
Livestock keeping 
Wage labour 
- public 
-private 
Private business 
Culuvalion 
No occupation 
OUcmos 
704 
222 
139 
8 3 
4 6 
19 
0 9 
Embo-
l.oi 
77 3 
213 
8 0 
13 3 
13 
0 0 
0 0 
Kiboko 
78 9 
10.5 
7 9 
26 
10.5 
0 0 
0 0 
Elang'ata 
Wuas 
74 7 
17 3 
120 
5.3 
8 0 
0 0 
0 0 
Lom-
gosua 
87 0 
8 0 
6 0 
2 0 
5.0 
0 0 
0 0 
Meto 
93 3 
2 9 
0 0 
2 9 
2 9 
1 0 
0 0 
Ind Buyers 
ranchers
 m „_ m nm 
794 333 00 
118 667 500 
00 00 00 
118 667 500 
88 00 00 
00 00 500 
00 00 00 
source, aurnors survey 
Note, ms Maasai, nm=non-Maasai. 
Table 10.5 tells us that stock-keeping is no longer considered to be the main 
occupation of some 20-30 per cent of the heads of households interviewed. In 
the North Kaputiei ranches in particular, people have turned to other types of 
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employment (mainly wage labour). In the south (Lomgosua and Meto) stock-
keeping is still the most important activity. This is more in line with the 
situation found by Metson of 97.7 per cent of the heads of households stating 
that stock-keeping was their main occupation (see Metson 1974:table 11). The 
most important off-ranch main occupations in the mid-1970s were teaching (1 
per cent) and shopkeeping (0.5 per cent). 
By the early 1990s some head of households were engaged in public 
employment such as that of policeman, soldier, teacher, civil servant, 
accountant and magistrate. Private employment included jobs as watchman, lab 
technician, tour guide, cook, waiter, mechanic, industrial labourer, carpenter, 
bus conductor and corpse washer in the mortuary. Private businessmen 
included stock traders/meat suppliers, hide and skin traders, butchers, shop 
owners, blacksmiths and taxi drivers. 
A number of respondents said they had more than one occupation. Some were 
even said to be involved up to in 4 different jobs. For instance, someone could 
be employed as a policeman while running a shop, owning a taxi business and 
helping in cultivating the shamba. Table 10.6 summarises the percentage of 
heads of households involved in several activities. It shows that, in general, 
half of the heads of households are engaged in a second income-earning 
activity mostly cultivation or the keeping of livestock. Private businesses were 
also often mentioned. 
Table 10.6 Number of Other Activities of Heads of Households 
Olkinos 
Second occupation 
S lock-keeping 
Wage labour 
- public 
-pnvale 
Private business 
Culuvauon 
Third occupation 
Stock-keeping 
Wage labour 
-public 
-pnvale 
Private business 
Cultivation 
Fourth occupation 
Stock-keeping 
Wage labour 
-public 
-pnvate 
Private business 
Culuvauon 
source autnors survey 
Note, m s Maasai, nm = 
454 
204 
46 
37 
09 
65 
13 9 
HI 
37 
00 
00 
00 
37 
37 
37 
09 
00 
00 
0 0 
28 
00 
Embo-
hol 
000 
200 
13 
13 
00 
67 
320 
70 7 
13 
00 
00 
00 
27 
67 
13 
00 
00 
00 
0 0 
13 
00 
: non-Maasai 
Kiboko 
526 
15 8 
26 
00 
26 
132 
211 
79 
26 
26 
00 
26 
00 
26 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
Elang'a 
ta Wuas 
440 
267 
54 
27 
27 
107 
13 
12 0 
00 
27 
13 
1.3 
00 
93 
13 
00 
00 
0.0 
00 
00 
13 
Lom­
gosua 
600 
120 
20 
00 
20 
240 
220 
10 0 
00 
0 0 
0 0 
00 
20 
80 
00 
00 
00 
00 
0 0 
00 
00 
Meto 
913 
67 
29 
10 
19 
212 
606 
2а а 
00 
10 
10 
00 
5.8 
221 
10 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
10 
Imi. 
ranch " 
706 
176 
88 
29 
59 
14 7 
500 
235 
29 
00 
0 0 
00 
118 
88 
29 
00 
00 
00 
0 0 
29 
00 
Buyei 
m 
667 
33 3 
00 
0.0 
0.0 
00 
33 3 
33 3 
00 
0.0 
0 0 
00 
333 
00 
00 
0 0 
0 0 
00 
0 0 
0 0 
00 
[S 
nm 
500 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
500 
767 
00 
00 
00 
00 
16 7 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
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Metson (1974:table 12) recorded a total of S9.9 per cent of livestock owners 
having an extra occupation, livestock trading (47.1 per cent) in particular. An 
increase does not seem to have occurred in the number of Maasai heads of 
households engaged in other occupations alongside stock-keeping. Lack of 
detailed data from Metson's survey hinders any definitive statement on quality, 
timespan and number of third or more jobs. 
The activities performed by other household members were also noted. An 
overview of the main activity of all other household members is shown in table 
10.7. It reveals that, besides the involvement of household members in 
livestock herding and house-keeping some S per cent of them helped the head 
of household to earn money either by running a private business or by way of 
wage employment. These percentages are higher among the group of buyers, 
Maasai and non-Maasai alike. 
Table 10.7 Main Activity of Other Household Members3 
House-keeping 
Livestock herding 
Culbvalion 
Wage labour 
- public 
-private 
Private Business 
At school 
No occupation 
Ollunos 
222 
66 
04 
26 
20 
06 
16 
45 5 
214 
Embo-
hoi 
248 
12 8 
00 
42 
33 
09 
11 
441 
133 
Kiboko 
272 
19 3 
00 
03 
00 
03 
00 
35 7 
17 0 
Elang'aia 
Wuas 
209 
269 
00 
21 
09 
12 
19 
252 
227 
Locn-
gosua 
гоз 
346 
01 
03 
01 
02 
16 
101 
22 5 
Meto 
28 8 
306 
00 
06 
03 
03 
06 
131 
261 
Ind 
ranch 
196 
18 8 
09 
34 
30 
04 
17 
39.5 
156 
Buyers 
m 
136 
00 
68 
160 
114 
46 
113 
45.5 
68 
run 
179 
00 
107 
21.5 
14 3 
72 
14 3 
28 6 
71 
source au итог's survey 
Note m = Maasai, nm = non-Maasai 
A certain stigma exists concerning young Maasai who flood the streets of 
Nairobi looking for jobs as watchmen (askari) for shops, factories and houses 
in the better-off residential areas of the city. The Standard (21/12/80 and 
12/04/84) reported that, since 1975, the number of Maasai watchmen hired by 
employers in Nairobi had increased tremendously. This will also be the result 
of the good reputation of Maasai watchmen. Letters in newspapers have 
praised the Maasai for their trustworthiness, hard-work and bravery (see DN 
30/12/77). The Standard estimated that in 1980 some 600 Maasai were 
roaming Nairobi doing all sorts of jobs, mostly guarding shops, 24 hour night 
clubs and cars. Most of these watchmen were said to be from Kajiado District, 
particularly from the Ngong area and from Samburu (see DN 24/08/82). The 
With respect to the mam activity mentioned it should be realised that more tasks than these 
are performed School-going children, for instance, will help m household duties, milking and 
cultivation. 
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over-representation of the Ngong Maasai is explained by its proximity to 
Nairobi, good transport facilities and the increasing shortage of land in the 
area. The older generation of Maasai labourers in Nairobi came to the city after 
the drought of 197S. By the early 1980s the number of young semi-educated 
Maasai was thought to be rising among the group of Nairobi watchmen. 
The data presented in table 10.4 and 10.7 and our analysis of emigration 
from the district before, however, show no evidence of a massive flight of the 
Maasai to Nairobi for employment as askari by the late 1990s It should also 
be realised that this kind of employment is of a temporary nature. After having 
saved enough money most Maasai want to return to their area of origin (see 
DN 28/04/85). In a survey among 77 young male Maasai of Esokota group 
ranch (i.e. 18-30 years of age) five were found to be residing in Nairobi: two 
soldiers, two parastatal employees (one security officer), and one watchman. In 
total eight more watchmen were counted in nearby Kajiado and Ngong towns 
(see Kantai 1989:12-15). 
One of the most important opportunities for diversification is cultivation. In 
section 8.6.2 attention was paid to the increasing amount of land set aside for 
cultivation. After a period of drought many Maasai decide to try cultivatmg a 
shamba. Metson (1974:table 39) still found only 9.3 per cent of her sample 
households practising cultivation By 1990 our figures give a percentage of 
42.3 per cent cultivating households (see section 8.6.2). 
Table 10.8 reveals that it is the lower wealth stratum households which are 
particularly engaged in cultivation. For all locations the poor showed the 
highest percentage of farming households. However, not the middle but the 
higher wealth class takes up second position in this respect Thus the often 
aired statement that cultivation is solely for the poor seems outdated. 
Nowadays even the most wealthy also seem to be interested in farming. 
Table 10.8 Cultivating Households by Wealth Strata 
Stratum I 
Stratum Π 
Stratum ΠΙ 
source aulne 
Olkinos 
45 9 
27 6 
35 7 
и" s survey 
Embolioi 
4S0 
33 0 
42 3 
Kiboko 
333 
182 
313 
Elang'ata 
Wuas 
261 
33 
95 
Umigosua 
364 
306 
226 
Meto 
88 4 
821 
864 
lud 
ranchen 
667 
45 5 
412 
Buyers 
714 
00 
1000 
The fanners' main reason for practising cultivation was for subsistence reasons, 
though some respondents used the produce for exchange or sale to raise a little 
money. Non-Maasai wives have played a role in increasing acceptance of 
cultivation which is said to have been alien to the Maasai because of the low 
and unpredictable rainfall and due to cultural barriers (crop production being 
seen as an inferior venture) (see eg. Sinket 1990*93 and van Klinken & ole 
Seitah 1990:99). Irrigated agriculture in particular is becoming a favoured 
occupation among Maasai pastoralists (see Masharen 1989.9). 
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We also questioned those not engaged in cultivation as to why they were 
not In table 10.9 the reasons for not cultivating a shamba are presented. 
Table 10.9 Reasons For Not Cultivating (%) 
Oik En* Kib Ews Lor Met lal Buy Toul 
50.0 
50.0 
Lack of (reliable) rainfall 
Lack of (money for) labour 
No interesl/no need 
Not/just settled 
Lack of good land 
Crop damage by animals 
No seeds/equipment 
No fanning knowledge 
No land in possession 
source: autnor's survey 
27.5 
45.0 
2.5 
25.0 
18.8 
68.8 
6.2 
6.2 
14.3 
42.9 
7.1 
14.3 
7.1 
14.3 
60.0 
5.5 
12.7 
1.8 
7.3 
9.1 
1.8 
18.2 
40.9 
27.3 
2.3 
4.5 
4.5 
2.3 
42.9 
14.3 
28.5 
14.3 
n.a. 
α a. 
n.a. 
n.a, 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
25.9 
25.4 
13.2 
11.6 
7.7 
6.0 
5.0 
3.3 
2.2 
Lack of adequate and reliable rainfall and inadequate availability of labour are 
the main reasons mentioned by the households for not practising cultivation. 
The problematic position of large parts of Elang'ata Wuas group ranch is 
reflected in that 60.0 per cent of these households mentioned the lack of 
reliable rainfall as being the major obstacle. The suitability of the soil was 
hardly mentioned. This is in line with the remarks made by Mortimer in 1932 
concerning the failure of cultivation in the Sultan Hamud-Konza area being 
foremost drought and infestations of caterpillars and locusts (see KLC 
1934:1250). Likewise Metson (1974:table 31) found that only 15.7 per cent of 
the respondents mentioned poor soils as an obstacle to farming. 
The percentage of cultivating households that hire non-Maasai labour is highest 
among individual ranchers (64.3 per cent) and Meto Maasai (56.2 per cent), 
followed by Embolioi (48.1 per cent), Olkinos (43.6 per cent), Lomgosua (42.3 
per cent) and Kiboko (10.0 per cent). None of the Elang'ata Wuas respondents 
mentioned the hiring of labour. 
Table 10.10 suggests that both sexes are involved in all aspects of 
cultivation. Men seem to be slightly over-represented in ploughing, while 
planting, weeding and harvesting are mostly done by women. Rather 
surprisingly, daughters are less involved in cultivation than we had expected. 
Other members (dependents or casual labourers) are mainly involved in 
ploughing. 
In the past, cultivation has often been propagated by the Colonial 
Authorities as an alternative to stock-keeping. However, diversification into 
cultivation enables a growth in livestock numbers directly as well as indirectly. 
The proceeds of commercial agriculture are often reinvested in the livestock 
sector (see Masharen 1989:9). Likewise, subsistence production leaves, 
potentially, more milk for the calves. This provides an extra stimulant for their 
growth and reduces the risks of calf-mortality. 
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Table 10.10 Involvement of Household Members in Cultivation (%) 
Area 
OUunos 
Embolien 
Kiboko 
Elang'ata Wuas 
Lotngosua 
Meto 
Olíanos Buyers 
Individual ranchers 
Household 
member 
Heads 
Wives 
Sons 
Daughters 
Others 
Heads 
Wives 
Sons 
Daughters 
Others 
Heads 
Wives 
Sons 
Daughters 
Others 
Heads 
Wives 
Sons 
Daughters 
Others 
Heads 
Wives 
Sons 
Daughters 
Others 
Heads 
Wives 
Sons 
Daughters 
Others 
Heads 
Wives 
Sons 
Daughters 
Others 
Heads 
Wives 
Sons 
Daughters 
Others 
Ploughing 
436 
55 0 
524 
227 
931 
444 
36 7 
65 4 
23 8 
100 0 
22 2 
77 8 
62 5 
33 3 
100 0 
33 3 
77 8 
28 6 
00 
na 
80 8 
400 
313 
77 
1000 
697 
256 
29 3 
35 
981 
42 9 
429 
33 3 
333 
na 
71 
313 
33 3 
429 
909 
Planting 
462 
900 
571 
56.5 
789 
33 3 
38 7 
731 
361 
92 3 
22 2 
1000 
"62.5 
500 
1000 
33 3 
778 
14 3 
125 
na 
61.5 
600 
313 
77 
200 
79 8 
68 6 
621 
22 8 
52 0 
42 9 
85 7 
667 
50 0 
100 0 
14 3 
62 5 
667 
643 
600 
Weeding 
462 
85 0 
571 
52 2 
63 2 
37 0 
35 5 
69 2 
381 
846 
444 
1000 
75 0 
667 
1000 
22 2 
88 9 
00 
00 
na. 
500 
68 0 
313 
154 
100 
78 7 
68 8 
621 
263 
38 8 
429 
714 
667 
667 
1000 
14 3 
56 3 
667 
643 
700 
Harvesting 
53 8 
95 0 
667 
52 2 
85 0 
55 6 
516 
731 
476 
923 
111 
1000 
750 
500 
1000 
22 2 
1000 
14 3 
12.5 
na. 
560 
708 
33 3 
16 7 
444 
809 
76 7 
621 
28 1 
306 
57 1 
85 7 
833 
833 
1000 
14 3 
62.5 
667 
643 
600 
source autnors survey 
We believe that account should be taken of the fact that the diversifícation of 
the household economy not always lead to an analogous level of growth in 
income For example, productivity in the livestock sector is likely to fall if less 
tune can be spent on this enterprise As early as the 1930s, Count Domhoff, 
reporting to the Kenya (Carter) Land Commission, pointed out the difficulty of 
rearing cattle in agncultural-potential areas which are often fly-infested. In that 
case the boma is located too far away and control over the cultivated plot is 
lost allowing wildlife and livestock to destroy crops (see KLC 1934:1208). 
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Research assistants in Embolioi reported a relative lack of interest in the 
livestock enterprise when households were engaged in the mining industry. 
Likewise absentee individual ranchers, having their main occupation mostly 
outside the livestock sector, mentioned a similar negative aspect to their 
homebound livestock enterprise performance. Overall, however, diversification 
enables the spread of risks and creates opportunities for "straddling" so that 
earnings, knowledge and experience obtained in occupations outside livestock-
keeping can be used to one's own benefit (see Poyck 1985:35). 
Several authors have stressed the need for the diversification of the Maasai 
economy, particularly in coping with the negative consequences of group ranch 
subdivision. Nevertheless, as Potter (1989:30) remarks 'Agriculture is incapable 
of doing it alone'. Sources of income outside agriculture should be sought to 
help the Maasai to fulfil the needs of a growing population. 
Apart from cultivation, three specific opportunities for diversification were 
mentioned by the 1989 ASAL conference: the exploitation of minerals, tourism 
and livestock based industries (see van Klinken & ole Seitah 1990:100). 
Instead of having others reap the benefits of the district's fortunes (e.g. the 
mining companies or the tourist industry) it was said that the Maasai 
themselves should take advantage of these assets. At least they should be 
compensated fairly for the labour provided in the mining business and the 
negative effects of tolerating wildlife on their pastures. 
Campbell (1986:51) perceives a largely untapped potential for the 
development of livestock-related small-scale industries. For example, 
slaughtering and leather-working activities could generate off-farm 
employment In this way a new opportunity could be provided for the Maasai 
population without disrupting their socio-economic system. Holland (1989:21) 
stresses that some of these industries (tanning, slaughter, leather-craft) exist at 
the fringes (e.g. Athi River, Ong'ata Rongai) of Kajiado District but that they 
are mostly run by the Kikuyu, partially because of the Maasai's traditional 
negative attitude to these activities. Still, he pictures a change in the outlook 
for Maasai engagement in slaughtering, butchering and leather-crafts. It is 
mostly women who play an important role in the development of the latter 
activity. Today as well as products being exported to the Nairobi tourist stores 
handicraft shops can also be found in Kajiado District. 
Campbell (1981b:58) points out that some of the following conditions 
would have to be met: suitable scale of operations; improved quality of 
livestock, hides and skins and appropriate financing arrangements. We would 
like to underline the present difficult position of the leather-processing industry 
world-wide. After the Second World-War until the early 1980s conditions for 
this industry flourished. Since then overproduction in Australia and the increase 
of shoats-keeping in Europe as a result of the EG-milk quota, resulted in a 
collapse of the market. Prices dropped' and factories closed. In Australia 20 
million sheep were killed in an attempt to restore a balance between supply 
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and demand (see Volkskrant 22/07/92). 
Diversification within the livestock sector of the Maasai household economy, 
i.e. changing the herd's composition, is another option. We already mentioned 
the growing importance of small stock as opposed to cattle (see section 8.1.1). 
Furthermore, the importance of poultry, rabbits and apiculture (bee-keeping) is 
rising. Pigs are found in the Ngong area. It is mostly non-Maasai households 
that are involved in these enterprises (see table 8.3). 
A revolutionary development has been the recent introduction of camels to 
Kajiado District4 The Ministry of Livestock Development in co-operation with 
the AS AL programme managed to transport 110 camels from Wajir District to 
willing buyers of the Kajiado Maasai.9 A subsidy from the ASAL programme 
allowed the price of a camel to be set at Ksh. 1,000/- only. The idea was that 
camels as browsing animals provide an opportunity to Maasai pastoralists to 
make better use of the taller shrubs and bushes available in Kajiado District 
Moreover, watering is only required three times a month, resulting in a 
high(er) rate of survival during times of severe drought Also, milk production 
during these times continues longer than with cattle. Drawbacks to camel 
keeping are their proneness to diseases (e.g. Trypanosomiasis), high calf 
mortality, expensiveness and problematic handling. A successful introduction 
will depend on the Maasai getting used to the milk and the animals ability to 
survive in the semi-arid ranges of Kajiado District This is particularly true for 
newborn camels. 
Finally, as Sinket (1990:96) nghtly stresses, certain inftastructural 
improvements (communications, water supply, education) must be undertaken 
to make the process of diversification possible. Bekure et al. (1987:448-9) also 
call for an integrated rural development effort although they place most 
emphasis on the intensification and commercialization of the livestock 
economy. Community development centres run by local Maasai development 
workers trained in practical skills and geared to livestock extension (including 
veterinary services, maintenance of water facilities, provision of inputs and 
Camels are the dominant species kept by Saharan pastoralists They also use the camel to 
nde on. In contrast East African pastoralists are called herders-on-fooL Pastoral groups like the 
Ttnkana, Raxhlle, Gabbia and Somali, living in the and zones of northern Kenya, keep camels 
but noi for human transpon Pastoralists, especially those living in the seim-and areas, often 
hardly have any camels but concentrate on caule and small stock 
On October 2nd 1989 the camels were handed over to the 58 Loodolulam and Matapalo 
Maasai owners at Bissel Holdmg Ground Among the buyers were established mdlvidual rancherg 
as well as group ranch members and one women's group It was agreed to form five camel 
herding groups herded by a herdsman Reacuons so far have been posiuve (eg camel meat is 
highly appicaaied) But some Maasai herding boys in Lomgosua group ranch killed a camel thai 
had gone astray They had never seen one before and feared that this guaffe-like creature would 
attack their cattle 
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breeding stock, livestock marketing) adult education, infrastractural 
development and maintenance should be started at local level. In addition to 
national and international commitments poll taxes should be introduced to 
finance these projects. In the following sections we look at the intensification 
of the Maasai economy. 
10.4 The Intensification of the Maasai Economy 
To raise output from livestock labour, resources and capital can be adjusted to 
increase productivity. We tried to gain information for a number of these 
parameters in respect of the intensification of Maasai livestock production. The 
issue of increasing primary production (i.e. raising herbage production by 
applying a proper stocking rate and other range management practices such as 
water improvements) has been dealt with in chapters 7 and 8. Here our interest 
will primarily focus on the means applied to improve secondary productivity 
(i.e. to directly raise the output per animal: use of veterinary medicines, 
vaccinating, dipping or spraying of animals, introducing improved breeds, 
frequency of milking and the like). The consequences of these measures are 
mostly the intensification of labour and capital. 
Cultivating practices can also be intensified, for example, by irrigating 
which gives shorter intervals between farming seasons (i.e. the intensification 
of land use) or by intensifying inputs of labour or capital (e.g. fertilizers, 
pesticides, improved seeds). 
10.4.1 The Intensification of Livestock Production 
According to Poyck (1985:22) the Maasai society of the past was characterized 
by a minimal labour intensity of as little as 1 to 2 hours a day as livestock 
herding was mostly performed by the older children. It is understood that 
Poyck only refers to men in respect of labour input as in the past the labour 
intensity for women would have been higher considering their nomadic 
existence (i.e. packing up and rebuilding their huts) and relatively large herds 
(i.e. milking many animals). 
In the early 1930s Count Domhoff told the Kenya Land Commission that 
'all the cows which are fresh in milk are generally milked but then many of 
the cows which would still give some milk are left over. I know that a cow 
will give on an average not more than half a gallon [2.3 1]. I should think the 
average is below that, I should say about three pints [1.7 1]. (...) there is a great 
deal more milk than is used' (KLC 1934:1205/6). It is not known whether or 
not Domhoff was acquainted with the Maasai practice of milking only two 
teats leaving the others for the calves. 
As reported by de Leeuw and Wilson (1987:381) assessing milk yields in 
traditional herds presents considerable difficulties, one major problem being the 
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partitioning of total milk output into that taken by calves and that for human 
consumption. The ILCA survey among Maasai households has also made clear 
that milking strategies of poor households (less than 30 cattle) differed from 
that of wealthy ones (over 2S0 head). Rich herd owners took only 20 per cent 
of the potentially available milk, whereas poor households extracted near the 
maximum. In rich households only one third of the cows with calves were 
milked, mainly once a day rather than twice daily as was practised by poor 
households (see de Leeuw & Wilson 1987:381). 
Potter (1989:14) mentions a maximal daily yield of 3 litres per Maasai cow, 
of which, after allowing the calf to suckle, only one litre would be available 
for human consumption. Thus a 100 ha farm could support about 20 cows of 
which some 15 would be lactating continuously. In other words, a maximum of 
15 litres per day is expected for the household, causing Potter to see relying on 
subsistence production from natural grazing to be foolhardy. 
We asked respondents to estimate the daily milk production of their herd of 
cattle available for human consumption, the number of times livestock was 
milked, and the practice of milking small stock (see table 10.11). 
Table 10.11 Milking Practices Among Maasai Pastoralists 
Milk output 
Maasai hbolds 
CATTLE 
av nr lactating 
av qr milked 
% milked 
av ltrs/hh/day 
lln/cow/day 
SHOATS 
bh milking in 
wet season 
av ltn/hb/day 
dry season 
av llrs/hh/day 
Oik Emb 
(ii=93) (n=70) 
7 9 
5 8 
73% 
9 6 1 
171 
9 2% 
6 0 1 
224% 
5 4 1 
10 5 
7 2 
69% 
6 5 1 
0 9 1 
2 8% 
12.01 
9 9 % 
3 7 1 
Kib 
(n-36) 
19 5 
141 
72% 
8 7 1 
0 6 1 
16.2% 
161 
162% 
131 
Ews 
(ii=70) 
17 8 
169 
95% 
2021 
121 
563% 
4 1 1 
324% 
181 
Lor 
(ii=95) 
15 5 
13 1 
85% 
20 7 1 
161 
69 5% 
3 5 1 
43 2% 
2 5 1 
Met 
(n=104) 
140 
12 2 
87% 
22 61 
191 
82 5% 
2 5 1 
14 6% 
101 
Кар 
(n=14) 
319 
17 6 
55% 
19 61 
1 11 
0 0 % 
na. 
7 1% 
6 0 1 
Loo 
(n=7) 
609 
48 4 
79% 
5301 
1 11 
33 3% 
1171 
111% 
3 0 1 
Mai 
(ii=ll) 
377 
25 5 
68% 
5011 
2 0 1 
45 5% 
301 
18.2% 
151 
Buy 
(n=3) 
293 
190 
65% 
1071 
0 6 1 
0 0 % 
na. 
0 0 % 
na. 
source autnors survey 
The data presented in table 10.11 should be interpreted with great care. As 
stated above by de Leeuw and Wilson several factors are involved in 
determining the actual availability of milk for human consumption. For 
instance, the seemingly smaller quantity of milk available for human 
consumption among the Kaputiei households is congruent with a lower need as 
their households are also smaller. The degree of diversification is also expected 
to influence the need for milking for human consumption. The ability to 
purchase food lowers the demand for milk and meat from the herd. In contrast, 
poor people are forced to milk more animals for larger quantities at the 
expense of the calves. The high daily production of 1 9 litres for Meto cows as 
compared, for instance, with the 06 litres for Kiboko could be due to the 
relatively less wealthy households living in Meto group ranch as compared to 
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the better-off Kiboko Maasai. The litres produced per cow presented here do 
not necessarily reflect the milking quality of the cows. 
Nevertheless, our data seem to confirm the afore mentioned practice of rich 
ranchers milking less animals than are potentially available (i.e. 55 to 79 per 
cent) while other ranchers milk some 70 to 95 per cent of all the lactating 
cows. Households milking small stock are mainly found among the Matapalo 
and Loodokilani Maasai. The impact of the dry season period on milk output 
can be seen in that the availability of milk per household is significantly higher 
during the wet periods. Again no hard conclusions can be drawn as to output 
per animal. 
Another factor influencing the household's production of milk is the number of 
improved breeds available. Under favourable conditions these animals are able 
to produce more milk than indigenous breeds. For instance, White & Meadows 
(1981:iii) reported that 'the Sahiwal crosses in the zone Г areas recorded 
higher milk yields than the Small East African Zebus throughout the study 
period, even at the end of a long dry period from August to mid November 
1980, when it was thought that conditions might have been too harsh for them, 
with adverse effects on milk production.' 
As highlighted in chapter 6 the Maasai pastoralists have always shown an 
interest in keeping improved breeds. Colonial regulations, however, frustrated 
the importation of В oran cattle from northern Kenya. Since Independence a 
significant number of bulls of other breeds have been introduced into Kajiado 
District in an attempt to improve the quality of the Maasai herds and to 
increase the production of milk and beef. The most important introduction has 
been the Sahiwal (Bos indicus) which is a comparatively recent arrival to 
Kenya from Pakistan (see White & Meadows 1981:23). Other exotic animal 
types, though much less in number, include Boran, Friesian, Ayrshire, 
Simmental, Jersey and Charoláis. These animals have been bought either as 
pure breeds or as a cross-breeds with the local Zebu.6 
The original Maasai sheep were the Red Maasai sheep (also named Fat-
Tailed Brown Maasai). Since the early 1970s crossbreeding is reported as 
being on the increase. For this purpose use is made of Dorper and Blackheaded 
Somali sheep in particular. Other imported sheep species are the Merino and 
Suk. According to White and Meadows (1981:24) the upgrading of goats is 
The Small East African Zebu is the major breed of East Africa. It is smaller than the Boran 
or Sahiwal. Several types of the Small East African Zebu exist that vary somewhat in size and 
colour. The Maasai type shows many signs of other breeds, pamcularly Nandi Zebu, Boran and 
Ankole longhom found in Central African countries. In general, Maasai Zebu are taller than other 
Small East African Zebu. The typical colour is black. Though the milk yield is low the caule tend 
to be long-lived (breeding lives of IS cattle in 20 years). They can go for long distances and can 
stand being without water for two to three days (see Pratt & Gwynne 1978:147). They have a high 
tolerance of local diseases and a long breeding life. Pouer (1989 22) quesuons the hardiness of 
European breeds and wams against the unconsidered condemnation of the Zebu. 
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less common. The Small East African goat still dominates the Maasai 
household's flocks. In fact, before the 1960/61 drought there were hardly any 
goats in some parts of Kajiado District goats. This has changed nowadays and 
the Galla goat has become popular for upgrading purposes. Other exotic goats 
are the Boer goat and Tockenburg goat (particularly in Ngong). 
Ingule studied the time of acquisition and important factors involved in 
adopting improved breeds among a group of 300 Kajiado Maasai (see Ingule 
1980:60). It turned out that over the 1940-1980 period almost three quarter of 
the respondents had acquired their improved breeds in the 1961-1970 period. 
According to Ingule the role played by the Maasai Rural Training Centre-
Isinya has been of importance. Members of MRTC visited cattle dips to inforni 
the Maasai herders concerning exotic breeds. The 1960 disaster was mentioned 
as a significant moment for speeding up the adoption of improved breeds.7 
By 1980 four out of nine Kiboko households owned some S ahi wal crosses. 
comprising IS per cent, 25 per cent, 40 per cent and SO per cent of their herds, 
respectively. On Elanga'ta Wuas five of the nine households (56 per cent) had 
improved breeds in their herds, but on Lomgosua all cattle owned had local 
Zebu. Among individual ranchers a total of 52 per cent had upgraded animals 
(see White & Meadows 1981:24). For the late 1980s Sinket (1990:95) noted a 
trend in Kajiado District in animal production towards dual purpose breeds, 
Sahiwal in particular. 
We tried to gain some insight into the percentage of improved breeds within 
the Maasai herds of today. In chapter 4 we cited a Ministry of Livestock 
Development estimate that by the end of the 1980s 60 per cent of the district 
herd would still be local Zebu. The exact importance of improved breeds is 
hard to determine and was outside the scope of this survey. We restricted 
ourselves to determining the number of pastoralists having improved breeds at 
all. In addition information was gathered on the types of improved breed. 
Table 10.12 provides an overview of these aspects. It shows that Elang'ata 
Wuas group ranch members in particular seem to be significantly more 
interested in improved breeds than other Maasai. This is not in line with 
ILCA's statement that the introduction of improved breeds is mainly restricted 
to group ranches that receive higher rainfall (see Bekure et al. 1987:420). 
However, though improved breeds have higher watering and feeding 
requirements the impact of livestock diseases seems to be crucial in 
understanding the adaptation of improved breeds. It is said that ECF is present 
mainly in the higher rainfall receiving zones of the district (see White & 
Meadows 1981:31). 
We would like to point out the impact the ending of the status of closed district had on the 
banning of livestock imports and the importance of outside assistance after 1960. 
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Table 10.12 Percentage of Pastoralists Having Improved Breeds and 
Percentage Distribution over Types of Improved Breeds Held 
Improved breeds Oik Emb Kib Ews Lor Met Кар Loo Mat Buy 
% having Improved 16 42 65 79 33 47 71 89 91 67 
CATTLB 
Sablwal 
Boran 
Fnesian 
Ayrshire 
Other 
% having Improved 
small suck 
GOATS 
Galla 
Boer 
Other 
SHEEP 
Dorper* 
Menno 
Other 
Source author's survey 
* crossbreed of Dorset Hom and Persian Blackhead sheep 
Table 10.13 Percentage of Ranchers with Diseased Livestock Among Their 
Herds and Flocks 
56 
18 
26 
0 
0 
24 
91 
9 
0 
96 
4 
0 
81 
13 
3 
0 
3 
36 
100 
0 
0 
93 
0 
0 
90 
10 
0 
0 
0 
73 
90 
10 
0 
69 
31 
0 
62 
17 
13 
2 
5 
88 
97 
3 
0 
86 
9 
5 
38 
30 
15 
12 
5 
46 
91 
2 
7 
100 
0 
0 
40 
45 
7 
0 
8 
76 
96 
0 
4 
97 
0 
3 
50 
22 
22 
6 
0 
71 
100 
0 
0 
80 
20 
0 
39 
22 
11 
6 
23 
89 
67 
22 
11 
87 
13 
0 
46 
27 
8 
0 
20 
WO 
92 
8 
0 
100 
0 
0 
67 
0 
33 
0 
0 
67 
100 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
CatUe 
Olkinos 
Embolioi 
Klboko 
Elang'ata Wuas 
Lomgosua 
Meto 
-KapuUel IR 
-Loodoldlam IR 
-Matapalo IR 
Sheep and Goats 
Olkinos 
Embolioi 
Klboko 
Elang'ata Wuas 
Lomgosua 
Meto 
-KapuUel IR 
-LoodokilaiU IR 
-Matapalo IR 
East 
Coast 
Fever 
97 9 
83 8 
80 6 
45 1 
88 9 
98 1 
92 3 
571 
909 
East 
Coast 
Fever· 
35 1 
29 4 
5 6 
14 
4 1 
25 0 
57 1 
0 0 
18 2 
Foot& 
Mouth 
716 
25 7 
25 0 
52 1 
77 8 
442 
53 8 
714 
545 
Foot* 
Mouth 
247 
15 
27 8 
155 
21 
2 9 
214 
12 5 
0 0 
Malignant 
Catanh 
7 4 
28 4 
2 8 
0 0 
0 0 
10 
308 
0 0 
0 0 
CCPP 
32 0 
176 
58 3 
43 7 
52 6 
18 3 
35 7 
75 0 
364 
Trypano 
somiasls 
0 0 
0 0 
667 
0 0 
0 0 
10 
77 
0 0 
0 0 
Orbuss 
12 4 
16 2 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
12 5 
0 0 
Other« 
116 
23 0 
36 1 
23 9 
414 
36 5 
30 8 
42 9 
909 
Manges 
113 
26 5 
2Я 
14 
4 1 
0 0 
71 
0 0 
0 0 
Disease 
free 
1 1 
81 
5 6 
169 
91 
0 0 
7 7 
0 0 
0 0 
Diarrhea 
0 0 
25 0 
2 8 
21 1 
46 6 
59 6 
14 3 
12 5 
364 
Ovine 
entor 
10 
4 4 
56 
15 5 
38 1 
154 
0 0 
37 5 
364 
Other 
15 5 
14 7 
22 2 
2 8 
7 2 
115 
286 
0 0 
18 2 
Disease 
free 
39 2 
38 2 
22 2 
32 2 
17 5 
154 
214 
12 5 
18 2 
source author's survey 
* sheep only, 
# mainly anthrax in Olkinos, Elang'ata Wuas and Lomgosua and contagious abortion among 
animals of Meto and Matapalo individual ranchen 
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According to the Ministry of Livestock the five major livestock diseases found 
in Kajiado District are East Coast Fever, Trypanosomiasis, Foot & Mouth, 
CBPP and rinderpest (see KDDP 1988:106-7). The latter had been almost 
eradicated while CBPP occurred in mostly periodic outbreaks. ECF and 
Trypanosomiasis cannot be controlled by vaccination and are, in general, 
responsible for livestock deaths. Only preventative treatment, by way of 
dipping is possible. Table 10.13 provides an overview of the percentage of 
Maasai herders that mentioned that their animals had been affected by some 
land of disease in 1989. The prevalence of ECF and F&M for cattle and ECF, 
Contagious Caprine Pleura Pneumonia (CCPP) and diarrhea for shoats is 
clearly shown. 
Apparently the major reason for the relatively better performance of 
improved breeds in the Loodokilani area compared to other parts of Kajiado 
District seems to be related to the remarkably lower frequency of ECF. This 
peculiarity of the Loodokilani area has been recognized by several author's 
(see e.g. van Klinken & ole Seitab 1990:97 and White & Meadows 1981:27). 
Several respondents also stated that they had transferred part of their herd to 
the Loodokilani area because of the relatively less frequent occurrence of 
livestock diseases. One key informant, a Maasai individual rancher from 
Olkiloriti, stated he had transferred 40 young steers acquired via an AFC loan, 
to a relative in Elang'ata Wuas to avoid ECF which was prevalent in his home 
area. Likewise, at the time of the 1988 Livestock Census ranchers from North-
Kaputiei often mentioned the Loodokilani area as the destination for cattle they 
had temporarily transferred from the household's home area. 
For small stock the percentage of ranchers stating to have disease-affected 
animals was much lower than among cattle owners. This could be the rationale 
for the slightly larger number of ranchers who had improved sheep or goats as 
compared to improved cattle (see table 10.12). The much higher body weight 
of Dorper sheep, in particular, is popular among Maasai pastoralists. Likewise 
the Galla goat is said to produce more milk than the local Maasai breed. 
Nevertheless, at the Conference on the Future of Maasai pastoralists it was 
reported that the Galla goat is more susceptible to pneumonia (see van Klinken 
& ole Seitab 1990:97). 
Other types of upgraded shoats are also more vulnerable to diseases than 
the indigenous species. Among our group of respondents one Olkinos rancher 
mentioned that he had bought a Boer goat in 1985 which died within 12 
weeks. Another had only recently bought a Merino sheep that had died soon 
after. For this reason some Conference participants favoured a strategy of 
selective breeding with the local Maasai goat in order to raise milk output 
while preserving the qualities of hardiness and resistance to diseases. 
Table 10.14 shows the main reasons given by some of the Maasai 
pastoralists for having no improved breeds. High acquisition costs were most 
often mentioned. The risks and the lack of availability were also among the 
Chapter 10: The Future of Maasai Pastoralism in Kajiado District 445 
main reasons given for having no improved breeds. Lack of interest in these 
was hardly ever expressed. As a result of the variety in topographic location, 
local environmental conditions and wealth standards the importance of each of 
the factors mentioned above varies. 
Table 10.14 Reasons Given by Maasai Pastoralists for Having No Improved 
Breeds 
% having no 
improved breeds 
CATTLE 
Not available 
Too expensive 
Too mich risk 
Unfamiliar 
No interest 
% having no 
unproved breeds 
SHOATS 
Not available 
Too expensive 
Too mucbnsk 
Unfamiliar 
No interest 
Oik 
84 
14 
44 
35 
5 
2 
76 
19 
35 
38 
5 
3 
Emb 
58 
7 
71 
14 
0 
7 
64 
6 
41 
41 
0 
12 
Kib 
35 
9 
45 
36 
9 
0 
27 
0 
71 
29 
0 
0 
Ews 
21 
17 
75 
8 
0 
0 
12 
11 
78 
0 
0 
11 
Lor 
67 
22 
68 
8 
2 
0 
54 
33 
60 
4 
2 
0 
Met 
53 
23 
56 
17 
2 
2 
24 
58 
33 
9 
0 
0 
Кар 
29 
0 
0 
0 
0 
100 
29 
0 
0 
0 
0 
100 
Loo 
и 
0 
100 
0 
0 
0 
11 
0 
100 
0 
0 
0 
Mat Buy 
9 33 
100 
0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 33 
0 
50 
0 
0 
50 
source author's survey 
The lack of upgrading centres was one of the main problems pointed out by a 
study conducted by TARDA in the early 1980s. It was then concluded that: 
'One of the constraints facing ranchers in Kajiado District is absence of a 
reliable source of improved beef stock. It is therefore proposed that four 
holding grounds i.e. Namanga, Emali, Kuku and Shombole be converted into 
duo-purpose centres for rearing better performing stock as well as 
accommodating bull camps' (TARDA 1984:123). In spite of these 
recommendations no action has been taken since then and the 1989 AS AL 
Conference also called upon the Government to be more active in ensuring the 
availability of improved breeds. 
That year the new Kajiado District Development Plan revealed a willingness 
to upgrade the Maasai herds by the development of AI service and the 
encouragement of "bull camps" (see KDDP 1988:96). Financial assistance from 
the Kajiado ASAL Programme finally made it possible to build a Livestock 
Multiplication Centre. In Mile 46 the former holding ground (840 ha) was 
allocated to be turned into a centre for upgrading small stock. If successful, 
cattle improvement will also be taken in hand (see ASAL 1989-November:6) 
Until the present time the Sahiwals were mainly obtained from upgrading 
centres in Naivasha and the Borans from Mutara. In 1988 and 1989 official 
imports of Sahiwal bulls stood at only 63 and 50. Boran bulls numbered 25 in 
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1989 and Friesian bulls 2 and 3 in 1988 and 1989, respectively (see MoLD/AR 
1988, 1989). Apart from these official channels more improved breeds were 
obtained either from local upgrading centres or family members, friends and 
markets in or outside the district (see table 10.15). In general the ranchers tried 
to acquire a single bull for upgrading their cattle herd. Likewise rams and 
bucks are favoured though female sheep and goats are also purchased. 
Table 10.15 Main Sources of Improved Breeds 
ranch 
(n) 
own berd 
fnend/relative 
neighbourhood 
upgrading centre 
livestock market 
Oik 
(64) 
94 
109 
234 
531 
31 
Emb 
(65) 
00 
46 
18.5 
73 8 
31 
Kib 
(70) 
29 
29 
114 
65 7 
171 
Ews 
(168) 
48 
417 
71 
28 0 
184 
Lor 
(95) 
00 
4 2 
10.5 
37 9 
474 
Met 
(190) 
147 
368 
116 
116 
253 
Кар 
(30) 
0.0 
16 7 
23 3 
567 
33 
Loo 
(28) 
0 0 
28 6 
36 
42 8 
250 
Mat 
(47) 
43 
298 
21 
48 9 
14 9 
Buy 
(5) 
00 
400 
00 
600 
0 0 
Source autnor s survey 
Note for all acquisitions of improved breeds (both small and large slock) we recorded the place of 
procurement. In general a transaction consisted of only one or two animals 
Finally, we tried to gain some information about the willingness of the Maasai 
to increase the relative number of improved breeds within the Maasai herds. 
Table 10.16 shows that a nearby multiplication centre will be waimly 
welcomed by the Maasai herders for cattle and small stock alike. The low 
percentage of Olkinos ranchers having improved breeds as demonstrated in 
table 10.12 is also reflected in their reservation about increasing their numbers. 
Table 10.16 Maasai Willingness to Increase the Number of Improved Breeds 
in Herds and Flocks 
Improved 
breeds 
CATTLE 
Decrease 
No change 
Increase 
SHOATS 
Decrease 
No change 
Increase 
Oik 
11 
45 3 
53 7 
21 
43 2 
547 
Emb 
19 
95 
886 
19 
113 
86 8 
Kib 
80 
360 
560 
40 
16 0 
800 
Ews 
00 
28 
97 2 
00 
14 
986 
Lor 
00 
21 
97 9 
00 
21 
97 9 
Met 
00 
129 
871 
00 
90 
910 
Ind 
00 
16 7 
83 3 
00 
16 7 
83.3 
Кар 
0.0 
35 7 
643 
00 
35 7 
643 
Loo 
0 0 
0 0 
100 0 
0 0 
00 
1000 
Mat 
00 
91 
909 
00 
91 
909 
Buy 
00 
333 
67 7 
167 
167 
66.6 
source autnor s survey 
The intensification of the Maasai livestock sector therefore mainly involves the 
increased application of capital to the acquisition of improved breeds. In 
addition, these breeds are more susceptible to disease and call for increased 
expenditure on the buying of veterinary medicines and vaccinations. Finally, 
because of this and the more frequent need for water the input of labour has 
also been intensified. 
The Kajiado District Development Plan (1988:106-7) estimated that some 
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35 per cent of Kajiado cattle was vaccinated." This low percentage is mainly 
due to problems occurring at the supply side such as the poor supply of 
vaccines and the district's poor infrastructure. A setback of vaccinating one's 
animals is a drop in milk production and the risk of other diseases affecting the 
animal as the health condition of the animal is lowered (see White & Meadows 
1981:iii). On the other hand animals which are dipped have a higher rate of 
survival and higher milk production as the ticks obstipate the udderteats of the 
cow. It was reported by one key-informant that dipping had raised the rate of 
survival of calves from 25 to 75 per cent 
Table 10.17 Veterinary Care Practised by Maasai Pastoralists (per cent) 
CATTLE 
dipping 
band-spraying 
drenching 
vacc mating 
antibiotics 
SHOATS 
dipping 
hand-spraying 
drenching 
antibiotics 
formaline bath 
Oik 
210 
727 
116 
253 
8 4 
51 
83 7 
561 
315 
33 6 
27 5 
Emb 
25 3 
73 2 
0 0 
4 2 
0 0 
141 
76 1 
43 7 
14 
0 0 
0 0 
Kib 
2 7 
919 
5 4 
13 5 
0 0 
0 0 
946 
911 
27 
0 0 
0 0 
Ews 
2 8 
98 6 
0 0 
761 
280 
0 0 
1000 
1000 
22 2 
33 3 
37 5 
Lor 
71 
77 8 
23 2 
27 2 
9 0 
5 2 
917 
67 7 
170 
5 0 
0 0 
Met 
59 6 
23 1 
0 0 
10 
0 0 
5 8 
817 
37 9 
0 0 
10 
0 0 
Ind 
53 0 
47 1 
117 
412 
8 9 
23 5 
794 
76 5 
29 3 
118 
205 
Кар 
78 6 
286 
14 3 
286 
14 3 
35 7 
704 
92 9 
285 
214 
214 
Loo 
0 0 
88 9 
22 2 
667 
111 
0 0 
889 
88 9 
444 
222 
444 
Mat) 
63 6 
364 
9 1 
364 
182 
27 3 
727 
45 5 
182 
182 
0 0 
bouree auiDors survey 
Table 10.17 shows the practices applied by the Maasai ranchers in respect of 
the veterinary care practised. It shows that nowadays most Maasai households 
are involved in dipping or hand-spraying their l ivestock 9 Vaccinating is 
mostly practised among the Elang'ata Wuas ranchers. Their dedication to 
Vaccinations are mainly given to control CBPP, Rinderpest and F&M ECF and 
Trypanosomiias, being uck-bom diseases, cannot be controlled by vaccinatioa Only preventative 
treatment by way of dipping or spraying the animals with acaricide (see Pralt & Gwyime 
1978 184-6) The bites of the licks (Jhedena lawrencei) act as transmitiere of ECF Treatment of 
ECF is only effective In the very early stages of the disease Dipping should be done every five 
days as the best way to control East Coast Fever The OUunos enumerator came across a strange 
belief among some OUunos ranchers that milking the cow "dry" would prevent it from being 
affected by ECF Trypanosomiasis is spread by the tsetse fly (Glossina) For "Tryps" several 
curative drugs are available Mention was already made of the practice of burning bush to 
eradicate the fly In the Magadi area a tsetse trap has recently been introduced A blue cloth, 
drenched ш cow or buffalo unne equated with cheap natural chemical attractant lines a plasuc 
bag The flies are then killed by heal once they enter this bag (see DN 21/09/89) 
It should be kept in mind that the table provides no information concerning the frequency 
and quality of the dipping practices In general dipping is done once every week. The dipping bath 
could be too watery or out of date which will make the treatment m-effecuve whilst too strong a 
solution could harm the animal A problem also is that ticks become resistant to a certain type of 
acaricide. Hand-spraying was favoured for its mobility but is said Ю be less effective 
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veterinary measures was also recognized by White and Meadows (1981:27) 
stating that on Elang'ata Wuas ECF was no problem, yet all households 
recorded the use of acaricide over the survey period. 
Finally, improved feeding could increase the output of the livestock 
enterprise. Before we have shown that the provision of extra feeding or range 
improvement is virtually non-existent among the Maasai pastoralists 
interviewed (see table 9.19). According to several authors natural pastures will 
continue to be the main source of animal feed in the district (see e.g. Sinket 
1990:94). Only in those rangeland areas where conditions are favourable, can 
the planting of, for example, napier grass be tried. Lowering of grazing 
pressures through the opening up of too remote water-deficient pastures by 
establishing new watering points is another option. A more even spread of 
livestock over the rangelands could therefore be a positive side effect of the 
subdivision of group ranches. On the other hand it does increase the risks of 
overgrazing on a local scale Improved feeding, watering and management will 
be necessary if improved breeds are adopted. In conclusion, intensifying the 
input of capital (e.g breed improvement, veterinary drugs, use of acaricide, 
watering, etc.) is seen as the best improvement possible (see Bekure et al. 
1987:421). 
10.4.2 The Intensification of Cultivation 
In general the growing of crops under rainfed conditions in the rangelands of 
Kajiado District is successful in only 3 out of 8 seasons (see Bekure et al. 
1987:417). Ways to offset the problem of poor rainfall and to increase the 
production of crops are shown in table 10.18. 
Table 10.18 Practices Applied to Increase Crop Production 
Tractor 
Ox-plough 
Certified seeds 
Insecucides 
Fertilizer 
Manure 
Fenced shamba 
Improved storage 
Faraifecoid 
Oik 
n=36 
639 
28 
417 
83 
00 
28 
250 
56 
00 
End) 
n=31 
16 1 
65 
97 
32 
00 
00 
226 
00 
32 
Kib 
n=10 
100 
100 
500 
00 
00 
200 
500 
00 
00 
Ews 
n=9 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
222 
666 
00 
00 
Lor 
n=30 
00 
00 
13 3 
00 
00 
33 
200 
00 
00 
Met 
n=89 
00 
34 
00 
00 
00 
00 
270 
00 
00 
Ind 
n=17 
250 
63 
188 
63 
63 
313 
43 8 
12.5 
6.3 
buy 
2m 
500 
00 
500 
00 
00 
00 
500 
500 
00 
buy 
5 nm 
800 
00 
800 
00 
00 
400 
600 
400 
00 
source aumor s survey 
Note application of a tractor means an iniensified use made of capital while extensifying the input 
of labour 
The use of certified seeds seems to be the most wide-spread adoption so far. 
The favourable position of non-Maasai buyers is also clearly reflected. 
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10.5 The Commercialization of the Maasai Economy 
In section 9.6.2 we quoted several authors who had conducted one or more 
years follow up studies of livestock transactions and who had stated that, for 
many years, the Maasai had sold virtually all their saleable cattle (see 
Evangelou 1984:256-7). In the foregoing we provided district-wide offtake 
fígures for Kajiado cattle and small stock (see table 4.18). The impact of 
periods of drought (high offtake of up to 40 per cent) and times of post-
drought (a mere 7 per cent) are significant as are climatic fluctuations on an 
annual basis. The outbreak of disease also influences the number of animals 
marketed as does the recurring obligation to pat school fees.10 
Most of the above mentioned sales are provoked by events unlike the sales 
which are part of buying-fattening-selling or stock-trading practices. The high 
totals of female cattle also point to the still primarily milk-oriented livestock 
economy of the Maasai pastoralists. 
10.5.1 The Selling of Livestock 
The functions of livestock transactions are numerous. Among the most 
important is the sale of livestock for the payment of school fees, medicines, 
clothing, furniture and the like. For 1974 Metson found a total figure of 32.6 
per cent of respondents who had sold livestock over a one year period (see 
Metson 1974:11/table 23). We found that, over a one month period in late 
1989, 30 to 74 per cent of the respondents were involved in the selling of 
cattle (see table 10.19)." This could illustrate a growth in the importance of 
commercial livestock transactions. For small stock this figure stood at 21 to 64 
per cent. Table 10.19 also shows the high reproductive rate of small stock and 
the net offtake of the herd, taking into account slaughtering and other 
transactions such as exchanges and gifts. 
In table 10.20 the effect of wealth on livestock transaction strategies is 
highlighted. It can be concluded that the percentage gross offtake from poor 
rancher's herds and flocks is, in general, higher than that of most of the rich 
households.'2 Taking purchases into account the net offtake of the middle 
In this section we will restrict ourselves mostly to a qualitative analysis of this issue as we 
wen only able to collect information about livestock transactions by Maasai pastoralists 
concerning a penod of one month (December 1989) 
" Multiplying this monthly figure by 12 to reach the annual offtake is pointless as livestock 
transfers occur in peaks. Likewise the number of newborn animals is subject to specific penods of 
the year. 
It should be noted that our figures refer to a number of animals without discnmmaüng 
between the young or the mature A more detailed analysis considering monetary values will be 
presented in forthcoming publications 
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group is sometimes higher than that of the poorest group. 
Table 10.19 Livestock Transactions for December 1989 (abs) 
Cattle 
CHkinos 
EmboUol 
Klboko 
Elang'au W. 
Loragosua 
Meto 
IR 
-Kaputlel 
-Loodoldlanl 
-Matapalo 
Sheep and 
Goau 
OUanos 
EmboUol 
Klboko 
Elang'ata W 
Loragosua 
Meto 
m 
-Kaputlel 
-Loodololanl 
-Maiapato 
Nrof 
holdings 
97 
73 
37 
74 
99 
104 
33 
14 
8 
11 
Nrof 
boldugs 
99 
72 
38 
73 
96 
104 
34 
14 
9 
11 
Nrof 
cattle« 
5,058 
3,433 
3.859 
6.926 
8,345 
7323 
8.542 
2.773 
3.068 
2.701 
Nrof 
shoals* 
10,646 
8.681 
3.828 
9.832 
8,174 
11,676 
8.825 
4.283 
1.922 
2.620 
cattle 
out 
227 
191 
176 
270 
500 
399 
301 
131 
45 
125 
shoats 
out 
506 
416 
186 
635 
588 
788 
397 
251 
32 
114 
caule 
In 
222 
106 
213 
184 
142 
185 
105 
63 
14 
28 
shoats 
in 
481 
126 
29 
258 
252 
167 
102 
48 
11 
43 
% net 
offtake* 
-01 
-2 6 
+10 
-13 
-45 
-3 0 
-2 3 
-2 6 
-10 
-3 7 
% net 
offtake· 
-03 
-3 7 
-49 
•A4 
-5 1 
-6 0 
-3 9 
-5 2 
-1 I 
-3 6 
calves 
bora 
479 
266 
273 
574 
735 
472 
356 
106 
98 
152 
shoats 
born 
1.614 
1,140 
763 
1.703 
1.930 
1,978 
1.490 
559 
197 
734 
% natural 
growth 
104 
8 2 
7.7 
8 9 
9 2 
67 
4 2 
3 9 
3 3 
57 
% natural 
growth 
15 2 
14 6 
23 7 
17 3 
29 3 
19 2 
19 5 
14 2 
113 
37 5 
%hh 
selling® 
35 
30 
68 
68 
74 
67 
70 
64 
75 
82 
29 
21 
39 
30 
46 
64 
47 
57 
22 
45 
source autnors survey 
# by February 1990 
* compared to November 1989 situation (I e 
@ excluding exchanges or gifts. 
- calves/shoals born or bought + numbers sold) 
Table 10.20 Livestock Transactions by Wealth Class in December 1989 (as % of 
animals) 
Calile 
out 
ш 
net 
Shoals 
out 
ш 
net 
Caille 
out 
in 
net 
Shoao 
out 
In 
net 
Olkinoa 
I Π Ш 
-74-4 1 -48 
2.0 
-5 4 
-101 
75 
-26 
50 5 0 
0 9 0 2 
-9 J -3 6 
36 41 
-59 05 
Emboboi 
Ι Π Ш 
-S3 -46-63 
41 3 0 32 
- 1 2 - 1 6 - 3 1 
- 4 9 - 4 0 - 6 0 
20 06 20 
- 2 9 - 3 4 ^ 0 
Klboko 
I 
-121 
70 
-5 1 
-89 
28 
-61 
Ind ranchers Kaputlel 
I Π Ш I 
-33 -67 -31 -3.3 
0 0 
-3 3 -
-22 9 -
112 
-117 -
14 13 0 0 
5 3 -18 -3 3 
87 -34-260 
15 07 135 
7 2 -27 -12.5 
II 
-51 
0 0 
-51 
-5 9 
22 
-3 7 
Π 
-84 -
25 
-5 9 
Ban Wuas 
Ш Ι Π UI 
3 7 - 8 8 - 3 9 - 3 7 
68 11 71 29 
3 1 -7 7 3 2-10 
-98 -47 -107 -56 -81 
07 
-9 1 -
1 
Ш 
-51 
26 
-25 
-47 
03 
-44 
0 8 47 34 25 
39 -60-22 -56 
Loodokilani 
I II in 
na -80 -04 
na 09 0 4 
na -71 0 0 
0 0 -51 -09 
0 0 26 01 
0 0 -25 -08 
Lorngosua 
Ι Π ΠΙ 
Meto 
Ι Π 
-158 -89 -39 -128 -65 
3 2 2 5 IJ 
-126-64-26 
36 19 
•92 -46 
-194 -78 -67 -107 -89 
124 4 4 14 
- 7 0 - 3 4 - 5 3 · 
Maiapato 
Ι II Ш 
-3 1 -7 5 -4 1 
0 0 25 0 8 
-3 1 -5 0 -3 3 
•100 -126 -28 
0 0 0 4 3 0 
-100-122 0 2 
32 15 
•75 -74 
Ш 
-28 
29 
01 
-51 
11 
-40 
Buyers 
I 
-77 
0 0 
-7 7 
0 0 
115 
115 
Ш 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
-09 
0 0 
-09 
source author's survey 
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White & Meadows 1981 (appendix table 7) found overall cattle offtake (sales) 
percentages of 13.3, 12.3 and 12.0 for Kiboko, Elang'ata Wuas and Lomgosua, 
respectively in the August 1980-July 1981 period. Figures for shoats were 8.1, 
6.4 and 10.6 per cent. For individual ranchers from Kaputiei, Loodokilani and 
Matapalo they found annual offtake figures for cattle of 18.8, 22.6 and 12.7 
per cent and for small stock of 24.5, 1.0 and 4.8 per cent 
For our sample ranches table 10.21 offers a detailed overview of the broad 
variety and relative importance of livestock transactions such as sales, 
exchanges, gifts and slaughter. Forms of acquisition are also shown. The data 
of table 10.21 highlights the importance of taking into account these other 
forms of acquisition and offtake when valuating the pastoral livestock system. 
For example, in Olkinos it was found non-sale offtake was responsible for 
between 17 and 42 per cent of gross cattle offtake, depending on the wealth 
class. Commercial sales were only enumerated for the richest Olkinos 
households. 
Bekure et al. (1987:306) found that in Olkarkar and Mbirikani sales were 
responsible for 82 and 76 per cent, respectively, of cattle offtake. For shoats 
these figures were only 38 and 10 per cent. It was concluded that many sales 
simply do not go through market channels. Our data underline this statement. It 
can be seen that the level of sales of shoats in our sample is higher. This could 
mean a grown importance of commercial sales but could also be due to 
differences in place (closer to Nairobi) and/or in time (Christinas). In general, 
the sales of small stock decrease when the level of wealth rises. This seems to 
be in line with White and Meadows (1981 :iv) who reported that rich 
households mainly depended on the sale of cattle while poorer households 
mainly relied on the selling of small stock. 
Exchange as a form of livestock acquisition offers the advantage of 
knowing exactly what kind of animal is obtained as the former owner is, in 
most cases, a relative or a friend. Sometimes the exchange is in part a gift 
when, for instance, a goat is exchanged for a cow. Gifts are provided for 
helping a friend or relative in need, for tightening social relations or for 
conducting a ceremony. Bekure et al. (1987:303) rightly stress that the gifting 
of small stock in particular is a very important social mechanism among the 
Maasai. Small stock is also mostly used for home slaughter. 
Bekure et al. (1987:318) found that commercial purchases accounted for 58 
per cent of the reported cattle acquisition in Olkarkar and only 37 per cent in 
Mbirikani. Figures for small stock were 47 and 39 per cent, respectively, but 
thought to be overestimated. Among our group of respondents purchases of 
cattle are highest among the northern Kaputiei ranchers and less so among the 
Matapalo ranchers. The Meto ranchers in particular obtained most animals via 
exchange. In contrast purchases and gifts are the most important ways for 
acquiring small stock. Appendix 10.1 gives more information concerning the 
sale and purchase of cattle and shoats. 
ТаЫе 10.21 Relevance of Type of Livestock Transactions by Wealth Class in December 1989 
Cattle 
sale 
com. sale 
slaughter 
exchange out 
gift out 
purchase 
com purchase 
exchange in 
gift m 
Shoots 
Sale 
com. sale 
slaughter 
exchange out 
gift out 
purchase 
com. purchase 
exchange m 
gift in 
Oik 
I 
57 
0 
30 
10 
3 
63 
0 
37 
0 
54 
4 
24 
3 
15 
73 
3 
3 
21 
II 
53 
0 
29 
0 
18 
27 
48 
2 
23 
31 
0 
55 
0 
14 
30 
50 
0 
20 
III 
36 
34 
23 
0 
6 
20 
71 
0 
9 
17 
6 
51 
3 
23 
39 
32 
2 
27 
Emb 
I 
76 
0 
0 
0 
24 
0 
68 
0 
32 
44 
8 
30 
0 
18 
10 
0 
0 
90 
II 
55 
0 
4 
4 
37 
26 
17 
0 
57 
56 
0 
18 
0 
26 
67 
0 
0 
33 
III 
55 
29 
5 
6 
5 
0 
75 
19 
6 
46 
14 
30 
0 
10 
15 
70 
0 
15 
Kib 
I 
48 
21 
10 
0 
21 
0 
54 
0 
46 
37 
0 
47 
0 
16 
0 
0 
0 
π 
48 
11 
10 
0 
31 
20 
24 
0 
56 
28 
0 
51 
0 
21 
0 
0 
0 
100 100 
HI 
26 
34 
11 
0 
29 
2 
60 
34 
4 
11 
34 
30 
0 
25 
29 
43 
0 
2S 
Ew» 
I 
85 
0 
5 
5 
5 
60 
0 
20 
20 
39 
0 
38 
0 
23 
93 
0 
2 
5 
Π 
51 
21 
3 
5 
20 
19 
45 
10 
26 
25 
6 
47 
2 
20 
49 
17 
3 
31 
III 
62 
0 
14 
0 
24 
24 
0 
66 
10 
15 
0 
33 
32 
20 
8 
4 
64 
24 
Lor 
I 
82 
0 
4 
4 
8 
19 
25 
13 
44 
58 
2 
17 
3 
20 
28 
35 
13 
24 
II 
63 
23 
7 
2 
27 
27 
20 
27 
27 
37 
0 
33 
9 
21 
74 
5 
7 
14 
HI 
58 
3 
18 
3 
18 
31 
23 
23 
23 
32 
0 
32 
11 
25 
36 
14 
14 
36 
Met 
I 
56 
0 
22 
14 
8 
3 
30 
52 
15 
31 
9 
39 
7 
14 
53 
0 
16 
31 
II 
64 
3 
11 
6 
16 
6 
5 
61 
28 
56 
0 
20 
8 
16 
31 
25 
13 
31 
III 
50 
11 
0 
21 
18 
7 
14 
52 
27 
38 
10 
22 
12 
18 
20 
0 
0 
80 
Ind 
1 
84 
0 
16 
0 
0 
. 
-
-
-
10 
49 
40 
0 
1 
0 
100 
0 
0 
π 
55 
33 
5 
0 
7 
0 
0 
79 
21 
38 
0 
28 
13 
21 
27 
20 
0 
53 
III 
52 
29 
10 
I 
10 
0 
85 
0 
15 
47 
0 
38 
0 
15 
0 
0 
1 
99 
¿owce: aumor s survey 
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10.5.2 SeUing Hides and Skins 
For 1974 Metson found that only 25 per cent of the interviewed households 
sold hides and skins (see Metson 1974:table 22). We were also interested in 
the commercial importance of this livestock related activity. Households were 
asked if they had sold or bartered cow hides, calf skins or shoats skins during 
the last month. Table 10.22 gives the outcome. 
Table 10.22 Selling of Hides & Skins (percentage of households involved by 
wealth strata) 
Cowhide· 
Calfskuu 
Sboata sldoi 
Oik 
Ι Π Ш 
38 45 68 
16 35 41 
31 48 SO 
Emb 
I 
33 
13 
29 
II 
29 
25 
50 
Ш 
46 
39 
46 
Kib 
I 
33 
11 
44 
Π 
30 
0 
50 
Ш 
33 
0 
40 
Ews 
I 
13 
9 
65 
Π 
10 
3 
60 
Ш 
10 
0 
91 
Lor 
I 
24 
9 
49 
Π 
31 
11 
53 
ΠΙ 
29 
7 
52 
Met 
I 
2 
7 
23 
Π 
10 
8 
26 
ΠΙ 
5 
5 
9 
bouree: aumor s survey 
Olkinos and Embolioi were mainly involved in the selling of hides and the rich 
were particularly active sellers. The other ranches were less involved in the selling 
of hides. The selling of shoats skins is mainly practised among Elang'ala Wuas 
ranchers. 
The nearby presence of the Olkinos tannery and Athi River Leather Industries 
possibly explains the higher degree of involvement of Olkinos and Embolioi 
ranchers in the selling of hides and skins. 
10.5.3 The Selling of Milk 
Metson (1974:table 24) found that only 4.5 per cent of the Maasai households 
interviewed selling milk in 1974. The early 1990s experienced a similar level of 
commercial milk offtake. Most sellers, however, seem to bave started only recently, 
i.e. since the 1984/85 drought. Only among the group of individual ranchers and 
Kiboko group ranch members was some above average interest in the selling of 
milk recorded. It seems as if it is mainly the group of less wealthy group ranch 
stratum 1 households and the most wealthy individual ranchers who are involved in 
this practice. Established ranchers in Kaputiei were particularly active in selling 
milk. In comparison, the Loodokilani and -even more- the southern Matapalo 
individual ranchers showed only modest interest in the selling of milk. In terms of 
the amount of milk sold, another picture emerges. Embolioi and Loodokilani 
ranchers had high average sales per household per week. In contrast, Kiboko 
members sold only very small amounts. In general, per household between 10 and 
20 litres of milk are sold per week. 
In addition to the fact that some households had no surplus for sale, marketing 
and transport problems were the most frequently mentioned reasons for not selling 
milk. Those who did sell said that town dwellers (41 per cent), restaurants (32 per 
cent), local residents (e.g teachers, quarry workers - 23 per cent) and a co-operative 
dairy (4 per cent) were the purchasers. 
According to Potter (1989:24) the commercial production of milk on subdivided 
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farms is hampered by hygiene, transport and marketing difficulties. Only on a few 
favoured sites close to the small number of population centres does Potter see a 
potential for milk production to develop into a major commercial activity. Holland 
(1989:23) has stated that a locally based dairy industry needs a network of small-
scale trucks which would pick up the milk locally, particularly during the wet 
season when milk is a little тэте abundant A cost-benefit analysis should be made 
first. Like Potter he expressed doubts about the viability of a year round milk 
industry unless using high inputs and operating in favourable areas. 
The Kajiado Ministry of Livestock Production actively tríes to assist the farmers 
in the high-potential zones of Ngong but also Kitengela in improving and 
commercializing the production of milk (e.g. the Kitengela milk cooler). 
In addition to milk some households (Elang'ata Wuas and individual ranchers in 
particular) sell eggs, honey or manure. 
Table 10.23 Sample Population Sales of Milk 
H/hlds selliDg milk 
-itratuml 
-stnuum Π 
-stratum Ш 
Mean liues/hh/week 
Selling alnce 
- < 1979 
-1980-84 
-1985-89 
Reason пм selling 
- no marketAranspon 
- no surplu« 
- no cows 
-no labour 
- no interest 
Oik 
n-95 
4.2 
77 
3 6 
2 4 
105 
0 0 
25 0 
75 0 
11-91 
42.8 
440 
121 
1 1 
0 0 
Emb 
n»72 
5 6 
0 0 
0 0 
154 
122 5 
0 0 
0 0 
1000 
n-64 
344 
62.5 
31 
0 0 
0 0 
Kib 
n=36 
111 
11 1 
27 3 
0 0 
2 3 
0 0 
0 0 
1000 
ii=27 
519 
401 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
Ews 
D-69 
58 
15 0 
0 0 
5 3 
101 
0 0 
500 
500 
n-67 
343 
597 
4 3 
0 0 
15 
Lor 
n=98 
5 0 
0 0 
8 3 
67 
254 
0 0 
0 0 
1000 
n«94 
415 
510 
1 1 
0 0 
6 4 
Met 
n=104 
3 8 
7 0 
2 6 
0 0 
193 
0 0 
33 3 
667 
n-98 
27 5 
684 
0 0 
0 0 
4 1 
bid 
n=33 
18 2 
0 0 
18 2 
23 5 
605 
167 
33 3 
500 
n=27 
445 
40 7 
37 
0 0 
111 
Кар 
n=14 
28 6 
0 0 
33 3 
42 9 
48 8 
25 0 
25 0 
500 
n-10 
500 
500 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
Loo 
n-8 
125 
na 
25 0 
0 0 
1400 
0 0 
0 0 
100 0 
n=8 
500 
37.5 
12.5 
0 0 
0 0 
Mat 
n-11 
9.1 
0 0 
0 0 
167 
28 0 
0 0 
1000 
0 0 
n-9 
33 3 
33 3 
0 0 
0 0 
33 3 
Buy 
n-9 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
na 
ал 
ал 
na 
ιι=9 
22 2 
111 
667 
0 0 
0 0 
source autnor s survey 
10.5.4 The Selling of Crops 
Finally, information was gathered concerning the number of households 
involved in the selling of crops. Metson (1974:table 40) reached a figure of 3.S 
per cent of those interviewed who claimed to sell crops. We recorded 21 
households stating to have sold crops in 1989. This is equivalent to 3.9 per 
cent of all respondents or 9.1 per cent of all farming households. Buyers (40 
per cent) and Olkinos households (25 per cent) are the ones most involved in 
the selling of crops. 
Maize and beans are the crops most frequently sold. These are destined for 
the neighbouring households or towns in the main. In general, only small 
quantities are involved and the bulk of the harvest is used for home 
consumption. The change in dietary habits among the Maasai has been going 
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on now for some time. The use of foodstuffs other than milk, blood and meat 
is said to be on the increase. As Njoka (1979:256) reports, non-livestock 
products like sugar, tea, maize cake, porridge and beans were popular among 
most of the families even before 1950. Bread and chicken are the most recent 
introductions. A cultural barrier against the eating of pork and fish still exists. 
Another aspect of this change in diet is that it allows the Maasai to obtain a 
relatively favourable gain in calories when livestock is sold to purchase maize. 
This is the result of favourable terms of trade of meat to grain products. 
Following this strategy the livestock requirements for a household can be 
lowered (see Dietz 1987:127, O'Leaiy 1987:64, Oba 1987:39). 
Finally, we asked the households if they had a bank account as this was 
thought to be an indication of a more financially-oriented attitude. 66.7 per 
cent of the buyers stated that they had a bank account. Except for the 
individual ranchers (62.5 per cent), the Elang'ata Wuas ranchers (24.3), 
Olkinos (23.5), Embolioi (10.0), Lomgosua (8.0), Kiboko (3.1) and Meto (1.9) 
were much less involved in this. It should be taken into account that it is only 
in recent times that financial institutions or banks have been present in 
Loitokitok (1984) and Magadi (1990). Ngong and Kajiado have had AFC 
branches since 1963 and 1973. 
10.6 Maasai Pastoralism in the 1990s 
In the foregoing some of the problems the Maasai face today have been 
touched upon such as difficulties in obtaining improved breeds, disease 
threatening their herds and flocks or impossibility of their young people 
becoming registered group ranch members which could make them squatters in 
the near future." In the mid-1970s Metson (1974:table 49) recorded that the 
main problems the Maasai were facing at that time were human health (88.9 
per cent), lack of water (88.4 per cent), shortage of schools (72.3 per cent), 
wildlife (48.8 per cent) and cattle disease (45.3 per cent). 
Table 10.24 shows a detailed overview of the major problems as put 
forward by our group of respondents in early 1990. For each group ranch we 
indicated the three most frequently mentioned problems in bold type. Lack of 
water is still the most often mentioned difficulty Maasai households face in 
Kajiado District. Similarly important are the problems caused by animal 
disease. The favourable position of the Elang'ata Wuas ranchers is clearly 
illustrated. Lack of capital comes in third place. Other important problems are 
the poor infrastructure and the prédation of game. These latter are usually 
In this last section we will briefly highlight the most important problems in the daily 
cunning and improvement of their household economies as seen by the respondents themselves. In 
our view, this should be a starting point for any local or foreign organization wishing to assist the 
Maasai in improving their standard of living. 
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problems on a local scale. 
Table 10.24 Major Problems Experienced by the 
Problems 
Ammal disease 
Lack of walertunfall 
Lack of capital 
Lack of land/pasture 
Lack of transport 
Poor infnstiucbire 
Prédation by game 
Game disease 
Game destnicbou of crops 
Shortage of labour 
Erosion 
Shortage of firewood 
Fuor land quality 
Lack of farming knowledge 
Lack of seeds 
Lack of dipfepray-pump 
Lack of food/animals 
Human health 
Illiteracy 
Insecurity 
source aumor s survey 
Oik 
66.7 
80.4 
69.6 
88 
20 
00 
00 
00 
10 8 
24.5 
10 
69 
00 
69 
00 
49 
59 
20 
59 
59 
End) 
77.0 
67.6 
35 1 
41 
17 6 
39.2 
00 
257 
176 
13 5 
14 
00 
12 2 
14 9 
00 
41 
95 
14 
14 
00 
Kib 
94.1 
67.« 
353 
00 
23.5 
00 
58Л 
00 
59 
29 
00 
00 
29 
00 
00 
29 
59 
118 
00 
00 
Ews 
48.5 
60.6 
373 
45 
61 
303 
121 
106 
IS 
15 
00 
00 
30 
0 0 
15 
45 
45 
30 
00 
00 
Lor 
S4.7 
91Л 
367 
10 
61 
41.8 
71 
10 
00 
20 
00 
00 
133 
92 
102 
51 
13 3 
28 6 
31 
00 
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Respondents 
Met 
86.5 
88.5 
67.3 
10 
29 
19 2 
00 
00 
00 
58 
00 
00 
10 
0 0 
38 
87 
13 5 
13.5 
19 
00 
Кар 
83J 
41.7 
250 
250 
33.3 
250 
250 
16 7 
83 
00 
00 
00 
83 
00 
250 
83 
00 
00 
83 
00 
Loo 
444 
44A 
333 
111 
22.2 
44A 
44A 
222 
00 
111 
222 
00 
0 0 
0 0 
222 
222 
00 
111 
00 
00 
Mat 
72.7 
63.6 
72J 
18 2 
91 
91 
91 
0 0 
0 0 
00 
00 
00 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
91 
00 
91 
0 0 
00 
Buy 
222 
88 J» 
333 
111 
00 
33.3 
00 
00 
22 2 
22 2 
00 
111 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
55.6 
In comparison with Metson the significance of human health has become less 
relevanL This could be due to the penod of drought the Maasai were facing at 
the time. Also problems of the lack of schools seems to have been reduced. 
This is a good development, although one should keep in mind that the 
demand for schools is still on the rise, that classes are crowded with pupils and 
a shortage of trained teachers exists The Maasai population still has a long 
way to go in improving its level of education. 
It is thought that higher standards of eduction will be necessary for those 
Maasai who, in the years to come, will not be able to make a living the way 
their fathers and grandfather did Besides formal education, framing will be 
needed for those Maasai wanting or needing to remain in the pastoral sector 
In 1988 the Ministry of Livestock Development, m co-operation with the 
ASAL-Programme, started up the "North Kaputiei Extension Project" It was 
intended to train farmers of the five subdivided group ranches of Olkinos, 
Embolioi, Empuyiankat, Kitengela and Kisaju as well as established individual 
ranchers in this region in "zero grazing" techniques and other methods needed 
to compensate for the shrinking availability of land. 
More specifically, the project aims to assist the ranchers in the procuring 
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and management of superior breeds, to assist in the organization of the use of 
dips and boreholes and to enhance the diversification of livestock enterprises, 
e.g. poultry, apiculture etc. Besides giving demonstrations in the area, seminars 
and tours to other districts such as Baringo and Machakos have been 
organized. Initially, former group ranch committee-members were used as 
contact farmers who were to announce these activities in their area. This did 
not work well and nowadays every farmer is contacted individually. 
One of the results of the project was the creation of dip committees in 
Empuyiankat, Olkinos and Embolioi. In Embolioi, however, internal struggles 
arose causing this group to malfunction. Also, in some areas village 
development committees have been formed who are now in charge of grazing 
and other development matters. 
In respect of the commercialization of the Maasai economy it can be reported 
that the World Bank has announced plans for a livestock-marketing project 
Earlier drafts of this plan have been criticised as it threatens to be a blow to 
the trading system of many young Maasai livestock traders. Small groups of 
them are involved in the transporting of cattle and small stock from the interior 
of Kajiado District to the Nairobi markets.14 
Fearing the need to import meat in the near future the call for the Maasai to 
increase their offtake can still be heard. To feed its fast growing population it 
is realised that shortages of beef might arise, particularly whenever subdivision 
of group ranches results in the replacement of livestock-keeping on cultivation. 
The statement made at the second conference on the future of the Maasai in 
Kajiado District by Mr. John Keen, Assistant Minister within the Office of the 
President, that land should be used for that for which it is best suited; i.e. 
livestock-keeping, is an indication that doubt on the soundness of subdivision 
is widespread. 
It was nevertheless realised among the conference participants that the process 
of the subdivision of group ranches has become irreversible. The latest reports 
from Kajiado District are that subdivision is moving forward at an accelerating 
rate. To speed up group ranch dissolution private surveyors are being 
increasingly involved in this process. 
The conference participants considered the future for pastoralism in the 
present set-up to be bleak (see van Klinken 1992:61). In my view this is not 
necessarily the case as subdivision has given new impetus to some of the 
flexibility and mobility of the Maasai pastoral system. Corrupt committee-
14
 Ironically, in its latest World Development Repon, the World Bank stated thai- 'African 
pastoralists, such as the Maasai and Samburu of Kenya, are able to exploit apparently marginal 
savannahs (...) Building on these strengths requires great care, expertise, and patience. But 
development projects that do not take exisUng practices into account often fail (World Bank 
1992:93). 
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members can no longer frustrate developments and the misuse of group 
territory by individual ranchers has been stopped. Informal groups could 
possibly act as a viable alternative to the former group ranches. This would 
allow for easier and better management 
I agree, however, that with the dissolution of group ranches and the 
individualization of landownership a Trojan horse has entered Kajiado District 
and the registration of individual ranches has resulted in the commoditization 
of land. What had been predicted by Eliot in the beginning of this century and 
was restated by Lawrance in the mid-1960s, i.e. that the ultimate infiltration by 
other groups cannot be stopped by any means -including the registration of 
land- looks likely to be fulfilled by the end of this century. 
The Maasai have a saying that 'non can live like bird, on a branch' (see 
Peron 1984:71). Nevertheless, non-registered youngsters in Olkinos who 
wanted to attend a group ranch meeting on subdivision were refused. They 
were told to go to a tall nearby tree and build their house on top! The 
ownership of land will result in a profound and structurally altered Maasai 
society. In the words of a Maasai participant at the "Limuru Conference" 
'Ironically, because of the newly acquired value attached to land, and due to 
the commercialization of this inelastic commodity a new "tribe" of landless 
Maasai is in the making, swelling the ranks of many other Kenyans who have 
gone there before' (Polong 1990:105). At the second conference Minister John 
Keen used the word 'disastrous' and coined the phrase 'the Maasai is, in a 
way, his own enemy' (see van Klinken 1992:11). 
The participants of the second conference on the future of the Maasai 
brought forward the following resolutions in respect of land (see van Klinken 
1992): 
1. There is great diversity m the land potential of the distnct and the process of land subdivision 
should take place based on (he economic viability of the units Alongside the process of 
subdivision studies should be undertaken to impress upon proper land use for the people based 
on economic advantages that would be best accrued from the land parcels 
2 The Agricultura] Land Acts and Land Control Acts governing the subdivision of pareéis to 
economically viable units, should be firmly adhered to as to the recommended sizes within 
certain ecological zones This is so to enable the Land Control Boards to make appropriate 
recommendations on the economic size of the land parcels The Ministry of Agriculture and 
Livestock Development together with other relevant bodies they would like to consult or 
incorporate should come up with minimum acreages m the distnct unmediaiely 
3. Group Ranch Accounts auditing unit of the Ministry of Lands under the Registrar of group 
representatives should be reactivated to ensure proper accounting of funds m Group Ranches 
4 Poliücization of group ranch management issues should be discouraged as politicians 
manipulate the ranch committees to their own benefit 
5 A moratorium on land sales on long term basis of 23 yean be imposed immediately to curb 
indiscriminate land sales 
6 Localize Land Control Boards to place the onus of controlling land sales and transfers on local 
people by ensuring fair representation by people electing their own people in the Land Control 
Boards These will be people of integrity and chiefs and Assistant chiefs should veto and 
approve transactions 
7. Tide Deeds should go to family umts rather than to individuals to safeguard the family 
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taiteresu m the land 
8. The Ministry of Lands, Departmenls of Land Adjudication and Survey should be revamped to 
ensure smooth subdivision of the group ranches 
9. Co-operative organisations m the pastoral areas should be encouraged, be it under group 
ranches, individual ranches or family ranches as this is one factor that will ensure success and 
susiainabdity 
10. During subdivision provisions must be made to ensure that all members have access to public 
utilities e g watering points, saltlicks, etc 
11. We recommend (hat the ASAL Program™ In the district ensures that a task force be formed 
to ensure that these recommendations are passed on to the relevant authorities for 
Implementation. 
12. Group ranch subdivision alternatives' 
-The Konza concept where members are settled on a portion of (lie ranch and the rest of 
the land is used as a commercial ranch 
•The Olkuamauan concept zoning the ranch mio various economic units e g agricultural 
area, tounst attraction zone and ranching 
-Embolioi concept individual ranchen on already subdivided ranches regroup under a co 
-operative arrangement to manage their resources more effectively 
Although Mr. Keen had stated that the Government would consider the 
outcome of the conference at length I doubt whether, for instance, a 25 year 
moratorium on the sale of land could be implemented. Such a step, however, 
seems to me a necessary step be it only for 5-10 years or so. In addition, 
consciousness raising, the provision of soft loans, the imposition of land 
ceilings and the taxation of landownership to reduce land speculation, are all 
believed to be necessary instruments to stop the indiscriminate selling of land 
in Kajiado District. If this process is not halted future Maasai generations will 
be the ones left holding "the grapes of wrath". Being aware of this risk young 
Maasai nowadays blame their fathers for "selling wealth to buy poverty". 
10.7 Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter an overview has been presented of the diversification, 
intensification and commercialization of the Maasai economy as recorded 
among our group of respondents by early 1990. In the previous chapters we 
have already reported on the growing involvement of Maasai households in 
cultivation. Poor households in particular, but also the rich concentrate on this 
activity. Those who had shown no interest indicated climatological reasons or 
the lack of labour as the reasons for this. 
We concluded that, increasingly, Maasai heads of household have their 
main occupation outside the livestock sector. In particular, wage labour either 
in public institutions or in private enterprises has become a major way of 
earning a living (some 20-30 per cent of the respondents). Others mentioned 
running their own business. In general, some 90 per cent of the heads of 
households remained at the household's home for most of the year. The 
exception being Olkinos, where 25 per cent were staying elsewhere. Still, 
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residence outside the district was recorded for only 6.4 per cent of the group of 
Olkinos heads of households whereas, for other ranches, this was not above 3.0 
per cent. 
Diversification also includes the change in the composition of the Maasai 
herds. A remarkable development has been the increase in the importance of 
small stock. Recently camels have been introduced into the district It is still 
too early to judge the wisdom and the potential of this move. 
The intensification of the Maasai economy is another option implemented 
by many Maasai. One of the opportunities is the raising of the production of 
milk through the introduction of or the increase in the number of improved 
breeds. Obstacles to this were said to be high purchase prices, non-availability 
and vulnerability to disease and drought. Huge differences were recorded with 
respect to the importance of upgraded stock in both herds and flocks. In 
general, the percentage of ranchers having upgraded small stock is higher than 
for improved cattle. 
Finally, we looked into the commercialization of the Maasai economy. We 
tried to get an idea of the relative importance of commercial sales and 
purchases. In particular it was the rich who were among those mentioned as 
having sold animals for commercial reasons. We also highlighted other sales, 
slaughtering, exchanges, loans and gifts as these actions should also be taken 
into account when considering livestock offtake figures. It was estimated that 
an additional 30 per cent of stock are removed from the herds because of these 
afore-mentioned reasons. The sale of hides and skins was mentioned by half of 
our group of households. In contrast, the selling of milk was recorded for a 
mere S per cent of the respondents. The sale of crops was also negligible. 
In 1962 Fallon wisely prophesied that "The future of the Kajiado Masai largely 
depends on what happens to their land' (see Fallon 1962:46). The Maasai of 
Kajiado District still have the future in their own hands. This is true for those 
Maasai having a large enough individual ranch or who are members of a group 
ranch. The younger generation, however, will in the near future be confronted 
with a reduced access to land as a result of the process of group ranch 
dissolution into individually owned parcels. It is expected that this will result 
in a process of stratification and marginalization within Maasai society. The 
integration of different forms of land use and the creation of alternative 
employment opportunities should be given the highest priority. Education is of 
major importance in this respect. In the short term attention should be 
primarily directed at curtailing the selling out of land. Consciousness raising 
and training in methods of increasing the output of livestock herding is 
required on the small parcels. First of all a moratorium on the sale of land 
could be of major help in preventing the Maasai selling their land to outsiders. 
To stop this practice would be a difficult a but necessary step to benefit the 
Maasai, their children, the district's wildlife population and the Kenyan 
economy. 
Chapter 10: The Future of Maasai Pastoralism m Kajiado District 461 
Appendix 10.1 
Table 10.25 Livestock Transactions by Wealth Class in December 1989 (as 
percentage of households involved) 
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Table 1026 Types of Livestock Transactions by Wealth Class in December 
1989 (as percentage of total herd owned by wealth class) 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In 1982 Anders Hjort expressed his astonishment about the fact that so little 
systematic research had been carried out on losses of land and on the effects of 
such losses among pastoral societies. He called for the need for co-operation 
between geographers and anthropologists on studying the specific peculiarities 
of pastoral land use: 
'Certainly, it would lead to a better appreciation of the local relations to the 
macro-society if present-day local conflicts over grazing are not analyzed 
in the ethnic terms which govern the contestants' perceptions, but rather in 
terms of a competition between different economic systems over productive 
land which pushes its victims against each other. (...) The immensity of the 
problem of pastoral land loss seems to fail to impress planners and public 
opinion alike. Perhaps harsh figures on the rate of resource shrinking is the 
only way we can communicate it? This is an example of research 
anthropologists as well as ecologists should do if we want to be of any 
practical use to those whom we study' (Hjort 1982:22). 
This study has been an attempt to review the Maasai pastoralists use and 
ownership of land from a geographer's perspective, while taking into account 
ecological, economical, and socio-cultural aspects. Special attention has been 
paid to the process and consequences of the individualization of land 
ownership in the Maasai area as it developed over the last century. In the 
following pages, we will present a review of this evolution chronologically, 
whilst distinguishing four major periods. Referring to the model for analysis 
presented in chapter 1 we will draw conclusions concerning the causes and the 
consequences of these changes in the use and ownership of land for each 
specific period. 
A. 1890-1920: Arrival of the Europeans and the Formation of Maasai 
Reserves 
Since the mid-19th century neighbouring agricultural and pastoral groups such 
as the Kikuyu, Kamba, Kalenjin, Pokot and Turkana had started to occupy 
certain patches of a vast area of some 160,000 km2 which had once been 
firmly controlled by the pastoral Maasai. Approximately 60,000-70,000 km2 of 
this territory was located in present day Kenya. Internecine wars amongst the 
Maasai and human and livestock diseases had resulted in the death of some 90 
per cent of all livestock and half of the human population. This had weakened 
the Maasai's once very powerful position while that of the group of 
agriculturalists had grown in strength. Actually, the picture outlined above of 
the changing fortunes and base of power was nothing new. Spheres of 
influence and control over land in the African continent had always been a 
dynamic feature like an ebb and flow. 
The arrival of the European colonizers in the heart of what later was to be 
called the East African Protectorate in the late 19th century put an end to this. 
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After the arrival of the British colonizers the pace by which the Maasai were 
losing their pastures was accelerated. 
In 1895 the Maasai people were separated after a straight boundary was 
drawn from the Indian coast to Lake Victoria in the interior. This meant the 
creation of Tanganyika, governed by the Germans, the East African 
Protectorate and the Ugandan Protectorate, both in the hands of the British. For 
mainly strategic and commercial reasons British interest was foremostly 
directed towards the latter territory. The East Africa Protectorate was more an 
obstacle than an asset to the colonizers. To recover part of the high costs 
involved in the construction of the "Uganda Railway" linking the port of 
Mombasa with Lake Victoria settlers were invited to come to the East Africa 
Protectorate by offering large grants of land at extremely low prices. Arriving 
settlers simply went out and chose whatever area they liked. The 
Administration offered Jewish refugees from Eastern Europe the Maasai held 
Uasin Gishu plateau as their new homeland. The proposal was ultimately 
rejected as it was decided to establish an autonomous Jewish state in Palestine. 
As non-Europeans were prevented from buying land the high-potential areas 
north of Nairobi became known as the "White Highlands". African land rights 
were violated in every respect. Of the 31,000 km2 of European maximum 
settled land area (excluding forest reserves) 18,000 km2 were former Maasai 
lands. 
In 1904 a treaty was signed between the British and Maasai which meant a 
renewed division of Maasai into a northern and southern reserve totalling some 
24,000 km2. This was a reduction to some 35-40 per cent of their former 
territory. In this way the Maasai were deprived of their best pastures as the 
assigned reserves had been traditional Maasai pastoral lands. 
The treaty was slightly adjusted in the following years as an extension was 
needed for the too small northern reserve. In 1911 the "Second Maasai Treaty" 
was signed making it possible to remove the Maasai from the north to an 
extended Southern Reserve gazetted as the Maasai Reserve District by 1918 
(some 38,000 km2). 
Referring to our framework for analysis presented in figure 1.2, each of the 
contexts mentioned (from local to international) can be seen to have played a 
role in the loss of access to land by the Maasai pastoralists. The international 
context (i.e. the establishment of colonial power in Kenya to serve the interest 
of European nations for strategic reasons mostly) overruled the local tensions 
among the Maasai and towards agricultural groups. The arrival of the British 
resulted initially in a stabilization of the Maasai's already weakened powers 
and control over land and stopped the incursion of other groups into their 
territory. The British, fearing the Maasai, joined a pact which enabled the latter 
to regain some strength by the means of punitive expeditions against other 
groups. With numbers of both livestock and human beings growing worries 
were expressed by the local administration (i.e. national context). 
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At the turn of the century plans were made by administrators (Eliot) in a 
close though unofficial alliance with influential settlers (e.g. Delamere) to 
remove the Maasai from their best grazing areas. In later years a settler-
dominated Land Board even gained legal influence in directing the local 
governors to serve the settler interests at the cost of those of the Maasai and 
other African groups. 
Lucrative land legislation was enforced. The "First Crown Lands Ordinance" 
of 1902 proclaimed that all public land was Crown land under the control of 
the Administration. African land rules were simply overruled by the issue of a 
single paper. Non-Europeans were excluded from acquiring land, ultimately 
resulting in a segregation of the population along racial lines. Amendments 
made in later years allowed settlers to lease pastoral land of up to 10,000 acres 
at exceedingly low prices. Some settlers and European land-buying companies, 
however, were able to obtain over 100,000 acres, mostly in the heart of the 
Maasai country. As these arrangements were in conflict with the London 
guidelines, problems arose over this state-enforced legislation and development 
policy supported at the national level. 
The somewhat unconventional move of endorsing two treaties (1904, 1911) 
was made to "safeguard" Maasai interests. Actually these agreements served 
settler's interests and resulted in the removal of the Maasai from their best 
grazing areas near Naivasha and Laikipia. In return the Maasai were restricted 
to newly created reserves of much lower carrying capacity. Most of this 
"reserved territory" was traditional Maasai land, anyway. Large parts of the 
new pastures, however, suffered from infestation with tsetse fly, lacked water 
and had an overall lower grazing capacity. In combination with the huge 
reduction in land quantity the final consequence was the stress placed upon the 
Maasai's ability to herd their livestock. Moreover, a huge land concession of 
some 900 km2 was granted to the Magadi Soda Company to exploit the soda 
deposits at Lake Magadi. The 1915 Crown Lands Ordinance allowed the 
extension of leases from 99 to 999 years, removed restrictions on the 
accumulation of land and extended the definition of Crown land to 'all lands 
occupied by the native tribes and all lands reserved for the use of any members 
of any native tribes.' This last clause still allowed the Governor to extract 
reserve land for lease or sale to white settlers while Africans and Asians were 
still excluded from purchasing land outside the reserves. 
Maasai loyalty to British and settler interests had been rewarded with the loss 
of their best pastures and the prohibition of selling and improving their cattle. 
This led the Maasai to opt for an attitude of nonchalance, distrust and eventual 
resistance. Possibly, the internal tensions between the Maasai and their 
experience of the colonizers' powers were responsible for the seemingly rather 
modest protest made by the Maasai. Support in their claims for land and 
requests for development only came from individual administrators. As a 
consequence some of them were removed from their posts. Support from 
churches was virtually non-existent and sometimes they were even opposed to 
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the Maasai. Just like the Colonial Government, missionaries mainly 
concentrated on "civilizing" the Maasai. 
B. 1921-1945: The Period of Neglect 
In the inter-war period an increase in the number of settlers was seen. In 
following the Maasai other African groups were also restricted to too small 
reserves. They eventually became a source of cheap labour for the settler-
owned farms and plantations. White settlers engaged in livestock keeping, 
feared the competition from African herders and opposed any real development 
of African livestock husbandry. Quarantine regulations and heavy taxation were 
imposed. The former hindered traditional African access to livestock markets 
or the obtaining of bulls for interbreeding. More quarantine stations were 
constructed only after newly arriving settlers had raised the demand for 
(African) cattle. 
In the words of Zwanenberg and King (1975:97) 'The restrictions on African 
pastoral development in Kenya can only be understood in relation to the 
positive emphasis that was placed on European stock development. African 
pastoralists in Kenya were sacrificed on the altar of white settlement'. One of 
the draw backs of the restrictions imposed was the apparent overstocking of 
the reserves. During times of drought the reduced mobility and lost access to 
dry season grazing pastures was felt. The Maasai repeatedly showed their 
interest in water development and inoculations to raise the carrying capacity 
and prevent livestock diseases, providing funds for these actions themselves. 
Within the Local Administration opinions differed concerning the economic 
development policy within the Maasai reserves. The final outcome was a 
policy favouring only the development of the ghee and hides business. 
The history of livestock marketing has also made clear that the often aired 
criticism concerning pastoralists' interest in large herds of low quality stock 
resulting in overgrazing is questionable at the very least. Quarantine prohibited 
the sale of livestock. Prices offered by private traders and illegal sales 
flourished to the detriment of official ones. At the same time the administrators 
blamed the Maasai for not wanting to sell their animals! Moreover, repeated 
periods of drought and livestock diseases diminished the size of the herds 
considerably. Part of the "surplus" was in reality an insurance against these 
disasters. 
The Maasai repeated their protest against their loss of land, including some 
minor disputed areas along the Chyulu triangle and the Uganda Railway and its 
Magadi branch, totalling some 720 km2 to the Kenya (or Carter) Land 
Commission installed to review African land grievances. The Maasai 
furthermore requested the removal of the artificial boundary between them and 
the Tanganyika Maasai and aired their wish to be reunited. 
The Native Land Trust Ordinance introduced in 1930 prohibited the lease of 
land by non-natives if occupied or needed by Africans. Non-Maasai who 
infiltrated Kajiado District were nevertheless not ejected by the Kajiado Local 
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Administration. Some individual Maasai also favoured the coming of these 
agriculturalists to cultivate Maasai owned plots. As a group, however, the 
Maasai disliked this massive influx. 
The final report of the Kenya Land Commission reaffirmed the policy of the 
Administration towards pastoralists in totally opposing any extension of their 
land. In fact, the Commission, which had not given serious consideration to the 
Maasai grievances, blamed them for having so much land to the detriment of 
Europeans and other African groups. 
As the result of the Land Commission's work new land legislation came into 
force by the end of the 1930s: Native Lands Trust Ordinance (1938), Crown 
Lands (amendment) Ordinance (1938). The latter redefined the various land 
categories: 1) 'Native' instead of 'Crown' land for the original reserves; 2) 
Temporary Native Reserves and 3) Native Leasehold Areas. 
Though some of the African groups may have profited somehow from these 
new arrangements it was noted by the late 1930s that the settlers, comprising 
less than 0.2 per cent of the total estimated population, owned 5.5 per cent of 
all and 18 per cent of Kenya's good agricultural land area. This was the real 
cause of the economic crisis in the African Reserves and the influx of non-
Maasai to Kajiado District. Still, due to their low numbers cultivation was of 
minor importance. In 1931 less than 1,000 acres was under cultivation in the 
whole of the Maasai Reserve. During the 1930s and 1940s it remained an 
activity mainly performed by drought-stricken Maasai and immigrants. 
From the foregoing review it becomes clear that, in general, British colonial 
administrators simply disregarded any genuine development efforts in favour of 
the Maasai Reserve. With white settlers gaining influence and the British 
Government sending commissions (not all of them deserving the label 
"knowledgeable" and "impartial") no group was willing or able to protect 
Maasai interests. Moreover, the Maasai themselves, feeling betrayed and 
coming to realize the consequences of the loss of their high potential pastures 
north of Nairobi during the early 1930s drought in particular, simply ignored 
most of the programmes started (specifically the education programmes). 
Several state-imposed regulations concerning livestock quarantines, market 
outlets and taxation mostly favoured the settler community. The Maasai 
overcame some of these problems by setting up their own system of (illegal) 
livestock trade which earned them much higher returns. The opening of the 
Liebig's meat factory at Athi River in 1937 could not change this practice as 
the company, though begun under favourable conditions, was unable to 
compete with individual traders. Prices offered fell by some 25 to 50 per cent. 
During the war Kajiado District supplied between 10,000 to 13,000 head of 
cattle annually, or almost 60,000 in total to the specially installed Meat 
Marketing Board. This, however, was a more or less obligatory provision as, 
after the war, this figure dropped considerably. 
Estimates in 1930 for the Kenyan Maasai and their livestock reached some 
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48,400 people, 720,000 cattle and 820,000 shoats residing in a Maasai Reserve 
comprising some 39,000 km2 In other words, the Maasai of those days owned 
on average 16 8 LE/AAME Potential mean availability of land was 1000 ha 
per AAME Stocking densities were therefore 6 0 ha/LE This means that, 
overall, the availability of land and livestock during those days (shortly before 
the 1933 drought) allowed the Maasai to subsist entirely on a diet of milk, 
blood and meat, while the size of herds stayed within the potential carrying 
capacity of the Maasai Reserve. 
The actual capacity will have been lower due to the huge numbers of wildlife 
sharing the Kajiado pastures at that time Also, some localities within the 
Reserve were heavily infested with tsetse flies or lacked sufficient water The 
latter was (partly) the result of the Maasai Treaties and the consequent loss of 
watering points for the benefit of white settlers along the Maasai Reserve's 
northern boundary Approximately 40 per cent of the Reserve was, as a result 
of these problems, considered to be useless or, at best, of low value The 
migration of the Uasinkishu Maasai towards other section's land in the western 
Narok region also caused some local congestion and hardship 
Still, Colonial Administration and special committee's reports concerning 
overstocked Maasai rangelands should be seen as being at least slightly 
exaggerated Possibly, economic political reasons and the fact that most 
reviews were made in a post-drought situation have been responsible for this 
conclusion about overstocking 
Land legislation, favouring white settler's interests created an artificial 
scarcity of land in the Afncan Reserves As a result infiltration towards the 
high-potential zones of the less populated semi-and regions occurred No firm 
policy was conducted to stop this practice Competition for land in these 
regions was therefore indirectly caused by the development policy favouring 
and protecting the interests of the white settlers Their powerful position was 
only stopped by the British Colonial Office the moment the settlers tried to 
gain self-government, otherwise the whole Administrative apparatus had served 
the white farmer's activities 
C. 1946-1963: Grazing Scheme Experiments in Land Management and 
Development 
Forced migration of squatters residing on the European-owned farms back to 
the Afncan reserves started after World War II Demand for land was further 
extended as 90,000 ex-military recruits needed to be taken care of These 
developments augmented the natural growth in the too small African temtones 
(between 1945 and 1962 the Afncan population of Kenya increased from 5 0 
to 8 4 million people) The authorities, however, mainly kept on pointing to the 
legal and the poor ecological condition of the Afncan Reserves Rather than 
expanding the Afncan Reserves at the cost of the 'White Highlands" the 
strengthening of communal control over land was seen as a device to stop 
environmental degradation For this purpose the Afncan Settlement Board was 
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created in 1945. This Board (after 1953 named the African Land Development 
Board (ALDEV)) constructed over 1,600 dams, over 200 wells, a mere 50 
boreholes and other water availability improving measures in the rangeland 
areas of Kenya. 
Substantial economic progression, however, did not occur. Ultimately, by 
1952 some African groups (Kikuyu in particular) took up an armed struggle 
against the British colonial administration. Disagreement among the settlers 
concerning the best approach to dealing with this uprising weakened their 
position at the cost of London influence. As in the twenties and thirties several 
commissions were sent to review the situation and to advise on the reforms 
needed. The most important reform document was the "Swynnerton Plan" of 
1954. The main aim of this plan was to intensify the development of African 
agriculture. One of the prerequisites was said to be conducting a programme of 
land consolidation and registration in the high-potential zones. Because 
financial institutions had not been willing to provide funds to fanners without 
privately owned land, the idea of communal landownership had been dropped 
as early as the beginning of the 1950s. In addition, the economic potential of 
the pastoral areas was underlined by the "Swynnerton Plan". Measures were 
considered necessary to improve productivity. Marketing (outlets) and grazing 
management (de-stocking, range management, water improvement, tsetse 
eradication) was the main concern. 
In addition, the Local Native Councils had become involved in development 
oriented projects (water, education, health and infrastructural developments 
mainly). Finances were derived from a Local Native Council tax, fees, fines, 
grants and the proceeds of sand, wood and limestone royalties. The Maasai 
continued to be the highest taxed group in Kenya. Missionary activities had 
also gained in importance by the end of the 1950s. Most of their efforts were 
in the field of education, health care and water development. 
In Kajiado District, grazing control was a first priority in the eyes of the 
local administration. Again, no firm evidence of the need to pursue this policy 
was available. On the contrary, reports for the year 1948 (semi-drought) stated 
that the rangelands of Kajiado District were in good condition. Possibly the 
Maasai decision of 1946 to abolish the section boundaries allowing free 
grazing for all Maasai in every part of the district had helped to rationalize the 
use of the Kajiado pastures. Still, with drought conditions worsening, tensions 
between sections grew and section boundaries were re-introduced. In practice, 
however, throughout the 1950s massive movements by all sections were made 
and relations between them were good in general. 
The Administration tried to persuade the Maasai to accept some form of 
grazing control. By allowing a maximum number of stock in the vicinity of a 
borehole it was attempted to gradually form some kind of ranch unit. A pilot 
experiment had started at Konza in 1949 as part of the ALDEV programme. 
Twelve families, 1,285 disease-free cattle, 9,325 completely fenced hectares, 2 
boreholes, a cattle dip, rotational grazing, a manager and veterinary assistant 
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were the ingredients that were to provide the Maasai with a bright example of 
western superiority in livestock improvement. The initial success, except for 
the frequently broken fencing, was said to have generated much enthusiasm 
among the local Kaputiei Maasai. Their eagerness, however, was mainly for 
dipping as this was the main reason for the comparatively better condition of 
Konza stock during a favourable year. Fencing and rotational grazing played 
either only a minor role or no role at all. Frictions developed between the 
manager and the Konza ranch Maasai, particularly concerning de-stocking. The 
latter was a government objective which had not been mentioned at the start of 
the scheme. 
Plans to divide the whole of the district into ranch units were dropped after 
investigation showed (hat, with the exception of the Kaputiei area, most of the 
district was unsuited for a static form of ranching because of climatic and 
geological conditions. The Konza experiment was continued under more strict 
conditions until 1959. Some participants withdrew. The scheme was completely 
abandoned at the height of the 1960/61 drought and ultimately was turned into 
individual ranches. 
In Kisonko (1954), Matapalo (1957) and Loodokilani (1959) "Sectional 
Grazing Schemes" were started by the mid and late 1950s. Here the Maasai 
were also mainly interested in modem methods of husbandry such as dipping 
and inoculation and water provision improvement. The Schemes again tried to 
enforce strict grazing control in addition to traditional range use. On the other 
hand the Administration stated that it realized that, owing to the vagaries of the 
rains, an even pattern for grazing control would never be achieved. Indeed by 
1959 every control in the Kisonko scheme had had to be abandoned due to the 
drought and the Maasai trespassing to other districts. The main advantage of 
the Scheme had mainly been the construction of water improvement works. 
Individual ranches were another new phenomenon of the 1950s. The first 
individual ranch was started up in 1954 by Reverend Daudi Mokinyo in the 
Elang'ata Wuas area. In 1956, after failing to find water, another location near 
the Toroka river was chosen where borehole drilling turned out to be more 
successful. By the end of the 1950s more Maasai (chiefs and teachers mainly) 
had opted for individual ranches. The Colonial Administration of those days 
feared that land-grabbing for speculative reasons was the main reason behind 
the applications for individual ranches. A maximum ranch size of 2,000 acres 
was introduced. 
After having purchased the ranch it needed to be developed. This was a very 
costly business which was severely hampered by high rates of interest. Still, by 
1963, Kajiado District had a total of 24 individual ranches located in several 
parts of the district. In addition, a programme of land consolidation was begun 
in the Ngong area by 1961. Although opposed by Maasai elders this move was 
encouraged by the young and educated and backed by the Kajiado County 
Council. 
One of the reasons mentioned for this action was that it was said to stop 
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infíltration by non-Maasai (mainly Kikuyu) agriculturalists. After the war, 
increasing numbers of them had come to Kajiado looking for land to be 
cultivated. Their eyes had fallen on the high-potential areas such as Ngong, 
Namanga and Loitokitok. These areas had suffered from charcoal burning and 
forest clearing for agricultural purposes in particular. At times the alien 
squatters were removed and the areas closed for cultivation. The Kajiado Local 
Native Council installed a special committee for appraising every applicant 
before consent for residence was provided in order to check the influx. In 1951 
more comprehensive and effective legislation (i.e. Land Usage By-Laws) was 
introduced empowering section councils to control the spread of cultivation in 
their territories. Irrigated agriculture was started in Loitokitok locations such as 
Kimana, Sinnet and Rombo. In the Ngong area some cash crops (coffee, 
pyrethrum) were introduced. 
The land legislation and the declaration of the Emergency which enabled 
Kikuyu thought to be involved with Mau Mau activities to be evicted, at times 
reduced the area under cultivation. Special villages had been created in the 
Ngong area to control Kikuyu immigrants. The number of non-Maasai 
increased during the 1950s. This increase had accelerated by the end of the 
Emergency in 1959. Between 1948 and 1962 the number of Kajiado District 
non-Maasai had risen from some 2,500 to 15,200 or, in other words, from a 
mere 9.0 per cent to over 22.0 per cent. Approximately 40 per cent of these 
non-Maasai were Kikuyu, mostly residing in the Ngong area. 
Tourism also gained importance. Within a decade the number of visitors to 
the Amboseli Game Reserve had increased tenfold, making tourism the main 
source of revenue for the Kajiado District Council. After the war a strong 
international lobby for conservation had developed. More protection for 
wildlife was also sought in the Maasai areas. By December 1946 the Nairobi 
National Park (117 km2) was proclaimed which meant the loss of this grazing 
area for Maasai cattle. In 1947 Amboseli National Reserve (3,260 km2) was 
gazetted. The Maasai did not lose access this time, although, over the years, 
the Administration had tried several times to force the Maasai to restrict 
livestock numbers near the Ol Tukai swamps which had become a tourist rest 
camp. By 1961 negotiations had started between the Maasai and the Kajiado 
County Council to set aside a 78 km2 stock-free area to be leased to a tourist 
industry corporation. 
The Maasai pastoral economy in the post-war period was characterized by an 
initial drop in livestock numbers to some 335,000 head of cattle on the one 
hand and an increased {officiali) offtake, partly in response to increased 
livestock prices, on the other. Until the mid-1950s the number of black-market 
sales (to Nairobi, Central Province and Tanganyika in particular) were double 
the official sales. This was the result of the revenues of the former being some 
20 per cent higher than of the latter. Auctions organized on a voluntary basis 
were a failure, even after raising official livestock prices. Liebig's had run into 
trouble and had to close down as early as 1949. The following year the Kenya 
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Meat Commission (KMC) took over the Liebig's factory. Now official 
producer prices became even less lucrative, with private traders paying more 
than double the KMC prices. Illegal trade with Tanganyika via Illasit became 
very popular. Kajiado Administrators deliberately allowed this practice to 
continue as it was an important source of revenue for the Maasai and, through 
taxation, for the Administration as well. By 195S Illasit was made an official 
outlet and official sales increased dramatically to some 25,000 annually. 
By 1960 the Maasai livestock economy collapsed once more as the result of 
a severe drought. Livestock numbers decreased by some 65-80 per cent. Food 
aid had to be provided to some half of the Kajiado District population. The 
KMC was paying very low prices and could not handle the huge numbers of 
cattle offered. Outside assistance from Tanganyika was refused for commercial 
and strategic reasons. It was feared that this competitor would take over part of 
the comed-beef export market. 
Reviewing the post-war period up till Independence African protests could be 
seen growing louder in response to the Colonial Administration's policy of 
sending squatters back to the too-small reserves. This action was foremost a 
political and economic move to safeguard settler interests. The raised 
consciousness and increased self-confidence among the African population, 
mainly Kikuyu, started an active opposition which ultimately resulted in a 
struggle for freedom. The winds of change had also swept through British 
Colonial policy resulting in less sympathy for the dominance of Kenyan affairs 
by settlers. These developments at the local, national and international levels 
resulted in an erosion of the influence of settlers by the beginning of the 
1950s. Africans began to gain some influence in the National parliament. 
Economic reform programmes were proposed for the African Reserves, 
including the semi-arid rangelands to develop the economic potential they were 
"discovered" to possess. Much attention was given to the question of land 
consolidation and the change of land tenure in the high-potential zones. Initial 
ideas of strengthening communal tenure were dropped and individual 
ownership propagated instead by way of the adjudication and registration of 
land. 
For the rangelands opinions differed as to the right approach. Local level 
Maasai politicians in Kajiado District had started acquiring large individual 
ranches without the legal means to do so. Support for these individuals was, 
however, provided by the Local County Council, not infrequently because of 
private interests. The Colonial Administrators expressed their concerns, but did 
not actively oppose this development. Instead they tried to introduce once 
again a means of destocking the Maasai pastures by proposing the creation of 
grazing schemes. These were accepted by the Maasai for economic reasons 
(i.e. the improvement of livestock and the availability of water sources) 
mainly. The effect on herd movements and destocking, however, was very 
modest. Only in the Loitokitok region was some form of rotational grazing 
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achieved. Times of stress disrupted this range management practice. The Konza 
grazing experiment and other surveys had also made clear that an idea to 
divide the district into a specific number of ranches was unsound from an 
ecological point of view. 
Moreover, the land resource base available for Maasai livestock herding 
started to dwindle as more agriculturalists started to infiltrate and occupy the 
high-potential dry season grazing pastures. This and the instalment of the 
Amboseli Game Reserve and Nairobi National Park, partly in response to an 
international conservationist lobby, put a further strain on the availability of 
land for livestock. 
Worried Maasai repeatedly asked that the reasons for these tensions be 
removed or they fought their own battle with the intruders. Moreover, with 
negotiations begun to handover power to the African population in an 
independent Kenya, the Maasai feared that this influx of outsiders into their 
area would grow into enormous proportions. Indeed, spokesmen of the 
agricultural Kikuyu, the most powerful African group at the time, repeatedly 
said that an Independent Kenya should be a country where every person was 
free to live. In other words, the safety provided by the Maasai Treaties of 1904 
and 1911 was under threat. After organizing themselves into their own political 
party the Maasai went as far as to request the United Nations to recognize a 
Maasailand which comprised of Tanzanian and Kenyan Maasai. This proposal 
was as much condemned to fail, as the Maasai request to the British 
Government to hand back the former "White Highlands" the pastures of 
Laikipia, Uasin Gishu and suchlike. 
D. 1963-1980: The Formation of Group Ranches 
We placed the birth of the group ranch concept at somewhere between the 
1955 report of the East African Royal Commission favouring individual land 
tenure for the whole of Kenya and the Lawrance Mission of 1965 which 
favoured the establishment of large ranches with ownership vested in the name 
of a group in Kenya's semi-arid regions. As the Mission reported: 
'we are conscious of the limitations imposed by the fact that the Kenya 
Government has for several years been widely committed to a policy of 
individual absolute ownership. (...) sometimes individual absolute 
ownership can be an impediment to development [though] in some of the 
semi-arid areas of the country it would be wasteful and even harmful to 
register in individual ownership land which is badly eroded or denuded of 
grass cover, for the owners may be unable to assist, let alone derive a cash 
income, from holdings until remedial action has been taken to restore the 
land to productive capacity' (Lawrance 1966:34-5). 
The Lawrance Mission argued that group ownership would be a much more 
suited form of land tenure to deal with the fragile conditions of the Maasai 
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lands. 
In short the idea of a group ranch meant the setting aside of a certain piece 
of land to be communally owned by a group of people who were recorded and 
registered as the legal owners through membership of the particular ranch. 
Unlike in the past, livestock movements would be restricted within the group 
ranch's specific boundaries and non-members would be forbidden to bring their 
animals to graze. Through the provision of loans for infrastructural 
development and steer fattening an attempt was made to radically transform the 
nomadic subsistence-oriented production of the Maasai pastoralists into a 
sedentary, more commercial system. This market-oriented production was to 
bring about a destocking of the Maasai pastures while at the same time 
providing meat for the national market and international market. 
The Maasai were reasonably favourable about this proposal. Besides 
welcoming the idea of water provision, veterinary care, improved livestock 
breeds and the like, a major rationale for accepting the group ranch proposal 
was the increase in the number of Maasai acquiring individual ranches and the 
fears of the encroachment of non-Maasai into the District. Also the fear that 
even more land could be lost to game Reserves or National Parks played a 
role. 
Discussions concerning the status of Maasailand reached a height in the early 
1960s. The Maasai feared that Independence would end the Maasai Treaties 
which gave them exclusive rights to occupy Kajiado and Narok Districts. 
Among the Kaputiei Maasai, in particular, the land tenure debate was 
significant. A wide variety of propositions such as the registration of the 
section under one title deed or the creation of a fringe of individual ranches 
near the northern boundary to stop illegal infiltration were discussed. The 
Colonial Authorities disagreed with the one title deed option. Young and 
formally educated Maasai supported by the Kajiado County Council suggested 
the idea of individual ranches. Elderly Maasai opposed the move to 
individualization. Support for the latter was given by the Lawrance Mission 
that criticized the haphazard approach of the government to the Maasai land 
question and the illegal approval of the creation of individual ranches. 
In the end, all of the Maasai sections accepted the group ranch concept, 
although in some regions of northern Kaputiei and the better-watered parts of 
the Ngong area individualization was preferred and opposition to the formation 
of a group ranch persisted. In these ranches the group ranches, though 
officially registered, never functioned as such. 
The actual establishment of group ranches followed a phased programme. 
After declaring an "Adjudication Section" any person claiming to have an 
interest in a particular section had to bring his claim before the Adjudication 
Committee which was comprised of not less than ten people. Most of these 
were recruited from the group of educated Maasai, politicians and government 
officials. Further subdivision into individual and group ranches followed after 
60 days. Finally, a group ranch committee was installed and a certificate of 
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incorporation issued by the Land Registrar of Kajiado District and the group 
was officially registered under a specific name. 
In 1964 the pilot Рока group ranch had already been started in the south 
Kaputiei location. In 1969 phase one of the Kenya Livestock Development 
Project (KLDP I) was officially started. By 1970, 14 group ranches, covering 
over 10 per cent of the district's area were recorded in the Kaputiei area. 
KLDP II, which had started in late 1974 had added 16 ranches comprising 
another 25 per cent of the Kajiado District area. Finally, by 1980, 20 more 
ranches had been incorporated. These are often referred to as "phase three 
group ranches" but no World Bank funds were provided for them. This brought 
the total number of group ranches to 51 covering some 15,200 km2 or some 75 
per cent of the Kajiado District area. 
The Kajiado District group ranches were effective in stopping an educated 
elite of Maasai allocating huge chunks of former communal land to themselves 
that had been set aside as individual ranches. Secondly, the group ranches 
initiated livestock management techniques and the construction of facilities 
such as boreholes, dams, troughs, tanks, pipelines and cattle dips. Thirdly, 
group ranches stimulated the building of schools, shops and health centres. A 
last achievement of the group ranch development is said to have been to allow 
wildlife to continue roaming freely over large parts of Kajiado District. 
Besides these accomplishments the problems and failures of the group ranch 
project have also been mentioned; delays and problems in project 
implementation; disappointing rates of investment and difficulties in loan 
repayment; continuing trespassing of group ranch boundaries; refusal to de-
stock ranches; no real transformation to a market-oriented livestock production 
and corruption among several group ranch committees. 
The final outcome of these problems and the resulting frustrations was a 
growing wish among many Maasai for the subdivision of the group ranch into 
individually owned shares. 
When reviewing the creation and performance of Kajiado District group 
ranches it can be concluded that in many respects, the group ranch concept as 
proposed by outsiders was an artificial creation which lacked a firm traditional 
sociological as well as an ecological basis. The Kenya Livestock Development 
Project responsible for the implementation of this change in land tenure was 
moreover overambitious in aiming at the destocking of the pastures and the 
commercializing of production, while they took hardly any account of 
pastoralists strategies and household needs. 
Still, the introduction of the group ranch had organizational, juridical and 
economical consequences. At local level group ranch committees meant that a 
new instrument for land use regulation had appeared. Its effectiveness in terms 
of the initially target set of boundary maintenance was, however, rather 
modest. Of more importance was the juridical consequence of group ranch 
membership. By the late 1960s the status of closed district was removed. From 
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now on non-Maasai, very well represented at the national level, were able to 
enter the Maasai districts much more easily. The installation of group ranches, 
however, excluded outsiders from legally buying land. Only land from 
individual ranchers could be acquired, as in the Ngong and Loitokitok areas. 
It should be bome in mind that, whereas in the mid-1960s the Lawrance 
Mission had pleaded for communal tenure, a decade later the World Bank 
openly condemned the Maasai's capacity to stop other Kenyan groups 
acquiring land in Maasai districts. Narok District was particularly criticised for 
having large tracts of high-potential land suitable for fanning close to those 
who were virtually landless and living in the densely populated neighbouring 
districts. 
The group ranch also gave an opportunity to the young and educated Maasai 
to gain influence in Maasai society at the expense of the traditional Council of 
elders. International donors also had a say in the livestock enterprise of the 
Maasai by supplying technical personnel and providing funds. 
The finances donated by international organizations as "soft loans" ultimately 
reached the group ranches at high interest rates. Channelling the money 
through the Kenyan Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) was said to have 
been the main reason for this. It was frequently a problem to repay loans. Not 
seldom was repayment of the loans problematic. This was either the result of 
corrupt group ranch committees or because of natural causes such as droughts 
or disease killing the steers bought for fattening. For group members that had 
failed to benefit from these loans it was hard to understand and to accept the 
reasons for repaying them. 
In addition, the use of the group's pastures by herds belonging to 
neighbouring individual ranchers and the massive rise in the number of young 
Maasai calling for registration contributed to growing negative feelings towards 
the group ranch and fuelled the ultimate call for subdivision. 
Б. 1981-1990: The Dissolution of Group Ranches and the 
Individualization of Land Ownership 
In the early 1980s no clear position was taken by Government in response to 
the call for the subdivision of group ranches -apparently because the 
Administration itself had doubts and individual departments were in dispute 
with each other. 
In general, those opposing subdivision claimed that the ultimate result would 
be the alienation of land to the non-Maasai, the creation of severe erosion in 
areas where cultivation was to start, the loss of Maasai culture and the 
restriction of the movement of wildlife and livestock to the detriment of the 
meat producing and tourist attracting functions of the district. 
Supporters of group ranch subdivision said that it would help self 
advancement and raise standards of living, boost the ability to procure a loan 
using the freehold title deed as collateral, minimize the exploitation of the poor 
by rich households, promote Maasai engagement in agricultural and industrial 
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enterprises and facilitate better maintenance of the existing infrastructure. 
By 1990 a total of 40 group ranches had made the decision to dissolve their 
ranches. Seven had already gone through the procedure and the members had 
obtained their private titles. Only the 4 Magadi Division group ranches 
opposed the idea of subdivision, while another 7 ranches, mostly from 
Loitokitok, had not yet decided. In other words, at that time the whole of 
Ngong and Central Division, which included 78 per cent of the ranches, had 
ceased existing or were soon about to do so. Alongside this process a whole 
range of other difficulties arose including disputes over ranch boundaries, 
corruption in plot allocation and conflicts between registered and non-
registered group members. 
The effects of the group ranch process of subdivision into individually owned 
parcels were investigated in this study. Attention was given to the ecological 
and economic viability of the new, individual ranches. Aspects of land use, 
including patterns of residence, fencing, livestock movements, cultivation and 
wildlife habitats were also considered. This analysis was based on the post-
subdivision developments as they occurred in Olkinos and Embolioi group 
ranches since late 1986 until the beginning of 1990 (see chapter 8). For cross 
reference purposes, developments in other, not yet divided, group ranches (i.e. 
Kiboko, Elang'ata Wuas, Lorngosua, Meto) as well as buyers and established 
individual ranchers were provided. 
In the first place we presented some characteristics of our sample population 
and concluded that the declining trend of cattle ownership per person as 
demonstrated over the 1950-85 period had halted. In our sample population we 
counted an ownership of 9.1 heads of cattle per person with the addition of 
12.9 shoats per person. The resulting 1:1.42 ratio for cattle/small stock was 
significantly different from the ratio of 1:0.77 found in these ranches 
(excluding Lorngosua and Melo) in 1977 (see ILCA 1979:10). 
In contrast, hardly any or only a modest change had occurred with respect to 
the percentage of female cattle within the Maasai herds. For Embolioi this 
proportion reduced from 69 per cent in 1968 to 54 per cent in 1990. The 
overall 1990 percentage of female cattle within the Maasai herds stood at 68 
per cent for group and 67 per cent for individual ranchers. A structural switch 
to a market and meat-oriented economy for cattle does not seem to have 
occurred. 
Wealth classes among our group of respondents are based on livestock 
equivalents owned by active adult male equivalents (LE/AAME). A fairly even 
distribution along three strata was found. The same cut-off points had been 
used as defined by the ILCA for their 1980 population. Their stratification 
showed a larger group of respondents in the middle stratum and less in the 
lower one. 
The remainder of chapters 8 and 9 dealt in particular with the outcome of the 
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group ranch subdivision process in Olkinos and Embolioi. An overall positive 
attitude towards the process of subdivision and allocated plots was recorded 
among the Olkinos and Embolioi ranchers. Approximately 1 out of 5 
households, however, had mixed to negative feelings concerning the size of the 
plots allocated. 
After subdivision the former Olkinos members possessed a 46.71 ha mean 
size ranch within a range from 11.00 to 132.00 ha per parcel. In Embolioi the 
average plot size was 93.37 ha varying from 30.0 to 225.0 ha. The process of 
subdivision had been most favourable to the most powerful within the Maasai 
group ranch constellation. In both ranches former committee members had 
obtained above average plot sizes (Olkinos: 81.80 ha as compared to 42.53 for 
non-members and Embolioi 130.74 ha versus 86.84 ha). 
Landownership per person decreased over the 1986-90 period due to natural 
population growth and the sale of land. The average availability of land for 
Olkinos ranchers was reduced from 8.43 ha/person in 1986 to 7.06 ha/person 
in 1990, a 16 per cent fall. Embolioi figures for these years are 15.53 
ha/person and 14.29 ha/person, respectively. The Olkinos gini-coefficient, 
expressing the inequality of the distribution of plot sizes, increased from 0.26 
to 0.33. 
One of the main questions concerning the subdivision of group ranches deals 
with the economic and ecological viability of the allocated plots. For an 
estimation of the economic viability we started considering the number of 
animals owned per AAME. It was concluded that overall livestock ownership 
was 11.4 LE/AAME or some 30 per cent above the 8.6 LE/AAME requirement 
for self-sufficiency from pure pastoralism. However, livestock and population 
numbers are not uniformly distributed over all households. All of the stratum I 
households and a large part of those in stratum II live below the level enabling 
them to practise pure pastoralism. In other words, within our survey area 
approximately 40 per cent (Kiboko) to 65 per cent (Meto) of the Maasai 
households are considered to be no longer able to depend solely on their 
animals for food requirements. For Olkinos and Embolioi percentages found 
were 48 and 51, respectively. 
Herd sizes needed by each household imply certain demands in the amount 
of land required. In the past several authors have mentioned minimum land 
requirements for individual ranches of some 80 ha per adult male or 467 ha 
per household which is far from the Olkinos plot sizes. Starting from a 
minimal land requirement needed for self-suffiency it was concluded for 
Olkinos and Embolioi that only a mere 10 per cent or less of the households 
had a sufficient large parcel during the dry season period. The other parcels 
would be severely overstocked. Moreover, since the time of subdivision, this 
capacity has been eroded by another 1-2 per cent. 
Starting from four different categories of landownership based on a situation 
of deficit or surplus for the wet season or dry season situation, it was estimated 
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that for those OIkinos households lacking sufficient land in both seasons still 
40.3 per cent owned a large enough number of animals for complete self-
sufficiency. In the reverse situation of having enough land for both seasons 75 
per cent of these parcel owners were self-sufficient in livestock. For Embolioi 
these figures were 28.6 per cent and 100 per cent, respectively. We also 
concluded that, for Embolioi large numbers of households held a reasonable 
amount of land although they lacked the animals to make use of it. 
Asked for their opinion on the economic viability of their individual ranch a 
large majority (84.9 per cent) of the Embolioi considered it to be highly viable. 
OIkinos households, with generally much smaller parcels, showed more mixed 
feelings in this respect and only 43.5 per cent believed their parcel to be viable 
or highly viable. 
The imbalance between livestock and land raises questions about the ecological 
viability of the allocated parcels. Information provided by the Kajiado District 
1988 Livestock Census was presented, showing the recommended stocking 
rate, actual stocking density, estimated range condition and trends and the 
availability and condition of water sources for our sample group ranches. 
According to these figures the overstocking of most ranches (except Embolioi) 
was established at ratios of 1.7 to 2.9 times the densities allowed. However, 
overall range condition was stated to be fair or even good, as in the case of 
Kiboko. 
Pans and tanks turned out to be the most important sources of water in our 
study area. Boreholes were also available, particularly among the group of 
individual ranchers. Most striking was how individual ranchers to rely on 
boreholes for watering their animals during the dry season. In general the 
northern group ranches made use of rivers while those in the south relied on 
wells and pans during the dry season period. 
The availability of pasture in the dry season showed the opposite picture with 
OIkinos and Embolioi ranchers mainly complaining of an inadequate quantity 
of dry season reserves on their privately-owned parcels. Half of the established 
individual ranchers (mainly Matapato ranchers) were also of this opinion. Short 
and long-term thresholds were applied and revealed that, for both OIkinos and 
Embolioi, the livestock densities had increased resulting in a theoretically 
unviable ranch size in OIkinos for 72.0 per cent of the households in the short 
term and as high as 93.0 per cent in the long term. For Embolioi these figures 
were 36.5 and 63.5 per cent, respectively. 
This outcome has led us to question the postulation that the individualization 
of land tenure will result in a reduction of the stocking rate at carrying 
capacity levels. In fact, those ranchers that actively changed the number of 
animals on their ranch did so by increasing rather than decreasing their total 
number of animals, irrespective of whether or not they possessed an over or 
understocked ranch. Established individual ranchers behaved similarly. 
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Besides the level of stocking we looked at the changes in grazing 
management practices after the subdivision of Olkinos and Embolioi group 
ranches. It was found that some 20-25 per cent of households interviewed had 
located part of their herd in other bornas at the time of the survey. Kaputiei 
established individual ranchers mentioned a total of 21.4 per cent. Overall a 
total of 32.4 established ranchers' households mentioned they that had 
transferred part of their livestock away from the ranch. Therefore, among the 
group of Matapalo and Loodokilani individual ranchers a similar number of 
households had animals located elsewhere when compared to their 
neighbouring group ranch members. 
Detailed information for 1989 medium and long-term herd movements of 
cattle and small stock revealed that it was not so much the legal status but 
rather the ecological condition of the ranch which was the driving force behind 
transferring animals to other places for medium to long periods of time. Also, 
no firm evidence could be found for a trend towards the commoditization of 
grazing. Only two households mentioned that they had paid money to gain 
access to pastures elsewhere. 
The fencing of complete ranches has not yet occurred among the group of 
respondents. Huge fences could only be seen in the "Presidential Area" of 
Kisaju which was mainly owned by wealthy immigrants. In the Olkinos and 
Embolioi areas small enclosures protecting shambas and ol-okeri from both 
domestic and wild animals were increasingly being erected. This increase is 
faster than the increase in the number of shambas over this same period. 
Enclosures made in the not yet subdivided group ranch areas show even higher 
percentages of households involved in this practice. The increase in this is not 
as fast. 
In our view it is the fencing of the shambas and ranches by non-Maasai 
which will pose the major threat to the mobility of Maasai livestock. Their 
need to defend their major economic activity of cultivation and the small, and 
less costly to fence parcels will result in the fast growth of small enclosures 
scattered over the former group ranch territory. In contrast, the non-appearance 
of fenced ranches among the Maasai respondents was attributed to the fact that 
Maasai ranchers are less accustomed to fencing practices, that they face higher 
costs and that they are less willing to fence as they realize that, due to the 
climatic conditions, to fence ranches will ultimately lead to severe problems. 
Since the early 1980s a huge increase has been seen in the total number of ol-
okeri and shambas either fenced or unfenced. Of the total sample population 
42.3 per cent claimed to be cultivating a shamba in 1990 as compared to 10-15 
per cent before the 1984/5 drought. Both the number of shambas and the 
acreage covered has increased rapidly. We estimated that the area under 
cultivation had increased over this period from 0.1-0.2 to 0.53 per cent of the 
total area available to our sample population (i.e. including the non-cultivators). 
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We also tried to highlight the competition for pastures by game in our study 
area. According to official wildlife estimates based on aerial counting, a 
decline in the number of wild animals was recorded. This trend was confirmed 
by our respondents. A doubling of the human population and increased fencing 
is expected to further reduce competition from wildlife, particularly in the 
north-Kaputiei area. Overall, these new developments in land use and land 
tenure will contribute to a further reduction in the accessibility of grazing areas 
to Maasai herds. 
Chapter 9 dealt exclusively with the outcome of the group ranch subdivision in 
Kajiado District with respect to transfers of land and improvements made. An 
analysis was made of the fragmentation, sale or mortgage of the subdivided 
lands of Olkinos, Embolioi, Empuyiankat, Kitengela and Рока group ranches 
by February 1990. A total of 757 Maasai had received their privately owned 
parcel of land by this time. By February 1990 36.7 per cent of these ranchers 
had applied already for further subdivision of their newly acquired parcels. Of 
this group 78 Maasai or 10.3 per cent of all former group members had 
obtained authority to transfer 1,728 ha of land. This is 2.4 per cent of the five 
former group ranch territories. 
No specific set of characteristics could be disentangled for the group of 
sellers. Nonetheless, the group of Olkinos former committee-members turned 
out to be foremost among the group of non-sellers. Those committee-members 
who did sell land had previously bought this from a neighbouring rancher -
apparently for speculative reasons. 
The often-stated premise about the possibility of and incentive for the offering 
of land as a collateral once land is in single private hands could not be 
confirmed. Only 17 applicants (2.2 per cent) of all former group members, 
intended to or actually mortgaged 1,195 ha or 1.6 per cent of the former group 
ranch territory. It was stated by the Maasai that the selling of land is a much 
faster, less obstructive and more comprehensive way of acquiring money than 
is mortgaging. Financial institutions also seem to be somewhat reluctant to 
provide loans, except when the prospective borrower has been well educated 
and has other more important sources of income. 
The group of land buyers in Olkinos group ranch was also analyzed in order to 
obtain information concerning their area of origin, main occupation, residence, 
education, age and the like. This revealed that, out of a total of 37 plots sold in 
Olkinos area, all but 6 were acquired by non-Maasai. Rich business men, civil 
servants and less wealthy people comprised the group of Kikuyu buyers. 
Maasai buyers were mainly former Olkinos committee-members, individual 
ranchers, civil servants and politicians. 
Evaluating the actions both pending and confirmed taken by the buyers of 
land so far showed that, in contrast with the Maasai, there was an equal 
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preference for mortgaging and for reselling of land. 
We were mainly interested in the use made of the proceeds of the sale of land 
and loans taken. For Olkinos and Embolioi detailed information in this respect 
had been collected. 
In Olkinos the percentage of people who made infrastructural improvements 
rose from 21, before subdivision, to 56 of all Olkinos ranchers afterwards. The 
Embolioi group ranch percentage increased from a mere 8 to 45, respectively. 
Lack of funds or not being settled were among the most frequently mentioned 
reasons for not conducting an improvement. A comparison of Olkinos sellers 
versus non-sellers and borrowers versus non-borrowers showed that both 
groups were increasingly engaging in infrastructural improvements. However, 
the rise amongst the group of sellers is significantly higher. No clear picture 
emerged. Embolioi ranchers also seemed to be as much development oriented 
in either selling or non-selling, mortgaging or non-mortgaging of land. Olkinos 
ranchers mentioned the sale of land 33 times and loans in 10 cases as being 
the source of finance for constructing infrastructural innovations. For Embolioi 
this was 5 and 0, respectively. 
Attention was also given to the kind of improvement made. The building of a 
modem house was most popular improvement. Fences (mainly for shambas), 
sprayraces and pans followed though at a distance. The group of buyers are 
mostly investing in fences and watertanks. 
In other words, most of the infrastructural improvements made seem to have 
occurred in non-productive investments such as the building of a modern 
house. People will need to sell another part of their parcel to start real 
development. Those Maasai having had previous no involvement in the group 
ranches seem to be the most willing to sell part of their ranch and earn a 
lifetime's salary all at once. Some excesses have apparently, followed like the 
drinking of beer and the buying of cars. Attention was also paid to the less 
capital intensive improvements made in range management. Hardly any 
innovations were accomplished since the time of subdivision. Potter (1989) has 
stressed the common sense of this attitude as these adjustments would be 
economically unviable anyway. 
In the last chapter we concentrated on the processes and the degrees of 
diversification, intensification and commercialization of the Maasai economy 
among our group of respondents in early 1990. To balance the reduction of 
land available for livestock-keeping and the growth of the human population 
alternative ways of making a living need to be sought. We tried to gain 
information about Maasai initiatives in this respect. Our main conclusion was 
that, besides the grown relevance of cultivation, a significant number of heads 
of household nowadays find their main occupation outside the primary sector. 
Wage labour has become a major source of income varying over the surveyed 
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locations from 7 to almost 30 per cent of the interviewed heads of household. 
Moreover, a majority of these ranchers were involved in more than one 
activity. 
Diversification of the livestock economy includes a change in the 
composition of the Maasai herds. Besides the growing importance of small 
stock, other kinds of animals, including camels, can be found nowadays in 
Kajiado District. 
The intensification of the Maasai economy mainly refers to raising the 
production of milk and meat through the keeping of improved breeds. Among 
the major obstacles to this the ranchers mentioned the high prices of purchase, 
the scarcity of these breeds and their vulnerability to disease and drought 
Overall the attitude of the Maasai is positive and most ranchers are willing to 
increase the number of these breeds in their herd. 
Finally, we looked into different forms of commercialization of the Maasai 
economy. We tried to value the importance of commercial sales and purchases, 
in particular. Among those ranchers who claimed to sell for commercial 
reasons the rich were most prominent. Non-commercial sales, slaughterings, 
exchanges, loans and gifts were also found as forms of livestock offtake. We 
estimated that sales make up some 70 per cent of herd offtake. 
Approximately half of our group of respondents had sold a hide or skin in 
the preceding month of the survey. In contrast, only a mere 5 per cent 
mentioned the selling of milk. Also the sale of crops was negligible. 
Reviewing the developments in Kajiado District in the last decade leaves one 
with the impression of a people under increasing pressure on their way of life. 
A shrinking land resource because of increasing numbers of Maasai people and 
the even faster-growing numbers of migrant settlers in the district, 
malfunctioning group ranches and the call for subdivision of these, a lack of a 
clear Governmental land policy and corrupt land practices threatening large 
groups of Maasai off the rangelands they used to control exclusively until very 
recently all contribute to this. 
In my opinion, there is no single cause of the Maasai problems of today. 
Rather there is a combination of factors, as mentioned above which are at (he 
heart of the matter. Still, we would like to stress that the situation the Maasai 
face today cannot be understood without understanding the history of their 
ownership of the land. Likewise the invasion of non-Maasai in the district is 
mainly caused by an imbalance of the distribution of land in other parts of 
Kenya. 
Furthermore the role of the Kenyan Government should be stressed. Central 
Government's initial opposition to the subdivision of group ranches seems to 
have changed towards a standpoint of modest support for this process. Once 
the dissolution of group ranches was no longer opposed by (part) of the 
Administration the process of subdivision began at full speed. In my opinion, 
none of those who allowed this process to start fully realised the possible 
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negative side effects it could have for a large number of Maasai people, their 
children, the district's ecology, the livestock economy, wildlife and the tourism 
sector. If they were aware, however, then it is they who should be blamed 
would they should be blamed for allowing it to happen without clear guidelines 
and amongst a group of people who were not yet ready to withstand the 
clamour for land within modem day Kenya. Nowadays, Government officials 
judge the initial outcome of group ranch subdivision to be disastrous. The best 
the Maasai youngsters can hope for is that their parents will value the wealth 
they still own as a non-renewable resource and that the Government's apparent 
recognition of the seriousness of the current situation will not be remain mere 
words but will result in the action required. 
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NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING 
In de jaren 1883/84 slaagde de jonge Schotse geoloog en ontdekkingsreiziger 
Joseph Thomson er als eerste Europeaan in het gebied van oostelijk Afrika 
gelegen tussen de Indische Oceaan en de bronnen van de Nijl te doorkruisen. 
De relatief onervaren Thomson ondervond op zijn tocht verrassend weinig 
tegenstand van de als zeer bloeddorstig afgeschilderde en daarom zo gevreesde 
Maasai. Deze Oost-Afrikaanse veehouders waren echter door een 
aaneenschakeling van vijandigheden met naburige akkerbouwers, door 
onderlinge twist en door ziekten van mens en dier zeer verzwakt, zelfs zodanig 
dat sommige groepen zich onder de hoede van de Europese nieuwkomer 
schaarden in de hoop op betere tijden. 
De gevraagde bescherming werd gaame geboden, maar de Maasai 
betaalden hiervoor wel een hoge prijs. Al direct deelden de Europese indringers 
het Maasai volk op door van de kust naar het Victoriameer een vrijwel rechte 
lijn te trekken. De noordelijke Maasai kwamen onder het gezag van het Britse 
"East Africa Protectorate" en de zuidelijke Maasai onder dat van het Duitse 
Tanganyika. In 1904 en 1911 werden de "Maasai Verdragen" gesloten tussen 
vertegenwoordigers van de noordelijke Maasai en de Britse koloniale 
autoriteiten. Resultaat hiervan was dat deze Maasai exclusieve gebruiksrechten 
verkregen ten aanzien van twee van elkaar gescheiden reservaten, tezamen 
ongeveer 24.000 km2 groot. In latere jaren werd deze splitsing in de "East 
Africa Protectorate" ongedaan gemaakt door het meest noordelijke gebied in 
handen te geven van blanke kolonisten en het zuidelijke reservaat uit te breiden 
tot 38.000 km2. Desondanks zagen de Keniaanse Maasai hun oorspronkelijke 
territorium van ongeveer 60.000-70.000 km2, met zo'η 40% afnemen. 
De verliezen in kwalitatieve zin waren zo mogelijk nog belangrijker. De 
beste weideterreinen werden door Europese immigranten overgenomen. Dit 
was mogelijk dankzij de actieve medewerking van het Britse koloniale bewind 
dat zorgde voor een gunstige wetgeving betreffende landbezit, op soepele wijze 
omging met de restricties die golden bij de toewijzing van land en 
terughoudend was bij het opleggen van straffen. 
Het aan de Maasai toegewezen reservaat omvatte uitgestrekte gebieden 
waarin gebrek was aan water of gras. In andere delen werd het gebruik 
bemoeilijkt door veeziekten. De Maasai gaven herhaaldelijk te kennen de 
beweidingscapaciteit van het gebied te willen verhogen door verbetering van de 
watervoorziening. Ook toonden zij grote belangstelling voor het vaccineren van 
het vee. Dit laatste was ook in het belang van de inmiddels in grote getale 
toegestroomde blanke kolonisten. 
In de periode tussen de beide wereldoorlogen concentreerde de koloniale 
machthebber zich op het beschermen van de door de Europese immigranten 
opgezette veeranches. Quarantainemaatregelen belemmerden de Maasai in hun 
traditionele pogingen betere veesoorten vanuit noordelijk Kenya te importeren. 
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Ook de legale verkoop van Maasaivee werd bemoeilijkt, evenals de vnje trek 
van Maasaaikudden op zoek naar gras en water Daarentegen floreerde in het 
Maasaigebied de illegale veehandel die in handen was van pnvé handelaren die 
beduidend hogere pnjzen boden 
In deze periode van belemmering en veronachtzaming kwamen de 
Maasai voornamelijk in de schijnwerpers ten tijde van de "Kenya Land 
Commission" Deze commissie, ook wel vernoemd naar haar voorzitter Carter, 
had als taak een onderzoek in te stellen naar de door de Afnkaanse bevolking 
geuite protesten tegen het verlies van land De Maasai verklaarden ten 
overstaan van deze commissie recht te hebben op een aantal aangrenzende 
zones en claimden een gebied van in totaal 720 km2 Bovendien verlangden zij 
dat de kunstmatige grens tussen hen en de Maasai in Tanganyika werd 
opgeheven De Carter commissie wees echter op de zeer geringe 
bevolkingsdichtheid in het Maasaigebied in vergelijking met die in de nabunge 
gebieden van Europese boeren en Afnkaanse akkerbouwers Gezien deze 
gennge bevolkingsdichtheid was het weinig verwonderlijk dat de illegale 
vestiging van Afnkaanse akkerbouwers in het Maasaigebied oogluikend door 
de lokale bestuurders werd toegestaan Behalve tot een uitbreiding van de 
akkerbouw leidde deze vestiging ook tot een verminderde vraag naar goed land 
in de "White-Highlands", waar blanke kolonisten zich de betere gronden 
hadden toegeëigend 
Na de Tweede Wereldoorlog kwam de discnminerende politiek van de 
koloniale regenng ш toenemende mate onder vuur te staan Niet alleen vanuit 
de Afnkaanse bevolking kwamen steeds meer protesten tegen de achterstelling 
van de inheemse meerderheid ten gunste van een kleine groep blanke 
kolonisten, vnj snel kwamen dergelijke protesten ook vanuit Groot-Bnttannie 
zelf De Afnkanen zochten de oplossing in gewapende stnjd ( 'Mau Mau"), het 
moederland reageerde door een aantal onderzoekscommissies in te stellen Het 
uit deze commissie activiteiten voortgekomen Plan to Intensify the 
Development of African Agnculture', beter bekend als het 'Swynnerton Plan", 
betekende een breuk met het verleden, dat gekenmerkt was geweest door 
desinteresse voor en belemmering van het functioneren en het welzijn van de 
Afnkaanse samenleving Het in een eerder stadium gepropageerde idee van 
communaal landeigendom als de beste garantie voor een verantwoord 
landgebruik werd, voorzover het de vruchtbare en natte hooglanden betrof, 
vervangen door dat van individueel landbezit Voor de semi-ande gebieden 
werd een programma voorgesteld dat moest leiden tot beter weidemanagement 
en maximale veebezetting 
De Maasai werd gevraagd in te stemmen met een systeem waarbij een 
maximaal aantal families rondom een waterput gesitueerd zou worden 
Getracht werd om aldus een vorm van "ranching" te ontwikkelen Enige 
ervaring hiermee had men in Maasailand al in het midden van de jaren veertig 
opgedaan via het zogenaamde Konza expenment Dit project had tot doel een 
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kleine groep Maasai kennis te laten maken en ervanng te laten opdoen met 
westerse methoden van veehouderij Omheining van de weiden, weiderotatie, 
veterinaire hulp en intensieve verzorging moesten, als voornaamste elementen 
van het project, een breuk met het traditionele nomadische verleden 
bewerkstelligen De Maasai waren bijzonder geïnteresseerd in deze moderne 
methoden Problemen ontstonden echter ten tijde van droogte maar met name 
naar aanleiding van de verplichte vermindering van de kuddegrootte Plannen 
om het gehele distnct in "ranch units" op te delen werden ingetrokken nadat 
onderzoek had uitgewezen dat als gevolg van klimatologische en geologische 
omstandigheden slechts het noordelijke deel van het district voor deze vorm 
van exploitatie geschikt was 
Aan het eind van de jaren vijftig en het begin van de jaren zestig 
werden toch weer ontwikkelingen in gang gezet die een verandering moesten 
bewerkstellingen in de rechten ten aanzien van het land en daarmee in de wijze 
van veehouden In 1954 werd de eerste privé ranch toegewezen en snel daarna 
deden tal van Maasai het verzoek ook voor zo'η ranch in aanmerking te 
komen De belangstelling kwam vooral uit de hoek van hen die enig formeel 
onderwijs hadden genoten Een andere ontwikkeling was de registratie van het 
Maasailand in de Ngong regio Mier hadden in toenemende mate andere 
Afrikaanse volken hun toevlucht gezocht teneinde de groeiende congestie in de 
eigen reservaten te ontlopen Deze congestie was mede ontstaan doordat de 
blanke kolonisten steeds meer landarbeiders hadden afgestoten en naar de eigen 
reservaten teruggestuurd De vruchtbare gebieden in het Kajiado distnct 
vormden voor deze landlozen een aantrekkelijk alternatief Vestiging in dit 
gebied was echter alleen mogelijk met toestemming van de Maasai Ten tijde 
van de noodtoestand was zelfs dit met langer een legaal alternatief, maar na de 
opheffing van de noodtoestand vond de toestroom van met-Maasai weer in 
versneld tempo plaats 
Het creëren van een gordel van individuele ranches in het grensgebied 
met de Kikuyu werd gezien als een mogelijkheid om illegale vestiging tegen te 
gaan Al spoedig bleek evenwel dat dit, van meer ontwikkelde Maasai 
afkomstige, idee voornamelijk ten eigen bate werd aangewend Tal van oudere 
Maasai en de koloniale machthebber constateerden terecht dat de mogelijkheid 
tot verwerving van individuele ranches zou leiden tot landspeculatie, maar 
waren niet in staat of bereid het proces te stoppen 
De toenemende vestiging van akkerbouwers, de reservering van delen 
van het weidegebied voor wildparken en de naderbij komende 
onafhankelijkheid verontrustten de Maasai in die tijd zodanig dat zij herhaalde-
lijk protesteerden tegen de ontwikkelingen De toestroom van andere 
Afnkaanse groepen in met name het gebied van de noordelijke Kaputiei 
Maasai nam snel toe Voorstellen om een gordel van individuele ranches in het 
grensgebied met de akkerbouwende groepen te creëren of het als geheel 
registreren van de Kaputiei bleven bij plannen De vrees dat het exclusieve 
recht op het land na de onafhankelijkheid verloren zou gaan bracht de Maasai 
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er zelfs toe een verzoek bij de Verenigde Naties in te dienen tot hereniging 
met de Tanzaniaanse Maasai en de vorming van een eigen staat. Dit verzoek 
werd echter niet gehonoreerd, evenmin als de verzoeken tot teruggave van 
vroeger Maasai gebied. 
In het begin van de jaren zestig werden de Maasai getroffen door ernstige 
droogte. Grote aantallen vee gingen verloren, waardoor de Maasai opnieuw in 
een kwetsbare situatie kwamen. Onder deze omstandigheden gingen zij 
akkoord met de oprichting van communale ranches: een bepaald stuk land 
werd toegewezen aan een groep mensen die na registratie als lid van de groep 
het wettelijk bezit over dit deel van het Maasaigebied verwierven. Het 
dagelijks bestuur van de ranch kwam in handen van maximaal 10 personen, 
gekozen uit de leden. Zij dienden er onder andere op toe te zien dat het vee 
binnen de grenzen van de ranch bleef en er voor te zorgen dat er leningen voor 
infrastructurele voorzieningen werden afgesloten en tijdig afgelost. Ook kregen 
zij het beheer van deze voorzieningen. Op deze wijze poogde de overheid de 
zelfvoorzienende Maasai-economie te transformeren in marktgerichte produktie. 
Met uitzondering van enkele regio's werd het voorstel door de Maasai 
geaccepteerd. Naast de mogelijkheid om de watervoorziening en de veterinaire 
diensten te verbeteren zagen de Maasai in het voorstel ook een mogelijkheid 
om de uitgifte van individuele ranches, het opzetten en uitbreiden van 
wildparken en de infiltratie door akkerbouwers tegen te gaan. In 1964 werd een 
proefranch (Рока) opgezet. Uiteindelijk resulteerde dit in de gefaseerde 
vorming van 51 communale ranches in een gebied van 15.200 km2, 
overeenkomend met ongeveer 75% van het Kajiado District. In 1969 werd een 
start gemaakt met de eerste fase van het "Kenya Livestock Development 
Project", dat voornamelijk gefinancierd werd met fondsen van de Wereldbank. 
De uitvoering was in handen van de landbouw- en ontwikkelingsinstanties van 
de Verenigde Naties (FAO en UNDP). Het streven van de projectleiders naar 
een meer marktgerichte produktie werd naar de mening van de donoren echter 
niet voldoende gerealiseerd. Het negeren van de groepsranchgrenzen, de 
weigering de kuddegrootten te verminderen, corruptie bij vele comités, tegen-
vallende investeringen en problemen met de aflossing van de leningen waren 
de overige redenen om in 1982 verdere financiering stop te zetten. Het project 
bleek te ambitieus en had te weinig rekening gehouden met pastorale strateg-
ieën en behoeften. 
In het begin van de jaren tachtig neemt de roep om te komen tot opdeling van 
de groepsranches toe. Tot de mogelijk positieve effecten werden gerekend de 
(vergrote) mogelijkheid om leningen af te sluiten, het tegengaan van de 
exploitatie van de armen door rijke huishoudens, de ruimere mogelijkheid 
andere activiteiten (zoals akkerbouw) te beginnen en de mogelijkheid om de 
bestaande infrastructuur beter te beheren en nieuwe voorzieningen in te voeren. 
De tegenstanders waren evenwel bevreesd voor verkoop van land aan 
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buitenstaanders, erosie in de gebieden waar akkerbouw uitgeoefend zou gaan 
worden, verlies van de Maasaicultuur en inperking van de bewegingsvrijheid 
van wilde dieren die van vitaal belang zijn voor het toerisme in het district. 
Begin 1990 hadden 40 ranches besloten tot opdeling. Bij zeven ranches 
was op dat moment het proces van opsplitsing reeds geheel voltooid. Slechts 4 
ranches hadden opsplitsing afgewezen. 
Deze studie concentreert zich op de gevolgen van de opdeling. Met name de 
ontwikkelingen op het vlak van landbezit werden nader onderzocht. Daarnaast 
werd aandacht besteed aan de ecologische en economische levensvatbaarheid 
van de nieuwe kleine individuele ranches. In twee voormalige communale 
ranches (Olkinos en Embolioi) werd de nieuwe individuele bezitters gevraagd 
naar de door hen doorgevoerde landtransacties, het aangaan van leningen en de 
introductie van veranderingen op het vlak van weidemanagement, afgrenzing 
van het weidegebied, infrastructuur (zoals waterputten) en diversificatie 
(bijvoorbeeld de introductie van akkerbouw). Ter vergelijking werd tevens 
onderzoek verricht bij een aantal (nog) niet opgedeelde communale ranches en 
bij reeds bestaande individuele ranches. 
Geconstateerd werd dat de opdeling van de communale ranches met 
name voordelig was voor de voormalige leden van het ranchcomité. Zij 
verkregen de grootste en best gelegen bedrijven. Verder bleek dat maximaal 
10% van de Olkinos en Embolioi huishoudens zo veel land hebben verworven 
dat zij in staat zijn om zowel in de droge als de natte periodes op de eigen 
ranch zo veel dieren te houden dat zij geheel van de veehouderij kunnen 
bestaan. Sinds de opdeling van de ranches in 1986 is dit aantal nog eens met 
een extra 1-2 procent afgenomen. 43% van de Olkinos huishoudens meende dat 
hun ranch economisch levensvatbaar zou zijn. Voor de grotere Embolioi 
ranches lag dit percentage op bijna 85. 
Uitkomst van het onderzoek was voorts dat 72 tot 93% van de Olkinos 
ranches te veel vee zouden hebben in het natte, respectievelijk het droge 
seizoen. In Embolioi was de situatie iets beter: 37 resp. 64%. De vaak geuite 
veronderstelling dat de individualisering van het landbezit zou leiden tot een 
vermindering van de veestapel tot op het niveau van de draagcapaciteit van de 
ranch wordt hiermee weersproken. Integendeel, veel ranchers blijken extra vee 
te hebben gekocht, ongeacht de veedichtheid op hun ranch. 
Gezien deze situatie zal het geen verwondering wekken dat de Maasai 
pastoralisten ook na de opsplitsing vast hebben gehouden aan hun strategie van 
veeverplaatsing. In Olkinos en Embolioi had ongeveer 20-25% van de huishou-
dens een deel van het vee elders gesitueerd. Het vinden van weidegrond is niet 
de enige verklaring; een belangrijke reden is ook dat hiermee andere huishou-
dens worden geholpen en dat bepaalde ziektes worden ontlopen. Bij de al 
langer gevestigde individuele ranchers en in de communale ranches werd een 
zelfde strategie geconstateerd. Met andere woorden, niet zo zeer de legale 
status als wel de ecologische situatie en intermenselijke relaties zijn van 
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invloed op de graaspatronen van het vee. Vooralsnog vindt de mobiliteit plaats 
zonder financiële vergoedingen. Slechts twee huishoudens rapporteerden te 
hebben betaald voor het verkrijgen van toegang tot elders gelegen weidegebied. 
De door de tegenstanders vaak geuite vrees dat de individuele ranches omheind 
zullen worden en daardoor de trek van het vee en het wild ernstig belemmerd 
wordt lijkt vooralsnog ongegrond. De omheiningen beperken zich tot op heden 
voornamelijk tot het akkerland en tot speciaal voor ziek en jong vee gereser-
veerde kleine weiden. Het geheel omheinen van de ranches is erg duur. Het 
zijn daarom met name immigranten, die nu op legale wijze land kunnen 
verkrijgen in het voormalige communale gebied, aktief bezig zijn met 
omheinen. Daarnaast hebben enkele zeer rijke opkopers van land grote 
hekwerken geplaatst. Afgezien van de financiële consequenties beseffen vele 
Maasai dat het geheel afsluiten van de eigen ranch onder de huidige 
klimatologische omstandigheden tot problemen zal leiden. De uitsluiting van 
wild kan in de nabije toekomst echter wel een motief zijn om toch tot 
volledige afrastering van de ranches over te gaan. Corridors en een uitgebreid 
netwerk van vrienden zullen het dan mogelijk maken het vee zo nodig nog te 
verplaatsen. 
De komst van niet-Maasai heeft geleid tot een uitbreiding van het 
akkerland. Toch is de feitelijke omvang daarvan nog beperkt (0,53% van het 
studiegebied). Ook de Maasai leggen overigens een grotere belangstelling voor 
akkerbouw aan de dag. Ruim 40% van de onderzoekspopulatie bedreef enige 
akkerbouw. Voor de droogte van 1984/5 was dit nog slechts 10-15%. 
Uitgebreid werd in deze studie stilgestaan bij de door de nieuwe land eigenaren 
ondernomen landtransacties. Er werd een analyse gemaakt van de verdere 
opdeling, verkoop en het als onderpand bij leningen gebruiken van de nieuw 
verworven ranches. Naast de Embolioi en Olkinos ranches werden daarbij nog 
drie andere opgedeelde ranches in de beschouwing betrokken (Рока, 
Empuyiankat en Kitengela). Een totaal van 757 Maasai van deze voormalige 
ranches bezat in februari 1990 een eigen ranch. 36,7% van hen had reeds 
besloten het land verder op te delen. 78 Maasai (10,3%) hadden toestemming 
verkregen een stuk land te verkopen. In totaal betrof het 1.728 ha ofwel 2,4% 
van het voormalig communale bezit. 
De groep verkopers vertoonde geen specifieke kenmerken. Wel kwam 
uit het onderzoek naar voren dat voormalige comitéleden niet tot de verkopers 
behoorden. Een enkel voormalig comitélid dat een stuk land had verkocht had 
dit enkele maanden eerder van een buurman gekocht. Speculatie bleek zeer 
aantrekkelijk te zijn vanwege de snel stijgende landprijzen en de exorbitant 
hoge bedragen die daardoor geboden worden. Een Olkinos Maasai eigenaar zal 
bij verkoop van zijn gehele ranch ongeveer ƒ 75.000 kunnen krijgen, d.w.z. 
een bedrag dat overeenkomt met ongeveer 25 jaren loonarbeid. 
De voormalige comité-leden waren wel significant aanwezig in de groep 
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van personen die een lening hadden aangevraagd. Slechts 17 personen (2,2%) 
hadden in totaal 1.195 ha (1,6%) van het land als onderpand voor een lening 
aangeboden. Volgens de meeste Maasai is de verkoop van land een snellere en 
eenvoudiger mogelijkheid om geld te krijgen dan het aangaan van een lening. 
De financiële instellingen zijn namelijk niet erg toeschietelijk en lijken, 
onuitgesproken, ook allerlei eisen te stellen bij het verstrekken van een lening, 
zoals een bepaald ontwikkelingsniveau en de aanwezigheid van 
neveninkomsten. 
Degenen die stukjes land gekocht hadden waren voornamelijk niet-
Maasai. Deze groep bestond zowel uit rijke zakenmensen en ambtenaren als uit 
minder draagkrachtigen. De enkele Maasai onder de kopers waren gevestigde 
individuele ranchers, voormalige comité-leden en politici. De groep van 
landkopers vertoonde een evenwichtige verdeling voor wat betreft het opnieuw 
verkopen (speculatie) en het als onderpand voor een lening aanbieden van de 
grond. 
Aandacht werd in het onderzoek ook besteed aan de vraag in hoeverre de 
Maasai in Olkinos en Embolioi infrastructurele verbeteringen hadden 
aangebracht nadat ze een eigen ranch hadden verworven. Op beide voormalige 
groepsranches werd wat dit aangaat een toename geconstateerd. Het feit dat 
een deel van het land verkocht werd of dat een lening werd aangevraagd 
speelde hierbij geen rol. Het is echter niet uitgesloten dat de doorgevoerde 
verbeteringen niet eveneens zouden hebben plaats gevonden indien deze 
ranches niet opgedeeld zouden zijn. 
De aangebrachte verbeteringen lagen voornamelijk in de consumptieve 
sfeer. Moderne huizen werden het meest gebouwd, daarna volgden 
investeringen in omheiningen, veterinaire voorzieningen en infrastructurele 
werken ter verbetering van de watervoorziening. De groep van opkopers 
investeerde vooral in omheiningen en watertanks. 
Tenslotte werd in deze studie een overzicht gegeven van de aanpassingen in de 
huishoudeconomie van de Maasai. De toename van de akkerbouw werd 
hierboven reeds gememoreerd. Vooral de armere huishoudens houden zich hier 
meer mee bezig, maar ook de rijkste huishoudens, die in staat zijn 
arbeidskracht in te huren, tonen er belangstelling voor. Zij die geen akkerbouw 
bedrijven doen dit voornamelijk vanwege het klimaat of een tekort aan 
arbeidskracht. Daarnaast blijken de Maasai huishoudens in toenemende mate 
een inkomen buiten de landbouwsector te verwerven. Deze diversificatie 
betekent voor Olkinos dat nog slechts 70% van de hoofden van huishoudens de 
veehouderij als de meest belangrijke activiteit beschouwt. Ruim 22% is in 
loondienst en ongeveer 5% heeft een eigen onderneming. Deze trend is ook, zij 
het in mindere mate, waarneembaar op de overige ranches. Sommige hoofden 
van huishouden verblijven dientengevolge de meeste tijd elders. Over het 
algemeen is er echter geen sprake van een definitief vertrek naar gebieden 
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buiten het district. Een uiting van diversificatie is ook de veranderde samen-
stelling van de kuddes. Het onderzoek bevestigde dat geiten en schapen meer 
betekenis hebben gekregen. Recentelijk zijn ook dromedarissen (camels) in het 
Kajiado gebied geïntroduceerd. Het is evenwel nog te vroeg om een uitspraak 
over de haalbaarheid van deze ontwikkeling te doen. 
Intensivering van de traditionele Maasai-economie is een andere optie 
die door vele Maasai huishoudens is aangegrepen. Een van de mogelijkheden is 
het verhogen van de melkproduktie door de introductie van goede melkkoeien 
of uitbreiding van hun aantal. Een probleem hierbij is de hoge prijs, de 
beperkte beschikbaarheid van goed melkvee en hun gevoeligheid voor ziekten 
en droogte. 
Nog weer een andere mogelijkheid is de produktie meer te commerci-
aliseren. Het is namelijk een misvatting dat de Maasai niet in de verkoop van 
vee geïnteresseerd zouden zijn. In het verleden hebben zij hiervoor wel 
degelijk belangstelling getoond. Vermeld moet worden dat de kuddegrootte niet 
alleen door verkoop kan afnemen, maar ook op andere wijze tot stand kan 
komen, en wel door slacht, leningen, giften en ruil. De verkoop van vee uit 
puur commerciële overwegingen bleek vooral aan aangelegenheid te zijn van 
de rijke huishoudens; gedwongen verkopen bij ziekte van het vee of vanwege 
problemen in het huishouden kwamen bij deze groep minder voor. Over het 
algemeen vormden de verkopen ongeveer 70% van het totale aantal tot afname 
leidende transacties. 
Ongeveer de helft van de huishoudens verkocht huiden en vellen. Met 
name de rijkere huishoudens waren hierin actief. Daarentegen verkocht maar 
5% van de respondenten melk. Ook de verkoop van akkerbouwprodukten is in 
dit deel van het Kajiado District verwaarloosbaar. 
De Maasai hebben hun toekomst thans nog grotendeels in eigen handen. De 
jongere generatie zal in de toekomst echter geconfronteerd worden met het feit 
dat een Maasai niet meer automatisch toegang heeft tot zijn of haar 
geboortegrond. Verdergaande sociale stratificatie en daarmee gepaard gaande 
marginalisatie lijken onafwendbare ontwikkelingen. De vraag naar weidegrond 
zal versneld toenemen, terwijl onder meer door de uitbreiding van de 
akkerbouw en de individualisering van het bezit de beschikbaarheid ervan zal 
afnemen. Het zoeken naar mogelijkheden om vormen van landgebruik zo goed 
mogelijk te integreren en het creëren van alternatieve vormen van werkgele-
genheid verdienen in het ontwikkelingsbeleid de hoogste prioriteit. Educatie 
speelt daarbij een belangrijke rol. Op korte termijn lijkt prioriteit te moeten 
worden gegeven aan goede voorlichting over de mogelijkheden van deskundig 
en verantwoord landgebruik en dienen landverkopen aan speculanten te worden 
tegengegaan. Een moratorium op de verkoop van land, taxatie en een 
maximum bezit van land en goede voorlichting zijn nodig om te voorkomen 
dat de Maasai hun huidige rijkdommen verruilen voor toekomstige armoede. 
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Selling Wealth to Buy Poverty 
van 
Marcel Rutten 
1. Collier en Lal maken in hun analyse van armoede bij pastoralisten in Kenia 
gebruik van foutieve vooronderstellingen, te royale berekeningen en 
onvolledige gegevens. Een calculatie die recht doet aan andere 
inkomstenbronnen, variabele klimatologische omstandigheden en een preciezere 
grootte van huishoudens, en gebaseerd is op meer frequente methoden van 
dataverzameling laat zien dat niet 85% van de Maasai pastoralisten maar 
"slechts" 25 tot 35% van hen een inkomen onder het officiële Keniase 
bestaansminimum heeft (World Bank 1983 p. 2OO, dit proefschrift p. 42). 
2. De door White en Meadows gebruikte methode ter bepaling van drie 
inkomensklassen bij de Maasai pastoralisten van de Olkarkar "group ranch" is 
onjuist. De door hen gebruikte indeling is er niet een van "arm", "modaal" en 
"rijk", maar een van "modaal", "rijk" en "zeer rijk" fWhite & Meadows 1980, ILCA 
1979. dit proefschrift p. 426). 
3. De geconstateerde toename in de veedichtheid op de nieuw gevormde 
individuele ranches in Kajiado District weerlegt de these dat individualisering 
van pastoraal landbezit zal leiden tot een vermindering van de veestapel tot een 
ecologisch verantwoord niveau (dit proefschrift p. 358). 
4. Sinds de vorming van individuele ranches is de stratificatie van de Maasai 
samenleving, beschouwd vanuit de verdeling van het landbezit, toegenomen. 
Om deze marginaliserende ontwikkeling te stoppen is goede voorlichting, 
training in nieuwe veeteeltmethoden, taxatie van landbezit en een moratorium 
op de verkoop van land van minimaal 15 jaar noodzakelijk (dit proefschrift p. 460). 
5. Gegeven een gemiddelde grondprijs van een dubbeltje per m2 is het mogelijk 
tegen betaling van 2 miljard gulden (ongeveer б à 7 χ de som die Indonesië nu 
jaarlijks niet langer wenst te ontvangen) het gehele Kajiado District op te 
kopen en op deze wijze het proces van humane en ecologische marginalisatie te 
stoppen. Ondanks het feit dat de verkoop van land aan buitenlanders in Kenia 
sinds 1988 legaal is zal de Nederlandse ontwikkelingshulp een dermate hoog 
niveau van effectiviteit wel nimmer willen bereiken. 
De Maasai die voorheen zitting hadden in de "group ranch'-coraités zijn met 
uitzondering van enkelen afgeschilderd als incapabele, corrupte managers. De 
vergelijkbare situatie van grote financiële tekorten en falend beleid bij de 
"Rotterdam School of Management" suggereert dat het opdoen van specifieke 
kennis van organisatiekunde een vernietiging van kapitaal en een overbodige, 
zoniet ongewenste, inspanning is. 
De Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen dient serieus in overweging te nemen een 
ere-doctoraat toe te kennen aan de Nijmeegse priester Frans Mol, sinds 1961 
missionaris te Kenia, voor de door hem geschreven en samengestelde 
woordenboeken van het Maa - de taal van de Maasai pastoralisten. 
Dat Wotro (Stichting voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek van de Tropen) zich in 
alle opzichten richt op de Derde Wereld moge blijken uit het feit dat de in Afrika 
geconstateerde 'Economy of Affection' - omschreven door Goran Hyden als 'a 
network of support, communications and interaction among structurally defined 
groups connected by blood, kin, community or other affinities - helaas ook op de 
werkwijze van deze Nederlandse financieringsinstantie van toepassing is. Zij die 
zich speciaal richten op de bestudering van de Afrikaanse cultuur spelen dit spel 
het meest succesvol (G. Hyden 1983 p. 8). 
Het "Groene Boekje", schrijf- en speUingsrechter voor de Nederlandse taal, maakt 
zich schuldig aan subtiele discriminatie van pastorale volkeren door jagers en 
verzamelaars als Indianen, Eskimo's, Bosjesmannen en Hottentotten wel doch 
bedoeïenen en berbers niet met een kapitaal te schrijven. In de eerstvolgende 
herdruk van de "Herziene Woordenlijst Nederlandse taal" dient dit storend feit te 
worden gecorrigeerd ("Groene Boekje" 1990 pp. 107. 118, 149. 232. 323. 333). 
Als Westers wetenschapper de "Derde Wereld" uiteenzetten dat men uitgebuit 
wordt ten gevolge van de meerwaarde afromende werkingen van de internationale 
kapitalistische politiek-economische wereldorde is in essentie vergelijkbaar met 
een vermoeide marathonloper expliciteren dat deze zojuist 42 kilometer en 193 
meter gelopen heeft 
In toenemende mate wordt aan Nederlandse universiteiten een vergoeding 
gevraagd voor het begeleiden van zogenaamde buiten-promovendi (met name 
Twente, Delft, Utrecht). Gegeven het feit dat het in 1986 ingevoerde stelsel van 
Assistent-In-Opleiding voor de betrokken promovendi geleid heeft tot een 
inkomstenderving van ongeveer ƒ40.000 ten opzichte van hun bezoldiging in 
vergelijkbare functies, is de eis aan buiten-promovendi om minimaal eenzelfde 
som te voldoen ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor gerechtvaardigd, mits dit 
aan eerstgenoemde groep ten goede zou komen. Echter vanuit een standpunt van 
wetenschapsbevordering en interuniversitaire samenwerking en vanuit de gedachte 
van een "open universiteit" is deze ontwikkeling ongewenst 
12. Om niet geheel het vertrouwen in de bruikbaarheid van wetenschap te verliezen 
zou iedere student 'ecologie van de tropen' een aantal sociaal-
wetenschappelijke vakken in het studiepakket dienen op te nemen om op deze 
wijze kennis te kunnen nemen van disciplines die meer zekerheden en 
consensus aanreiken dan zijn hoofdspecialisatie. 
13. Aangezien het wiskunde-onderwijs aan scholen in het voortgezet onderwijs zich 
ontwikkelt naar toepassing en gebruik in niet-wiskundige contexten inclusief de 
geografische, is het gewenst de scholing van wiskunde docenten te verbieden 
met capita selecta op het gebied van de geografie: niet elke mathematicus is 
een "Galileo Galilei" en wiskundig juiste doch geografisch onzinnige conclusies 
kunnen ZO vermeden worden (Commissie Ontwikkeling WUkunde-onderwijs, Trajectenboek, 
juli 1992). 
14. In de Universele Verklaring van de Rechten van de Mens wordt het recht op 
leven, vrijheid en onschendbaarheid van iedere persoon erkend. Het is stotend 
te moeten constateren dat deze Verklaring door bijvoorbeeld godsdienst-
fundamentalisten misbruikt wordt om anderen het recht op vaccinatie tegen 
levensbedreigende ziekten zoals polio te ontzeggen. Zij die het argument van 
de onuitvoerbaarheid van dit vaccinatierecht hanteren dienen zich te realiseren 
dat het oormerken van vee in dit land een wettelijke plicht en het principieel 
ontduiken ervan een strafbaar feit is. 
15. Hulporganisaties als het Rode Kruis, Artsen Zonder Grenzen, het Liliane 
Fonds, Amref en Memisa, allen actief op het terrein van de gezondheidszorg 
inclusief de opvang van gehandicapte kinderen in de Derde Wereld, zouden 
giften van tegenstandeis van vaccinatie principieel dienen te weigeren. 
16. Het Keniase dagblad "The Daily Nation" concludeert in een beschouwend 
artikel over euthanasie: 'the three most progressive countries are Great Britain, 
the Netherlands and Holland'. De euthanasie van de geografie is blijkbaar 
uitgegroeid tot een mondiaal verschijnsel (Daily Nation OM 1-1988). 
17. Het ontbreken van een café genaamd 'ZANZI' moet ofwel geweten worden aan 
een gebrekkige creativiteit dan wel aan een tekort aan topografische kennis 
onder Nijmeegse kasteleins. 
2 december 1992 


In 1883 the young Scottish geologist Joseph Thomson was the first 
European to cross Maasailand in eastern Africa the home of the feared 
Maasai nomadic pastoralists. He was followed by missionaries, explorers, 
adventurers and British and German colonizers in their scramble for Africa. 
Weakened by the many epidemics which had killed both livestock and the 
human population the Maasai offered the Europeans little resistance in 
their bid to divide the original Maasai homelands between them. Settlers 
from Europe and South Africa were offered the best Maasai pastures in the 
British Protectorate of East Africa. In order to prevent settlers from taking 
over all the lands the Maasai population signed a Treaty to set aside two 
Reserves which were 'to last as long as the Maasai as a race existed'. Many 
prophesied that the Protectorate's Commissioner Eliot's repeatedly 
expressed wish that the Maasai 'would disappear as soon as possible, 
except in books of anthropology' would come true but they were wrong. 
This book gives an overview of the Maasai livestock economy as it has 
developed during the last century until the early 1990s. But most importantly 
it is an analysis of the processes and policies of land use and landownership 
of the Maasai pastoral areas from thearrival of the European until the recent 
massive individualization of land tenure. It is the first publication ever on the 
effects of the subdivision of group ranches introduced in Kenya in the late 
1960s among the Maasai pastoralists of Kajiado District and it adds another 
aspect to the experience of the struggle for land by pastoralists world-wide. 
The main arguments used by both opponents and supporters of the 
process of individualization of land tenure have been considered in particular. 
These disputing groups can even be found within single households and 
sometimes result in sons taking their fathers to court in order to stop them 
from "selling wealth to buy poverty". 
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